By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Gregory Tsonis, and Brittany Wunderlich
Duane Morris Takeaways: On August 21, 2023, Judge Barbara Rothstein of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington granted the EEOC’s motion for reconsideration, reversing its decision granting summary judgment to defendant Telecare Mental Health Services of Washington, Inc.’s (“Telecare”) in a disability discrimination case entitled EEOC v. Telecare Mental Health Services of Washington, Case No. 2:21-CV-1339 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 21, 2023). Despite giving the EEOC multiple opportunities to submit evidence rebutting Telecare’s argument that the claimant was not qualified for the position to which he applied, and the EEOC’s failure to do so prior to its motion for reconsideration, the Court ultimately found from the EEOC’s belated evidence that a disputed material fact existed that must be resolved by a jury. The ruling demonstrates the difficulty in achieving summary judgment in an discrimination case, as well as the reluctance of courts to bar discrimination claims entirely. For employers handling EEOC litigation, this ruling is instructive, as successful motions for reconsideration are rare, and reversals of summary judgment even rarer.
The court noted that when ruling on Telecare’s motion for summary judgment, it gave the EEOC multiple opportunities to submit evidence rebutting Telecare’s argument that the claimant was not qualified for the position in which he applied. The court further chastised the EEOC for submitting such evidence for the first time in its motion for reconsideration, calling the EEOC’s failure “particularly egregious.” Despite the EEOC submitting such evidence for the first time in its motion for reconsideration, the district court ultimately reinstated the claimant’s claim after finding that an issue of material disputed fact existed.
Case Background
In 2019, claimant Jason Hautala applied for a position as a registered nurse at a Telecare facility that assisted the mentally ill. While Telecare extended an offer of employment to the claimant, the offer was conditioned on the requirement that Hautala pass a physical examination to determine his fitness for the position. Telecare ultimately rescinded its offer because the claimant had a permanent leg injury, which made him unable to perform the basic functions of a registered nurse.
The EEOC filed suit on behalf of Hautala under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) claiming that Telecare discriminated against him because of his disability. Telecare moved for summary judgment, arguing in part that Hautala was not a “qualified individual” for the position under the ADA based on comments he made that reflected a negative attitude towards the mentally ill. Telecare alleged Hautala made statements including “in my youth, I used to enjoy a crazy person takedown, but as I get older, I enjoy these things less and less” and “fighting off meth heads isn’t as much fun in my 50s as it was in my 30s.” Id. at 3. In support of its motion, Telecare submitted evidence that compassion toward patients with mental illness was an essential job function, and that Telecare would not hire someone who referred to patients as “crazy” or “meth heads.” The EEOC, in its opposition brief, failed to address Telecare’s argument or offer any contrary evidence.
The Court gave the EEOC a second chance to present evidence rebutting Telecare’s argument, requesting supplemental briefing on Telecare’s argument that Hautala was not a “qualified individual” for the position. Despite the second opportunity to rebut Telecare’s position, the EEOC offered no contrary evidence and argued only that the comments, “as after-acquired evidence, could not be considered as a post hoc justification” for Telecare’s failure to hire Hautala. Id. at 4.
Accordingly, the Court granted Telecare’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the EEOC failed to allege facts sufficient to support its prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA. In particular, the Court found that the claimant was not a qualified individual for the nursing position he applied for given Telecare’s undisputed evidence that Hautala had made the “troubling” and “inappropriate” comments, that compassion for patients suffering from mental illness was a necessary qualification for the position, and that the comments “conclusively demonstrated a lack of such compassion.” Id.
The EEOC’s Motion For Reconsideration
The EEOC subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration of the summary judgment ruling in Telecare’s favor. In doing so, the EEOC for the first time provided evidence that Telecare was aware of Hautala’s views towards the mentally ill, and argued that a material issue of fact required reinstating Hautala’s ADA claims.
The EEOC contended that it was entitled to reconsideration because subjective criteria (i.e., whether the claimant possessed the requisite compassion for the job) could not be considered as part of its prima facie case. In rejecting this argument, the Court found the McDonnel Douglas burden-shifting framework inapplicable because Telecare admitted it did not hire Hautala based upon his disability, nor was the subjective criteria at issue “hotly contested” like the criteria in the EEOC’s cited precedent.
However, the Court found the EEOC’s second argument for reconsideration more convincing. The EEOC argued that there was a disputed issue of fact as to whether Telecare knew of the claimant’s view on mentally ill patients during the application process, thereby contradicting Telecare’s argument that Hautera’s comments were disqualifying for the position. The EEOC submitted as evidence an email from Telecare’s employees following Hautera’s interview in which they acknowledged Hautera’s comments, but nonetheless “advanced Hautala in the application process.” Id. at 9. As a result, in order to “avoid the potential for manifest error” and “in the interests of justice,” the Court concluded that summary judgement on the issue of whether Hautala was a qualified individual was not appropriate and that “[d]enying Claimant Hautala a chance to have his substantive disability discrimination claims heard based on the EEOC’s failure to timely present the issue is a potential injustice that is easily avoided.” Id. The Court, however, made clear that it was “not absolving” the EEOC “of its obligation to prove that Hautala was a qualified individual with a disability,” only that a factual dispute exists as to whether Telecare “would actually have considered the comments disqualifying.” Id. at 10.
Though the Court ultimately reinstated the EEOC’s claim, Judge Rothstein chastised the EEOC for not citing this evidence in its summary judgment briefing, noting that the EEOC’s failure to cite to such evidence was “particularly egregious” given that the Court gave the EEOC a second chance to do so. Noting that the parties filed over 1,000 pages of exhibits in support for their motions, the Court chastised the EEOC for failing to cite the evidence in its summary judgment briefs and noted that “[j]udges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs’ or on the record.” Id. at 9.
Implications For Employers
This decision demonstrates the reluctance of courts to bar discrimination claims asserted by the EEOC even after severe and “egregious” missteps in litigation. This latitude afforded to the EEOC, coupled with the resources available to the government in EEOC-initiated actions, requires close coordination with experienced counsel to defeat discrimination lawsuits at the pleading stage. Employers faced with such claims should work closely with their counsel to ensure a comprehensive litigation strategy that maximizes the potential for defeating claims before the necessity of going to trial.