{"id":2310,"date":"2025-07-17T19:50:51","date_gmt":"2025-07-17T23:50:51","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/classactiondefense\/?p=2310"},"modified":"2025-07-17T19:50:52","modified_gmt":"2025-07-17T23:50:52","slug":"no-right-to-bear-arms-in-class-action-complaint-federal-court-rejects-shotgun-pleading","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/classactiondefense\/2025\/07\/17\/no-right-to-bear-arms-in-class-action-complaint-federal-court-rejects-shotgun-pleading\/","title":{"rendered":"No Right To Bear Arms In Class Action Complaint:\u00a0 Federal Court Rejects Shotgun Pleading"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"alignleft size-large is-resized\"><a href=\"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/classactiondefense\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/56\/2025\/07\/Fire.jpg\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"576\" src=\"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/classactiondefense\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/56\/2025\/07\/Fire-1024x576.jpg\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-2311\" style=\"width:237px;height:auto\" srcset=\"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/classactiondefense\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/56\/2025\/07\/Fire-1024x576.jpg 1024w, https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/classactiondefense\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/56\/2025\/07\/Fire-300x169.jpg 300w, https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/classactiondefense\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/56\/2025\/07\/Fire-768x432.jpg 768w, https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/classactiondefense\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/56\/2025\/07\/Fire.jpg 1280w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 767px) 89vw, (max-width: 1000px) 54vw, (max-width: 1071px) 543px, 580px\" \/><\/a><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p><strong>By Jerry Maatman, Shannon Noelle, and Alek Smolij<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Duane Morris Takeaway:<\/strong> <em>On July 2, 2025, in Bush v. Honda Development &amp; Manufacturing of America, LLC, Case No. 1:25-CV-893, 2025 WL 1830702 (N.D. Ala. July 2, 2025), Judge R. David Proctor of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama <a href=\"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/classactiondefense\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/56\/2025\/07\/Bush-N.D.-Ala.-Decision.pdf\">dismissed <\/a>a class action complaint with leave to replead on the basis that the complaint utilized impermissible \u201cshotgun pleading\u201d in connection with a Title VII and Section 1981 class action brought by current employees, associates, and contractors alleging that the employer (an automobile manufacturing company) engaged in a pattern and practice of racial discrimination in employment opportunities.\u00a0 The Court granted leave to file an amended complaint containing the required specificity demonstrating \u201ccommon answer[s]\u201d to the question of why class members were allegedly \u201cdisfavored\u201d by the employer such that class action treatment is justified.\u00a0 This decision underscores that plaintiffs must plead factual content showing ascertainability, commonality, typicality, adequacy of representation, predominance, and superiority at the pleading stage to move forward with claims asserted through the class action vehicle.\u00a0<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Background<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>On October 29, 2024, Plaintiff Johnny Bush, Jr. \u2014 an African American employee in a supervisory fleet maintenance role at Defendant Honda Development &amp; Manufacturing of America, LLC (\u201cHDMA\u201d) \u2014 brought an action on behalf of himself and a putative class of African American employees, associates, and contractors alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Section 1981 of the U.S. Code claiming class members did not have the opportunity, due to their race, to apply for certain jobs or promotions, were discouraged from applying, or applied and did not receive such positions while working for HDMA.&nbsp; <em>Bush v. HDMA<\/em>, 2025 WL 1830702, at *1 (N.D. Ala. July 2, 2025) (citing ECF No. 1).&nbsp; HDMA brought a Motion to Dismiss and For A More Definition Statement arguing that the class action complaint failed to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) requirements (i.e., ascertainability, commonality, typicality, adequacy, predominance, and superiority) and maintaining that the complaint was an impermissible shotgun pleading.&nbsp; <em>Id.<\/em> (citing ECF No. 16, at 17-20).&nbsp; The Court agreed on all fronts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>The Court\u2019s Decision<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The Court found that the complaint failed to meet Rule 23(a) requirements rejecting Plaintiff\u2019s argument that <em>Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes<\/em>, 564 U.S. 338 (2011), requires an \u201cevidentiary record\u201d to conduct such an analysis and finding, instead, that class allegations must be reviewed for \u201csome specificity . . . even as early as the pleadings stage.\u201d&nbsp; <em>Bush<\/em>, 2025 WL 1830702, at *3.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The Court found ascertainability to be lacking as HDMA\u2019s business records would not be able to identify:&nbsp; (1) class members that did not apply for positions because the position was not properly posted; (2) class members that were unaware of vacancies; or (3) class members that did not hear about positions through word of mouth.&nbsp; <em>Id. <\/em>at *1.&nbsp; On the issue of commonality, the Court determined that the proposed class was not likely to generate \u201ccommon <em>answers<\/em>\u201d to the question of how or why class members were allegedly disfavored due to their race because the complaint alleged \u201ca full range of different claims,\u201d such as \u201cbeing discouraged from applying for a job, applying for a job and not getting it, or not being told about an opportunity,\u201d which are all separate theories presenting different factual scenarios.