{"id":622,"date":"2025-02-27T16:21:50","date_gmt":"2025-02-27T20:21:50","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/animallawdevelopments\/?p=622"},"modified":"2025-02-27T16:21:51","modified_gmt":"2025-02-27T20:21:51","slug":"u-s-supreme-court-limits-prevailing-party-status-for-attorneys-fee-recovery-by-plaintiffs","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/animallawdevelopments\/2025\/02\/27\/u-s-supreme-court-limits-prevailing-party-status-for-attorneys-fee-recovery-by-plaintiffs\/","title":{"rendered":"U.S. Supreme Court Limits \u201cPrevailing Party\u201d Status for Attorney\u2019s Fee Recovery by Plaintiffs"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

The U.S. Supreme Court\u2019s recent opinion in Lackey v. Stinnie<\/em>, No. 23-621 (U.S. Feb. 25, 2025<\/a>), clarified for plaintiffs what it means to be a \u201cprevailing party\u201d for recovery of attorney\u2019s fees.\u00a0 While the case arose under the attorney\u2019s fee provision for civil rights cases \u2013 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1988(b) \u2013 the holding has broader implications for federal court litigation, particularly where the only relief sought by the plaintiff is injunctive relief.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The case was a civil rights challenge by Virginia automobile drivers pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, claiming that they were denied due process by a Virginia statute that required suspension of their drivers\u2019 licenses without sufficient notice or hearing for failure to pay parking tickets and the like, with the suspension lasting until the fine was paid or a payment plan established.\u00a0 The district court granted a preliminary injunction, finding that plaintiffs were likely to prevail on their constitutional claim.\u00a0 Before the case could be tried, the state legislature repealed the statute at issue, and the parties, agreeing that the case was moot, stipulated to dismissal.\u00a0 Plaintiffs then sought recovery of their attorney\u2019s fees under section 1988(b), which permits an attorney\u2019s fee award to a \u201cprevailing party,\u201d inter alia<\/em>, in a section 1983 case. \u00a0Plaintiffs argued that, by obtaining a preliminary injunction that, in all likelihood, led to the repeal of the statute, they were \u201cprevailing parties.\u201d\u00a0 The Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc<\/em>, agreed with plaintiffs, but the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, reversed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Relying on a legal dictionary definition of \u201cprevailing party\u201d contemporaneous with the enactment of section 1988(b) \u2013 a party who successfully prosecutes the action \u2013 the Court  reasoned that, because a preliminary injunction is based only on a likelihood of success on the merits, the plaintiff who obtains such relief has not \u201cprevailed:\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

Because preliminary injunctions do not conclusively resolve the rights of parties on the merits, they do not confer prevailing party status. \u00a0A plaintiff who secures a preliminary injunction has achieved only temporary success at an intermediary \u201cstage[ ] of the suit.\u201d \u00a0Black\u2019s Law dictionary 1352. \u00a0It cannot yet be said that he will \u201cultimately prevail[] when the matter is finally set at rest\u201d or that he will have \u201csuccessfully maintained\u201d his claim \u201cat the end.\u201d Ibid<\/em>.\u00a0 And external events that render a dispute moot do not convert a temporary order designed to preserve the status of the parties into a conclusive adjudication of their rights.\u00a0 [Slip op. at 7.]<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

According to the Court, its ruling \u201cserves the interests of judicial economy.  A straightforward, bright-line rule is easy to administer, reducing the risk of a \u2018second major litigation\u2019 over attorney\u2019s fees.\u201d  [Slip op. at 10].  In this regard, the Court dismissed the plaintiffs\u2019 concern that  a defendant could \u201cstrategically moot\u201d a case and avoid an award of attorneys\u2019 fees if it feared ultimately losing the case. The Court noted that plaintiffs with damage claims would not face that threat and, even in cases seeking only injunctive relief, the case does not become moot if the challenged conduct is capable of repetition yet evading review.  [Slip op. at 10].  At bottom, it is up to Congress to decide whether attorney\u2019s fees should be awarded to plaintiffs who achieve some success but do not prevail \u2013 as is the case with Freedom of Information Act claims where plaintiffs can seek legal fees if they \u201csubstantially prevail[].\u201d  Id<\/em>. at 11 (citing 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 552(a)(4)). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Court did, however, limit its ruling to prevailing plaintiffs:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

