The Protect College Sports Act Clears the Senate: What Stakeholders Need to Know

On September 28, 2026, the U.S. Senate passed the Protect College Sports Act (S.4668), as amended, by a 77-22 vote, marking the first time either chamber of Congress has approved sweeping federal legislation governing college athletics. The bill was unveiled in late May 2026 and formally introduced on June 2, 2026, by Senators Ted Cruz (R-TX) and Maria Cantwell (D-WA). The Senate-passed version differs substantially from the introduced bill after revisions in August and September and three floor amendments. It represents the most comprehensive federal attempt to bring legal order to a college sports landscape that has been operating under a patchwork of state NIL laws, court rulings, and evolving NCAA policies since states began passing their own NIL statutes in 2021. As the Duane Morris Sports Law Blog noted when the bill was first introduced, the legislation’s significance for universities and conferences “cannot be overstated,” as it addresses the structural chaos that has defined college athletics in the post-NIL era. For college and university general counsel, athletic directors, and compliance officers, the immediate question is what issues should be anticipated now.

Key Provisions of the Bill

The bill’s material provisions are wide-ranging and would fundamentally reshape the governance of college sports. At a high level, the Protect College Sports Act would:

  • Establish a uniform federal NIL framework, preempting specified state-law requirements concerning NIL, transfers, eligibility, and student status and academics, while preserving state tort, civil rights, contract, consumer protection, and similar laws, including personal-injury claims alleging inadequate health or safety measures.
  • Lock the House v. NCAA revenue-sharing model into federal law, maintaining an approximately $21.3 million per-school annual cap for 2026-27 (up from $20.5 million in 2025-26, with 4% annual increases and a three-year reset at 22% of average shared revenue), while creating a $22.5 million retention fund plus up to $5 million more unlocked dollar-for-dollar by compensation or NIL spending on women’s, Olympic, and other non-revenue sports (maximum $27.5 million; total potential outlays of about $48.8 million).
  • Grant the NCAA and conferences a limited antitrust exemption to enforce rules governing eligibility, transfers, and compensation — a protection the industry has sought for years through multiple failed legislative efforts.
  • Impose transfer restrictions, limiting athletes to one transfer before a mandatory eligibility pause, with a five-year playing window capped at age 24.
  • Create a federal agent registry capping representation fees at 5% and requiring athletes to report NIL deals exceeding $600.
  • Mandate health and academic protections, including coverage of out-of-pocket medical costs for sports-related injuries for five years post-competition and provisions to protect opportunities in women’s and Olympic sports.

A Closer Look: The Provisions That Will Drive Institutional Risk

The headline provisions tell only part of the story. For institutions, the more consequential features sit in the bill’s mechanics, and several deserve closer scrutiny.

The compensation architecture. The bill does more than preserve the House cap. For 2026-27, the cap would be approximately $21.3 million per school (up from $20.5 million in 2025-26), with 4% annual increases and a three-year reset at 22% of average shared revenue. Schools could exceed the cap by up to $22.5 million annually through a retention fund for athletes who completed at least one full season, plus up to $5 million more unlocked dollar-for-dollar by compensation or NIL spending on women’s, Olympic, and other non-revenue sports (maximum $27.5 million), for potential total outlays of about $48.8 million. Under Sec. 115, the cap and retention fund end when the House settlement expires or terminates unless Congress passes a joint resolution; defendants must give Congress 180 days’ notice. The retention fund also sunsets nine years after enactment and is conditioned on academic benchmarks. Institutions should therefore build expiration, sunset, and academic-performance scenarios into athletics budgets rather than treat above-cap spending as permanent.

