John Simpson – Animal Law Developments

March 24, 2025March 27, 2025 by John M. Simpson

D.C. Circuit: Machine Using AI to Create Artwork Cannot Own a Copyright in the Artwork

On March 18, 2025, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed a district court ruling that a work created with artificial intelligence (AI) using a machine cannot be registered in the name of the machine itself because the Copyright Act requires that a copyright owner be a human being. Thaler v. Perlmutter, No. 23-5233 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 18, 2025).

The plaintiff had created a picture entitled “A Recent Entrance to Paradise” with a machine called the “Creativity Machine” that generated the artwork using AI. The plaintiff applied for copyright protection, listing the machine as the author and the plaintiff as the owner. Plaintiff argued (1) that, under the Copyright Act, an “author” need not be a human being but can be a machine; and (2) that plaintiff could be the owner of the work under the work-for-hire doctrine because non-humans such as corporations can be authors under this doctrine. As did the Copyright Office and the district court, the appellate court rejected both arguments.

As to the first point, the court noted that, while the Copyright Act does not define “author,” the statute’s use of that term is incompatible with a machine being an author. This is because, under the Copyright Act an “author”

must have the legal capacity to own property;
must have a lifespan since copyrights generally last for the author’s life plus 70 years;
must have surviving spouses or children under the statute’s inheritance provision;
must have a signature;
must have a nationality or domicile;
must have intentions since authors of joint works intend that the contributions be merged together.

[Slip op. at 11-12.] Machines can do none of these things. Furthermore, the Copyright Act at several places discusses machines and makes it clear that machines are tools not authors.

As to plaintiff’s work-made-for-hire argument, the court observed that that provision “allows the copyright and authorship protections attaching to a work originally created by a human author to transfer instantaneously, as a matter of law, to the person who hired the creator.” [Slip op. at 17.] The fact remains that the author of the work for hire must still be a human being.

While the plaintiff also argued that he should be considered the “author” of the work because he made and used the Creativity Machine, the court deemed this argument waived because it was not made to the Copyright Office. [Slip op. at 23.]

So, one might ask, what does this case have to do with animal law? Well, the Thaler case illustrates the arguments made by litigants seeking to get courts to convey to animals or other non-humans rights and privileges conventionally held only by human beings. One such argument in Thaler was the plaintiff’s point that the dictionary defined “author” as “one that originates or creates something” and therefore was not limited to human beings. However, as the court observed:

[S]tatutory construction requires more than just finding a sympathetic dictionary definition. We “do not read statutes in little bites,” or words in isolation from their statutory context. Kircher v. Putnam Funds Tr., 547 U.S. 633, 643 (2006). The judicial task when interpreting statutory language, instead, is to discern how Congress used a word in the law.
[Slip op. at 16.]

In fact, the D.C. Circuit made a specific connection to animal law by citing the decision in Naruto v. Slater, 888 F.3d 418 (9th Cir. 2018), in which the Ninth Circuit held that a monkey cannot be an “author” under the Copyright Act. And, like Thaler, animal rights groups have tried to base their arguments on dictionary definitions. See, e.g., Animal Leg. Def. Fund v. U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture, 933 F.3d 1088, 1094 (9th Cir. 2019) (the term “individual” in the Freedom of Information Act cannot reasonably be interpreted to include a Bengal tiger).

As AI continues to develop and grow more robust, stayed tuned for more novel arguments in this space.

March 10, 2025March 10, 2025 by John M. Simpson

PETA Claims First Amendment Right to Communicate with Monkeys

The Beach Boys wrote a song called “Pet Sounds.” In a recently filed federal lawsuit, animal rights organization People for the Ethical Treatment Animals (“PETA”) claims that it has a First Amendment right to receive monkey sounds (as well as monkey movements).

