{"id":483,"date":"2022-09-02T15:23:03","date_gmt":"2022-09-02T19:23:03","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/animallawdevelopments\/?p=483"},"modified":"2022-09-02T15:48:03","modified_gmt":"2022-09-02T19:48:03","slug":"oregon-court-of-appeals-rules-animals-are-not-entitled-to-legal-personhood","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/animallawdevelopments\/2022\/09\/02\/oregon-court-of-appeals-rules-animals-are-not-entitled-to-legal-personhood\/","title":{"rendered":"Oregon Court of Appeals Rules Animals Are Not Entitled to Legal Personhood"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><strong>by Michelle C. Pardo<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>We\u00a0 \u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/animallawdevelopments\/2018\/08\/16\/a-horse-is-a-horse-of-course-but-a-plaintiff\/\">previously blogged<\/a> about the Oregon negligence lawsuit that animal activist group Animal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF) brought on behalf of &#8220;Justice&#8221; &#8212; an American Quarter Horse &#8212; and his self-described &#8220;guardian&#8221; against the horse&#8217;s former owner.\u00a0 Back in 2017, Justice (formerly named &#8220;Shadow&#8221; and renamed ostensibly for this lawsuit) was removed from his prior owner&#8217;s care for neglect and relocated to a new caretaker.\u00a0 Months later, Justice&#8217;s former owner pleaded guilty to first degree animal neglect and was ordered to pay for the cost of Justice&#8217;s care prior to July, 2017. <!--more--><\/p>\n<p>In May of 2018, Kim Moisman, Justice&#8217;s new caretaker, filed a lawsuit that named &#8220;Justice, an American Quarter Horse&#8221; as plaintiff (with Moisman as Justice&#8217;s legal &#8220;guardian&#8221;).\u00a0 The single claim of negligence sought economic damages for Justice&#8217;s past and future care, noneconomic damages for Justice&#8217;s pain and suffering, and attorneys&#8217; fees.\u00a0 The trial court granted a motion to dismiss the case, finding that a horse, which is not a person or legal entity,\u00a0 lacks legal capacity to sue in court.\u00a0 Justice and his caretaker appealed.<\/p>\n<p>Two years after the appeal was argued and submitted, the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court&#8217;s decision, finding:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"font-size: 1rem\">&#8220;only human beings and legislatively created entities are persons with the capacity to sue under Oregon common law.&#8221;\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><em>Justice v. Vercher<\/em>, 321 Or. App. 439, 441 (2022) (<a href=\"https:\/\/cdm17027.contentdm.oclc.org\/digital\/collection\/p17027coll5\/id\/32318\/rec\/1\">read opinion here<\/a>).<\/p>\n<p>The Court of Appeals first rejected the notion that Moisman was the horse&#8217;s &#8220;<em>de facto<\/em> guardian&#8221; and that the trial court could have appointed her to be the horse&#8217;s guardian\u00a0<em>ad litem<\/em> to represent his interests in court.\u00a0 The Court of Appeals challenged plaintiff&#8217;s argument that a &#8220;party&#8221; to a lawsuit could be anyone other than a natural or artificial person.\u00a0 <em>Id.<\/em> at 445.\u00a0 &#8220;A procedural mechanism does not appear to exist under Oregon law for a person to sue on behalf of an animal.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>But the Court of Appeals didn&#8217;t stop there.\u00a0 In examining whether it would be appropriate to appoint a legal guardian for an animal, the court considered how it could discern what the interests of an animal are in a negligence action, or any action at law, and importantly, who gets to decide the animal&#8217;s own interests in pursuing a legal action.\u00a0 The Court went on:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>&#8220;An animal such as a horse inherently lacks self-determination and the ability to express its wishes in a manner that the legal system would recognize.\u00a0 That incapacity exists in perpetuity such that it would be difficult to say that a court &#8212; or any human being &#8212; may actually discern the animal&#8217;s own interest in pursuing a legal action.&#8221;<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><em>Id.\u00a0<\/em>at 446.\u00a0 The unanswerable question remains: if Justice could make legal decisions and communicate the same, would he want ALDF to represent him in court?\u00a0 Or an agricultural or equine organization?\u00a0 Or prefer instead to focus on a life unencumbered by litigation?\u00a0 The Court pondered:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>&#8220;Who is the appropriate agent to make an assumption on behalf of an animal, to create that legal fiction?&#8221;<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>In considering this dilemma, the Oregon Court of Appeals recognized the Ninth Circuit&#8217;s similar concerns in the highly-publicized &#8220;animal as plaintiff&#8221; case &#8212; <em>Naruto v. Slater (<\/em>the &#8220;selfie monkey&#8221; case) in which the Court denied PETA&#8217;s attempt to assert &#8220;next friend&#8221; status on behalf of the monkey and delivered the oft-quoted smackdown about PETA&#8217;s intentions:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>&#8220;however worthy and high minded the motives of &#8216;next friends&#8217; may be, they inevitably run the risk of making the actual [party] a pawn to be manipulated on a chessboard larger than his own case.&#8221;<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><em>Naruto v. Slater<\/em>, 888 F.3d 418, 431 (9th Cir, 2018) (read about the selfie monkey case <a href=\"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/animallawdevelopments\/wp-admin\/post.php?post=57&amp;action=edit\">here<\/a>).\u00a0 The Ninth Circuit notably called animal next-friend standing &#8220;particularly susceptible to abuse&#8221; and that organizations could &#8220;use it to advance their own institutional goals with no means to curtail those actions.