by John M. Simpson.<\/p>\n
Yesterday, in Animal Legal Defense Fund v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, et al<\/em>., ___ F.3d ___, No. 18-16327 (9th Cir. Aug. 12, 2019),<\/a> the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a summary judgment of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California holding that a Bengal tiger is not an “individual” within the meaning of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).\u00a0\u00a0 The case had been brought by the Animal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF) after the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) denied ALDF’s request for expedited treatment of its FOIA request for records concerning an inspection request regarding a tiger named “Tony.”\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/p>\n Under FOIA, a requester can seek expedited treatment of its request where there is a “compelling need” which, in turn, means that “a failure to obtain the requested records on an expedited basis \u2026 could reasonably be expected to pose an imminent threat to the life or physical safety of an individual<\/strong><\/em>.”\u00a0 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 552(a)(6)(E)(v)(I) (emphasis added).\u00a0 ALDF argued that the “individual” whose life or physical safety was threatened was Tony, who at the time of the request, was being maintained at a truck stop in Louisiana.\u00a0 The district court ruled that “individual” could only mean a human being, and the Ninth Circuit agreed.<\/p>\n The court of appeals first determined that it had jurisdiction notwithstanding the government’s argument (made below but abandoned on appeal) that the case was moot due to the fact that the requested records had been produced (although not on an expedited basis) and Tony had been euthanized.\u00a0 Despite these facts, the matter was not moot because ALDF was not simply challenging the denial of an individual FOIA request but a policy of the USDA to exclude animals from the meaning of “individual.”<\/p>\n On the merits, the court of appeals ruled that, in the absence of a statutory definition (and there was none), the term “individual” had to be given its ordinary meaning, which, in this case, was\u00a0“single human being.”\u00a0 The court found the Supreme Court’s decision in Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority<\/em>, 566 U.S. 449 (2012), instructive.\u00a0 That case involved the meaning of “individual” under the Torture Victims Protection Act.\u00a0 As the Ninth Circuit observed:<\/p>\n The Court\u00a0 defined\u00a0 \u201cindividual\u201d\u00a0 to mean \u201cnatural\u00a0 person\u201d\u00a0 as\u00a0 opposed\u00a0 to\u00a0 an\u00a0 organization.\u00a0 Id. at 451\u201352.\u00a0 Although Mohamad addressed a different statutory context, we find much of its reasoning applicable here.\u00a0 Surveying dictionaries, the Court wrote, \u201cAs a noun, \u2018individual\u2019 ordinarily means \u2018[a] human being, a person.\u2019\u201d Id. at 454 (quoting 7 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 880 (2d ed. 1989)); see also, e.g., RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 974 (2d ed. 1987) (\u201ca person\u201d); WEBSTER\u2019S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1152(1986) (\u201ca particular person\u201d). The Court continued, \u201cAfter all, that is how we use the word in everyday parlance.\u201d Mohamad, 566 U.S. at 454.\u00a0 We agree that, as a noun standing alone, \u201cindividual\u201d ordinarily refers to a single human being.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n Slip op. at 10.\u00a0 The Ninth Circuit also rejected all of ALDF’s statutory construction arguments:\u00a0\u00a0(i) FOIA’s goal of “broad disclosure” was no warrant for concluding that “individual” in the statute meant anything other than a human being.\u00a0 (ii) The animal-protection policies underlying the Animal Welfare Act have nothing to do with whether Congress intended that animals be covered by the expedited processing provision of FOIA.\u00a0\u00a0(iii)\u00a0 The reference, under FOIA Exemption (b)(7), to withholding law enforcement records to avoid endangering the life or physical safety of “any individual” did not signify that “individual” means\u00a0animals:<\/p>\n [W]e agree with ALDF that these two provisions of FOIA should be read consistently.\u00a0 But we disagree with ALDF as to their meaning.\u00a0 In our view, both provisions use the term “individual” to mean “human being.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n Slip op. at 14.<\/p>\n The outcome of this case marks another set-back for\u00a0“non-human rights.”\u00a0 This case is one of several recently unsuccessful attempts\u00a0to have various animals declared eligible for the rights or legal protections available to human beings.\u00a0 See our prior blog posts here<\/a> and here<\/a>.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" by John M. Simpson. Yesterday, in Animal Legal Defense Fund v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, et al., ___ F.3d ___, No. 18-16327 (9th Cir. Aug. 12, 2019), the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a summary judgment of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California holding that a … <\/p>\n