{"id":75,"date":"2018-08-03T17:40:25","date_gmt":"2018-08-03T21:40:25","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/animallawdevelopments\/?p=75"},"modified":"2018-08-03T17:40:25","modified_gmt":"2018-08-03T21:40:25","slug":"court-rules-bengal-tiger-is-not-an-individual-under-foia","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/animallawdevelopments\/2018\/08\/03\/court-rules-bengal-tiger-is-not-an-individual-under-foia\/","title":{"rendered":"Court Rules Bengal Tiger Is Not An “Individual” Under FOIA"},"content":{"rendered":"

by John M. Simpson<\/a><\/p>\n

In Animal Legal Defense Fund v. U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture<\/em>, 2018 WL 23987812 (N.D. Cal. May 25, 2018), the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California recently granted summary judgment to the government in a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) lawsuit in which the plaintiff challenged the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s “policy and practice of interpreting the statute to exclude nonhuman animals.”\u00a0 The case arose out of a FOIA request by an animal rights organization for\u00a0inspection records of USDA’s Animal and Plant\u00a0Health Inspection Service\u00a0concerning Tony the Tiger — a Bengal tiger maintained at a truck stop in Louisiana.<\/p>\n

The plaintiff had sought expedited processing of the request under a provision of the FOIA that provides for expedited processing when the requestor demonstrates a “compelling need,” which the statute defines as a situation where failure to produce the records “could reasonably be expected to pose an imminent threat to the life or physical safety of an individual<\/em><\/strong> ….”\u00a0 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 552(a)(6)(E)(v)(I) (emphasis added).\u00a0 Plaintiff contended that the request was entitled to expedited treatment because the “individual” at issue here — Tony — had\u00a0a health condition that could be life-threatening.\u00a0 Tony apparently\u00a0expired before the request was processed, but plaintiff had also submitted other requests for expedited processing, so the court found that the challenge to USDA’s policy and practice was not moot.<\/p>\n

On the merits, the court rejected the argument that\u00a0“individual” within the meaning of this FOIA provision included anything other than human beings.\u00a0 The court noted that “every dictionary consulted by this court includes a definition of ‘individual’ as a person or human being.”\u00a0 2018 WL 23987812 at *7.\u00a0 The other most consistently appearing definition defined individual as an individual thing as opposed to a group.\u00a0 This definition was not helpful because it could include plants, and suggesting that plants were “individuals” under the FOIA “would lead to an absurd result.”\u00a0 Id<\/em>. & n.2.<\/p>\n

The court also found its conclusion reinforced by the Supreme Court decision in Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth<\/em>., 566 U.S. 449 (2012), ruling that “individual” within the meaning of the Torture Victim Protection Act encompassed only natural persons, and rejecting the argument that it included “nonsovereign organizations:”<\/p>\n

\n

“‘This is not to say that the word \u201cindividual\u201d invariably means \u201cnatural person\u201d when used in a statute.\u00a0 Congress remains free, as always, to give the word a broader or different meaning. But before we will assume it has done so, there must be some indication Congress intended such a result.'”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Id<\/em>. at *8 (quoting 566 U.S. at 454-55).\u00a0\u00a0 Similarly, the court found in the present case that “[t]he proper solution, if any, is for Congress to alter the statute’s text — not for this court to do so.”\u00a0 Id<\/em>. at *9.<\/p>\n

The plaintiff has noticed an appeal to the Ninth Circuit.<\/p>\n

This case is similar to other recent, but unsuccessful, efforts to have various animals declared eligible for the rights or legal protections available to human beings.\u00a0 See our prior blog posts:<\/p>\n

Ninth Circuit Recently Slams PETA Over Monkey Selfie Lawsuit<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n