Animal Law Developments

October 6, 2022 by Michelle Pardo

Animal Rights Activist Gets Rammed by NFL Player

By Michelle C. Pardo

The video of NFL linebacker Bobby Wagner tackling an animal rights activist who had charged the field with a smoke bomb at last week’s Los Angeles Rams – San Francisco 49ers game in Santa Clara was the subject of much (and some amusing) color commentary. But Direct Action Everywhere (DxE), the radical animal rights group behind the dangerous stunt, raises significant issues regarding player, referee, security staff and spectator safety.

The DxE activist was protesting and trying to bring attention to criminal charges against two of his fellow activists who are facing trial for the “open rescues” – the act of illegally entering and stealing animals from farms to “save” them and prevent them from entering the food supply. Wayne Hsiung, the founder of DxE (who stepped down from his leadership position due to his multiple criminal cases (see our blog post, here) is currently on trial in Utah for a 2017 raid of a pork production facility. Hsiung was previously convicted in North Carolina for another “open rescue” but received no jail time, a sentence he actually had wanted according to his social media postings. (Read our blog post about it, here). Hsiung and DxE member Paul Picklesimer are currently on trial in St. George, Utah, on felony burglary and theft charges for “Operation Deathstar” — their infiltration of a Smithfield owned pig farm in Utah. If convicted, they could face more than 10 years in prison. Other DxE protestors accepted pleas deals, but the two remaining defendants sought to go to trial to raise awareness of their cause.

Wagner noticed that security was having trouble intercepting the protestor and stepped in to stop him, with linebacker Takkarist McKinley giving him an assist. According to DxE’s press release, the protestors were cited and released from custody that night. A similar protest occurred at the season-opener Bills-Rams game, which, according to DxE, resulted in a head injury to one of its protestors. DxE also took responsibility for a protest at a Minnesota Timberwolves game back in April.

It has been reported that the protestor subsequently filed an assault complaint (with the Santa Clara police) against the Rams players, describing their conduct as “blatant assault.” But was the conduct justified under a theory of self-defense or defense of others? While an unruly fan charging the field may have done so “merely” for publicity, an unauthorized person, running onto the field and near other players and personnel, while waiving an unidentified smoking device, and resisted attempts to stop him, could reasonably be interpreted as someone who could do harm. As Wagner later told media, you “never know” the intruder’s intentions or whether they are carrying or concealing a weapon. In California, self-defense (or defense of others) is a valid defense to assault where the individual reasonably believes that he or someone else was in imminent danger of suffering bodily injury. In acting in self-defense, however, one may only use the amount of force that is reasonably necessary to defend oneself or others.

While some may view Wagner’s action as excessive force, as the video shows, prior to the tackle, others had tried to stop the protestor and failed.

Apart from self-defense, under a theory of assumption of the risk – if you run onto a football field during a game, it is reasonably foreseeable that you could be tackled and suffer injury (particularly if you choose to storm the field in a t-shirt without pads or a helmet).

For DxE members, the threat of injury or prison goes with the activist territory. In a recent Harper’s Magazine story about DxE’s press coordinator, Matt Johnson said that it made “practical sense” to go to prison for a piglet – presumably more practical than his 2018 idea to set himself on fire in order to gain attention for climate change. But for the NFL – or other sport teams or high profile entertainers that pack venues across the country – these publicity stunts can create real threats to the safety of players, security guides and even participants. This time, it may have been just a smoke bomb, but a copycat seeking to “one up” this stunt could use something far more destructive to bring attention to a cause.

In California, employers may seek a Workplace Violence Restraining Order (WVRO) on behalf of an employee, which prohibits unlawful violence or credible threats of violence against an employee. Cal. Civil Proc. §527.8. An employer must prove that the employee has suffered unlawful violence (like assault or battery) or a credible threat of violence. WVROs can order the restrained person to stay away from the employee’s workplace or not go near the employee.

An exception exists where the accused person is engaging in constitutionally protected activity, which can be a significant barrier to obtaining a WVRO against a protestor. But for those protestors that repeatedly target a business or organization or its employees, and their conduct advances from peaceful protest to threatening or engaging in bodily harm, the constitutional protections will not insulate their actions. The California WVRO procedure has been used to stop individual animal activists whose protests resulted in conduct that threatened a business’s employees.

Unfortunately, the threat of legal action against its members may not concern DxE, which reportedly saw the “biggest spike” to its website following the NFL stunt. Unfortunately, until sidelined with legal action or an actual criminal conviction with prison time, DxE protestors may continue to threaten the safety of players and other employees in pursuit of their goal: to “achieve revolutionary social and political change for animals in one generation.”

