Tag Archives: Gregory Bombard

Fifth Circuit Decision Adds to Growing Body of Case Law on the Scope of Uniform Trade Secrets Act Preemption

Your New Orleans restaurant has never been more successful.  Business is booming.  People cannot get enough of your famous crawfish étouffée.  With your success, you’re planning to expand into the lucrative retail hot sauce market.  You have all the supply, manufacture, and distribution contracts lined up.  Suddenly, Judas, your trusted sous chef for ten years, quits your business, takes your secret hot sauce recipe and your business plans, and starts his own hot sauce brand.  How are you protected?

The Fifth Circuit’s recent decision in Brand Servs., L.L.C. v. Irex Corp., 909 F.3d 151 (5th Cir. 2018) addresses this issue and adds to a growing list of cases addressing whether state enactments of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”) preempt common law claims for conversion of confidential business information. Continue reading Fifth Circuit Decision Adds to Growing Body of Case Law on the Scope of Uniform Trade Secrets Act Preemption

Massachusetts Is Set to Adopt the Uniform Trade Secrets Act . . . What Now?

On August 1, 2018, the Massachusetts legislature passed a bill adopting the Uniform Trade Secrets Act in Massachusetts. The bill is headed to the Governor’s desk for approval within ten days. Massachusetts adopting the UTSA will leave New York the sole jurisdiction in the United States that relies only on common law protections for trade secrets.

In large part, the UTSA is consistent with and codifies existing Massachusetts law. In some important respects, however, the new UTSA protections are different from what previously existed. As a result, some immediate questions arise with respect to trade secret litigation under the new UTSA. Until Massachusetts courts decide these issues, the answers will not be certain.

What is a Trade Secret?

Massachusetts previously followed the six-factor test in the Restatement of Torts to determine if information is a trade secret. By contrast, the UTSA defines a trade secret as “information . . . that (i) . . . provided economic advantage, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, others who might obtain economic advantage from its acquisition, disclosure or use and (ii) . . . was the subject of efforts that were reasonable under the circumstances, which may include reasonable notice, to protect against it being acquired, disclosed or used without the consent of the person properly asserting rights therein or such person’s predecessor in interest.”

While the new UTSA definition is similar to the former rule, one new development under the UTSA is that trade secrets are protectable if they have “actual or potential” economic value. Under the former definition, the trade secret had to have actual value, and had to be “used in one’s business.” The new UTSA definition will cover secret information with “potential” economic value, even if it had not being actively used by the victim of the misappropriation.

Are c. 93A Damages Still Available for Trade Secret Misappropriation?

Before enactment of the UTSA, trade secret misappropriation claims in Massachusetts would include a Chapter 93A claim as a matter of course because trade secret misappropriation can be an unfair trade practice under Chapter 93A. See Peggy Lawton Kitchens, Inc. v. Hogan, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 937, 939 (1984).

The UTSA, however, expressly “supersede[s] any conflicting laws of the commonwealth providing civil remedies for the misappropriation of a trade secret.” An open issue is whether Massachusetts courts will find that treble damages under Chapter 93A are “conflicting” with the UTSA’s damages provision that limits exemplary damages to double actual damages in the event of “willful and malicious” misappropriation.

Are Other Business Torts Superseded by the UTSA?

Massachusetts common law includes a tort for misappropriation of confidential business information, even if that information does not meet the technical definition of a trade secret. USM Corp. v. Marson Fastener Corp., 379 Mass. 90, 104 (1979).

It is not clear if the new UTSA will supersede this tort in Massachusetts going forward. Other jurisdictions are split on this issue. Some hold that UTSA preempts all causes of action related to the misappropriation of trade secrets, but others allow such claims to proceed because they are expressly based on claims other than trade secret misappropriation. See Orca Communications Unlimited, LLC v. Noder, 337 P.3d 545 (Az. 2014).

When Will Attorney’s Fees Be Recoverable?

The UTSA includes a new attorney’s fee shifting provision. As mentioned above, most trade secret plaintiffs in Massachusetts already included claims under Chapter 93A, with an accompanying attorney’s fees claim. Under the UTSA, attorney’s fees are recoverable for the plaintiff in cases of “willful and malicious misappropriation.” This may be a more restrictive standard than existed under Chapter 93A for the recovery of attorney’s fees.

The UTSA expressly allows the defendant in a trade secret misappropriation claim to recover fees if the court finds “a claim of misappropriation is made . . . in bad faith.” This fee-shifting provision liberalizes existing Massachusetts law, which would only allow a trade secret defendant to recover attorney’s fees in limited circumstances. This provision may act as a deterrent to trade secret misappropriation claims brought in “bad faith.”