The lawsuit, filed on March 6, 2025 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, is entitled People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. National Institute of Mental Health, et al., No. 8:25-cv-00736-PX. The case centers on research done in an NIMH laboratory that utilizes the Rhesus Macaque. According to the Tulane University National Primate Research Center, Rhesus Macaques are placed within the Cercopithecidae family (Old World Monkeys), So, for simplicity, we’ll refer to them as monkeys.

The gravamen of the lawsuit is that the federal defendants turned down PETA’s request for a live-stream audiovisual feed of the monkeys in the laboratory. PETA claims that the monkeys are “willing speakers” who “regularly communicat[e]” about their physical and psychological condition. According to PETA’s complaint, experts in monkey communication claim the ability to understand the information that the animal sounds, body posture, facial expression and other actions purportedly convey. PETA claims that denying it the ability to communicate with “fellow primates” violates PETA’s First Amendment rights, and PETA therefore wants the court to permanently enjoin the defendants from “withholding from PETA … access to the rhesus macaques’ communications.”

PETA’s track record in opposing animal-based medical and mental health research is well-known. Thus, most of the complaint is devoted to describing the research that is performed, the conditions of the laboratory and in making PETA’s overall case for the abolition of animal-based research. However, the First Amendment predicate for the case is extremely thin, if not nonexistent. PETA cites a number of cases to the effect that there is a First Amendment right to receive information even though the speaker may not, itself, have a First Amendment right. But PETA cites no case (and we are aware of none) holding that the sounds and body gestures of a monkey constitute speech that is protected under the First Amendment – whether it concerns the speaker’s right to speak or the listener’s right to receive.

PETA’s complaint also pleads a denial of due process under the Fifth Amendment but is very vague on what “property” or “liberty” interest of PETA was allegedly violated.

This isn’t the first time that PETA and other animal rights groups have sought attention by trying to get a court to confer human rights on an animal, but very few of these efforts has succeeded. Thus, killer whales are not subject to the Thirteenth Amendment, elephants are not covered by the writ of habeas corpus, a Bengal tiger can’t pursue a Freedom of Information Act request, humans don’t have “next friend” standing to pursue a copyright claim on behalf of a monkey or a bill of attainder claim on behalf of a barn owl, and dogs, birds and dugongs don’t have standing in federal court to sue. PETA’s current effort to have a federal court declare monkey speech protected by the First Amendment would clearly seem to be headed for a similar fate. Indeed, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rejected an effort to invoke the First Amendment on behalf of “Blackie the Talking Cat,” an animal that allegedly “spoke, for a fee, on radio and on television shows such as ‘That’s Incredible.’” Miles v. City Council of Augusta, Ga., 710 F.2d 1542, 1543 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam). Affirming dismissal of the First Amendment claim, the court ruled that it “will not hear a claim that Blackie’s right to free speech has been infringed. . . . [A]lthough Blackie arguably possesses a very unusual ability, he cannot be considered a ‘person’ and is therefore not protected by the Bill of Rights.” Id. at 1544 n.5.

February 27, 2025February 27, 2025 by John M. Simpson

U.S. Supreme Court Limits “Prevailing Party” Status for Attorney’s Fee Recovery by Plaintiffs

The U.S. Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Lackey v. Stinnie, No. 23-621 (U.S. Feb. 25, 2025), clarified for plaintiffs what it means to be a “prevailing party” for recovery of attorney’s fees. While the case arose under the attorney’s fee provision for civil rights cases – 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) – the holding has broader implications for federal court litigation, particularly where the only relief sought by the plaintiff is injunctive relief.

The case was a civil rights challenge by Virginia automobile drivers pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that they were denied due process by a Virginia statute that required suspension of their drivers’ licenses without sufficient notice or hearing for failure to pay parking tickets and the like, with the suspension lasting until the fine was paid or a payment plan established. The district court granted a preliminary injunction, finding that plaintiffs were likely to prevail on their constitutional claim. Before the case could be tried, the state legislature repealed the statute at issue, and the parties, agreeing that the case was moot, stipulated to dismissal. Plaintiffs then sought recovery of their attorney’s fees under section 1988(b), which permits an attorney’s fee award to a “prevailing party,” inter alia, in a section 1983 case. Plaintiffs argued that, by obtaining a preliminary injunction that, in all likelihood, led to the repeal of the statute, they were “prevailing parties.” The Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, agreed with plaintiffs, but the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, reversed.

