{"id":2825,"date":"2026-03-20T08:31:49","date_gmt":"2026-03-20T12:31:49","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/classactiondefense\/?p=2825"},"modified":"2026-03-20T08:31:50","modified_gmt":"2026-03-20T12:31:50","slug":"illinois-supreme-court-rules-that-employees-must-be-paid-for-pre-shift-covid-19-screenings-under-illinois-wage-law","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/classactiondefense\/2026\/03\/20\/illinois-supreme-court-rules-that-employees-must-be-paid-for-pre-shift-covid-19-screenings-under-illinois-wage-law\/","title":{"rendered":"Illinois Supreme Court Rules That Employees Must Be Paid For Pre-Shift COVID-19 Screenings Under Illinois Wage Law"},"content":{"rendered":"
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By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, and Tyler Zmick<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Duane Morris Takeaways:\u00a0\u00a0<\/em><\/strong>In Johnson, et al. v. Amazon.com Services, LLC, 2026 IL 132016 (Mar. 19, 2026), the Illinois Supreme Court held<\/u> <\/a>that unlike the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (\u201cFLSA\u201d), Illinois\u2019s Minimum Wage Law (\u201cIMWL\u201d) requires employers to compensate hourly employees for time spent completing pre-shift COVID-19 screenings and other \u201cpreliminary or postliminary\u201d activities. In doing so, the Illinois Supreme Court embraced an employee-friendly interpretation regarding the scope of compensable time under the IMWL. Johnson is a must-read opinion for companies that impacts all employers with hourly, non-exempt employees working in Illinois.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Background<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Plaintiffs were former hourly Amazon employees who worked at the company\u2019s distribution warehouses in Illinois. In March 2020, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Amazon began requiring employees to undergo COVID-19 symptom screenings before they could enter the warehouses and clock in for their shifts. According to Plaintiffs, it \u201ctook 10 to 15 minutes on average\u201d to complete the pre-shift screenings. See<\/em> Johnson, <\/em>2026 IL 132016,\u00b6 4.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Plaintiffs subsequently filed a class action lawsuit alleging that Amazon violated the FLSA and IMWL by not paying them and other warehouse employees for time spent undergoing the mandatory screenings.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Amazon moved to dismiss Plaintiffs\u2019 Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Plaintiffs\u2019 claims failed because under the FLSA an hourly employee need not be compensated for time spent on \u201cactivities which are preliminary to or postliminary to\u201d the employee\u2019s principal work duties. See<\/em> 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 254 (a)(2). In granting Amazon\u2019s motion and dismissing Plaintiffs\u2019 FLSA and<\/em><\/strong> IMWL claims, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois reasoned that \u201cstate and federal courts frequently look to case authority interpreting and applying the FLSA for guidance in interpreting the [IMWL].\u201d Johnson, <\/em>2026 IL 132016,\u00b6 7.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Rather than ruling on the substance of the appeal, however, the Seventh Circuit certified the following question to the Illinois Supreme Court: \u201cwhether Section 4a of [the IMWL] incorporates the [FLSA\u2019s] exclusion from compensation for \u2018employee activities that are preliminary or postliminary to their principal activities.\u2019\u201d Id. <\/em>\u00b6 1.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Illinois Supreme Court\u2019s Decision<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Illinois Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that the IMWL provides \u201ca right of overtime compensation for Illinois employees\u201d and also sets forth 10 \u201cspecific exceptions to the general right to overtime compensation.\u201d Johnson, <\/em>2026 IL 132016,\u00b6 12 (citing 820 ILCS 105\/4a(1)-(2)). Importantly, the Court observed that four of Section 4a(2)\u2019s 10 exceptions incorporate certain provisions of the FLSA and\/or related federal regulations, yet none of the exceptions reference FLSA regulations regarding the exclusion of \u201cpreliminary or postliminary activities\u201d from the definition of compensable time. See id.