Third-party NIL and the “associated entity” test. Athletes could continue to sign outside NIL deals, but those agreements would have to serve a legitimate commercial purpose and reflect the athlete’s market value. The Senate bill adopts the House settlement’s definition of “associated entity,” including boosters and collectives, which reaches, among others, individuals who have given more than $50,000 to the athletics program. Compensation from associated entities counts toward the cap, and those deals must serve a valid business purpose and be commensurate with market comparables. The bill adds a three-part certification requirement: multimedia rights holders, sponsors, apparel companies, and vendors must certify that the institution is not the source of the athlete’s compensation; the actual funder must certify that it is the true source; and the institution, if required, must certify that it is not using the arrangement to circumvent the cap. Since NIL Go launched in June 2025, the CSC had declined to clear 1,812 deals worth roughly $90 million as of its July 2026 report, about 20% of submitted dollars. As we noted when the bill was introduced, the CSC has taken the position that redirecting corporate sponsorship dollars to rosters as third-party NIL is a way of circumventing the cap, and the bill would empower the CSC to police that conduct. Schools whose donor and collective relationships have been structured around that practice should assume those arrangements will be examined closely.

Reporting obligations. Athletes would be required to report NIL deals exceeding $600, aggregated over a 12-month period and inflation-adjusted, to their school and association within five days. A five-day window is tight. The athlete bears the reporting duty, but the institution will realistically bear the operational burden of intake, tracking, and follow-up, and of explaining any gaps.

The antitrust shield, and its limits. The limited antitrust exemption is the structural foundation on which the rest of the bill rests, and it has eluded the industry through years of failed legislative attempts, including the House’s SCORE Act, which stalled before a floor vote. The sponsors have framed the Sec. 118 protection as targeted legal certainty rather than blanket immunity. The safe harbor is conditional: it applies only if the association adopts rules implementing all covered categories, and compliance with the revenue cap is a condition. The bill also creates a private right of action for athletes, subject to 30-day notice and cure, except for physical injury, death, or sexual abuse claims; pre-dispute arbitration is barred. That distinction matters. The protection attaches to enforcement of the new rules, so institutions and conferences that act outside the statutory framework should not assume they are insulated from suit.

Governance, coaching, and media rights. The bill limits in-season coaching movement for FBS football coaches and key staff taking over another program in the same season. It also imposes merger and acquisition limits on power conferences with more than $700 million in revenue, sets a 20-member ceiling (raised from 19 by the adopted Moody-Blumenthal floor amendment), provides a three-year independent period for schools switching power conferences that sunsets after six years, and bars entities such as private equity from acquiring schools’ media rights to form a new league. Media pooling requires approval from 75% of FBS institutions. These changes carry direct contractual and governance consequences for athletic departments and conference offices. Proponents estimate pooled media rights could generate $4 billion to $8 billion in additional revenue, although the SEC and Big Ten have said they would not participate. Notably, a floor amendment to cap coach pay at $5 million narrowly failed, but institutions with more than $80 million in athletic revenue may not pay coaches more than $500,000 from funds other than college sports revenue or athletic-department donations.

Health and safety mandates. Schools would be required to cover out-of-pocket medical costs for sports-related injuries, including for five years after an athlete’s final competition, and to carry catastrophic injury coverage above $90,000. The bill would also establish a $60 million association medical trust fund, expandable to $100 million, for lower-revenue schools and long-term conditions such as CTE, and guarantee scholarship and degree completion for 10 years after eligibility ends. These are new, affirmative federal standards, and institutions that fall short face potential exposure.

What the bill leaves unresolved. Several open issues should be on every general counsel’s radar. First, the bill stays neutral on whether athletes are employees, which leaves the possibility of employee status or collective bargaining alive. Second, the bill includes a Title IX savings clause, while the House settlement has faced Title IX challenges on appeal at the Ninth Circuit. Third, the women’s and Olympic sports protection in Sec. 125 applies only to institutions with at least $50 million in athletic revenue, requires maintaining 2024-25 roster and scholarship levels, and is subject to nine-year and four-year sunsets. Fourth, the HBCU program authorizes, but does not appropriate, $180 million per year for fiscal years 2027-2032. Federal preemption will simplify some questions, but narrowed preemption and preserved state-law claims will not eliminate litigation risk.

The Senate Vote and the Road Ahead

The bill passed late Monday night after nearly six hours of debate. The Senate voted on seven amendments, three of which were adopted: the Baldwin preemption carve-out (96-1), the Scott foreign-financing disclosure amendment, and the Moody-Blumenthal amendment raising the membership ceiling to 20. Opposition was pointed. Sen. Cory Booker urged colleagues to postpone the vote, citing the bill’s impact on athletes, especially Black athletes, and all four Black Democrats in the Senate voted against the procedural motion on a bill strongly opposed by the NAACP.