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>The Oregon Court of Appeals went on to reject appellants&#8217; argument that animals should be afforded the same legal rights as incompetent or incapacitated persons &#8212; an argument often asserted by those pursuing animal &#8220;personhood&#8221; cases &#8212; finding that while humans have &#8220;millennia of experience understanding the interests and desire of humankind,&#8221; no human can ever &#8220;credibly articulate [an animal&#8217;s] interests or goals.&#8221;\u00a0 <em>Id.<\/em> at 448.\u00a0 In doing, the court definitively rejected the notion that an animal activist group or sympathizer will always have an animal&#8217;s best interest in mind and that to find otherwise, animals may well be &#8220;left at the mercy of the institutional actor to advance its own interests.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>As is routine in animal &#8220;personhood&#8221; cases, the court undertook an extensive analysis of the common law and concluded that under Oregon law, the right to sue and redress a violation of rights &#8220;is and always has been [the right of] a human being or an entity created by human law.&#8221;\u00a0 <em>Id.<\/em> at 450.\u00a0 \u00a0The court saw no reason to depart from that well-settled common law doctrine.\u00a0 Animals have not been considered persons &#8212; either natural or artificial &#8212; capable of holding and asserting rights under the law and are viewed as property in the law.\u00a0 The court noted, however, that while Oregon&#8217;s animal welfare statutes impose &#8220;one of the nation&#8217;s most protective statutory schemes,&#8221; this statutory scheme does not <em>confer<\/em> legal rights on animals\u00a0 &#8212; it merely qualifies <em>a person&#8217;s right<\/em> to exercise otherwise absolute dominion and control over an animal (e.g. as per Oregon Revised Statutes 167.305,\u00a0 mandating care for animals in ways that minimize pain, stress, fear and suffering).\u00a0 <em>Id.<\/em> at 452.<\/p>\n<p>The Court of Appeals recognized that the state legislature is the proper forum to determine, as a matter of policy, how the law should view animals. It did not foreclose the possibility that the Legislature could create a limited statutory cause of action allowing a person to sue on an animal&#8217;s behalf for specified damages in specific instances.\u00a0 \u00a0<em>Id.<\/em> at 458, n.11.\u00a0 But the Court recognized that extending to animals the right to sue in tort would have &#8220;profound implications&#8221; and, like the trial court it noted: &#8220;we, too, are unable to take that leap.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>This Court of Appeals decision marks yet another legal defeat in a string of defeats for the animal legal personhood movement.<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>&nbsp;<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>by Michelle C. Pardo We\u00a0 \u00a0previously blogged about the Oregon negligence lawsuit that animal activist group Animal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF) brought on behalf of &#8220;Justice&#8221; &#8212; an American Quarter Horse &#8212; and his self-described &#8220;guardian&#8221; against the horse&#8217;s former owner.\u00a0 Back in 2017, Justice (formerly named &#8220;Shadow&#8221; and renamed ostensibly for this lawsuit) was &hellip; <\/p>\n<p class=\"link-more\"><a href=\"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/animallawdevelopments\/2022\/09\/02\/oregon-court-of-appeals-rules-animals-are-not-entitled-to-legal-personhood\/\" class=\"more-link\">Continue reading<span class=\"screen-reader-text\"> &#8220;Oregon Court of Appeals Rules Animals Are Not Entitled to Legal Personhood&#8221;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":318,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[97,156,495,160,881,496,880,175,877,46,878,879,402,45,876],"ppma_author":[698],"class_list":["post-483","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-general","tag-aldf","tag-animal-legal-defense-fund","tag-animal-personhood","tag-animals-as-plaintiffs","tag-equine","tag-justice-the-horse","tag-justice-v-vercher","tag-michelle-c-pardo","tag-moisman","tag-monkey-selfie","tag-naruto-v-slater","tag-nhrp","tag-nonhuman-rights-project","tag-peta","tag-vercher"],"authors":[{"term_id":698,"user_id":318,"is_guest":0,"slug":"mcpardo","display_name":"Michelle Pardo","avatar_url":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/animallawdevelopments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/38\/2018\/06\/pardomichelle-125x150.jpg","0":null,"1":"","2":"","3":"","4":"","5":"","6":"","7":"","8":""}],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/animallawdevelopments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/483","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/animallawdevelopments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/animallawdevelopments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/animallawdevelopments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/318"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/animallawdevelopments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=483"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/animallawdevelopments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/483\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/animallawdevelopments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=483"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/animallawdevelopments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=483"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/animallawdevelopments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=483"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/animallawdevelopments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/ppma_author?post=483"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}