<\/em> \u00b6\u00b6 14, 16.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Illinois Supreme Court further noted that the IMWL gives the Illinois Director of the Department of Labor (\u201cIDOL\u201d) authority to define the IMWL\u2019s terms. See <\/em>820 ILCS 105\/10(a). Pursuant to that authority, IDOL promulgated a regulation defining \u201chours worked\u201d as \u201call the time an employee is required to be on duty, or on the employer\u2019s premises, or at other prescribed places of work, and any additional time the employee is required or permitted to work for the employer.\u201d 56 Ill. Adm. Code 210.110. In addition to acknowledging the breadth of this definition, the Illinois Supreme Court emphasized that while IDOL referenced provisions of the FLSA and related federal regulations in certain statutory definitions, IDOL did not<\/em><\/strong> reference the FLSA regulations \u201cthat establish a preliminary or postliminary activities exclusion from \u2018hours worked.\u2019\u201d Johnson, <\/em>2026 IL 132016 \u00b6 16; see also id.<\/em> (\u201cTo the contrary, IDOL defines \u2018hours worked\u2019 to include all time an employee is required to be on the employer\u2019s premises, which contradicts the potential applicability of any such exclusion.\u201d).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Accordingly, the Illinois Supreme Court held that a plain reading of Section 4a and IDOL\u2019s definition of \u201chours worked\u201d reveals that the Illinois legislature did not incorporate the FLSA\u2019s \u201cpreliminary and postliminary activities exclusion\u201d into the IMWL. Rather, the legislature delegated the authority to define \u201chours worked\u201d to IDOL, who \u201cadopted a definition of \u2018hours worked\u2019 that necessarily includes preliminary and postliminary activities, explicitly encompassing all time that an employee is required to be on an employer\u2019s premises.\u201d Id. <\/em>\u00b6 18.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In so holding, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected Amazon\u2019s argument that the FLSA\u2019s \u201cpreliminary and postliminary activities exclusion\u201d should apply to the IMWL because the IMWL\u2019s general overtime provision \u201cis patterned after the general overtime provision found in\u2026the FLSA.\u201d Id. <\/em>\u00b6 19. The Court reasoned that \u201cwhile section 4a of the [IMWL] contains the same general overtime provision of the FLSA, it does not include the preliminary and postliminary activity exclusion that is set forth in the FLSA\u2026.[T]o accept Amazon\u2019s invitation would be to read exceptions into the statute that depart from its plain language, in violation of our well-established rules of statutory interpretation.\u201d Id. <\/em>\u00b6 20.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Implications Of The Decision<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Illinois Supreme Court\u2019s opinion in Johnson<\/em> is required reading for companies with hourly employees working in Illinois. The decision definitively answers the question whether the IMWL incorporates the FLSA\u2019s \u201cpreliminary or postliminary activities exclusion\u201d \u2013 a question that, until now, has been heavily litigated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Johnson<\/em> is also a reminder of the importance of complying with federal and<\/em><\/strong> state wage-and-hour statutes, as laws in many jurisdictions (including Illinois) impose additional requirements on employers that are not found in the FLSA. See, e.g.<\/em>, Johnson<\/em>, 2026 IL 132016, \u00b6 20 (noting that the overtime provisions of the IMWL and the FLSA \u201care not parallel but rather state the same general rule with marked differences in their respective statements of exceptions\u201d). Companies must be vigilant to ensure they comply with wage-and-hour laws in all jurisdictions where they have hourly employees.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, and Tyler Zmick Duane Morris Takeaways:\u00a0\u00a0In Johnson, et al. v. Amazon.com Services, LLC, 2026 IL 132016 (Mar. 19, 2026), the Illinois Supreme Court held that unlike the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (\u201cFLSA\u201d), Illinois\u2019s Minimum Wage Law (\u201cIMWL\u201d) requires employers to compensate hourly employees for time spent … <\/p>\n

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