The adopted Scott amendment requires colleges, conferences, and associations to disclose amounts over $600 received from a foreign adversary, state-owned enterprise, or sovereign wealth fund.

While the Senate vote was a landmark moment, the bill’s path to enactment remains uncertain. The House of Representatives is not scheduled to return until November 9, 2026, after the midterms, and will face competing priorities including a government funding deadline on December 11. Critically, if the House does not pass the bill before the new Congress is sworn in on January 3, 2027, the legislation dies. The House’s own college sports bill — the SCORE Act — never reached a House floor vote, and House Republicans have signaled they want changes, including a ban on athlete employment status, limits on international players (including the proposed TEAM USA Act’s 20% roster limit), the conference-expansion clause, the private right of action, and HBCU funding. Any House changes would send the bill back to the Senate. Speaker Johnson has said he will take it up after the midterms. That said, President Trump has publicly urged lawmakers to pass the bill, and the strong bipartisan Senate vote of 77-22 gives it meaningful momentum.

What Schools and Compliance Departments Should Be Doing Now

For universities and their compliance offices, now is the time to prepare rather than wait. As the Duane Morris Sports Law Blog has advised, institutions “should not wait for final passage to begin preparing.” Stakeholders should closely monitor the House’s legislative calendar and any amendments that emerge, assess how the bill’s transfer restrictions and revenue-sharing caps would affect current roster management and NIL contract structures, and review compliance frameworks for the new agent registry and reporting requirements. Institutions that want to be ready should focus on the following:

  • Audit existing NIL and revenue-sharing agreements. Review current athlete agreements against the bill’s legitimate-business-purpose and market-value requirements, and identify any contract terms that interact with the one-transfer rule and eligibility pause.
  • Map donor and collective relationships. Identify boosters, collectives, and other parties that may qualify as associated entities under the House settlement definition, which reaches, among others, individuals who have given more than $50,000 to the athletics program. Sponsorship arrangements that route money to the roster should be revisited now.
  • Build a reporting and intake process. Put systems in place to capture athlete-reported deals above $600 within the five-day window, and train athletes and staff on the obligation.
  • Tie academic performance to budget planning. Because retention-fund eligibility depends on graduation and academic progress benchmarks, compliance should model where the institution stands before relying on above-cap spending.
  • Prepare for agent regulation. Develop protocols to verify agent registration and the 5% fee cap, since athletic departments have been operating in a largely unregulated agent market. The FTC’s January 12, 2026, inquiry letters to 20 Division I universities under SPARTA already signal growing federal interest in this area.
  • Review insurance and medical-cost coverage. Confirm that catastrophic injury coverage and post-eligibility medical obligations can be met, and price the long-tail cost of the five-year coverage requirement.
  • Revisit coaching contracts and conference obligations. In-season coaching movement limits and media-rights pooling will affect employment agreements and conference-level commitments.
  • Keep a Title IX and employment-status contingency plan. Neither issue is resolved by the bill, so institutions should keep monitoring the House appeal and labor developments.
  • Run sunset and budget scenarios. Model the financial effects of the House settlement’s expiration and the retention fund’s nine-year sunset, including academic-benchmark contingencies.
  • Build third-party certification protocols. Establish certification procedures for multimedia rights holders, sponsors, apparel companies, and vendors involved in NIL arrangements.
  • Inventory foreign-funding disclosures. Identify amounts over $600 received from foreign adversaries, state-owned enterprises, and sovereign wealth funds and prepare the required reporting process.
  • Review state-law litigation exposure. Reassess personal-injury, civil-rights, contract, consumer-protection, and similar claims in light of narrowed preemption and the private right of action.
  • Check roster and scholarship baselines. Compare current women’s and Olympic sports rosters and scholarship levels against 2024-25 baselines.
  • Review conference realignment and media-rights strategy. Assess the implications of the 20-member ceiling, power-conference limits, independent period, media-rights restrictions, and pooling requirements.