September 19, 2022 by Rebecca E. Bazan

VEGGIE Doesn’t Mean “Made of Vegetables,” California Judge Rules

In a somewhat surprising ruling, a judge in the Northern District of California last week dismissed with prejudice a false advertising case about certain MorningStar Farms products such as VEGGIE BURGERS, VEGGIE DOGS, AND VEGGIE CHIK’N. Kennard v. Kellogg Sales Co., No. 21-cv-07211 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2022), Dkt. No. 46.

The plaintiff alleged that naming the products “VEGGIE” leads reasonable consumers to believe that the products are made primarily of vegetables. Id. at 2. Because the products are actually composed primarily of non-vegetable ingredients like wheat gluten, oil, and corn syrup solids, the plaintiff alleged that the packaging is false or misleading in violation of, among other things, California’s False Advertising Law (“FAL”), Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), and Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”). Id. at 1-2. The FAL, UCL, and CLRA are very common vehicles utilized by California plaintiffs to bring lawsuits over statements they believe are false or misleading (a defendant can be liable even if its statements are technically true if they are misleading).

The defendant argued that the VEGGIE labels were not misleading because reasonable consumers understand the term VEGGIE to refer to vegetarian or meat substitute foods, not a reference to being made primarily of vegetables. Id. at 2, 5.

The Court previously dismissed the complaint once, agreeing with the defendant that reasonable consumers would not understand VEGGIE to mean made primarily from vegetables. He gave the plaintiff another chance to re-plead her case, however, to add facts showing why a significant portion of the public acting reasonably could be misled into thinking that the products were made from vegetables as opposed to grains, legumes, and oil. Id. at 2-3.

In the Amended Complaint, the plaintiff bolstered her allegations about consumer understanding with a survey that the she said demonstrated that consumers are misled by VEGGIE labeling, thinking that the products are made primarily from vegetables rather than non-vegetable plant-based ingredients. Id. at 3. The Court was not swayed, finding that the claims in the Amended Complaint were “implausible and do not support a reasonable inference that some significant portion of consumers would be misled into thinking the VEGGIE products are made primarily from vegetables as opposed to being vegetarian meat substitutes made from grains, oils, legumes, or other ingredients,” and dismissed the complaint again, this time with prejudice. Id. at 6, 14-15.

What makes this decision surprising is that the Court ruled definitively for the defendant at the motion to dismiss stage. At that stage, which usually happens early in a case before the actual facts are known, the Court is required to assume the truth of all well-pleaded factual allegations. How reasonable consumers interpret a label usually is a factual issue, not a legal one. Here, however, the plaintiff commissioned a survey prior to amending her complaint and even incorporated the survey findings into her complaint (which the Court had to accept as true when ruling on the motion to dismiss). One might have thought this would make the case particularly difficult to dispose of on a motion to dismiss.

So how did it happen? First, the Court said the label “VEGGIE” was not misleading because consumers could look for context clues. Even if the term VEGGIE was ambiguous, said the Court, consumers could look at the ingredient list on the packaging and therefore would not be misled. Id. at 6-7, 10. Second, the Court found that the plaintiff’s survey did not ask the right question. Id. at 10. The survey asked what plant-based ingredients consumers believed were primarily in the product, when it should have asked whether the term VEGGIE, taking into account the product packaging, “conveyed that the Veggie Products were meat-alternative or … were made with vegetables as opposed to other ingredients.” Id. at 10. The Court bolstered that opinion by citing to other cases where courts had determined that surveys cannot save “otherwise facially implausible consumer deception claims.” Id. at 9.

What can we take from this decision? First, both the defendant and the Court noted that it is rare for courts to decide as a matter of law that a reasonable consumer would not be deceived by a defendant’s packaging or marketing. Id. at 2, 5. Second, while it may be rare, it is not unprecedented. This decision made sure to cite as support for its position other cases holding that advertising was not misleading as a matter of law, many of which are very recent. Cases like these might be indicators that California federal courts are pushing back a bit against the wave of non-meritorious false/misleading advertising cases brought by plaintiffs under the UCL/CLRA/FAL. Look for these cases to be cited by future defendants when moving to dismiss false advertising-type cases.

