{"id":3110,"date":"2026-07-17T12:03:53","date_gmt":"2026-07-17T16:03:53","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/classactiondefense\/?p=3110"},"modified":"2026-07-17T12:03:54","modified_gmt":"2026-07-17T16:03:54","slug":"seventh-circuit-holds-that-the-tcpas-do-not-call-provision-does-not-cover-text-message","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/classactiondefense\/2026\/07\/17\/seventh-circuit-holds-that-the-tcpas-do-not-call-provision-does-not-cover-text-message\/","title":{"rendered":"Seventh Circuit Holds That The TCPA’s Do-Not-Call Provision Does Not Cover Text Message"},"content":{"rendered":"
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By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, and Ryan T. Garippo<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Duane Morris Takeaways:\u00a0 <\/em><\/strong>On July 14, 2026, in Steidinger, et al. v. Blackstone Medical Services, No. 25-2398, 2026 WL 2028517 (7th Cir. July 14, 2026), Judge Thomas Kirsch, writing for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, affirmed <\/a>the dismissal of a putative class action complaint and held that 47 U.S.C. \u00a7 227(c)(5) of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) does not create a private right of action for the receipt of unwanted text messages.\u00a0<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The decision is significant because it represents the first federal appellate decision squarely holding that text messages are not “telephone calls” within the meaning of Section 227(c)(5) and significantly reduces potential TCPA-related liability for companies operating in the Seventh Circuit.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Case Background<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The plaintiffs in this case are a group of individuals (\u201cPlaintiffs\u201d) who received text messages and calls from Blackstone Medical Services (“Blackstone”) promoting the company’s home sleep tests.  Plaintiffs alleged that they received these communications even though they were either registered on the national do-not-call registry or after they communicated to Blackstone that they did not want to be contacted.  As a result, Plaintiffs filed a putative class action complaint against Blackstone, alleging violations of the TCPA and Florida\u2019s mini-TCPA law, seeking statutory damages, an injunction, and declaratory relief.  Specifically, Plaintiffs sued under Section 227(c)(5) of the TCPA which provides plaintiffs with a private right of action for certain \u201cviolation[s] of the regulations prescribed under this subsection.\u201d  47 U.S.C. \u00a7227(c)(5)(a).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Blackstone moved to dismiss Plaintiffs\u2019 TCPA claims.  It argued that because the private right of action in Section 227(c)(5) is limited to any \u201cperson who has received more than one telephone call,\u201d the provision only applies to \u201ctelephone calls\u201d and not text messages.   The U.S. District Court for the Central District of Illinois agreed with Blackstone.  Jones v. Blackstone Med. Servs., LLC, <\/em>792 F. Supp. 3d 894, 902 (C.D. Ill. 2025).The district court concluded \u201cbased on a plain reading of the TCPA and its implementing regulations, Section 227(c)(5) does not apply to text messages.\u201d  Id.  <\/em>The district court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs\u2019 state law claim and dismissed the lawsuit.  Plaintiffs appealed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Seventh Circuit’s Ruling<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In a 13-page opinion, Judge Thomas Kirsch, writing for the Seventh Circuit, succinctly concluded \u201cthat \u00a7 227(c)(5) does not permit plaintiffs to sue for the receipt of unwanted texts.\u201d  Steidinger<\/em>, 2026 WL 2028517, at *1.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Seventh Circuit explained that Section 227(c)(5) creates a private right of action for any individual \u201cwho has received more than one telephone call within any 12-month period\u201d in violation of the regulations implementing that subjection.  Id. <\/em>at *2(quoting 47 U.S.C. \u00a7 227(c)(5)).  Thus, the dispute hinged on the meaning of the term \u201ctelephone call\u201d when the statute was passed in 1991.  Id.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

As Judge Kirsch explained, in 1991, a \u201ctelephone\u201d was defined as \u201c[a]n instrument for reproducing sounds at a distance\u201d and a \u201ccall\u201d was defined as \u201cto get or try to get into communication by telephone.\u201d  Id.  <\/em>Therefore, a \u201ctelephone call\u201d would have \u201creferred to communication via sound.\u201d  Id.  <\/em>But \u201c[t]ext messages do not reproduce sounds\u201d and would not have been thought of as calls (especially given that the first text message was not sent till 1992).  Id.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

