NLRB Declines to Find that Bargaining Proposals Can Constitute Unlawful Threats

By: Elizabeth Mincer

On July 29, 2026, the NLRB issued its decision in Inland Waters Pollution Control, Inc., 375 NLRB No. 15, a case that, while resulting in unfair labor practice findings against the employer, contains an important and favorable clarification for management: the mere act of making a bargaining proposal at the bargaining table does not constitute an unlawful threat under Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Employers engaged in collective bargaining should take note of this decision, which reinforces the right to propose controversial contract language at the table.

Background

The case arose from a labor dispute at Inland Waters Pollution Control, Inc., a Detroit-area sewer repair company whose hourly employees were represented by Teamsters Local 247. During successor contract negotiations in December 2020, the employer proposed adding language to the grievance and arbitration procedure that would allow it to “issue disciplinary actions against employees levying baseless, malicious or harassing grievances,” including “disciplinary steps of time off or termination for serious offenders.” During the bargaining session, the employer’s fleet manager stated the language was necessary because grievances were “just totally out of hand,” and the employer’s attorney told the union’s chief steward that his “excessive amount of grievances” was “a problem” and that he should cut down on “bulls*** grievances.” The employer later withdrew the proposal.

Separately, in April 2021, unit employees voted to reject the employer’s final contract offer and went on strike. Two employees were discharged, allegedly for engaging in union and other protected concerted activities. The ALJ found violations on all counts: two unlawful discharges under Section 8(a)(3) and an independent 8(a)(1) violation for threatening employees’ grievance-filing rights at the bargaining table.

The Board’s Decision

The Board agreed that the discharges were unlawful, applying the age-old Wright Line framework. However, in a significant win for management, Chairman Murphy and Member Mayer reversed the ALJ’s finding that the employer’s bargaining proposal and accompanying statements independently violated Section 8(a)(1). The majority noted that neither the ALJ nor any party cited a case in which the Board had previously found that merely making a bargaining proposal at the table constitutes an unlawful threat. The Board declined the former General Counsel’s invitation to expand Board law in that direction.

Critically, the Board grounded its reasoning in long-standing labor policy favoring “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate in labor disputes,” citing Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 273 (1974), and the Board’s historical tolerance of “intemperate, abusive and inaccurate statements” in the context of labor disputes. The majority concluded that the General Counsel failed to prove that the statements at the bargaining table constituted an unlawful threat to discharge employees for filing grievances. Member Mayer further noted that even if the proposal, if agreed to, would have subjected employees to discipline for protected grievance-filing activities, such waivers are lawful under Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693 (1983), and therefore proposing such a waiver, standing alone, is lawful.

The Dissent

Member Prouty dissented from the majority on these points. He reasoned that the employer’s statements that grievances were “just totally out of hand” and that the chief steward should cut down on “bulls*** grievances”—made in conjunction with the proposal to discipline employees for filing grievances—conveyed that the steward’s protected activity was unacceptable and could lead to discipline or discharge.

Member Prouty argued that just because it happens in the bargaining context does not immunize otherwise coercive statements, citing ExxonMobil Research & Engineering Co. and PRC Recording Co. for the proposition that the Board has repeatedly found independent 8(a)(1) violations based on statements made at the bargaining table. He characterized the employer’s proposal as “a threat cloaked in the garb of a bargaining proposal.”

Importance for Employers

This decision provides some comfort that proposing contract language at the bargaining table—even language addressing employee conduct like grievance filing—should not, standing alone, constitute an unfair labor practice. It also confirms that the rough-and-tumble of collective bargaining remains protected space for candid, even intemperate, exchanges about bargaining positions.

That said, employers should be mindful that this decision does not provide blanket protection: the majority carefully distinguished cases involving threats of retaliatory bad-faith bargaining and emphasized that an unlawful contract proposal could still be evidence of bad-faith bargaining under Section 8(a)(5), even if no such allegation was at issue here.

House Passes Faster Labor Contracts Act: Mandatory Deadlines for First-Contract Bargaining Could Reshape Labor Relations

By: Elizabeth Mincer

On June 9, 2026, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the Faster Labor Contracts Act (H.R. 5408) in a bipartisan 220–193 vote. Introduced by Rep. Donald Norcross (D-NJ), the bill would amend Section 8(d) of the NLRA to impose mandatory time limits on negotiations for initial CBAs following union certification or recognition under Section 9(a).