Whether the bill reaches the President’s desk in its current form, is modified in the House, or ultimately stalls, the direction of travel is clear: federal regulation of college sports is no longer a hypothetical — it is an active legislative reality that demands attention.

Vietnam Horse Race Betting: Navigating the Regulatory Track

By Dr. Oliver Massmann

For many years, Vietnam’s horse race betting industry resembled a race without a rulebook.

Investors were attracted by the prospect of participating in one of Asia’s fastest-growing economies, yet they faced a fundamental challenge: horse race betting had been permitted through limited pilot projects, but there was no comprehensive legal framework governing licensing, operation, investor qualifications, betting products or regulatory supervision.

That is no longer the case.

The legal landscape changed fundamentally with the issuance of Decree No. 06/2017/ND-CP on the Business of Betting on Horse Racing, Greyhound Racing and International Football, which established Vietnam’s first comprehensive regulatory framework governing licensed betting activities. The sector has therefore moved beyond the question of legalization and entered a new phase focused on implementation, compliance and commercial viability.

Read the full article on the Duane Morris Vietnam Blog.

When State Lines Become the Playing Field: The Chicago Bears’ Stadium Standoff and What It Means for Sports Development Law

By Michael R. Barz

The Chicago Bears’ search for a new stadium has become one of the most complex sports development stories in recent memory. In September 2021, the Bears entered into a purchase and sale agreement with Churchill Downs for the 326-acre site of the former Arlington International Racecourse in Arlington Heights, completing the $197.2 million purchase in February of 2023. When subsequent property tax negotiations with Arlington Heights stalled, Chicago and the State of Illinois entered the picture with their own competing proposal near Soldier Field. Then Indiana raised the stakes: Governor Mike Braun signed Senate Bill 27 in February 2026, establishing the Northwest Indiana Stadium Authority to help finance a potential Bears stadium in Hammond, Indiana, about 25 miles from downtown Chicago. As of early June 2026, Illinois lawmakers adjourned their spring session without passing a stadium bill, and the franchise stated it would “finalize its evaluation of both Arlington Heights and Hammond” on a late spring/early summer timeline.

The competing offers highlight how differently states can structure sports infrastructure deals. Indiana assembled a streamlined regional stadium authority empowered to issue state-backed bonds and leverage up to $1 billion in public financing, while establishing a Tax Increment Financing (TIF) district to funnel hotel, restaurant, and retail tax revenues back into stadium debt service. Additional financing mechanisms under SB 27 include a 12% ticket tax on all stadium events, a potential countywide 1% food and beverage tax in Lake and Porter Counties, and a doubling of Lake County’s innkeeper’s tax. Illinois, by contrast, struggled to coalesce around any framework: its Senate bill would have enabled Cook County municipalities to create local stadium authorities empowered to issue revenue bonds, with surrounding mixed-use development eligible for tax increment financing designation—but the House adjourned without voting on it.

Any move—whether to Arlington Heights, Hammond, or back to a Chicago site—must account for the team’s existing Soldier Field lease, under which the Bears could owe approximately $90 million if they depart before 2033—meaningful, but manageable relative to the scale of the overall project. The more consequential legal takeaway from the Illinois legislative failure is structural: Governor Pritzker recently noted that 38 states already have PILOT megaproject laws, characterizing Illinois as “literally behind the curve” with a “disorganized, dysfunctional” approach to property tax negotiation for large developments. Indiana’s ability to quickly assemble a credible, multi-layered financing package reflects years of enabling legislation that Illinois simply does not yet have. Counsel advising teams, municipalities, or lenders in these transactions must understand not only the deal structure itself, but whether the underlying statutory framework in a given jurisdiction can actually support it.

In order to meet the Bears’ stated timeline, Illinois would need to call a special legislative session this summer as its lawmakers are not scheduled to reconvene until November; noting, however, that any bill passed after the May 31 deadline established by the Illinois Constitution would require a three-fifths supermajority to take immediate effect. A move to Indiana would add the Bears to the long list of NFL franchises that have crossed city or state lines in search of better stadium terms and would offer a meaningful new template for how layered public finance tools can be used to attract a franchise to a jurisdiction without an existing NFL presence.