Will Massachusetts Adopt the “Inevitable Disclosure” Doctrine?

The majority of existing UTSA jurisdictions have adopted “some form of the inevitable disclosure doctrine.” Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 277, 291 (Ct. App. 2002). The “inevitable disclosure” doctrine arises out of UTSA language that empowers courts to enjoin “[a]ctual or threatened misappropriation” of trade secrets (emphasis added). In the seminal case of PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redomnd, 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995), a high-ranking Pepsi executive quit to work for Pepsi’s “fierce” then-competitor Quaker. Pepsi obtained an injunction against the employee’s continued employment with Quaker because the district court found that the employee’s disclosure of confidential marketing and development strategies was inevitable. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, expressly overruling common law, on the basis of the “threatened misappropriation” language of the Illinois UTSA. The “inevitable disclosure” doctrine has been applied by some courts to impose a de-facto non-competition agreement on employees who have not signed such an agreement in instances where their work for an employer would result in the “inevitable disclosure” of a prior employer’s trade secrets.

Massachusetts courts have previously resisted the application of the “inevitable disclosure” doctrine. One reason is a concern that it could jeopardize employees’ rights to future employment. With the new language of the UTSA, the question may be ripe to be re-visited by Massachusetts courts.

Massachusetts Court Rules California Law Supersedes Massachusetts Choice-of-Law Provision and Non-Compete Clause in Employment Contract

By Gregory S. Bombard

On June 9, 2017, the Business Litigation Session (BLS) of the Massachusetts Superior Court issued a decision about the extraterritorial application of California’s public policy against non-competition agreements (Full text of the decision: Oxford Global Resources, LLC v. Jeremy Hernandez).  The plaintiff, Oxford, is a recruiting and staffing company headquartered in Massachusetts.  It hired the defendant to work as an entry-level “account manager” in an office in California.  As a condition of his employment, the employee signed a “protective covenants agreement” that included non-solicitation, non-competition, and confidentiality provisions.  This agreement contained a Massachusetts choice-of-law provision and a Massachusetts choice-of-venue provision.  Continue reading Massachusetts Court Rules California Law Supersedes Massachusetts Choice-of-Law Provision and Non-Compete Clause in Employment Contract

White House Recommends Non-Compete Reforms

By Shannon Hampton Sutherland and Gregory S. Bombard

Last week, the White House called on states to enact sweeping reforms to their non-compete laws. The White House’s new policy position is that “most workers should not be covered by a non-compete agreement” and that, although “each state faces different circumstances,” many employers have sufficient other targeted remedies to protect their legal interests.

In its policy statement, the White House called on states to enact “non-compete” reforms, including one or more of the following: Continue reading White House Recommends Non-Compete Reforms

Negotiating and Enforcing Protective Orders in Trade Secret Cases

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On June 9, 2016, Duane Morris attorney Gregory S. Bombard moderated a panel at the Boston Bar Association on “Negotiating and Enforcing Protective Orders in Trade Secret Cases.”  The panel discussed best practices for protecting a client’s secret information during litigation, from discovery through motion practice and trial.  Michael R. Gottfried, the managing partner of Duane Morris’s Boston office, spoke about his experience using trade secret information at trial.   Also on the panel were Kenneth Berman of Nutter, McClennen & Fish and Sarah Herlihy of Jackson Lewis.

For more information, please contact Mr. Gottfried or Mr. Bombard of the Boston office or the members of the Non-Compete and Trade Secrets Practice.

The Long Smoldering Debate About Noncompetition Reform in Massachusetts Is Re-Ignited by House Speaker

By Bronwyn L. Roberts and Gregory S. Bombard

On March 2, 2016, Massachusetts House Speaker Robert A. DeLeo promised to put new legislative limits on noncompetition agreements, reigniting the debate over non-compete reform legislation that has continued since at least 2009.  In a speech to the Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce’s annual Government Affairs Forum, DeLeo said that he would push legislative reform with the following restrictions for enforceability of noncompetition agreements:

  • noncompetition agreements would be limited to one year;
  • noncompetition agreements would not apply to lower-wage workers; and
  • workers must be clearly informed that a noncompetition agreement is required before taking a job, including a “stated right to counsel.”

Continue reading The Long Smoldering Debate About Noncompetition Reform in Massachusetts Is Re-Ignited by House Speaker