{"id":2232,"date":"2025-06-17T09:20:40","date_gmt":"2025-06-17T13:20:40","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/classactiondefense\/?p=2232"},"modified":"2025-06-17T09:20:40","modified_gmt":"2025-06-17T13:20:40","slug":"nothing-common-or-predominant-about-emotional-distress-damages","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/classactiondefense\/2025\/06\/17\/nothing-common-or-predominant-about-emotional-distress-damages\/","title":{"rendered":"Nothing Common or Predominant About Emotional Distress Damages"},"content":{"rendered":"
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By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Shannon Noelle, and Anna Sheridan<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Duane Morris Takeaways<\/em>: \u00a0<\/strong>In an opinion issued on May 29, 2025, Judge Christy Wiegand of the U.S. District Court for\u00a0 the Western District of Pennsylvania denied <\/a>class certification of two proposed classes under the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act (\u201cFDCPA\u201d) (one in the alternative in the event of failure of the first) finding that the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) was not met where putative class members\u2019 standing would depend on individualized inquiries \u201chighly specific\u201d to each member or was based solely on the fact that the member was a consumer that received a debt collection letter (whether it was read or not).\u00a0 The ruling is a defense blueprint for defending FDCPA cases.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Case Background<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Named Plaintiff Jeffrey Lezark brought a putative class action under the FDCPA against I.C. System, Inc. (\u201cICS\u201d), a debt collector, that allegedly sent Lezark and putative class members debt collection letters (\u201c540 Letters\u201d) to collect on a medical debt.  The 540 Letter stated in relevant part that \u201c[i]f you fail to contact us to discuss payment of this account, our client has authorized us to pursue additional remedies to recover the balance due, including referring the account to any attorney.\u201d (ECF  91 \u00b6 17).  Lezark alleged that, in sending the 540 Letter, ICS violated the FDCPA by implying that legal action was possible to collect the debt when it was not.  The Court authorized distribution of a Claim Form Questionnaire to putative class members to enable Lezark to collect information regarding their standing.  The Questionnaire asked respondents for their individual experience upon reading the 540 Letter.  Putative class members were instructed not to fill out the questionnaire if they did not read the 540 Letter.  The questionnaire asked if putative class members:  (1) felt anxious, overwhelmed, or stressed because they believed they could be subject to legal action or have debt referred to an attorney; (2) contacted an attorney or some other person because they believed they could be subject to legal action or debt could be referred to an attorney; (3) contacted ICS because they believed that they could be subject to legal action or that their debt could be referred to an attorney; (4) made a payment on their account because they believed they could be subject to legal action or their debt could be referred to an attorney; or (5) experienced some other event or engaged in some other conduct after reading the 540 Letter.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Lezark proposed one class definition consisting of \u201call individuals in the state of Pennsylvania who within the applicable statute of limitations, received a letter from Defendant in which Defendant claimed it was authorized to refer a medical debt to an attorney, incurred said debt from a medical provider that entered into a contract with Defendant in which the provider elected [NLAR] and\/or litigation referral and incurred such debt for personal, family, and\/or household purposes.\u201d (ECF 130, at 4). There were over 15,000 putative class members of this first proposed class.  Lezark also sought certification of an alternative class definition if the Court determined the first class definition could not be certified consisting of \u201c[a]ll individuals who: signed, dated, and returned the Claim Form Questionnaire; checked the first, second, third, fourth, and\/or fifth box on the Claim Form Questionnaire; and did not indicate that they failed to receive or read the 540 Letter.\u201d Id.<\/em> There were over 700 putative class members of this alternative proposed class. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

