{"id":2800,"date":"2026-03-11T13:02:40","date_gmt":"2026-03-11T17:02:40","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/classactiondefense\/?p=2800"},"modified":"2026-03-11T13:18:15","modified_gmt":"2026-03-11T17:18:15","slug":"illinois-court-holds-interested-party-enforcement-provision-of-the-day-and-temporary-labor-services-act-unconstitutional","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/classactiondefense\/2026\/03\/11\/illinois-court-holds-interested-party-enforcement-provision-of-the-day-and-temporary-labor-services-act-unconstitutional\/","title":{"rendered":"Illinois Court Holds \u201cInterested Party\u201d Enforcement Provision Of The Day And Temporary Labor Services Act Unconstitutional"},"content":{"rendered":"
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By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, and Gregory Tsonis<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Duane Morris Takeaways:\u00a0 <\/em><\/strong>In a significant decision issued on March 6, 2026, Judge Neil H. Cohen of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, held that Section 67 of the Illinois Day and Temporary Labor Services Act (\u201cDTLSA\u201d), 820 ILCS 175\/67, is unconstitutional because it improperly authorizes private parties to enforce the statute in a manner that usurps the constitutional authority of the Illinois Attorney General. The ruling arose in Figueroa, et al. v. Visual Pak Holdings, LLC, et al., No. 2025 CH 04411 (Cir. Ct. Cook County Mar. 6, 2026), and can be found here<\/a><\/u>.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The court concluded that the statute\u2019s \u201cinterested party\u201d enforcement provision effectively creates a qui tam-style enforcement mechanism without the safeguards that preserve the Attorney General\u2019s control over litigation brought on behalf of the State.  Because the statute does not require notice to the Attorney General and gives the Attorney General no authority to intervene, control, dismiss, or settle such cases, the court held that the provision violates the Illinois Constitution.  The ruling could significantly affect the growing wave of DTLSA litigation brought by worker advocacy organizations and may reshape how the statute is enforced going forward.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Background On The Day And Temporary Labor Services Act And Figueroa<\/em> Lawsuit<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Illinois Day and Temporary Labor Services Act, 820 ILCS 175\/1 et seq<\/em>., regulates staffing agencies that provide temporary or day laborers to client companies. The statute imposes obligations on staffing agencies and the client companies that utilize temporary labor.  These obligations include registration requirements, disclosure rules governing job assignments, and compliance with wage and safety protections designed to regulate the temporary labor industry.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In recent years, amendments to the statute expanded its scope and enforcement mechanisms, including provisions mandating equal pay to equivalent permanent employees, safety training, recordkeeping and disclosure requirements, and joint compliance obligations between staffing agencies and the companies that receive temporary workers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Central to the dispute in Figueroa<\/em> was Section 67 of the statute, which authorizes enforcement actions by so-called \u201cinterested parties.\u201d The statute defines an \u201cinterested party\u201d broadly as \u201can organization that monitors or is attentive to compliance with public or worker safety law, wage and hour requirements, or other statutory requirements.\u201d  820 ILCS 175\/5.   Under Section 67, these organizations may file civil actions after providing notice to the Illinois Department of Labor and certain requirements are met, and can seek injunctive relief to compel compliance with the statute even if the organization itself did not employ the workers and did not suffer a direct injury.  Pursuant to Section 67(d) of the DTLSA, an \u201cinterested party\u201d that prevails in a civil suit can recover 10% of any statutory penalties awarded, as well as attorneys\u2019 fees and costs. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Figueroa<\/em> litigation was brought by temporary workers and the Chicago Workers\u2019 Collaborative (\u201cCWC\u201d), a nonprofit worker advocacy organization, alleging violations of the DTLSA by the defendants. The defendants moved to dismiss CWC\u2019s claims in the complaint, asserting that CWC lacks standing to bring suit because its standing is based Section 67 of the DTLSA, which is unconstitutional.  The defendants also moved to dismiss the individual plaintiffs\u2019 claims and challenged venue in Cook County, as CWC is the only entity located in Cook County and the defendants and employee plaintiffs are located in Lake County, Illinois.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Because the challenge implicated the constitutionality of a state statute, the Illinois Attorney General intervened in the case to defend the law.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Court\u2019s Decision<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

