The University of Georgia, through the University’s athletic association (UGAA), is seeking damages totaling $390,000 against a former football player, Damon Wilson II, after he elected to transfer to Missouri following the 2024 season. The demand stems from a clause in Wilson’s NIL contract that required him to forfeit the balance of his agreement if he transferred to another school.
Wilson signed a 14-month NIL deal in December 2024 through a third-party collective, reportedly worth $500,000 if he completed the full term. Payments were structured as monthly installments of $30,000, with two additional $40,000 bonuses contingent on compliance through future transfer-portal windows. The contract, however, also contained a liquidated-damages provision requiring that if Wilson left the team or entered the transfer portal, he would owe the remaining value of the contract in a lump sum. After reportedly receiving only one monthly payment before declaring his intent to transfer, the University—through its athletic association—has asserted that he now owes $390,000 under the exit clause.
This lawsuit carries outsized significance because it may become one of the first true test cases on the enforceability of buyout-style and liquidated-damages provisions in NIL agreements. To date, such clauses have been rare, largely untested, and clouded by uncertainty under traditional contract principles. A judicial decision upholding UGAA’s position could set a powerful precedent—effectively signaling to schools, collectives, and athletes nationwide that exit-fee mechanisms are viable and enforceable. Such a ruling could rapidly accelerate the adoption of buyout provisions across NIL contracts and fundamentally reshape the architecture of athlete compensation and mobility in the NIL era.
At the same time, the case squarely presents the question of whether the $390,000 figure represents a legitimate, good faith estimate of the collective’s anticipated losses or whether it crosses the line into an unenforceable penalty. Under longstanding contract law principles, liquidated-damages provisions are permissible only when they reasonably approximate the actual harm expected at the time of contracting. If a court concludes that the amount is disproportionate, punitive, or untethered to any measurable loss, the clause could be struck down as an impermissible penalty. Such a ruling could have an immediate effect on NIL and revenue share agreements across the country, as many contain similar purported liquidated damages provisions.
Wilson’s case could ultimately help set the first meaningful precedent on whether liquidated-damages clauses can function as an effective and legally defensible substitute for traditional buyout fees. If courts bless this model, it may open the door to a new era in NIL contracting—one in which exit-fee structures become a standard tool for shaping athlete mobility, program stability, and the broader economics of college sports.
