{"id":2553,"date":"2025-11-23T10:29:24","date_gmt":"2025-11-23T14:29:24","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/classactiondefense\/?p=2553"},"modified":"2025-11-23T10:29:26","modified_gmt":"2025-11-23T14:29:26","slug":"illinois-supreme-court-imposes-stricter-standing-test-for-no-injury-class-actions-premised-on-statutory-violations","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/classactiondefense\/2025\/11\/23\/illinois-supreme-court-imposes-stricter-standing-test-for-no-injury-class-actions-premised-on-statutory-violations\/","title":{"rendered":"Illinois Supreme Court Imposes Stricter Standing Test For \u201cNo-Injury\u201d Class Actions Premised On Statutory Violations"},"content":{"rendered":"
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By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Tyler Zmick, and Hayley Ryan<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Duane Morris Takeaways:\u00a0\u00a0<\/em><\/strong>In Fausett v. Walgreen Co., 2025 IL 131444 (Nov. 20, 2025), the Illinois Supreme Court narrowly construed<\/u> <\/a>t<\/span>he private right of action set forth in the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), holding that because the FCRA does not explicitly authorize consumers to sue for violations, the law does not authorize individual lawsuits unless<\/strong> a consumer shows that a violation caused a concrete injury. Thus, at least for FCRA actions, a plaintiff must now allege a \u201cconcrete injury\u201d in Illinois state courts similar to what a plaintiff must allege to establish Article III standing in federal courts. This is a significant development, as Illinois courts have not previously required \u201cconcrete-injury\u201d allegations for statutory claims under the state\u2019s more liberal standing test.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Fausett is <\/em>therefore <\/em>a must-read opinion that represents an obstacle for future plaintiffs pursuing \u201cno-injury\u201d claims premised on the FCRA, in addition to other federal statutes containing similar private rights of action.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Case Background<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Plaintiff alleged that Defendant violated the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA) \u2013 a provision of the FRCA \u2013 by printing a receipt containing more than the last five digits of her debit card number. Plaintiff sought statutory damages for the alleged FACTA violation, though she did not claim the violation led to actual harm by, for example, a third party using the receipt to steal her identity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Plaintiff moved to certify a class of individuals for whom Defendant printed receipts containing more than the last five digits of their payment card numbers. In granting class certification, the trial court rejected Defendant\u2019s argument that Plaintiff had no viable claim due to lack of standing. The trial court reasoned that Illinois courts are not bound by the same jurisdictional restrictions applicable to federal courts and that the Illinois Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Rosenbach<\/em> v. Six Flags Entertainment Corp.<\/em>, 2019 IL 123186, established that \u201ca violation of one\u2019s rights afforded by a statute is itself sufficient for standing.\u201d Fausett<\/em>, 2025 IL 3237846, \u00b6 15. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the trial court\u2019s class certification order, and Defendant subsequently appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Illinois Supreme Court\u2019s Decision<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The issue before the Illinois Supreme Court was whether standing existed in Illinois courts for a plaintiff alleging a FACTA violation that did not result in actual harm.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Court began by distinguishing the standing doctrines applied in Illinois state courts vs. federal courts. The Court observed that Illinois courts are not bound by federal standing law and that Illinois standing principles apply to all claims pending in state court \u2013 even those premised on federal statutes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Court then identified the two different types of standing that exist in Illinois courts, including: (1) common-law standing, which \u2013 like Article III \u2013 requires an injury in fact to a legally recognized interest; and (2) statutory standing, which requires the fulfillment of statutory conditions to sue for legislatively created relief. See id.<\/em> \u00b6 39 (for statutory standing, the legislature creates a right of action and determines \u201cwho shall sue, and the conditions under which the suit may be brought\u201d) (citation omitted). The Court further noted that a statutory violation, without actual harm, can establish statutory standing only where the statute specifically authorizes a private lawsuit for violations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Turning to Plaintiff\u2019s FACTA lawsuit, the Court determined that Plaintiff\u2019s claim could not invoke statutory standing because the FCRA\u2019s liability provisions \u201cfail to include standing language. In other words, Congress did not expressly define the parties who have the right to sue for the statutory damages established in FCRA.\u201d Id.<\/em> \u00b6 40; see also id.<\/em> \u00b6 44 (\u201cthe plain and unambiguous language\u201d of the FCRA \u201cdoes not state the consumer or an aggrieved person may file the cause of action\u201d). Thus, because the FCRA is \u201csilent as to who may bring the cause of action for damages,\u201d Plaintiff\u2019s FACTA claim \u201cdoes not implicate statutory standing principles, and thus common-law standing applies to plaintiff\u2019s suit.\u201d Id.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