After first establishing that CWC lacked associational standing that would allow it to bring claims, the court turned to assessing the constitutionality of Section 67, on which CWC\u2019s standing relied.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The court first analyzed whether Section 67 of the DTLSA is a \u201cqui tam<\/em>\u201d statute.  Under a \u201cqui tam<\/em>\u201d enforcement mechanism, private parties may bring lawsuits on behalf of the government and receive a portion of the penalty recovered.  \u201cQui tam<\/em>\u201d statutes are not inherently unconstitutional, but typically contain procedural safeguards that ensure the government retains ultimate control over the litigation.  Although the Attorney General \u201cargue[d] that section 67 is not a qui tam<\/em> statute,\u201d the court noted that the Attorney General took the opposite position in another case, Staffing Services Association of Illinois v. Flanagan<\/em>, Case No. 1:23-cv-16208 (N.D. Ill).  Ultimately, because the State, and not the interested party, is the entity with \u201can actual and substantial interest\u201d in the action, the court had little difficulty concluding that \u201cSection 67 is a qui tam<\/em> statute.\u201d  Id<\/em>. at 5.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Next, the court turned to whether Section 67 of the DTLSA improperly usurps the power of the Attorney General to represent the state.  Under the Illinois Constitution, the Attorney General serves as the State\u2019s chief legal officer and possesses the authority to enforce state law on behalf of the public.  While the legislature may create private rights of action, it cannot enact statutes that effectively transfer the State\u2019s enforcement authority to private actors.  Qui tam<\/em> statutes found constitutional, such as the False Claims Act, \u201cprovide for control over the litigation by the Attorney General by granting the Attorney General authority to intervene at any time, authority to control the litigation. and the authority to dismiss or settle the litigation at any time regardless of the wishes of the qui tam<\/em> plaintiff.\u201d  Id<\/em>. at 5. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

By contrast, the court concluded, the DTLSA contains none of those safeguards.  Section 67 does not require notice to the Attorney General when an interested party files suit, nor does it give the Attorney General authority to intervene, take control of the case, or dismiss or settle the action. The statute therefore allows private organizations to pursue enforcement litigation entirely independent of the State. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Attorney General argued that such explicit authority over suits was unnecessary in the statutory text of the DTLSA, as the Attorney General Act provides the Attorney General with authority to intervene, initiate, and enforce any proceedings concerning \u201cthe payment of wages, the safety of the workplace, and fair employment practices.\u201d  Id<\/em>. at 6 (quoting 15 ILCS 205\/6.3(b)).   The court, however, noted that the DTLSA does not require an \u201cinterested party\u201d to provide the Attorney General with notice that it filed a suit under Section 67, and thus the Attorney General \u201ccannot exercise its authority to represent the State if it has no notice of the filing of suit under Section 67\u201d of the DTLSA.  Id<\/em>. at 6.  As a result, the court held, the lack of notice \u201crenders section 67 an unconstitutional usurpation of the Attorney General\u2019s authority[.]\u201d  Id<\/em>. at 6.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Although the failure to provide notice was sufficient to find Section 67 unconstitutional, the court also held that Section 67 was also unconstitutional on the separate grounds that it \u201cdoes not grant the Attorney General any control over the interested party\u2019s suit.\u201d\u00a0 Id<\/em>. \u00a0The court found unpersuasive the argument that the Attorney General Act provides the Attorney General with the right to intervene, reasoning that \u201c[a] right to intervene is not the same as a right to control the litigation, including the right to dismiss that litigation over the objections of the plaintiff.\u00a0 Id<\/em>.\u00a0 \u00a0Because the statute allows private actors to enforce public rights without oversight or control by the Attorney General, the court concluded that Section 67 improperly interferes with the Attorney General\u2019s constitutional authority and is therefore unconstitutional.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Because Section 67 was found unconstitutional, the court dismissed CWC\u2019s claims for lack of standing and the case was appropriately transferred to a proper venue in Lake County, which could properly consider the arguments for dismissal of the individual plaintiffs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Implications For Employers<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Figueroa<\/em> decision could significantly affect the enforcement landscape under the DTLSA, though it is likely to face appellate review.   Employers operating in Illinois should therefore closely monitor further developments as the courts continue to address the scope and enforcement of the statute.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In recent years, worker advocacy organizations have increasingly relied on Section 67 to bring enforcement actions seeking injunctive relief against staffing agencies and the companies that utilize temporary labor.  By holding that provision unconstitutional, the decision calls into question the viability of those lawsuits and may substantially limit the ability of advocacy groups to initiate DTLSA litigation.  As a result, the ruling may shift enforcement of the statute more squarely toward state regulators, including the Illinois Department of Labor and the Attorney General\u2019s Office.  While this could reduce the number of private enforcement actions filed by advocacy organizations, employers should expect that regulatory authorities will continue to scrutinize staffing practices and DTLSA compliance. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Finally, employers should not interpret the ruling as diminishing the importance of DTLSA compliance.  Importantly, the decision does not invalidate the DTLSA itself, but strikes only the statute\u2019s \u201cinterested party\u201d enforcement mechanism as unconstitutional.  The statute\u2019s substantive requirements remain in effect, including the provisions governing wage protections, safety obligations, and responsibilities shared between staffing agencies and client companies.  Staffing agencies and employers that utilize temporary labor should continue to review their staffing arrangements and compliance practices carefully.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, and Gregory Tsonis Duane Morris Takeaways:\u00a0 In a significant decision issued on March 6, 2026, Judge Neil H. Cohen of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, held that Section 67 of the Illinois Day and Temporary Labor Services Act (\u201cDTLSA\u201d), 820 ILCS 175\/67, is unconstitutional because … <\/p>\n

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