by John M. Simpson
Somewhat lost in the din of current news reporting on the Supreme Court appointment controversy, was the release of the Trump administration’s National Strategy for Counterterrorism of the United States (Strategy) on October 4. That document makes specific reference to “animal rights extremism” as a “persistent” domestic security threat. Continue reading ““Animal Rights Extremism” Targeted in Trump Administration Counterterrorism Strategy”
by John M. Simpson.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently decided two consolidated appeals affirming the rejection of personal injury claims by two individuals injured while riding horseback in Wisconsin. Both plaintiff’s claims were barred by the Wisconsin “equine immunity” statute. Wis. Stat. § 895.481(2). Dilley v. Holiday Acres Properties, Inc., Nos. 17-2485 & 17-2970 (7th Cir. Sept. 25, 2018).
In the first case, the plaintiff (Dilley) had been injured during a trail ride when the horse Dilley was riding interacted with another horse, reared and threw her. Dilley, an adult in her sixties, had no horseback-riding experience and had been provided by the trail company with its most docile horse, an animal that it usually made available to children. Affirming the summary judgment issued against Dilley by the court below, the Seventh Circuit held that Dilley’s personal injury claims fell squarely within the scope of Wisconsin’s equine immunity statute, which broadly immunizes from civil liability a person’s
“acts or omissions related to his or her participation in equine activities if a person participating in the equine activity is injured or killed as the result of an inherent risk of equine activities.”
Wis. Stat. § 895.481(2). While Dilley argued that the defendant’s alleged negligence was avoidable and therefore not an inherent risk of horseback riding, the court disagreed: “the statute’s enumeration of immunized risks includes the ‘potential for a person participating in an equine activity to act in a negligent manner.'” Slip op. at 7.
Nor was the court persuaded that any of the statutory exceptions to equine immunity applied:
♦ While immunity does not apply where the provider of the horse fails to make “a reasonable effort” to determine the ability of the rider to safely ride or to safely manage the horse provided, Wis. Stat. § 895.481(3)(b), there was no dispute “that [defendants] asked Dilley about her experience, learned that she had none, and accordingly paired her with Blue, the most docile horse in their stable and the one usually assigned to small children.” Slip op. at 10.
♦ While immunity does not cover a “willful or wanton” disregard for personal safety, Wis. Stat. § 895.481(3)(d), “[n]othing in the record supports a finding that [defendants] were aware (or should have been aware) of a ‘strong probability’ that Dilley would be harmed.” Slip op. at 12.
♦ While immunity does not apply when the injury stems from equipment or tack that the operator who provided it knew or should have known was faulty, Wis. Stat. § 895.481(3)(a), Dilley’s only complaint was that “no one adjusted her stirrups,” not that “her stirrups — or any other equipment or tack — were defective in any way.” Slip op. at 12.
In the second case, the plaintiff (Brown), whose case was dismissed on the pleadings, was injured in a collision with another horse during a riding lesson conducted by the defendant stable owner. Brown brought her own horse and rode him during the lesson. Brown argued that her case fit with in the section 895.481(3)(b) immunity exception for a defendant’s failure to safely manage the horse provided because the defendant had control over the other horse that had caused the collision. The court rejected this argument because the defendant did not provide plaintiff with a horse: “A horseback-riding student who brings his own horse for a lesson supplies the horse; the instructor does not.” Slip op. at 13. Brown in fact “pleaded herself out of the exception” by affirmatively pleading in her complaint that she “provided her own horse to be used in the private lesson.” Id.
by John M. Simpson.
On September 18, 2018, the Los Angeles City Council unanimously approved a motion that directs the City Attorney to prepare a city ordinance whose proponents believe will prohibit the manufacture and sale of fur products within the City of Los Angeles. Continue reading “Potential Fur Ban Advances in L.A. City Council”
by John M. Simpson.