Ultimately, the broader lesson to be learned here may be that it becomes increasingly difficult for a team to complete its financing objectives when trying to structure a deal built on hastily assembled or legally untested enabling legislation. The saga of Oakland and the relocation of its legendary franchises offers a cautionary tale: the multi-year failure to produce a workable public financing framework contributed to the loss of both the Raiders and the Athletics to Las Vegas, each time ceding ground to a jurisdiction that had done the legislative groundwork in advance.

The Protect College Sports Act: What Universities and Conferences Need to Know

On May 27, 2026, Senators Cruz and Cantwell announced the Protect College Sports Act, a sweeping bipartisan bill that represents the most comprehensive federal attempt yet to impose legal order on college athletics. For universities and conferences, the significance of this legislation cannot be overstated. The bill would grant the NCAA and the College Sports Commission a long-sought limited antitrust exemption, enabling them to enforce rules governing athlete eligibility, transfers, and compensation ostensibly without the constant threat of state court litigation or competing state NIL regimes. The attempted antitrust shield, which has eluded the industry through years of failed legislative attempts – including the recently withdrawn SCORE Act – is the structural foundation on which the rest of the bill’s reforms rest. At the same time, the bill formalizes key elements of the House v. NCAA settlement into federal law, codifying the revenue-sharing framework while empowering the College Sports Commission (CSC) to police alleged above-cap spending – which the CSC has asserted includes the redirecting of corporate sponsorship dollars to rosters as third-party NIL to circumvent the $21.3 million annual cap.  

For some programs utilizing creative measures to compensate their athletes, passage of this bill would represent a fundamental change in the compliance environment. The bill also limits in-season coaching movement, prohibits the formation of a so-called super league, creates an agent registry capping representation fees at 5%, and permits the pooling of media rights – all provisions that carry direct contractual and governance consequences for athletic departments and conference offices.

If this bill is enacted into law, institutions will face substantial operational and legal challenges. The transfer restriction provisions alone – limiting athletes to one transfer before a mandatory eligibility pause, with narrow exceptions – will require universities to revisit their roster management strategies, revisit NIL and revenue-sharing contract structures, and reexamine how those agreements interact with transfer portal activity. The bill’s provisions around athlete health, safety, and academic protections establish new mandatory standards that institutions will be required to meet, creating potential exposure for schools that fall short. The agent registry and fee-cap provisions will require robust compliance frameworks for athletic departments accustomed to operating in a largely unregulated agent market. And, while codifying the House settlement structure may bring stability, it also locks institutions into a compensation model still under active appellate review for its Title IX implications.. Equally notable is what the bill does not resolve: it leaves the employment status of athletes largely open, explicitly preserving the possibility that athletes could eventually be deemed employees or pursue collective bargaining. For institutions, that means managing long-term labor risk under a federal framework that has not foreclosed the most consequential question in the industry.

The path to enactment remains uncertain. The bill’s reception has already revealed fault lines within the industry itself, as the SEC and Big Ten commissioners were notably absent from a letter endorsing the bill signed by ACC and Big 12 leadership, and SEC Commissioner Greg Sankey has publicly questioned the process of endorsing legislation before reviewing the final draft. Nonetheless, the bipartisan architecture of the bill gives it a realistic chance of advancing further than its predecessors. Universities and conferences should not wait for final passage to begin preparing. The attorneys at Duane Morris’s Sports Law Group are closely monitoring the bill’s progress and are available to assist universities, conferences, and other industry stakeholders in navigating the legal implications as this legislation develops.

New Bill Seeks to “Let Kids Play” by Limiting Private Equity in Youth Sports

By  AJ Rudowitz, Joseph J. Machi, Rebecca A. Guzman and Bryan Shapiro

On May 13, 2026, a bicameral coalition of Democratic lawmakers introduced the Let Kids Play Act, a sweeping piece of legislation that would effectively ban private equity from the youth sports industry. The bill represents the most direct federal legislative challenge yet to the growing consolidation of youth sports by institutional investors and it carries significant legal, regulatory and business implications for every stakeholder in the industry.

Read the full Alert on the Duane Morris LLP website.

