Steph Nakash – Duane Morris Sports Law

February 5, 2026February 5, 2026 by Alex Anderson

Agent Representation in Collegiate Athletics: The FTC Dips its Toe in the Waters of Regulatory Enforcement

As the calendar turns from 2025 to 2026, developments in college athletics continue to unfold at a rapid pace, with meaningful implications for universities, athletes, agents, and other industry participants.

Just last month, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) signaled that the federal government may be turning its attention to the largely unregulated market of agents representing college athletes. The FTC publicized that it had sent letters to twenty National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) member institutions seeking information relevant to determining whether sports agents representing student-athletes of those schools had complied with the requirements of the Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act (“SPARTA”), a rarely invoked federal statute enacted more than two decades ago.

For now, the FTC’s actions represent only a limited informational request from a relatively small number of schools; however, the FTC’s January 2026 letters represent one of the most visible compliance initiatives undertaken pursuant to SPARTA since its enactment. The FTC’s inquiry underscores the broader reality that college athletics remains a deeply unsettled landscape, presenting novel and evolving challenges that increasingly require sophisticated legal guidance.

The Largely Unregulated Market for Collegiate Sports Agents

Prior to the name, image, and likeness (“NIL”) boom, sports agents representing college athletes in negotiations with their own institutions or other industry participants was effectively unheard of due to the prohibition on student-athletes receiving compensation of any kind. That changed rapidly over the past five years. The NCAA’s retreat on NIL restrictions, combined with the advent of permissible revenue-sharing models, fundamentally altered the economics of college sports. Almost overnight, a cottage industry of “collegiate” sports agents emerged to represent athletes in negotiations with universities, NIL collectives, and third-party sponsors.

In professional sports, agent conduct is largely regulated through collectively bargained frameworks. For example, under the National Football League’s current Collective Bargaining Agreement, the NFL Players Association is responsible for agent certification and discipline, establishing standards of conduct and acting as a gatekeeper for those seeking to represent NFL players.

Currently, college athletics has no comparable structure. Absent any federal legislation, and because college athletes have not been universally recognized as employees, there is no players’ union, no collective bargaining, no certification regime, and no industry-wide standards governing agent conduct. As a result, virtually anyone—regardless of experience or qualification—may represent the hundreds of thousands of college athletes in the United States.

The absence of any certification and industry oversight increases the risk of abusive practices and unprofessional conduct, potentially harming not only athlete clients but also the institutions and third parties with whom agents negotiate.

The FTC Invokes SPARTA

Against that backdrop, it is unsurprising that the FTC has taken preliminary steps to address this void. On January 12, 2026, the agency sent form letters to twenty unidentified schools seeking documents and information concerning sports agents who had represented student-athletes at those institutions. Specifically, the FTC requested:

Identifying information for agents who represented student-athletes;
The dates on which agents notified schools that student-athletes had entered into agency contracts;
Whether the schools had received complaints or reports concerning agent conduct; and
Copies of agency contracts entered into by student-athletes at the schools.

The FTC grounded its requests in SPARTA, a federal statute enacted in 2004 to protect student-athletes and preserve the integrity of amateur collegiate athletics. SPARTA applies to any contractual agreement authorizing an individual “to negotiate or solicit on behalf of the student athlete a professional sports contract or an endorsement contract.” 15 U.S.C. § 7801(1).

Among other things, SPARTA prohibits agents from furnishing improper inducements or making false statements to secure representation, requires specific disclosures to student-athletes, and obligates agents to notify athletic institutions when an agency contract is executed. 15 U.S.C. § 7802. Notably, however, neither SPARTA nor its implementing regulations require that agency contracts be provided to schools or the NCAA. SPARTA does, however, attach certain monetary penalties for statutory violations, although it has rarely been enforced.

In addition, SPARTA is triggered only when an agency contract authorizes negotiation of a professional sports contract or an endorsement contract. Consequently, while most NIL brand deals fall within its purview, representation focused solely on university–athlete compensation or revenue‑sharing arrangements may not. Most agency agreements authorize endorsement negotiations, and thus SPARTA would apply even where the agent’s primary work involves institutional compensation. SPARTA’s trigger turns on contractual authority. Gray areas arise with bundled services (e.g., roster retention payments paired with brand activations) or collective‑funded arrangements that include marketing deliverables. In those mixed contexts, counsel should assume SPARTA coverage and structure disclosures and notices accordingly.

Despite the countless changes over the last decade that have reshaped college sports, SPARTA has largely remained dormant. Federal oversight of sports agents has not been a significant priority for Congress or the FTC, and reported enforcement activity under the statute has been minimal. However, it appears that such dormancy is starting to change, and the FTC’s January 2026 letters indicate a growing interest for federal oversight of agency representation in college sports.

What Comes Next?

