“Habitat” Flip Flop – Fish and Wildlife and National Marine Fisheries Services Rescind Trump Administration Definition of “Habitat”

Shortly after the new regulatory definition of “habitat” went into effect, the agencies that promulgated it (the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS)) have rescinded it.

The Endangered Species Act (ESA) has been described as “the most comprehensive legislation for the preservation of endangered species ever enacted by any nation.”  Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978).  One of the ways it purports to do so is through the designation and protection of “critical habitat.”  The Secretaries of the Interior (FWS) and Commerce (NMFS) designate “critical habitat” for threatened and endangered species.  16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3)(A)(i).  Once “critical habitat” is designated, the ESA requires federal agencies to ensure that none of their activities (such as granting permits) will “result in the destruction or adverse modification” of the “critical habitat.”  16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).

The term “critical habitat” is defined by the ESA itself, 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A), but the broader term “habitat,” is not.  This may seem insignificant, but the difference between “critical habitat” and “habitat” became—one might say, critical—in the Supreme Court’s 2018 opinion Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. FWS, 139 S. Ct. 361 (2018).  There, the Supreme Court held that an area cannot be designated a “critical habitat” unless it is also a “habitat,” which does not have a statutory definition.  Id. at 368-369.  The Supreme Court commented that “the statutory definition of ‘critical habitat’ tells us what makes habitat ‘critical,’ not what makes it ‘habitat.’”  Id. at 368.  The case, however, did not address what is or should qualify as “habitat.”

In response to this decision, FWS and NMFS promulgated the following regulatory definition of “habitat”: “For the purposes of designating critical habitat only, habitat is the abiotic and biotic setting that currently or periodically contains the resources and conditions necessary to support one or more life processes of a species.”  50 C.F.R. § 424.02.  The “habitat definition rule” was published on December 16, 2020 became effective on January 15, 2021.

Then came a change in administration and an about-face on the “habitat definition rule.”  On January 20, 2021 President Biden issued an Executive Order that required agencies to review federal regulations and actions taken between January 20, 2017 and January 20, 2021 (i.e., during the Trump administration) to determine their consistency with the Biden administration’s policy considerations.

Following that review, the agencies (FWS and NMFS) decided to rescind their own “habitat definition rule.”  87 FR 37757.  They noted that the regulatory definition was unclear, confusing, and inconsistent with the conservation purposes of the ESA.  Id.  The agencies’ main criticism of their own previous rule is that it prevented the designation of areas that did not currently meet a species’ needs, even if the area could in the future do so due to natural processes or reasonable restoration.  Id. at 37758.  Rather than replace it with a different definition of “habitat,” however, the agencies determined that there should not be a single regulatory definition and that the determination should be made on a case by case basis.  Id. at 37759.

The agencies gave a somewhat dissatisfying acknowledgement to the Weyerhaeuser case that set off this regulatory whiplash:  “[W]e recognize the importance of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Weyerhaeuser and intend to designate as critical habitat only areas that are habitat for the given listed species.”  Id.  In other words, while the agencies now claim that it is impossible for them to define “habitat,” they apparently know it when they see it.

Seem clear as mud?  We would not be surprised if there is future litigation regarding what constitutes “habitat,” now that the Supreme Court has made it clear that falling within the statutory definition of “critical habitat” is not sufficient and there is not currently a case law, statutory, or regulatory definition of “habitat.”

Federal Court Enjoins California Ban on Sale of Alligator and Crocodile Parts

by John M. Simpson.

On Tuesday, a federal district court in California enjoined the enforcement of Cal. Penal Code § 653o which criminalizes the sale and possession for sale of alligator and crocodile parts in California.  April in Paris v. Becerra, No. 2:19-cv-02471-KJM-CKD, consolidated with Louisiana Wildlife Fisheries Comm’n v. Becerra, No. 2:19-cv-02488-KJM-CKD (E.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2020).  Plaintiffs, business interests importing alligator and crocodile parts into California, brought the action against the California Attorney General and the Director of the state Department of Fish and Wildlife.  The law had been slated to take effect on January 1, 2020, but had been suspended pursuant to a stipulated retraining order pending the court’s decision on the preliminary injunction motion. Continue reading “Federal Court Enjoins California Ban on Sale of Alligator and Crocodile Parts”

Animal Rights Challenge to FWS Sport Trophy Decision Fails in D.C. Circuit

by John M. Simpson.

In Center for Biological Diversity v. Bernhardt, ___ F.3d ___, No. 19-5152 (D.C. Cir. June 16, 2020), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit recently affirmed a district court’s rejection of a challenge by animal rights groups to a decision by the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (FWS) to withdraw blanket findings as to whether the importation under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) of certain sport trophies of “threatened” species taken in other countries would enhance the survival and not be detrimental to the survival of those species. Continue reading “Animal Rights Challenge to FWS Sport Trophy Decision Fails in D.C. Circuit”

D.C. District Court Dismisses Endangered Species Act Case for Lack of Article III Standing

by John M. Simpson.

A U.S. District Court in the District of Columbia recently dismissed a lawsuit brought under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and the federal Administrative Procedure Act by the Center for Biological Diversity (CBD) against the Secretary of the Interior and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS).  Center for Biological Diversity v. Bernhardt, No. 18-2576 (RC) (D.D.C. Feb. 12, 2020).  CBD asserted that FWS’s guidelines for species-specific species status assessments (SSA’s) were issued without the requisite notice and comment.  The guidelines for species-specific SSA’s provide an analytical framework for the agency’s listing and critical habitat decisions under the ESA.  The court dismissed the case for lack of Article III standing. Continue reading “D.C. District Court Dismisses Endangered Species Act Case for Lack of Article III Standing”

The Case of the Austin Blind Salamander

By Michelle Pardo

Question: What do you get when you cross an Austin Blind salamander, a Barton Springs salamander, a golden-cheeked warbler, and a Texas highway project?