Relying on a legal dictionary definition of “prevailing party” contemporaneous with the enactment of section 1988(b) – a party who successfully prosecutes the action – the Court reasoned that, because a preliminary injunction is based only on a likelihood of success on the merits, the plaintiff who obtains such relief has not “prevailed:”

Because preliminary injunctions do not conclusively resolve the rights of parties on the merits, they do not confer prevailing party status. A plaintiff who secures a preliminary injunction has achieved only temporary success at an intermediary “stage[ ] of the suit.” Black’s Law dictionary 1352. It cannot yet be said that he will “ultimately prevail[] when the matter is finally set at rest” or that he will have “successfully maintained” his claim “at the end.” Ibid. And external events that render a dispute moot do not convert a temporary order designed to preserve the status of the parties into a conclusive adjudication of their rights. [Slip op. at 7.]

According to the Court, its ruling “serves the interests of judicial economy. A straightforward, bright-line rule is easy to administer, reducing the risk of a ‘second major litigation’ over attorney’s fees.” [Slip op. at 10]. In this regard, the Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ concern that a defendant could “strategically moot” a case and avoid an award of attorneys’ fees if it feared ultimately losing the case. The Court noted that plaintiffs with damage claims would not face that threat and, even in cases seeking only injunctive relief, the case does not become moot if the challenged conduct is capable of repetition yet evading review. [Slip op. at 10]. At bottom, it is up to Congress to decide whether attorney’s fees should be awarded to plaintiffs who achieve some success but do not prevail – as is the case with Freedom of Information Act claims where plaintiffs can seek legal fees if they “substantially prevail[].” Id. at 11 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)).

The Court did, however, limit its ruling to prevailing plaintiffs:

Our decision today should not be read to affect our previous holding that a defendant need not obtain a favorable judgment on the merits to prevail, nor to address the question we left open whether a defendant must obtain a preclusive judgment in order to prevail. See CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. EEOC, 578 U.S. 419, 431-434 (2016). As we have explained, “[p]laintiffs and defendants come to court with different objectives.” Id., at 431. [Slip op. at 9 n.*].

The decision in Lackey is likely to have implications beyond section 1988(b). Several federal statutes award legal fees to “prevailing parties.” In some regulatory cases, the preliminary injunction is in fact the main event of the case. For example, animal rights activists often file lawsuits under the National Environmental Policy Act or the Endangered Species Act, seeking to enjoin individual transactions or other activities by businesses who use animals for various purposes. The granting of a preliminary injunction, even though it is not a final determination of the merits of the case, could spell the end of the defendant’s project, either because the opportunity for the transaction has come and gone or the defendant does not have the resources to further litigate the case. Yet, in such circumstances, the plaintiff would not be entitled to seek attorney’s fees under the rationale of the Lackey case.

Whether Lackey has the result of cutting down on litigation by plaintiffs in in the regulatory sphere remains to be seen. However, that is what the dissenting opinion by Justice Jackson predicts. She points to research on the effect of the Court’s rejection of the “catalyst theory” in Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. West Va. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001), i.e., the theory that a plaintiff “prevails” if its suit was the catalyst for the defendant’s change in conduct. According to the dissent, Buckhannon “had the predictable practical effect of discouraging public interest organizations and private attorneys from taking on civil rights actions.” [Dissenting op. at 18].

February 4, 2025February 4, 2025 by John M. Simpson

PETA’s Animal Shelter Still Shows Grim Euthanasia Results

Animal rights group People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) runs a facility that it calls an animal “shelter” in Norfolk, Virginia. All animal shelters in the Commonwealth of Virginia must report annually the number of animals the shelter takes in and what happened to them. These reports are filed with the Virginia Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (VADCS) and are publicly available through that agency’s website.

