California Medicare Appeal Applies Strict Standing Rules

The Medicare Part B appeal process is lengthy and cumbersome, typically requiring full exhaustion of administrative remedies, including an administrative request for reconsideration, an ALJ hearing and Departmental Appeals Board review.  The process is especially frustrating when the appeal involves a challenge to a Local Coverage Determination (“LCD”), likely to have spawned several individual appeals of the same decision.

The Medicare Act does provide a shortcut to a legal review by way of 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(f)(3) which provides that a Medicare recipient “may seek review [of an LCD] by a court of competent jurisdiction without  … otherwise exhausting other administrative remedies.”  This direct access to court review applies only if “there are no material issues of fact in dispute, and the only issue of law is the constitutionality of a provision of this subchapter or that a regulation, determination or ruling by the Secretary is invalid.” Continue reading “California Medicare Appeal Applies Strict Standing Rules”

Texas Supreme Court Holds That Compounding Pharmacies Are Health Care Providers Under Texas Medical Liability Act

On April 24, 2015, the Texas Supreme Court dismissed claims against a compounding pharmacy and its individual pharmacists which alleged negligence in compounding a lipoic acid medication, finding that the defendants were health care providers entitled to the protections in the Texas Medical Liability Act (“TMLA”).

Continue reading “Texas Supreme Court Holds That Compounding Pharmacies Are Health Care Providers Under Texas Medical Liability Act”

SCOTUS Limits Claims Brought by Healthcare Providers’ for Denied Medicaid Reimbursement

In a recent 5-4 decision by the U.S. Supreme Court, Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc., Slip. Op., 575 U.S. ____ (March 31, 2015), Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, took aim at health care providers seeking to enforce Medicaid rate-setting provisions against a state that refused to incorporate those provisions in the state’s Medicaid plan, and instead reimbursed providers for Medicaid services at lower rates.

In Armstrong, the plaintiffs, providers of habilitation services under Idaho’s Medicaid plan sought an injunction to prevent Idaho’s State Department of Health from violating Section 30(A) of Medicaid, 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(30)(A), which requires a state to “assure that payments are consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care,” while “safeguard[ing] against unnecessary utilization of. . . care and services.”  The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision that the Supremacy Clause gave the providers an implied right of action to seek an injunction requiring Idaho to comply with Section 30(a). Continue reading “SCOTUS Limits Claims Brought by Healthcare Providers’ for Denied Medicaid Reimbursement”

OIG Issues Guide For Health Care Boards on Compliance Oversight

On April 20, 2015, the Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General (“OIG“) published its “Practical Guidance for Health Care Governing Boards on Compliance Oversight” (the “Guide“).  The Guide was prepared in collaboration with the Association of Healthcare Internal Auditors, the American Health Lawyers Association, the Health Care Compliance Association, and according to the Guide, provides tips to health care boards (“Boards“) on four categories: “(1) roles of, and relationships between, the organization’s audit, compliance, and legal departments; (2) mechanism and process for issue-reporting within an organization; (3) approach to identifying regulatory risk; and (4) methods of encouraging enterprise-wide accountability for achievement of compliance goals and objectives.”  While not a legally binding document, the Guide provides helpful insight for Boards and underscores best practices in these areas. Continue reading “OIG Issues Guide For Health Care Boards on Compliance Oversight”

Specific Facts Suggest Hospitals and Insurers Agreed to Group Boycott

A per se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, generally requires an agreement among horizontal competitors that unreasonably restrains trade. To withstand a motion to dismiss, a Section 1 plaintiff must allege facts that suggest direct of evidence of an agreement among the defendants, as opposed to alleging facts that merely are consistent with parallel conduct. These principles have been referred to by some courts as creating a heightened pleading standard for Section 1 claims.

In Arapahoe Surgery Center, LLC, et al. v. Cigna Healthcare, Inc., et al., 2015 U.S. Dist. Lexis 28375 (D. CO.), the Colorado District Court determined that the plaintiffs’ allegations of a group boycott were sufficient to meet the pleading requirements under Section 1, and therefore denied a motion to dismiss filed by three insurance carrier defendants. The specificity of the factual allegations concerning the agreement among the defendants, and the acts in furtherance thereof, underscore the importance of antitrust compliance in the healthcare and health insurance industries. Continue reading “Specific Facts Suggest Hospitals and Insurers Agreed to Group Boycott”

On-call coverage contracts are OK

An  orthopedic surgeon agreed on two separate occasions to an on-call coverage contract with a local hospital in which he warranted that no portion of his compensation was in exchange for referrals.  When the contracts were terminated by the hospital after the surgeon invested in a competing surgery center, the surgeon brought a whistleblower False Claims Act action against the hospital, alleging that the contract was intended to induce his referrals.