ICS focused its opposition on challenging both proposed class definitions adherence to Rule 23(b)(3)\u2019s predominance requirement.  ICS specifically cited to and relied on TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez<\/em>, 594 U.S. 413 (2021), where the U.S. Supreme Court held that federal courts must \u201caffirmatively determine that each putative class member has Article III standing before awarding that class member damages,\u201d arguing that both proposed class definitions would require individualized factual inquiries into the injuries sustained by each putative class member.  See <\/em>ECF No. 142 (citing ICS\u2019 opposition brief, ECF No. 136 at 14).  As to the first class definition, Lezark argued that there was standing under Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, <\/em>455 U.S. 363 (1982) as each class member suffered an injury \u201cin precisely the form [that the FDCPA] was intended to guard against.\u201d  Havens, <\/em>455 U.S. at 364.As it regards the alternative proposed class definition, Lezark argued that Huber v. Simon\u2019s Agency, Inc.<\/em>, 84 F.4th 132, 150 (3d Cir. 2023), confers standing as, in that case, the Third Circuit held that the named plaintiff that received a debt collection letter had standing as the plaintiff identified \u201can allegedly deceptive communication and specific harmful action and inaction she took as a result of the communication.\u201d  Huber<\/em>, 84 F.4th at 150.  The District Court rejected both proposed class definitions and Plaintiff\u2019s argument that case law precedent supported certification in this context.    <\/p>\n\n\n\n

As to the Havens<\/em> standing argument for the first proposed class definition, the Court found that the Havens<\/em> decisions was a distinguishable and narrow holding applicable to the Fair Housing Act (\u201cFHA\u201d) and not a proposed FDCPA class definition.  The Court explained that  \u201cthe plaintiff in Havens<\/em> was not just given false information but suffered a concrete injury in the form of racial discrimination prohibited by the FHA.\u201d  See <\/em>ECF No. 142, at 13 (citing Havens<\/em>, 373-74).  The Court found that Lezark\u2019s argument \u2014 that any consumer that is the object of a misrepresentation made unlawful under the FDCPA has de facto<\/em> suffered an injury in the precise form prohibited by the FDCPA \u2014 was in direct tension with the TransUnion <\/em>decision.  The Supreme Court in TransUnion <\/em>rejected the proposition that \u201ca plaintiff automatically satisfied the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate that right.\u201d  594 U.S. at 426.  The Court, therefore, declined to extend the logic in Havens<\/em> to \u201cthe 15,000-plus Proposed Class members\u201d that \u201csimply . . . receive the 540 Letter\u201d with no \u201cevidence that they read it, let alone suffered any downstream harm as a result.\u201d  See <\/em>ECF No. 142 at 14.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As to the alternative proposed class definition that Plaintiff argued had viability under Huber<\/em>, the Court pointed out that Huber<\/em> only found standing as to the named plaintiff and had been remanded to the district court to make a predominance determination.  The Court highlighted that Huber<\/em> guided the district court on remand to evaluate whether each putative class member \u201cundertook the kind of determinant action or inaction required for standing\u201d and could show the same with a \u201cplausible straight forward method\u201d suitable for class adjudication.  Huber<\/em>, 84 F.4th at 157-58.  Applying this directive, the District Court found that Lezark himself had demonstrated standing, having shown evidence of emotional distress and the decision to file for bankruptcy based on the 540 Letter, but the putative class members did not.  Plaintiff had to show that putative class members could \u201clikely\u201d demonstrate standing through summary judgment and trial but the Court found that given that standing was \u201cpremised on suffering emotional distress and\/or taking particular actions in response to the 540 Letter\u201d this \u201cnecessarily\u201d would require \u201cindividualized and highly\u201d specific inquiries as to each member requiring deposition testimony, cross and direct examination, and medical records.  See <\/em>ECF No. 142 at 10-11.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Implications For Employers and Debt Collectors<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

This decision reinforces that plaintiffs\u2019 burden at the certification stage of demonstrating concrete, particularized injury is not a mere formality.  To the contrary, plaintiffs must come forward with evidence showing that putative class members can likely<\/em><\/strong> demonstrate standing through summary judgment and trial using a method that is common amongst all class members and unlikely to produce individualized mini trials on the issue of damages.  The Lezark <\/em>decision also further underscores that this burden is particularly high in cases asserting standing on the basis of emotional distress or intangible injuries.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Shannon Noelle, and Anna Sheridan Duane Morris Takeaways: \u00a0In an opinion issued on May 29, 2025, Judge Christy Wiegand of the U.S. District Court for\u00a0 the Western District of Pennsylvania denied class certification of two proposed classes under the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act (\u201cFDCPA\u201d) (one in the alternative in … <\/p>\n

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