PETA’s reports for 2024 show a high percentage of euthanized animals. PETA has maintained over the years that this death rate is because PETA accepts all types of animals, regardless of how poor the physical condition or likelihood of survival the animal’s situation may be. However, the public shelter in Norfolk — the Norfolk City Animal Control and Public Animal Shelter (NACC) — which also has an open admission policy, has a much lower euthanization rate. PETA has tried to claim that it serves a broader area, but NACC and PETA are only about 6 miles apart, so the differing euthanasia rates are not likely attributable to proximity. Furthermore, the overall euthanasia rate in the Commonwealth of Virginia for dogs and cats also is significantly lower than PETA’s. These trends are shown below in the graph that is based on 2024 filings with VDACS:

PETA’s euthanasia rates for dogs and cats have been consistently high over the last ten years, as the chart below (also based on VDACS collected data) illustrates:

The overall totals for this ten-year period are shown below:

PETA winces at the claim that it kills animals, but it does exactly that and in outsized numbers. If every single one of the dogs and cats that PETA puts down is beyond saving, then PETA ought to be able to say that in their intake policy, which they also must file with VDACS. But they don’t say that. The resulting silence is deafening, particularly when coupled with PETA’s well known, negative views on “pet” ownership:

Consider it from the perspective of animals who are kept as companions: Humans control every aspect of their lives-when and what they eat, whom they interact with, what they have to entertain themselves, even when and where they are allowed to relieve themselves. Dogs long to run, sniff, play with other dogs, and mark their territory. Cats yearn to scratch, climb, perch, and play. But they can’t satisfy these natural desires unless the people they depend on give them the opportunity to do so – and they often don’t.

PETA had $69,874,898 in revenue and $28,958,530 in net assets in 2023 according to its Form 990 filed with the IRS. Maybe PETA could take some of that money and do a better job of adopting out some of the dogs and cats that come into their possession.

January 21, 2025January 21, 2025 by John M. Simpson

Turns Out That DOGE Already Existed – Just With a Different Name

At the federal level, stakeholders in the animal space often encounter regulators such as the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Animal & Plant Health Inspection Service or the Department of Interior’s Fish & Wildlife Service. Not uncommonly, federal regulation is heavy-handed. Thus, the regulated have been keenly interested in the much discussed Department of Government Efficiency or “DOGE” that President Trump touted during the presidential campaign. As originally described, DOGE – an advisory body to be headed by Elon Musk and Vivek Ramaswamy – would cut regulations and headcounts within the federal government.

Interestingly enough, however, when it came time to actually creating DOGE, President Trump’s January 20, 2025 Executive Order simply renamed and reorganized the duties of an existing federal agency – the United States Digital Service (“USDS”). USDS has been around for ten years. It was created by President Obama in 2014. The USDS website describes the agency’s mission as follows:

USDS brings together interdisciplinary teams of top technologists – including engineers, data scientists, designers, user researchers, product managers, and procurement experts – who collaborate closely with agency experts to tackle important problems. This collaborative approach prioritizes human-centered engineering and design, focusing on iterative improvements to create user-friendly, reliable, and seamless digital services.

USDS states that it puts together teams of individuals with the relevant expertise who, “with tours of service lasting no more than four years . . . bring[] fresh perspectives on technology and delivery to the government.” Among USDS’s listed achievements are improved user and customer digital experiences for the Veterans Administration, Social Security Administration, Internal Revenue Service and the Centers for Disease Control.

President Trump’s January 20, 2025 Executive Order (EO) “establishes the Department of Government Efficiency to implement the President’s DOGE agenda by modernizing Federal technology and software to maximize governmental efficiency and productivity.” The EO renames USDS as the United States DOGE Service. The EO requires each federal agency head to establish a “DOGE Team” within their respective agencies which will advise the agency head on “implementing the President’s DOGE Agenda.” According to section 4(a) of the EO,

The USDS Administrator shall commence a Software Modernization Initiative to improve the quality and efficiency of government-wide software, network infrastructure, and information technology (IT) systems. Among other things, the USDS Administrator shall work with Agency Heads to promote inter-operability between agency networks and systems, ensure data integrity, and facilitate responsible data collection and synchronization.