The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, in Cooper v. Pottstown Hospital Co., LLC, et al., dismissed the surgeon’s complaint.  The district court’s description of the failure of the complaint illustrates the characteristics of on-call contracts that make them a permissible relationship between hospitals and physicians.  Continue reading “On-call coverage contracts are OK”

Certain FCA Defendants Dismissed; “Lumping” Defendants Together Is Not Enough To State An FCA Claim

A district court in the Northern District of Illinois recently partially granted a motion to dismiss the Government’s False Claims Act (“FCA”) complaint filed against IPC The Hospitalist Company, Inc. (“IPC”) and its subsidiaries and affiliates. The district court dismissed IPC’s subsidiaries and affiliates because the Government simply “lumped” those subsidiaries and affiliates in with IPC, and did not plead facts tying the subsidiaries and affiliates to the alleged fraud. The decision underscores an important defense available to FCA defendants, and highlights the nuanced pleading requirements that the Government must meet in an FCA case. Continue reading “Certain FCA Defendants Dismissed; “Lumping” Defendants Together Is Not Enough To State An FCA Claim”

Consultants’ Communications Privileged from Discovery

In healthcare, companies often hire consultants to review billing and coding, privacy and security and a host of other technical issues that regular staff does not have the time or expertise to pursue.  A recent discovery ruling in federal court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania holds that communications with such outside consultants are privileged from discovery if they are made for the purpose of assisting the company in securing legal advice or making legal decisions.

In Smith v. Unilife Corporation, a whistleblower brought an action under Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank alleging shareholder fraud and failure to comply with certain FDA requirements.  The plaintiff sought discovery of two non-lawyer consultants regarding drafts of the company’s SEC Form 10-K filing.  The Court’s decision to deny the plaintiff’s motion to compel was based on the “functional equivalent” doctrine, a principle already adopted in the 8th, 9th and D.C. Circuits, but not yet in the 3rd Circuit.

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Virtual Credit Card Payments

Paying for Health Care by Virtual Credit Card
On January 30, 2015, several healthcare organizations sent a group letter to CMS protesting the use of virtual credit cards by health plans to pay providers. In a virtual credit card payment (a nonstandard type of electronic funds transfer EFT), a health plan or its payment vendor issues single-use credit card information to a provider via mail, fax or email; the payment is “virtual” in that there is not a physical credit card. Providers then manually enter the virtual credit card number into their point-of-sale (POS) processing terminal, and the card processing network authorizes the payment. Virtual credit card programs are generally rolled out as an opt-out function and providers can end up being enrolled without their knowledge or consent.
The letter states that “While the process described above may sound benign and similar to provider processing of patient credit cards, virtual credit card payments can have a significant negative financial impact on a provider. Interchange fees of up to five percent are imposed on virtual credit card payments; these fees essentially reduce the contracted fee rate that has been negotiated with the health plan for a particular service or services. Unfortunately, many providers are unaware of these fees when accepting virtual credit card payments. Yet while providers are losing income from this payment method, health plans and intermediaries can profit from virtual credit cards, as they often receive cash-back incentives from credit card companies.”

The letter recommended that CMS provide the following direction to the health care industry regarding virtual credit card and Automated Clearing House ACH EFT payments:
• Require that a provider explicitly opt-in to virtual credit card payments prior to the issuance of any payments via this method;
• Require that prior to opting in to virtual credit card payments, the provider must receive a complete disclosure of all fees associated with this payment option;
• Require that virtual credit card programs provide clear and hassle-free instructions to providers on how to opt-out of these payments, should they later decide to choose another payment method;
• Prohibit health plans from requiring acceptance of virtual credit card payments as part of their provider contracts;
• Clarify the definition of “excessive fees” in the context of ACH EFT payments to prohibit health plans and their vendors from charging fees for ACH EFT payments in excess of the nominal charge assessed by the providers’ financial institution; and
• Require that any services designed to supplement the standard ACH EFT process be independently selected at the provider’s discretion and be unambiguously separate from ACH EFT enrollment forms.
Providers need to examine the impact of virtual credit cards on their practices and consider the merits of opting in or opting out.

Health System Integration and Antitrust Laws on Collision Course

Health systems attempting to fulfill the mandate of integrating hospitals and physicians may find themselves accused of going too far.  Although the Affordable Care Act, shared savings, gainsharing and other alternative payment methodologies have made integration of physicians, hospitals and other providers an operational goal, success in reaching that goal may be challenged by private antitrust actions.

In a recent Florida federal court decision, the antitrust complaint of “several of Southern Brevard County’s physicians and physicians practice groups” was held to have stated a monopolization claim against Health First, Inc. and three of its wholly-owned subsidiaries —  an insurer, a hospital and a physician practice group.  Essentially, by fully integrating its business, and incentivizing in-network referrals and managed care pricing, Health First became vulnerable to claims of tying, exclusive dealing, price discrimination and monopolization.

Continue reading “Health System Integration and Antitrust Laws on Collision Course”

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The opinions expressed on this blog are those of the author and are not to be construed as legal advice.

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