September 8, 2022 by John M. Simpson

APHIS Updates Data on SARS-CoV-2 in Animals

On September 6, 2022, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture updated its “dashboard” that tracks confirmed cases of SARS-CoV-2 in animals in the United States. The data continues to show that the incidence of the COVID-19 virus in animals is quite low. Continue reading “APHIS Updates Data on SARS-CoV-2 in Animals”

September 2, 2022September 2, 2022 by Michelle Pardo

Oregon Court of Appeals Rules Animals Are Not Entitled to Legal Personhood

by Michelle C. Pardo

We previously blogged about the Oregon negligence lawsuit that animal activist group Animal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF) brought on behalf of “Justice” — an American Quarter Horse — and his self-described “guardian” against the horse’s former owner. Back in 2017, Justice (formerly named “Shadow” and renamed ostensibly for this lawsuit) was removed from his prior owner’s care for neglect and relocated to a new caretaker. Months later, Justice’s former owner pleaded guilty to first degree animal neglect and was ordered to pay for the cost of Justice’s care prior to July, 2017. Continue reading “Oregon Court of Appeals Rules Animals Are Not Entitled to Legal Personhood”

June 27, 2022 by Rebecca E. Bazan

“Habitat” Flip Flop – Fish and Wildlife and National Marine Fisheries Services Rescind Trump Administration Definition of “Habitat”

Shortly after the new regulatory definition of “habitat” went into effect, the agencies that promulgated it (the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS)) have rescinded it.

The Endangered Species Act (ESA) has been described as “the most comprehensive legislation for the preservation of endangered species ever enacted by any nation.” Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978). One of the ways it purports to do so is through the designation and protection of “critical habitat.” The Secretaries of the Interior (FWS) and Commerce (NMFS) designate “critical habitat” for threatened and endangered species. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3)(A)(i). Once “critical habitat” is designated, the ESA requires federal agencies to ensure that none of their activities (such as granting permits) will “result in the destruction or adverse modification” of the “critical habitat.” 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).

The term “critical habitat” is defined by the ESA itself, 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A), but the broader term “habitat,” is not. This may seem insignificant, but the difference between “critical habitat” and “habitat” became—one might say, critical—in the Supreme Court’s 2018 opinion Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. FWS, 139 S. Ct. 361 (2018). There, the Supreme Court held that an area cannot be designated a “critical habitat” unless it is also a “habitat,” which does not have a statutory definition. Id. at 368-369. The Supreme Court commented that “the statutory definition of ‘critical habitat’ tells us what makes habitat ‘critical,’ not what makes it ‘habitat.’” Id. at 368. The case, however, did not address what is or should qualify as “habitat.”

In response to this decision, FWS and NMFS promulgated the following regulatory definition of “habitat”: “For the purposes of designating critical habitat only, habitat is the abiotic and biotic setting that currently or periodically contains the resources and conditions necessary to support one or more life processes of a species.” 50 C.F.R. § 424.02. The “habitat definition rule” was published on December 16, 2020 became effective on January 15, 2021.

Then came a change in administration and an about-face on the “habitat definition rule.” On January 20, 2021 President Biden issued an Executive Order that required agencies to review federal regulations and actions taken between January 20, 2017 and January 20, 2021 (i.e., during the Trump administration) to determine their consistency with the Biden administration’s policy considerations.

Following that review, the agencies (FWS and NMFS) decided to rescind their own “habitat definition rule.” 87 FR 37757. They noted that the regulatory definition was unclear, confusing, and inconsistent with the conservation purposes of the ESA. Id. The agencies’ main criticism of their own previous rule is that it prevented the designation of areas that did not currently meet a species’ needs, even if the area could in the future do so due to natural processes or reasonable restoration. Id. at 37758. Rather than replace it with a different definition of “habitat,” however, the agencies determined that there should not be a single regulatory definition and that the determination should be made on a case by case basis. Id. at 37759.

The agencies gave a somewhat dissatisfying acknowledgement to the Weyerhaeuser case that set off this regulatory whiplash: “[W]e recognize the importance of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Weyerhaeuser and intend to designate as critical habitat only areas that are habitat for the given listed species.” Id. In other words, while the agencies now claim that it is impossible for them to define “habitat,” they apparently know it when they see it.

Seem clear as mud? We would not be surprised if there is future litigation regarding what constitutes “habitat,” now that the Supreme Court has made it clear that falling within the statutory definition of “critical habitat” is not sufficient and there is not currently a case law, statutory, or regulatory definition of “habitat.”

