Arbitrating Internal Affairs Disputes: Two New Chancery Opinions Chart the Path Under DGCL § 122(18)

Two recent Delaware Court of Chancery opinions—Mayya v. Lee (C.A. No. 2023-0382-NAC, July 27, 2026) and The Special Committee of Iridium Industries, Inc. v. Sassouni (C.A. No. 2025-1488-NAC, Aug. 5, 2026)—offer critical guidance for transactional practitioners seeking to route internal corporate governance disputes to arbitration via stockholder agreements.  These two opinions follow closely on the heels of an April 2026 opinion from the same court addressing these matters, which this blog discussed here.

The Legislative Evolution of Section 122(18)

Before August 2024, Delaware law firmly held that fiduciary duty and other internal affairs claims were “status-based” and arose independent of any contract. Under the Delaware Supreme Court’s Parfi Holding framework, and in subsequent application of that framework, corporations wishing to route internal affairs claims to a particular forum could only do so through charter or bylaw provisions compliant with DGCL § 115. A provision in a stockholder agreement or other contract simply “would not do the trick.”

The General Assembly abrogated that precedent by enacting Senate Bill 313, effective August 1, 2024, which added § 122(18) to the DGCL. This provision authorizes Delaware corporations and their stockholders to agree—through stockholder agreements covered by the statute—to route claims implicating the corporation’s internal affairs to non-Delaware fora, including arbitration. As Vice Chancellor Cook explained in Mayya, “Section 122(18) takes a different approach” by “authoriz[ing] stockholder agreements that route internal affairs claims related thereto exclusively to a non-Delaware forum.”

Two Cases, Two Outcomes

In Mayya v. Lee, the Court denied a motion to compel arbitration of fiduciary duty claims arising from a controlling stockholder’s alleged self-dealing. The reason was temporal: this action commenced in March 2023—over a year before § 122(18) took effect. Because the statute expressly provides it “shall not apply to or affect any civil action or proceeding completed or pending on or before” its effective date, the pre-122(18) regime controlled, and, therefore, the parties lacked authority to agree in advance to arbitrate those fiduciary claims via its stockholder agreements.

By contrast, in Iridium Industries, decided just nine days later, the same Vice Chancellor granted a motion to stay proceedings pending arbitration. There, a longstanding stockholder agreement from 1998 contained a broad arbitration clause covering “any claim or controversy” pertaining to the company. Because no statutory temporal bar applied, the Court held that § 122(18) “statutorily abrogated the Independent-Source Principle” as to stockholder agreements, meaning the arbitration clause would be enforced according to its terms—even for claims implicating the board’s authority under § 141(a).

Practical Takeaways

These opinions confirm that stockholder agreements are now a powerful vehicle for directing governance disputes away from public, often-lengthy, and usually very expensive open-court litigation in state or federal courts. Thus, practitioners structuring investments, joint ventures, or closely held company arrangements should consider these lessons where a smaller stockholder base makes it both desirable and feasible:

  • Draft broad arbitration clauses in stockholder agreements. The Iridium court enforced a clause covering “any claim or controversy . . . arising out of or pertaining to” the company. Broad language, paired with incorporation of institutional rules empowering arbitrators to decide their own jurisdiction, maximizes enforceability.
  • Ensure the agreement qualifies under § 122(18). The statute applies to stockholder agreements—not all contracts. Practitioners should confirm compliance with the statute’s requirements.
  • Consider the Delaware Rapid Arbitration Act (DRAA). The DRAA offers a best-of-both-worlds solution: arbitration that is private, faster, and less expensive than traditional litigation, and could be conducted by retired Delaware jurists justices who bring deep expertise in corporate law. For parties who value the predictability and sophistication of Delaware jurisprudence but prefer the efficiency and confidentiality of arbitration, designating the DRAA as the governing framework in a stockholder agreement’s arbitration clause may be an ideal option.  This blog has discussed the DRAA here, and here.
  • Mind the temporal limitation. As Mayya demonstrates, § 122(18) does not apply to proceedings pending before its August 1, 2024 effective date—regardless of subsequent amendments to the complaint or substitution of parties.

The 2024 Delaware General Corporation Law Amendments Are Effective August 1

Several amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL), articulated in Delaware Senate Bill 313 (SB 313), have been adopted by the Delaware General Assembly and signed into law by Governor John Carney. These amendments will take effect on August 1, 2024, and will apply retroactively to all contracts and agreements (including merger and consolidation agreements) made by a Delaware corporation and all contracts, agreements and documents approved by the board of directors of a Delaware corporation. We explore these amendments further below.

Read the full Alert on the Duane Morris LLP website.

Clarity at Last? Court of Chancery Confirms Corporate Officers Owe Oversight Duties

Since Chancellor William T. Allen’s seminal ruling in In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, the question of the duties owed by corporate officers, not directors, has remained unclear. For years, practitioners, academics and the courts have grappled with this question and others. Recently, Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster answered some of these questions and provided long-needed clarity, holding that corporate officers “owe a fiduciary duty of oversight as to matters within their areas of responsibility.”  While this opinion provides answers to the questions many have been asking, it also raises concerns.

To read the full Alert, visit the firm website.

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The opinions expressed on this blog are those of the author and are not to be construed as legal advice.

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