As for common law standing, the Court concluded that Plaintiff\u2019s claim did not satisfy Illinois\u2019s common law standing test, under which an alleged injury, \u201cwhether actual or threatened, must be: (1) distinct and palpable; (2) fairly traceable to the defendant\u2019s actions; and (3) substantially likely to be prevented or redressed by the grant of the requested relief.\u201d Id.<\/em> \u00b6 39 (quoting Petta v. Christie Business Holdings Co., P.C.<\/em>, 2025 IL 130337, \u00b6 18). The injury alleged must also be concrete \u2013 meaning that a plaintiff alleging only a purely speculative future injury lacks a sufficient interest to have standing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Court held that Plaintiff failed to allege or prove a concrete injury because she conceded that she was unaware of any harm to her credit or identity caused by the alleged FACTA violation, and she could not identify anyone who had even seen her receipts \u201cbeyond the cashier, herself, and her attorneys.\u201d See id.<\/em> \u00b6 48. Thus, Plaintiff could only show an increased risk of identity theft \u2013 something the Court has found to be insufficient to confer standing for a complaint seeking money damages. Because Plaintiff lacked a viable claim due to lack of standing, the Court held that the trial court abused its discretion in granting Plaintiff\u2019s motion for class certification.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Implications Of The Fausett<\/em> Decision<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Fausett<\/em> will impact FCRA class actions in a significant manner by precluding plaintiffs from bringing certain \u201cno-injury\u201d class actions in Illinois state courts. Federal courts have regularly dismissed such claims for lack of Article III standing based on the U.S. Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins<\/em>, 578 U.S. 330 (2016).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Fausett<\/em> now forecloses plaintiffs from refiling the same claims in Illinois state courts, leaving plaintiffs without a venue to prosecute no-injury FCRA claims in Illinois. Importantly, the Fausett<\/em> decision will likely reach beyond the FCRA context, as other federal consumer-protection statutes contain liability provisions with private-right-of-action language similar to the language found in the FCRA.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Tyler Zmick, and Hayley Ryan Duane Morris Takeaways:\u00a0\u00a0In Fausett v. Walgreen Co., 2025 IL 131444 (Nov. 20, 2025), the Illinois Supreme Court narrowly construed the private right of action set forth in the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), holding that because the FCRA does not explicitly authorize consumers to … <\/p>\n

Continue reading “Illinois Supreme Court Imposes Stricter Standing Test For \u201cNo-Injury\u201d Class Actions Premised On Statutory Violations”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":575,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[101],"tags":[],"ppma_author":[7,12,145],"class_list":["post-2553","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-fcra-class-actions"],"authors":[{"term_id":7,"user_id":575,"is_guest":0,"slug":"gmaatman","display_name":"Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.","avatar_url":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/classactiondefense\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/56\/2022\/09\/maatmangerald-100x100.jpg","0":null,"1":"","2":"","3":"","4":"","5":"","6":"","7":"","8":""},{"term_id":12,"user_id":578,"is_guest":0,"slug":"tzzmick","display_name":"Tyler Z. Zmick","avatar_url":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/classactiondefense\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/56\/2022\/09\/zmicktyler-100x100.jpg","0":null,"1":"","2":"","3":"","4":"","5":"","6":"","7":"","8":""},{"term_id":145,"user_id":740,"is_guest":0,"slug":"hhryan","display_name":"Hayley Ryan","avatar_url":{"url":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/classactiondefense\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/56\/2025\/09\/ryanhayley.jpg","url2x":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/classactiondefense\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/56\/2025\/09\/ryanhayley.jpg"},"0":null,"1":"","2":"","3":"","4":"","5":"","6":"","7":"","8":""}],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/classactiondefense\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2553","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/classactiondefense\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/classactiondefense\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/classactiondefense\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/575"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/classactiondefense\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2553"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/classactiondefense\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2553\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/classactiondefense\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2553"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/classactiondefense\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2553"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/classactiondefense\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2553"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/classactiondefense\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/ppma_author?post=2553"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}