Answer: An Endangered Species lawsuit.

On February 28, 2019, environmental advocacy group Save Our Springs (SOS) and frequent litigator Center for Biological Diversity (Center) sent a 60-Day Notice of Intent to Sue letter to the Texas Department of Transportation (TexDOT), the US Department of Interior and the US Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), which is a prerequisite to filing a lawsuit pursuant to the  Endangered Species Act (ESA).

The ESA is a federal law that prohibits the “taking” of threatened and endangered species, 16 USC § 1538; “take” has means to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, would, kill, trap, capture or collect (or attempt such conduct).

The environmental groups claim that the construction of the MoPac Intersections Project, a federally-funded highway project for which the TexDOT is the lead agency, risks an illegal “take” of three endangered species. According to the city of Austin’s official government website, the Austin Blind Salamander gets its name because it does not have “image-forming eyes”, a result of living in its dark, underground habitat in the waters of Barton Springs. The aptly-named Barton Springs salamander shares this same habitat. The other critter named in the potential lawsuit – the golden-cheeked warbler – was one of the eight endangered species protected by the first major urban habitat plan in the country. The groups claim that tree removal due to construction impacts the warbler’s nesting and foraging behaviors. Continue reading “The Case of the Austin Blind Salamander”

The Pitfalls of Serving as Activist Attorney and Client: Should We Give A Hoot?

by Michelle C. Pardo

You may have heard the well-known proverb, “a man who is his own lawyer has a fool for his client.” It stands for the concept that while individuals in our country are free to represent him or herself in a criminal or civil trial – acting pro se – many caution that this is not the wisest course.

The issue is even more precarious when an attorney attempts to participate as a fact witness in a case he or she has brought. Rule 3.7 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (a rule substantially echoed in many jurisdictions) states that “[a] lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness.” This rule applies absent certain narrow circumstances, such as the testimony relates to an uncontested issue or the nature and value of legal services. The reason for the rule is straightforward: combining roles of advocate and witness can prejudice the court and the opposing party and create a conflict of interest between lawyer and client.

Friends of Animals, an animal rights organization headquartered in Connecticut, recently was called out by a federal judge in Oregon when its in-house counsel, Michael Harris, tried to serve as a declarant in support of Friends of Animals’ summary judgment motion. The declaration was intended to establish the requisite “injury in fact” for Friends of Animals’ members to establish a critical element of “standing” – the threshold inquiry that permits a litigant to have an injury remedied by the federal courts.  Continue reading “The Pitfalls of Serving as Activist Attorney and Client: Should We Give A Hoot?”

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Dusky Gopher Frog Case

By John M. Simpson.

On November 27, 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in a closely watched Endangered Species Act (ESA) case involving the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service’s (FWS’s) designation of “critical habitat” for an endangered species known as the “dusky gopher frog” (Rana sevosa).  Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 586 U.S. ___, No. 17-71 (Nov. 27, 2018). The Court reversed the Fifth Circuit’s decision which had upheld the FWS designation. Continue reading “U.S. Supreme Court Decides Dusky Gopher Frog Case”

PETA Strikes Out Again in Eleventh Circuit

by John M. Simpson.

A petition for rehearing filed by People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) was recently denied by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in an Endangered Species Act (ESA) case involving a killer whale (Orcinus orca) maintained by the Miami Seaquarium.  The denial left standing a significant ruling by the court under the ESA.  PETA v. Miami Seaquarium, 879 F.3d 1142 (11th Cir. 2018).  Continue reading “PETA Strikes Out Again in Eleventh Circuit”

Asian Elephant Case Against Buttonwood Park Zoo Continues

by Michelle C. Pardo

An Endangered Species Act (ESA) lawsuit against the City of New Bedford will continue after a federal district judge in Massachusetts denied the defendant’s efforts to dismiss plaintiff Joyce Rowley’s lawsuit.  The City of New Bedford runs the Buttonwood Park Zoo, which has been home to two Asian elephants, Ruth and Emily, for decades.  Plaintiff Rowley runs an organization called Friends of Ruth & Emily Inc., which is dedicated to retiring Asian elephants Ruth and Emily to “a warm climate sanctuary to live out their days in peace, dignity, and freedom”.  In the last 25 months, it’s “Go Fund Me” page has raised just $10,025 of the requested $25,000 “to get justice” for the elephants. Continue reading “Asian Elephant Case Against Buttonwood Park Zoo Continues”

Fourth Circuit Vacates Incidental Take Statement for Gas Pipeline

by John M. Simpson

On August 6, 2018, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit granted a petition setting aside an Incidental Take Statement (ITS) of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) which had been issued under the Endangered Species Act (ESA)  in connection with the approval of the Atlantic Coast Pipeline, a 600-mile natural gas pipeline proposed to run through parts of West Virginia, Virginia and North Carolina.  Sierra Club, et al., v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Nos. 18-1082 & 18-1083 (4th Cir. Aug. 6, 2018).   Continue reading “Fourth Circuit Vacates Incidental Take Statement for Gas Pipeline”

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The opinions expressed on this blog are those of the author and are not to be construed as legal advice.

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