June 14, 2022 by John M. Simpson

New York’s Highest Court Declares that Elephants are NOT “Legal Persons”

Today, in a major blow to animal rights and nonhuman animal “personhood” advocates, the New York Court of Appeals, in a 5-2 decision, rejected the effort by the NonHuman Rights Project (NhRP) to employ the common law writ of habeas corpus to free an Asian elephant named “Happy” from the Bronx Zoo. In re Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Breheny, No. 52 (N.Y. June 14, 2022). The case caps a long line of baseless efforts by NhRP in New York to obtain habeas relief for animals. Continue reading “New York’s Highest Court Declares that Elephants are NOT “Legal Persons””

June 10, 2022 by John M. Simpson

PETA’s Defense of Its High Euthanasia Rate Is Unconvincing

In an interview posted on Youtube on June 6, 2022, Ingrid Newkirk, founder of the animal rights group People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), discussed several subjects, including claims made in 2004 by comedy team Penn & Teller that PETA kills dogs and cats. Ms. Newkirk described the Penn & Teller claims as “cheap” and “misinformed.” (We have reported in the past (see, for example, here) on the statistics compiled by the Virginia Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (VDACS) showing that PETA’s shelter in Norfolk, Virginia has a high rate of euthanasia when compared to other shelters operating in the Commonwealth of Virginia.) According to Ms. Newkirk, PETA’s shelter is an “open admission shelter” that takes in “animals that are on their last legs” — “the dregs, if you will” — that “have the door slammed shut on them in other places.” The implication is that this is the reason for the high euthanasia rate. Ms. Newkirk stated that PETA would “never” euthanize a healthy animal.

Ms. Newkirk’s interview came on the heels of an event recently sponsored by PETA called the “Poochella Festival” which PETA described as a “multishelter adoption event” designed to help “Virginia dogs find loving homes.” According to PETA, “[o]ur shelters” — presumably PETA and the four other local animal shelters that participated in the event — “are bursting at the seams with wonderful dogs who would love to become great companions.”

Given its history of euthanizing the vast majority of dogs that it receives, the assertion that PETA is “bursting at the seams” with dogs to be adopted struck us as questionable. So, we decided to look at the reported data to see how PETA compares with the four shelters that PETA stated participated in “Poochella:” Chesapeake Animal Services, the Norfolk SPCA, Virginia Beach Animal Control, and the Virginia Beach SPCA.

Continue reading “PETA’s Defense of Its High Euthanasia Rate Is Unconvincing”

June 9, 2022June 10, 2022 by Michelle Pardo

Sound Fishy? California Court Rules That Bees are “Fish” Under State’s Endangered Species Act

by Michelle C. Pardo

A California Court of Appeal in Sacramento has created a buzz in ruling that bumblebees can be considered “fish” under the California Endangered Species Act (CESA). This decision reverses a lower court’s ruling that bumblebees – which are terrestrial invertebrates — do not fall within the categories of endangered, threatened or candidate species that the state law protects. The California Endangered Species Act (previously known as the endangered and rare animal legislation) directs the Fish and Game Commission (Commission) to establish a list of endangered and threatened species. Fish & G. Code § 2070. Originally, Section 45 of the CESA defined “fish” as “wild fish, mollusks, or crustaceans, including any part, spawn or ova thereof,” but was amended in 1969 to include invertebrates and amphibians. See Stats. 1969, ch. 689, Section 1. Subsequent amendments made only stylistic changes. See Stats. 2015, ch. 154 § 5.

In 2018, several public interest groups petitioned to list the Crotch bumblebee, the Franklin bumblebee, the Suckley cuckoo bumblebee and the Western bumblebee as endangered under the CESA.

After the Commission designated the four bumblebees as candidate species under consideration for listing as endangered, in 2019 the Almond Alliance of California, and a coalition of growers’ associations and farm and agriculture organizations, filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate, which challenged the Commission’s decision to list the bumblebees, arguing that as terrestrial invertebrates, they did not fall within the definition of protected species and are not birds, mammals, fish, amphibians, reptiles or plants. The trial court granted the writ petition, finding that the Commission had violated its legal duty, was clear legal error, and was an abuse of discretion. The trial court concluded invertebrates were denoted only as connected to a marine habitat, and therefore would not cover insects such as bumblebees.

The Court of Appeal, however delivered a stinging defeat by ruling that bees fall within the definition of “fish” in the CESA. Wait, what? While headlines jeered the “bees are now fish” ruling, a journey through the CESA’s legislative history provides the explanation.

In making its determination, the Court of Appeal noted that the application of definitional Section 45 in the CESA created “textual tension” with the Legislature’s inclusion of amphibians in various sections of the CESA and in the definition of fish. Recognizing that statutory canons are not “infallible,” the Court of Appeal looked to legislative intent. The Court found that legislative history supports the liberal interpretation of “fish” in the CESA:

“Although the term fish is colloquially and commonly understood to refer to aquatic species, the term of art employed by the Legislature in the definition of fish in section 45 is not so limited.”