Our decision today should not be read to affect our previous holding that a defendant need not obtain a favorable judgment on the merits to prevail, nor to address the question we left open whether a defendant must obtain a preclusive judgment in order to prevail.\u00a0 See CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. EEOC<\/em>, 578 U.S. 419, 431-434 (2016).\u00a0 As we have explained, \u201c[p]laintiffs and defendants come to court with different objectives.\u201d\u00a0 Id<\/em>., at 431.\u00a0 [Slip op. at 9 n.*].<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

The decision in Lackey<\/em> is likely to have implications beyond section 1988(b).\u00a0 Several federal statutes award legal fees to \u201cprevailing parties.\u201d\u00a0 In some regulatory cases, the preliminary injunction is in fact the main event of the case.\u00a0 For example, animal rights activists often file lawsuits under the National Environmental Policy Act or the Endangered Species Act, seeking to enjoin individual transactions or other activities by businesses who use animals for various purposes.\u00a0 The granting of a preliminary injunction, even though it is not a final determination of the merits of the case, could spell the end of the defendant\u2019s project, either because the opportunity for the transaction has come and gone or the defendant does not have the resources to further litigate the case.\u00a0 Yet, in such circumstances, the plaintiff would not be entitled to seek attorney\u2019s fees under the rationale of the Lackey<\/em> case.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Whether Lackey<\/em> has the result of cutting down on litigation by plaintiffs in in the regulatory sphere remains to be seen. However, that is what the dissenting opinion by Justice Jackson predicts. She points to research on the effect of the Court’s rejection of the “catalyst theory” in Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. West Va. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Resources<\/em>, 532 U.S. 598 (2001), i.e.<\/em>, the theory that a plaintiff “prevails” if its suit was the catalyst for the defendant’s change in conduct. According to the dissent, Buckhannon<\/em> “had the predictable practical effect of discouraging public interest organizations and private attorneys from taking on civil rights actions.” [Dissenting op. at 18].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The U.S. Supreme Court\u2019s recent opinion in Lackey v. Stinnie, No. 23-621 (U.S. Feb. 25, 2025), clarified for plaintiffs what it means to be a \u201cprevailing party\u201d for recovery of attorney\u2019s fees.\u00a0 While the case arose under the attorney\u2019s fee provision for civil rights cases \u2013 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1988(b) \u2013 the holding has broader … <\/p>\n

Continue reading “U.S. Supreme Court Limits \u201cPrevailing Party\u201d Status for Attorney\u2019s Fee Recovery by Plaintiffs”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":317,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[1069,1068,21,1071,6,5,266,470,1070],"ppma_author":[697],"class_list":["post-622","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-general","tag-42-u-s-c-1983","tag-42-u-s-c-1988b","tag-animal-rights","tag-catalyst-theory","tag-endangered-species-act","tag-john-simpson","tag-national-environmental-policy-act","tag-preliminary-injunction","tag-prevailing-party"],"authors":[{"term_id":697,"user_id":317,"is_guest":0,"slug":"jmsimpson","display_name":"John M. Simpson","avatar_url":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/animallawdevelopments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/38\/2018\/06\/simpsonjohn-125x150.jpg","0":null,"1":"","2":"","3":"","4":"","5":"","6":"","7":"","8":""}],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/animallawdevelopments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/622","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/animallawdevelopments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/animallawdevelopments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/animallawdevelopments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/317"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/animallawdevelopments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=622"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/animallawdevelopments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/622\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/animallawdevelopments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=622"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/animallawdevelopments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=622"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/animallawdevelopments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=622"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/animallawdevelopments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/ppma_author?post=622"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}