Agent Representation in Collegiate Athletics: The FTC Dips its Toe in the Waters of Regulatory Enforcement

As the calendar turns from 2025 to 2026, developments in college athletics continue to unfold at a rapid pace, with meaningful implications for universities, athletes, agents, and other industry participants.

Just last month, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) signaled that the federal government may be turning its attention to the largely unregulated market of agents representing college athletes.  The FTC publicized that it had sent letters to twenty National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) member institutions seeking information relevant to determining whether sports agents representing student-athletes of those schools had complied with the requirements of the Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act (“SPARTA”), a rarely invoked federal statute enacted more than two decades ago.

For now, the FTC’s actions represent only a limited informational request from a relatively small number of schools; however, the FTC’s January 2026 letters represent one of the most visible compliance initiatives undertaken pursuant to SPARTA since its enactment. The FTC’s inquiry underscores the broader reality that college athletics remains a deeply unsettled landscape, presenting novel and evolving challenges that increasingly require sophisticated legal guidance.

The Largely Unregulated Market for Collegiate Sports Agents

Prior to the name, image, and likeness (“NIL”) boom, sports agents representing college athletes in negotiations with their own institutions or other industry participants was effectively unheard of due to the prohibition on student-athletes receiving compensation of any kind. That changed rapidly over the past five years. The NCAA’s retreat on NIL restrictions, combined with the advent of permissible revenue-sharing models, fundamentally altered the economics of college sports. Almost overnight, a cottage industry of “collegiate” sports agents emerged to represent athletes in negotiations with universities, NIL collectives, and third-party sponsors.

In professional sports, agent conduct is largely regulated through collectively bargained frameworks. For example, under the National Football League’s current Collective Bargaining Agreement, the NFL Players Association is responsible for agent certification and discipline, establishing standards of conduct and acting as a gatekeeper for those seeking to represent NFL players.

Currently, college athletics has no comparable structure. Absent any federal legislation, and because college athletes have not been universally recognized as employees, there is no players’ union, no collective bargaining, no certification regime, and no industry-wide standards governing agent conduct. As a result, virtually anyone—regardless of experience or qualification—may represent the hundreds of thousands of college athletes in the United States.

The absence of any certification and industry oversight increases the risk of abusive practices and unprofessional conduct, potentially harming not only athlete clients but also the institutions and third parties with whom agents negotiate.

The FTC Invokes SPARTA

Against that backdrop, it is unsurprising that the FTC has taken preliminary steps to address this void. On January 12, 2026, the agency sent form letters to twenty unidentified schools seeking documents and information concerning sports agents who had represented student-athletes at those institutions. Specifically, the FTC requested:

  • Identifying information for agents who represented student-athletes;
  • The dates on which agents notified schools that student-athletes had entered into agency contracts;
  • Whether the schools had received complaints or reports concerning agent conduct; and
  • Copies of agency contracts entered into by student-athletes at the schools.

The FTC grounded its requests in SPARTA, a federal statute enacted in 2004 to protect student-athletes and preserve the integrity of amateur collegiate athletics. SPARTA applies to any contractual agreement authorizing an individual “to negotiate or solicit on behalf of the student athlete a professional sports contract or an endorsement contract.”  15 U.S.C. § 7801(1).

Among other things, SPARTA prohibits agents from furnishing improper inducements or making false statements to secure representation, requires specific disclosures to student-athletes, and obligates agents to notify athletic institutions when an agency contract is executed. 15 U.S.C. § 7802. Notably, however, neither SPARTA nor its implementing regulations require that agency contracts be provided to schools or the NCAA. SPARTA does, however, attach certain monetary penalties for statutory violations, although it has rarely been enforced.

In addition, SPARTA is triggered only when an agency contract authorizes negotiation of a professional sports contract or an endorsement contract. Consequently, while most NIL brand deals fall within its purview, representation focused solely on university–athlete compensation or revenue‑sharing arrangements may not. Most agency agreements authorize endorsement negotiations, and thus SPARTA would apply even where the agent’s primary work involves institutional compensation. SPARTA’s trigger turns on contractual authority. Gray areas arise with bundled services (e.g., roster retention payments paired with brand activations) or collective‑funded arrangements that include marketing deliverables. In those mixed contexts, counsel should assume SPARTA coverage and structure disclosures and notices accordingly.

