The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York, recently issued a decision in Thorobird Grand LLC et al. v. M. Melnick & Co., Inc., et al., affirming the lower court’s ruling that granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on their cause of action alleging willful exaggeration of mechanic’s liens by the defendant Surety.[1] The court invalidated and discharged the Surety’s liens but denied the plaintiffs’ claim for damages under Lien Law § 39-a.
The court determined that the plaintiffs had demonstrated the Surety did not meet the statutory definition of a contractor under Lien Law § 2, thereby invalidating its liens. The plaintiffs had engaged M. Melnick & Co., Inc. as their general contractor for certain projects. In accordance with their agreement, Melnick, along with the Surety acting as Melnick’s guarantor, executed payment and performance bonds. Upon Melnick’s termination, which triggered the Surety’s obligations under the performance bond, the Surety elected to retain Melnick to complete the project.
Subsequently, the plaintiffs initiated an action asserting breach of contract claims against both Melnick and the Surety. In response, the Surety filed three mechanic’s liens for unpaid work, while Melnick filed its own liens. The Surety also counterclaimed against the plaintiffs and additional counterclaim defendants, asserting causes of action for breach of contract, quantum meruit, unjust enrichment, declaratory relief, and lien foreclosures. The plaintiffs then filed an amended complaint that included, among other claims, a cause of action for willful exaggeration of liens.
The plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on the willful exaggeration claim, contending that the Surety’s liens were invalid as a matter of law because sureties lack the right to file mechanic’s liens. In opposition, the Surety argued that it qualified as a contractor with standing to file liens and had not waived its lien rights by contract.
The court concluded that the takeover agreement between the parties was clear and unambiguous, establishing that the Surety remained in its capacity as a surety and did not assume the role of a contractor. As a result, the court found the Surety lacked standing to file mechanic’s liens. However, it declined to award damages to the plaintiffs under Lien Law § 39-a, noting that such damages are unavailable when a lien is discharged for reasons other than willful exaggeration.
This decision underscores the importance of precise contractual language and the legal distinction between a surety and a contractor in disputes involving mechanic’s liens.
Jose A. Aquino (@JoseAquinoEsq on X) is a special counsel in the New York office of Duane Morris LLP, where he is a member of the Construction Group and of the Cuba Business Group. Mr. Aquino focuses his practice on construction law, lien law and government procurement law. This blog is prepared and published for informational purposes only and should not be construed as legal advice. The views expressed in this blog are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the author’s law firm or its individual attorneys.
[1] 2024 WL 5080524 (1st Dep’t December 12, 2024)