After observing other structural elements of the TCPA which would suggest narrower reading of the term \u201ctelephone call,\u201d the Seventh Circuit also rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that the Federal Communications Commission’s (\u201cFCC\u201d) interpretation of \u201ccall,\u201d which included text messages, was entitled to deference.  In McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. v. McKesson Corporation<\/em>, 606 U.S. 146, 168 (2025), the U.S. Supreme Court had already determined that courts are \u201cnot bound by the FCC\u2019s interpretation of the TCPA.\u201d  Thus, the Seventh Circuit determined that it would not afford deference to the FCC\u2019s interpretation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Finally, the Seventh Circuit opined on the public policy concerns remedied by the TCPA.  The Seventh Circuit explained that, when Congress passed the TCPA, it \u201cspecifically found that telemarketing calls create a public safety risk when they seize telephone lines needed for emergency or medical assistance.\u201d  Steidinger<\/em>, 2026 WL 2028517, at *5.  But \u201c[s]pam text messages don’t pose this risk, making it unsurprising, or at the very least reasonable, that \u00a7 227(c)(5)\u2019s private right of action would cover telephone calls but not messages.\u201d  Id.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In short, \u201c[r]epeated, unwanted text messages are undoubtedly a nuisance.  But they do not fall within the private right of action created by \u00a7 227(c)(5).\u201d  Id.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Implications For Companies<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Steidinger<\/em> decision is likely the single most important decision in the post-McKesson<\/em> era.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For TCPA cases filed in Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin, a company cannot be sued based on text messages that were allegedly made in violation of the TCPA\u2019s implementing regulations.  As a result, the typical claims that are often brought under Section 227(c)(5) will no longer be available to plaintiffs where the communications in question were text messages.  These claims include situations where a company allegedly violated the national do-not-call registry\u2019s requirements, their own internal do-not-call registry\u2019s requirements, where texts were made without caller identification information, where texts were made during \u201cquiet hours,\u201d and other claims typically brought under Section 227(c)(5).  Steidinger<\/em> should take each of these claims off the table within these jurisdictions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Steininger<\/em>, however, is not the end of this fight.  In Howard v. Republican National Committee<\/em>, 164 F.4th 1119, 1123-24 (9th Cir. 2026), the Ninth Circuit determined (albeit while considering a Section 227(b)(3) claim) that text messages were covered by the broad definition of the phrase \u201cany call\u201d as applicable in that case.  Although there may theoretically be some daylight between the phrase \u201cany call\u201d as interpreted in Howard<\/em>, and the phrase \u201ctelephone call\u201d as interpreted in Steidinger<\/em>, this decision certainly signals a growing methodological division between these two circuits.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

While Steininger<\/em> is undoubtably beneficial for companies, corporate counsel should be mindful that this case does not mean their texts are unregulated for at least three reasons.  First, even in the Seventh Circuit, private plaintiffs can still theoretically bring claims under Section 227(b)(3) if the texts are made using an \u201cautomatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice.\u201d  47 U.S.C. \u00a7 227(b)(1)(A).  Second, there are also other federal, state, and local jurisdictions which prohibit the conduct previously protected by the TCPA in the Seventh Circuit.  And third, Steininger <\/em>only removes the risk of a federal class action lawsuit under Section 227(c)(5), it does not eliminate the risk of an FCC enforcement action related to a company\u2019s text messaging programs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

We will be monitoring any developments in this space and corporate counsel should continue to check in regularly as the TCPA landscape continues to shift.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, and Ryan T. Garippo Duane Morris Takeaways:\u00a0 On July 14, 2026, in Steidinger, et al. v. Blackstone Medical Services, No. 25-2398, 2026 WL 2028517 (7th Cir. July 14, 2026), Judge Thomas Kirsch, writing for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, affirmed the dismissal of … <\/p>\n

Continue reading “Seventh Circuit Holds That The TCPA’s Do-Not-Call Provision Does Not Cover Text Message”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":575,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[89],"tags":[],"ppma_author":[7,9,127],"class_list":["post-3110","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-tcpa-class-action-litigation"],"authors":[{"term_id":7,"user_id":575,"is_guest":0,"slug":"gmaatman","display_name":"Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.","avatar_url":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/classactiondefense\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/56\/2022\/09\/maatmangerald-100x100.jpg","author_category":"","last_name":"Maatman Jr.","first_name":"Gerald L.","job_title":"","user_url":"https:\/\/www.duanemorris.com\/attorneys\/geraldmaatman.html","description":"Read Gerald's bio.<\/a>"},{"term_id":9,"user_id":576,"is_guest":0,"slug":"jariley","display_name":"Jennifer A. Riley","avatar_url":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/classactiondefense\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/56\/2023\/08\/rileyjennifer-100x100.jpg","author_category":"","last_name":"Riley","first_name":"Jennifer A.","job_title":"","user_url":"https:\/\/www.duanemorris.com\/attorneys\/jenniferriley.html","description":"Read Jennifer's bio.<\/a>"},{"term_id":127,"user_id":692,"is_guest":0,"slug":"rgarippo","display_name":"Ryan Garippo","avatar_url":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/classactiondefense\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/56\/2024\/09\/garipporyan-100x100.jpg","author_category":"","last_name":"Garippo","first_name":"Ryan","job_title":"","user_url":"https:\/\/www.duanemorris.com\/attorneys\/ryangarippo.html","description":"Read Ryan's Bio<\/a>"}],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/classactiondefense\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3110","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/classactiondefense\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/classactiondefense\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/classactiondefense\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/575"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/classactiondefense\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3110"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/classactiondefense\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3110\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3113,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/classactiondefense\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3110\/revisions\/3113"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/classactiondefense\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3110"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/classactiondefense\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3110"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/classactiondefense\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3110"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.duanemorris.com\/classactiondefense\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/ppma_author?post=3110"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}