How far the FTC’s inquiry will extend—and how consequential it will be—remains uncertain. Even if all twenty recipient institutions are Division I FBS schools, they represent less than fifteen percent of such programs nationwide. The FTC’s requests are also relatively narrow and, in some cases, seek information schools may not possess. More fundamentally, SPARTA is not a substitute for a comprehensive certification regime or uniform industry standards. Any durable solution will likely require congressional action or a collectively bargained framework, which could provide stakeholders with some stability in an otherwise fragmented and increasingly risky regulatory landscape.

December 17, 2025December 17, 2025 by Bryan Shapiro

University of Utah Advances Private Equity Model for College Athletics Funding

The University of Utah is advancing a groundbreaking agreement with private-equity firm Otro Capital that is expected to generate more than $500 million for its athletics program. The deal creates a new for-profit entity, Utah Brands & Entertainment LLC, which will manage the commercial and revenue operations of the school’s athletic department, such as sponsorships, ticketing, licensing, concessions, and media-related revenue. The University of Utah will retain majority ownership and board control, while Otro Capital and a select group of major donors will acquire minority stakes.

This arrangement represents a significant shift in how a public university structures and finances its athletics operations. By blending private investment with donor participation, the model provides access to substantial capital at a time when athletic departments face rising costs tied to facilities, NIL activity, and anticipated revenue-sharing with student athletes. It also introduces new legal considerations, including governance design, transparency obligations for a for-profit entity attached to a public institution, and potential securities and conflict-of-interest issues arising from donor-investors gaining equity positions.

The partnership may also signal a broader trend toward hybrid public-private financing in college sports. The University of Utah is not the first to spin off its athletic department’s revenue streams into a private entity. However, the creation of a new for-profit entity, one that is majority-owned by the school but supported by private investors, underscores how rapidly the financial pressures of college sports are accelerating. Rising operational costs, the expansion of NIL opportunities, and the likelihood of direct revenue sharing with athletes have pushed universities to explore alternative funding mechanisms. For college athletics more broadly, the University of Utah’s model may become a blueprint. By blending university control with outside capital and professionalized operational management, the structure is designed to meet the commercial realities of today’s sports landscape while still preserving institutional oversight. If successful, this could influence everything from facilities funding and media rights strategy to athlete compensation and long-term planning. It also raises larger questions about how institutions reconcile what they have long dubbed as “amateurism” and their mission, with the sport’s growing commercial pressures.

Ultimately, the deal signals a broader evolution: college athletics is moving quickly toward professionalized, capital-intensive operations, and private equity (or debt) is likely to become a more common part of that ecosystem.

December 9, 2025 by Bryan Shapiro

Georgia Seeks Enforcement of Liquidated Damages Provision in Ongoing NIL Conflict

The University of Georgia, through the University’s athletic association (UGAA), is seeking damages totaling $390,000 against a former football player, Damon Wilson II, after he elected to transfer to Missouri following the 2024 season. The demand stems from a clause in Wilson’s NIL contract that required him to forfeit the balance of his agreement if he transferred to another school.

Wilson signed a 14-month NIL deal in December 2024 through a third-party collective, reportedly worth $500,000 if he completed the full term. Payments were structured as monthly installments of $30,000, with two additional $40,000 bonuses contingent on compliance through future transfer-portal windows. The contract, however, also contained a liquidated-damages provision requiring that if Wilson left the team or entered the transfer portal, he would owe the remaining value of the contract in a lump sum. After reportedly receiving only one monthly payment before declaring his intent to transfer, the University—through its athletic association—has asserted that he now owes $390,000 under the exit clause.

This lawsuit carries outsized significance because it may become one of the first true test cases on the enforceability of buyout-style and liquidated-damages provisions in NIL agreements. To date, such clauses have been rare, largely untested, and clouded by uncertainty under traditional contract principles. A judicial decision upholding UGAA’s position could set a powerful precedent—effectively signaling to schools, collectives, and athletes nationwide that exit-fee mechanisms are viable and enforceable. Such a ruling could rapidly accelerate the adoption of buyout provisions across NIL contracts and fundamentally reshape the architecture of athlete compensation and mobility in the NIL era.

At the same time, the case squarely presents the question of whether the $390,000 figure represents a legitimate, good faith estimate of the collective’s anticipated losses or whether it crosses the line into an unenforceable penalty. Under longstanding contract law principles, liquidated-damages provisions are permissible only when they reasonably approximate the actual harm expected at the time of contracting. If a court concludes that the amount is disproportionate, punitive, or untethered to any measurable loss, the clause could be struck down as an impermissible penalty. Such a ruling could have an immediate effect on NIL and revenue share agreements across the country, as many contain similar purported liquidated damages provisions.

Wilson’s case could ultimately help set the first meaningful precedent on whether liquidated-damages clauses can function as an effective and legally defensible substitute for traditional buyout fees. If courts bless this model, it may open the door to a new era in NIL contracting—one in which exit-fee structures become a standard tool for shaping athlete mobility, program stability, and the broader economics of college sports.