On September 7, 2018, the Supreme Court of Florida reversed a lower court decision that had enjoined, from inclusion on the November 2018 Florida ballot, a proposed amendment to the Florida Constitution on the ground that the ballot language was clearly and conclusively defective. Department of State v. Florida Greyhound Ass’n, Inc., No. SC18-1287 (Fla. Sept. 7, 2018). The measure — Amendment 13 — would, if adopted, prohibit commercial dog racing in Florida by gaming or pari-mutuel operations in Florida and would prohibit wagering on dog races within Florida. The Supreme Court ordered “that Amendment 13 appear on the ballot for the November 2018 general election” and ordered that “[n]o motion for rehearing will be allowed.” Slip op. at 21. Continue reading “Florida Supreme Court Gives Green Light to Greyhound Ballot Initiative”
by John M. Simpson.
In a case raising unusual issues (to say the least), a trial court in the Canadian province of British Columbia recently dismissed a case in which the plaintiff contended that his rights under law were violated by the government’s apparent refusal to recognize the plaintiff’s belief in the existence of sasquatch. Continue reading “Canadian Court Dismisses Sasquatch Case”
by John M. Simpson.
In a recent letter and an accompanying video directed at veterinarians, the Deputy Administrator for Animal Care of the USDA Animal and Plant Health and Inspection Service (APHIS), Bernadette Juarez, described a new initiative that will involve attending veterinarians more directly in APHIS inspections of persons and entities licensed under the Animal Welfare Act. Continue reading “APHIS to Involve Attending Vets Directly in Inspections”
By John M. Simpson
A federal district court in New Hampshire recently dismissed a citizen suit making novel claims under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) because the plaintiff could not prove that he had provided the required 60-day notice to the defendants prior to suit. Strahan v. Nielsen, 2018 WL 3966318 (D.N.H. Aug. 17, 2018). Continue reading “Endangered Species Act Case Founders on Lack of 60-Day Notice”
by John M. Simpson
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit recently affirmed a summary judgment in favor of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) which had denied a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request by People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) for information about the importation of nonhuman primates. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., No. 16-5269 (D.C. Cir. August, 17, 2018). The appellate court agreed with the lower court that the release of such information would cause substantial competitive injury to the importers who had provided such information to HHS and therefore was properly withheld under FOIA Exemption 4, which exempts “trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential” from disclosure. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4). Continue reading “D.C. Circuit Rejects PETA Nonhuman Primate FOIA Claim”
by: Michelle C. Pardo
“Justice” (formerly named “Shadow”) is an American Quarter Horse who had been subject to neglect by his prior owner. According to a complaint recently filed in state court in Oregon, the horse was left outside, underfed, and suffered from a variety of serious medical problems, including frostbite, trauma and infection. After complaints by a neighbor, the former owner surrendered Justice to a rescue organization back in March of 2017 and thereafter pleaded guilty to criminal neglect. The owner also agreed to pay restitution to the equine rescue organization for the costs of Justice’s care incurred prior to the plea. Media reports indicate that the owner paid more than $3,700 in restitution, was sentenced to three years probation, and may not possess any pets or livestock for five years (and only after completing 96 hours of community service). Typically, as disturbing as such court cases may be, that is the end of a legal proceeding involving animal abuse or neglect.
Justice’s story, however, has a “Part Two”. Justice is suing his former owner for negligence and has filed a lawsuit in his new name in a county court in Oregon. Continue reading “A Horse is a Horse (Of Course) . . .But a Plaintiff?”
by John M. Simpson
In Berardelli v. Allied Services Institute of Rehabilitation Medicine, No. 17-1469 (3rd Cir. Aug. 14, 2018), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled that, as to service animals, the 1973 Rehabilitation Act’s mandate of “reasonable accommodations” must be interpreted and applied in the same manner as the 1990 Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) standard of “reasonable modifications.” Therefore, even though there was no Rehabilitation Act regulation specifically so stating, the ADA regulation on public accommodations and public entities controlled. As a result, a request to an institution covered by the Rehabilitation Act for an individual to be accompanied by a service animal is “per se reasonable in the ordinary course.” Slip op. at 4. Continue reading “Third Circuit Decides Service Dog Issue of First Impression”