Opinion, Almond Alliance of California et al. v. Fish and Game Commission (Ct. of Appeal, Sacramento)(C09352) at 2.

But the legislative history behind invertebrates and the CESA has a bit of a tortured past. As it turns out, in 1980, the Commission passed an amendment to the California Code of Regulations to include two butterflies as endangered and one butterfly and a Trinity bristle snail as “rare” (language later amended to “threatened”). For those needing a brush up on critter biology, the Trinity bristle snail is a terrestrial gastropod that is both a mollusk and an invertebrate. After the amendment was submitted to the Office of Administrative Law for approval and publication, it was disapproved because the Office determined that the CESA could not be construed to include “insects” within the definition of “birds, mammals, fish, amphibians or reptiles.”

A 1984 subsequent proposed amendment to the CESA contemplated adding “invertebrates” to the definitions of endangered and threatened species to clarify that they were protected, as well as any species the Commission previously had determined to be endangered or threatened prior to January 1, 1985 (which included invertebrates). Nevertheless, it was removed from the proposed definitions. Why was it left out? The of Department of Fish and Game concluded that sufficient authority already existed to designate invertebrates and that adding the term would be confusing.

In response to a 1998 Assembly member request to clarify whether insects are eligible for listing under the CESA, the Attorney General’s office published an opinion recognizing that insects do not fall within any of CESA’s definitional categories and therefore were not eligible for listing as threatened or endangered species.

So whose interpretation carried the day? While recognizing that formal opinions of the Attorney Generally are normally persuasive authority and entitled to great weight, the court was not persuaded that the Attorney General’s Opinion properly considered the definition section of the CESA. Opinion at 24. The court did find that the Department had a “long history of regulation and management of numerous classes of invertebrates” and indeed, three species of invertebrates already had been designated as endangered or rare (threatened) by the Commission. Id. at 21. The court also relied upon the fact that the Legislature did not act to clarify the CESA after the 2007 California Forestry Association decision (156 Cal. App.4th 1535), which ruled that Section 45’s “fish” definition applied to the endangered and threatened sections of the CESA. “When the legislature amends a statute without changing the statute in response to a prior judicial construction, it is presumed the Legislature knew of the interpretation and acquiesced to it.” Opinion at 22 (citing People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 89). The inclusion of the snail by the Legislature also was the “hook” that made the Court of Appeal find that a protected “invertebrate” could be of the terrestrial or the aquatic variety.

The Court concluded that the term “fish” was therefore a “term of art” and could encompass species that reach far beyond its colloquial meaning — a rationale that takes a bit of the “sting” out of the seemingly absurd “a bee is now a fish” headlines that followed the decision.

What are the practical effects of this ruling? For the four bumblebee species, it means that mitigation measures and alternatives may need to be considered before certain activities (hunt, pursue, catch, capture, or kill or attempt to undertake these actions) can be undertaken. Exceptions exist, including for acts of “lawful routine agricultural activities.” See Fish & Game Code § 2087 (“accidental take”).

But what of the transportation of bees into California to pollinate almond crops? California is the source of approximately 80% of the world’s almond supply and roughly 80% of all commercial bee colonies in the United States visit California to pollinate almonds. Will this “transport” of an endangered species into and throughout California be considered to be part of the routine agriculture process, require an incidental take permit, or be outright illegal? The practical effect on the California almond industry – which is extremely reliant on bees – may face an uncertain regulatory future.

April 14, 2022 by John M. Simpson

COVID-19 In Animals Continues To Be Minor Issue In U.S.

While the overwhelming focus of the COVID-19 pandemic has been on the effect that the virus has had on humankind, there have been documented cases of the SARS-CoV-2 virus infecting animals. The U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) tracks the incidence of the the virus in animals in the U.S. That analysis continues to show that infection in animals is quite small. Continue reading “COVID-19 In Animals Continues To Be Minor Issue In U.S.”

April 5, 2022 by John M. Simpson

Ecuadorian Animal Rights Decision is Mixed Bag

Animal rights activists have pointed to a recent decision by the highest court in Ecuador — the Constitutional Court (Corte Constitucional Del Ecuador) — as a breakthrough for animal rights. As the NonHuman Rights Project (NHRP) described it, the decision “constitutes one of the most important advances in the field of animal rights and environmental law in recent years. . . . The Court’s groundbreaking ruling advances the constitutional protection of animals — ranging from the level of species to the individual animal — with their own inherent value and needs.”

Upon closer examination, the Court’s Final Judgment is not as far-reaching as has been claimed. Continue reading “Ecuadorian Animal Rights Decision is Mixed Bag”