Despite the countless changes over the last decade that have reshaped college sports, SPARTA has largely remained dormant. Federal oversight of sports agents has not been a significant priority for Congress or the FTC, and reported enforcement activity under the statute has been minimal. However, it appears that such dormancy is starting to change, and the FTC’s January 2026 letters indicate a growing interest for federal oversight of agency representation in college sports.

What Comes Next?

How far the FTC’s inquiry will extend—and how consequential it will be—remains uncertain. Even if all twenty recipient institutions are Division I FBS schools, they represent less than fifteen percent of such programs nationwide.  The FTC’s requests are also relatively narrow and, in some cases, seek information schools may not possess. More fundamentally, SPARTA is not a substitute for a comprehensive certification regime or uniform industry standards. Any durable solution will likely require congressional action or a collectively bargained framework, which could provide stakeholders with some stability in an otherwise fragmented and increasingly risky regulatory landscape.

University of Utah Advances Private Equity Model for College Athletics Funding

The University of Utah is advancing a groundbreaking agreement with private-equity firm Otro Capital that is expected to generate more than $500 million for its athletics program. The deal creates a new for-profit entity, Utah Brands & Entertainment LLC, which will manage the commercial and revenue operations of the school’s athletic department, such as sponsorships, ticketing, licensing, concessions, and media-related revenue. The University of Utah will retain majority ownership and board control, while Otro Capital and a select group of major donors will acquire minority stakes.

This arrangement represents a significant shift in how a public university structures and finances its athletics operations. By blending private investment with donor participation, the model provides access to substantial capital at a time when athletic departments face rising costs tied to facilities, NIL activity, and anticipated revenue-sharing with student athletes. It also introduces new legal considerations, including governance design, transparency obligations for a for-profit entity attached to a public institution, and potential securities and conflict-of-interest issues arising from donor-investors gaining equity positions.

The partnership may also signal a broader trend toward hybrid public-private financing in college sports. The University of Utah is not the first to spin off its athletic department’s revenue streams into a private entity.  However, the creation of a new for-profit entity, one that is majority-owned by the school but supported by private investors, underscores how rapidly the financial pressures of college sports are accelerating. Rising operational costs, the expansion of NIL opportunities, and the likelihood of direct revenue sharing with athletes have pushed universities to explore alternative funding mechanisms. For college athletics more broadly, the University of Utah’s model may become a blueprint. By blending university control with outside capital and professionalized operational management, the structure is designed to meet the commercial realities of today’s sports landscape while still preserving institutional oversight. If successful, this could influence everything from facilities funding and media rights strategy to athlete compensation and long-term planning. It also raises larger questions about how institutions reconcile what they have long dubbed as “amateurism” and their mission, with the sport’s growing commercial pressures.

Ultimately, the deal signals a broader evolution: college athletics is moving quickly toward professionalized, capital-intensive operations, and private equity (or debt) is likely to become a more common part of that ecosystem.

NASCAR Settles Antitrust Lawsuit with Racing Teams

On December 11, 2025, NASCAR settled an ongoing and closely watched antitrust trial brought by two racing teams, 23XI Racing (co-owned by Michael Jordan) and Front Row Motorsports, in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of North Carolina. The settlement was announced after the plaintiffs had presented their case-in-chief and following testimony from several high-profile witnesses, including Jordan. The financial terms of the settlement have not been publicly disclosed, but the agreement aims to provide a more equitable business framework for teams in the sport.

Read the full Alert on the Duane Morris website.

Georgia Seeks Enforcement of Liquidated Damages Provision in Ongoing NIL Conflict

The University of Georgia, through the University’s athletic association (UGAA), is seeking damages totaling $390,000 against a former football player, Damon Wilson II, after he elected to transfer to Missouri following the 2024 season.  The demand stems from a clause in Wilson’s NIL contract that required him to forfeit the balance of his agreement if he transferred to another school.

