In early March, cybersecurity professionals around the world filled the San Francisco Moscone Convention Center’s sprawling exhibition halls to discuss and learn about everything infosec, from public key encryption to incident response, and from machine learning to domestic abuse.
Companies should not overthink [data privacy and personal information]. Instead, data privacy lawyers said businesses should pay attention to what information they collect and where they operate to best understand personal data protection and compliance.
As Duane Morris LLP intellectual property and cyber law partner Michelle Donovan said:
“What it comes down to, is, it doesn’t matter what the rules are in China if you’re not doing business in China. Companies need to figure out what jurisdictions apply, what information are they collecting, where do their data subjects reside, and based on that, figure out what law applies.”
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On November 21, 2018, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center (UPMC) had a legal duty to exercise reasonable care to protect sensitive employee information against an unreasonable risk of harm when that information is stored on an internet-accessible computer system. Dittman v. UPMC, No. 43 WAP 2017 (Pa. Nov. 21, 2018). In doing so, the Court made clear that the criminal acts of third parties who may breach a computer system do not alleviate the legal duty on a business to protect such information. The Court further held that the economic loss doctrine (a doctrine that precludes tort cases where the loss is purely monetary) did not apply in this case because the legal duty to protect sensitive employee information exists independently from any contractual obligations between the parties.
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Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Spokeo v. Robins, courts have begun to ratchet back prior decisions on the minimum standard to plead an injury sufficient to establish Article III standing. The recent Eighth Circuit opinion in Braitberg v. Charter Communications adds to the growing number of cases defendants will rely upon to get data breach cases dismissed at the pleadings stage. Braitberg addressed standing in the context of the retention, use, and protection of personally identifiable information. Although the case did not involve a data breach, its holding is however instructive when defending against such cases.
In Braitberg, plaintiff alleged that he was required to provide personally identifiable information to purchase cable services and that the cable provider improperly retained his information long after he cancelled the services in violation of the Cable Communications Policy Act (“CCPA”).
Prior to Spokeo, such claims would have been sufficient to establish Article III standing because the Eighth Circuit permitted the actual injury requirement to be satisfied solely by pleading that there was an invasion of a legal right that Congress created. The Supreme Court in Spokeo held that Article III standing requires a “concrete injury” even in the context of a statutory violation.
With the benefit of Spokeo’s guidance, the Eighth Circuit acknowledged that Spokeo superseded its prior precedent. Accordingly, the panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the complaint for lack of Article III standing and failure to state a claim. In doing so, the panel rejected arguments that CCPA created standing to sue where the defendant merely retained the data in violation of the statute with no other injury. It further rejected an economic argument that retention of the data deprived plaintiff of the full value of the services received from the company.
This decision is important for two reasons. First, the Eighth Circuit further narrowed the scope of allegations that will give rise to Article III standing in a post-Spokeo world. Second, in denying the economic argument, the court cut off an alternative avenue by which plaintiffs have successfully alleged harm.