&nbsp; <em>Id.<\/em> at *2.&nbsp; The complaint also failed to establish that Plaintiff Bush was an adequate class representative as he holds a supervisory position at HDMA but seeks to represent class members in non-supervisory roles as well as contractors who cannot bring Title VII claims.&nbsp; Finally, on the requirement of predominance, the Court found that the class complaint sought damages that could only be assessed on an individual basis, i.e. \u201cback pay; front pay; lost job [and] preferential rights to jobs.\u201d&nbsp; <em>Id.<\/em> at *4 (citing ECF No. 1).&nbsp; The Court rejected Plaintiff\u2019s argument that the injunctive relief sought established predominance given that the monetary damage sought were not \u201cincidental\u201d to the injunctive relief but, instead, at the forefront of the redress requested. &nbsp;<em>Id.&nbsp;<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The Court also considered the \u201cform of the complaint\u201d to be a deficient \u201cshotgun pleading\u201d as it was replete with vague and conclusory allegations.&nbsp; The Court gave the specific examples of allegations that:&nbsp; (1) \u201cword-of-mouth information disproportionately excluded or disadvantaged African American employees from knowing about and competing for positions and training,\u201d (2) non-African American employees were \u201cpromoted at a faster pace to a higher-level position,\u201d (3) HDMA\u2019s \u201cdiscriminatory practices . . . deterred the Plaintiff and putative class members from further pursuing additional vacancies and job opportunities,\u201d (4) \u201cdepartmental and plant-based selection criteria and\/or restrictions [] favored employees in departments and\/or facilities or locations that were disproportionately Caucasian,\u201d (5) HDMA\u2019s \u201crecruitment and selection process perpetuated past and existing racial disparities in the jobs at issue,\u201d and (6) \u201cPlaintiff [] has personal knowledge of the discriminatory obstacles and disparate impact experienced by other members of the putative class.\u201d&nbsp; <em>Id. <\/em>at *4.&nbsp; The Court concluded, quoting <em>Dukes<\/em>, that these allegations failed to demonstrate \u201cglue holding the alleged <em>reasons <\/em>for all th[e challenged employment] decisions together\u201d and therefore fail to show how class treatment would generate a common answer as to why members of the class were allegedly disfavored.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The Court gave Plaintiff leave to replead the class allegations to cure the identified deficiencies but instructed that any amended complaint should only include allegations for which Plaintiff has a \u201cgood faith basis . . . supported by Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit case law.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Implications For Defendants<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>This decision serves as an important reminder that motion to dismiss scrutiny of class claims is more than just a cursory review particularly where the class definition spans employees at different levels (supervisory, non-supervisory, and contractor) and challenges a wide array of alleged employment decisions not facially suitable for common answers that would make class treatment of such claims efficient or logical.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Moreover, shotgun pleading that features vague and conclusory allegations devoid of factual content will not survive motion to dismiss or for a more definite statement review and provides fertile ground for discerning defendants to mount challenges to avoid the cost and expense of class adjudication at the outset.&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>By Jerry Maatman, Shannon Noelle, and Alek Smolij Duane Morris Takeaway: On July 2, 2025, in Bush v. Honda Development &amp; Manufacturing of America, LLC, Case No. 1:25-CV-893, 2025 WL 1830702 (N.D. Ala. July 2, 2025), Judge R. David Proctor of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama dismissed a class action &hellip; <\/p>\n<p class=\"link-more\"><a href=\"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/classactiondefense\/2025\/07\/17\/no-right-to-bear-arms-in-class-action-complaint-federal-court-rejects-shotgun-pleading\/\" class=\"more-link\">Continue reading<span class=\"screen-reader-text\"> &#8220;No Right To Bear Arms In Class Action Complaint:\u00a0 Federal Court Rejects Shotgun Pleading&#8221;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":583,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[111],"tags":[],"ppma_author":[30],"class_list":["post-2310","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-discrimination"],"authors":[{"term_id":30,"user_id":583,"is_guest":0,"slug":"classactiondefense","display_name":"Class Action Defense","avatar_url":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/classactiondefense\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/56\/2020\/10\/dmlogo.jpg","0":null,"1":"","2":"","3":"","4":"","5":"","6":"","7":"","8":""}],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/classactiondefense\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2310","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/classactiondefense\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/classactiondefense\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/classactiondefense\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/583"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/classactiondefense\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2310"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/classactiondefense\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2310\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/classactiondefense\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2310"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/classactiondefense\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2310"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/classactiondefense\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2310"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/classactiondefense\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/ppma_author?post=2310"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}