Wilson signed a 14-month NIL deal in December 2024 through a third-party collective, reportedly worth $500,000 if he completed the full term. Payments were structured as monthly installments of $30,000, with two additional $40,000 bonuses contingent on compliance through future transfer-portal windows. The contract, however, also contained a liquidated-damages provision requiring that if Wilson left the team or entered the transfer portal, he would owe the remaining value of the contract in a lump sum. After reportedly receiving only one monthly payment before declaring his intent to transfer, the University—through its athletic association—has asserted that he now owes $390,000 under the exit clause.

This lawsuit carries outsized significance because it may become one of the first true test cases on the enforceability of buyout-style and liquidated-damages provisions in NIL agreements. To date, such clauses have been rare, largely untested, and clouded by uncertainty under traditional contract principles. A judicial decision upholding UGAA’s position could set a powerful precedent—effectively signaling to schools, collectives, and athletes nationwide that exit-fee mechanisms are viable and enforceable. Such a ruling could rapidly accelerate the adoption of buyout provisions across NIL contracts and fundamentally reshape the architecture of athlete compensation and mobility in the NIL era.

At the same time, the case squarely presents the question of whether the $390,000 figure represents a legitimate, good faith estimate of the collective’s anticipated losses or whether it crosses the line into an unenforceable penalty. Under longstanding contract law principles, liquidated-damages provisions are permissible only when they reasonably approximate the actual harm expected at the time of contracting. If a court concludes that the amount is disproportionate, punitive, or untethered to any measurable loss, the clause could be struck down as an impermissible penalty.  Such a ruling could have an immediate effect on NIL and revenue share agreements across the country, as many contain similar purported liquidated damages provisions.

Wilson’s case could ultimately help set the first meaningful precedent on whether liquidated-damages clauses can function as an effective and legally defensible substitute for traditional buyout fees. If courts bless this model, it may open the door to a new era in NIL contracting—one in which exit-fee structures become a standard tool for shaping athlete mobility, program stability, and the broader economics of college sports.

NCAA Resets Rules on Student-Athlete Betting on Professional Sports

In a notable rebuke to the Division I Council’s recent policy push, NCAA Division I member schools have voted by a two-thirds majority to rescind a previously approved rule change that would have allowed student-athletes and athletics department staff to place wagers on professional sports. The proposal—introduced by the Council in October and scheduled to take effect on November 22, 2025—triggered swift and widespread backlash across the sports, media, and entertainment sectors. Following a 30-day review period, more than 240 Division I institutions voted to roll back the measure, reaffirming the NCAA’s longstanding prohibition on all forms of sports betting by student-athletes and athletics personnel.  

Recent Investigations Heightening Scrutiny

Critics of the proposed rule change warned that the measure carried significant risks for the integrity of both collegiate and professional competition. Opponents emphasized that permitting student-athletes to wager on the very professional leagues they hope to enter could create inherent conflicts of interest, particularly in light of their relationships with scouts, prospective teammates, and coaches. They also cautioned that access to privileged or insider information—whether obtained intentionally or inadvertently—could undermine competitive fairness and expose student-athletes to substantial legal, ethical, and compliance concerns.

In line with the integrity risks, the NCAA’s reversal comes in the wake of several high-profile scandals, which likely contributed to the NCAA’s decision. For example, just days after the NCAA’s proposal was announced in October, certain NBA players were charged in a federal gambling investigation for allegedly sharing inside information and manipulating their performance, and certain MLB players were charged on counts including wire fraud and conspiracy to influence sporting events. In the college game, the NCAA permanently revoked the eligibility of numerous Division I men’s basketball players for placing bets on their own games, sharing inside information, and manipulating performance to influence prop bets and has announced ongoing investigations against many more, involving allegations of wagering on their own contests, sharing non-public information, and attempting to influence game outcomes.

The membership vote reflects a recalibration by the NCAA, which appeared poised to capitalize on the expanding legalized sports-wagering market by relaxing its long-standing restrictions. But the recent wave of high-profile gambling investigations likely underscored the inherent risks of such a change. In effect, while the sports-betting industry continues its rapid growth, the NCAA has stepped back from a policy that might have opened the door to new revenue opportunities—pulling the proposal before it ever truly got off the sideline.

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The opinions expressed on this blog are those of the author and are not to be construed as legal advice.

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