The legislation would establish a structured timeline for first-contract negotiations. Specifically, an employer must meet and begin bargaining no later than 10 days after receiving a written bargaining request from a newly certified or recognized union, unless the parties mutually agree to a longer period. If no agreement is reached within 90 days of the commencement of bargaining, either party may notify the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) and request mediation.

If mediation by the FMCS does not produce agreement within 30 days, FMCS must refer the dispute to a three-person arbitration panel. That panel—comprising one member selected by each party and a mutually agreed-upon neutral—would issue a binding decision governing the terms of the CBA for two years. The arbitration decision must account for the employer’s financial status, size and type of operations, employees’ cost of living, employees’ ability to sustain themselves and their families, and wages and benefits offered by comparable employers in the same industry.

The Legislation Has Bipartisan Support and Could Become Law

This bill reached the House floor through an unusual procedural route: a discharge petition. The discharge petition secured the required 218 signatures—comprising 211 Democrats and 7 Republicans—to force a floor vote. The bill ultimately passed 220–193. It enjoys significant bipartisan cosponsorship, with 103 cosponsors.

A companion bill, S. 844, was introduced in the Senate on March 4, 2025 by Sen. Josh Hawley (R-MO), also with bipartisan support. S. 844 was read twice and referred to the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP), where it currently remains.

The breadth of cross-party support signals that lawmakers from both parties perceive the current first-contract bargaining process needs to be revamped.

Dramatic Implications for the Collective Bargaining Landscape

If enacted, the Faster Labor Contracts Act would represent a fundamental shift in private-sector labor relations—at least for initial CBA negotiations. Current law requires employers and unions to bargain in good faith but imposes no deadlines for reaching agreement. The process for bargaining a first contract can take significant time, typically more than a year and sometimes multiple years. That said, contracts are more complex than they used to be, as employers and unions have to navigate myriad issues including federal, state, and local employment-related laws.

The bill’s calendar-driven framework would move first-contract bargaining from an open-ended process to a structured system of escalating intervention: mandatory bargaining within 10 days, FMCS mediation at 90 days, and binding interest arbitration at 120 days. Labor unions would hold significant leverage over the process, as any extensions of these deadlines would have to be mutually agreed.

This legislation would also significantly alter traditional impasse dynamics. Under current law, failure to reach agreement in first-contract bargaining typically leads to continued negotiation, lawful economic pressure (including strikes or lockouts), or traditional impasse mechanisms. If this bill becomes law, unresolved disputes would proceed to binding arbitration, placing the decision-making in the hands of third parties.

Again, this would provide significant leverage for labor unions because unions would have a fast path to a first contract without the need for protracted economic pressure campaigns (i.e., strikes). Unilateral implementation by an employer of a last, best, and final contract would, effectively, no longer exist.

Based on the current iteration of the legislation, it is not entirely clear who would have to pay for all this. Arbitration can be expensive (thousands of dollars per day), and the law would require a panel of three arbitrators. There is no mention of the government footing the bill, so the parties would likely be on the hook. Further, the mandatory mediation and the arbitration assignment processes would be coordinated through the FMCS, an agency that, over the past year, was gutted and then reconstituted via injunction. It is currently understaffed and its fate remains unclear.

While the concept of speeding along negotiations for a first contract may be tempting for lawmakers seeking labor lobby support, the bill as written would be a practical and logistical nightmare. Collective bargaining is meant to be balanced, not one-sided. This bill puts a lot of power in the hands of labor unions, and fails to take into account the time it takes to negotiate a comprehensive initial contract that will not cause other problems down the road. Rushing the process just means a greater potential for future contract disputes.

Looking Ahead

The Faster Labor Contracts Act is not yet law. It requires Senate passage and the President’s signature before taking effect. However, the bipartisan House vote and the presence of a companion bill with growing Senate support suggest this legislation has meaningful momentum. Employers may want to consider contacting their legislators about this bill so that their opinions do not go unheard. Employers currently in protracted labor negotiations should consider adjusting their bargaining strategies if this legislation gets closer to final passage and signature.

We will continue to monitor this legislation as it moves through the Senate, so follow us for updates as the situation evolves.

© 2009- Duane Morris LLP. Duane Morris is a registered service mark of Duane Morris LLP.

The opinions expressed on this blog are those of the author and are not to be construed as legal advice.

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