So, what was described originally as an initiative that would basically slash and burn through the federal bureaucratic state, appears, at least in its original formulation, to be largely a plan to overall federal agencies’ information technology capabilities to maximize efficiency. Whether the United States DOGE Service expands its role beyond technological improvement remains to be seen.

As reported by several media outlets, within 15 minutes of President Trump’s oath of office and before the EO was even signed, several groups filed suit claiming that DOGE is an unlawful advisory committee under the Federal Advisory Committee Act. Whether those litigants revise their claims in light of the actual language of the EO is another thing that remains to be seen.

August 9, 2024August 9, 2024 by John M. Simpson

D.C. Circuit Bounces Animal Rights Case on Standing Grounds

Animal rights groups often pursue consumer-type cases against food producers and argue that packaging claims and images supposedly mislead buyers into thinking that the animals turned into food were humanely raised. The goal really isn’t transparency. The goal is to use the cost of defending such claims to end the eating of animals as food. On August 9, 2024, the D.C. Circuit knocked out such a case on standing grounds. Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc., v. Vilsack, No. 23-5009 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 9, 2024). Continue reading “D.C. Circuit Bounces Animal Rights Case on Standing Grounds”

July 1, 2024 by John M. Simpson

Supreme Court Guts USDA’s Power to Assess Civil Penalties Under the Animal Welfare Act

Somewhat overshadowed by Chevron’s spectacular crash and burn last week was the Supreme Court’s decision the day before in SEC v. Jarkesy, No. 22-859 (U.S. June 27, 2024), holding that the SEC’s assessment of civil penalties in an administrative proceeding is unconstitutional because it deprives the party assessed of its Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury. This result has particular significance for those regulated by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) under the Animal Welfare Act (AWA). Continue reading “Supreme Court Guts USDA’s Power to Assess Civil Penalties Under the Animal Welfare Act”

June 13, 2024June 14, 2024 by John M. Simpson

Supreme Court Puts an End to “Resource Drain” Standing

To paraphrase the line from “Forrest Gump,” Supreme Court opinions are like “a box of chocolates; you never know what you are going to get.” For standing nerds, there was a gem in today’s opinion in FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, No. 23-25 (U.S. June 13, 2024). Continue reading “Supreme Court Puts an End to “Resource Drain” Standing”

February 26, 2024 by John M. Simpson

Fourth Circuit Sends Family Dog Shooting Case to Trial

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently reversed a summary judgment in favor of a police officer who had been sued for an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment arising out of an incident that had resulted in the shooting death of a pet dog. According to the appellate court, the conflicting accounts of what happened could only be resolved by a jury. Ray v. Roane, No. 22-2120 (4th Cir. Feb. 22, 2024). Continue reading “Fourth Circuit Sends Family Dog Shooting Case to Trial”

February 7, 2024 by John M. Simpson

PETA’s Animal “Shelter” Continues as a Leader in Animal Death

Animal rights group People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) recently posted the “news” that it had “newly obtained public records” showing that certain research universities had euthanized laboratory animals during the COVID-19 pandemic and that PETA had complained about this to the National Institutes of Health. In its zeal to attack the use of animals in medical research, PETA described this as a “mass killing spree.” What this ignores, however, as reported by The Chronicle of Higher Education back in 2020 when all this happened, is that universities made these difficult decisions because they had no choice. Social distancing requirements that forced animal care personnel to stay out of the labs, precluded the delivery of proper animal care. It was not humane to allow the animals to go without food, water and other husbandry. But what we thought was particularly interesting is PETA’s use of the rhetoric “mass killing spree” in light of what goes on in its own facility in Norfolk, Virginia. Continue reading “PETA’s Animal “Shelter” Continues as a Leader in Animal Death”