Category: Class Action Weekly Wire

Duane Morris Takeaway: This week’s episode features Duane Morris partners Jerry Maatman and Sharon Caffrey with their analysis of a proposed $5.5 billion settlement aimed to resolve thousands of lawsuits alleging Johnson & Johnson’s talc-based products caused ovarian cancer.

Check out today’s episode and subscribe to our show from your preferred podcast platform: Spotify, Amazon Music, Apple Podcasts, Podcast Index, Tune In, Listen Notes, iHeartRadio, Deezer, and YouTube.

Episode Transcript

Jerry Maatman: Thank you for being here again for the next episode of our weekly podcast, the Class Action Weekly Wire. I’m Jerry Maatman, a partner at Duane Morris, and joining me today is my partner and colleague, Sharon Caffrey. Thanks so much for being on the podcast today.

Sharon Caffrey: Thank you, Jerry, it’s great to be here.

Jerry: Today, we’ll be discussing Johnson & Johnson’s recent announcement that it has agreed to pay approximately $5.5 billion to settle thousands of lawsuits alleging that its products containing talcum powder caused ovarian cancer. Sharon, I know this story has been unfolding for quite a while. What exactly happened here?

Sharon: Yeah, this is certainly one of the most significant settlements we’ve seen in the mass tort arena. Johnson & Johnson announced that it has reached a proposed agreement to resolve the claims against it brought by roughly 70,000 plaintiffs in federal talc multi-district litigation, which is pending in New Jersey, along with some related state court proceedings. Under the agreement, the company has agreed to commit at least $5.5 billion to compensate claimants. Importantly, though, the settlement is conditioned on participation by at least 95% of those plaintiffs. So, while it’s a major breakthrough, there are still some procedural hurdles before the settlement becomes final.

Jerry: One aspect of the settlement that stood out to me is that Johnson & Johnson maintains that its talc products are safe and do not cause cancer. So, this isn’t a situation where a company is admitting any liability.

Sharon: That’s exactly correct. Throughout the litigation, Johnson & Johnson has been consistent in arguing that its talc products do not contain asbestos and do not cause ovarian cancer. The company’s been unwavering on that position and in announcing the settlement, Johnson & Johnson characterized the agreement as a practical business decision rather than a concession on the merits. The company emphasized that it remains confident in the science supporting its products and believes it would have continued to prevail if these cases continued to move forward.

Jerry: That confidence also seems to be reinforced by some recent developments in the litigation itself.

Sharon: That’s correct, and in fact, the timing of the settlement is especially interesting, because it comes on the heels of a significant ruling in the multi-district litigation. Just last week, the federal court overseeing the MDL ordered the plaintiffs to demonstrate that they could produce admissible expert testimony linking talc to ovarian cancer. Without that evidence, the plaintiffs faced the possibility that their remaining claims would be dismissed. And that ruling followed the withdrawal of two key causation experts for the plaintiffs in Bellwether cases. Johnson & Johnson argued that those developments highlighted the fundamental problems for plaintiffs, proving that talc exposure caused a specific individual’s ovarian cancer.

Jerry: Certainly, when you talk about settlement of major litigation leverages everything, and it seems to me that the legal landscape might have been shifting in favor of Johnson & Johnson and against the plaintiffs here.

Sharon: Yeah, based on the specific causation issues that the plaintiffs were facing, that is accurate. Company representatives were pointing to those expert challenges at this time once the courts engaged in some more scrutiny of those experts. They essentially argued that plaintiffs were increasingly facing an uphill battle to establish specific causation, which is one of the most difficult things in product liability litigation.

Jerry: Well, $5.5 billion is what it is, and so the plaintiffs also claim victory here.

Sharon: Oh, of course they did. Plaintiffs’ leadership described the settlement as a landmark achievement and characterized it as long-delayed justice for women and families who have been waiting years for compensation. One of the more compelling points made by plaintiffs’ counsel was that the litigation is stretched on for more than a decade. During that time, many claimants have faced serious health issues, and some, unfortunately, have passed away before seeing a resolution of their claims. From that perspective, plaintiffs view this settlement as delivering certainty and compensation after years of legal battles.

Jerry: In terms of mass tort resolutions and class action litigation, an interesting feature, if not an unusual feature, that stood out to me was the fact that the settlement is uncapped. Could you explain to our listeners and viewers what that means?

Sharon: Sure. Usually, when there is a settlement of a mass tort, there is a fund, a specific fund, that is created for eligible claimants. And, it’s a fixed amount that must be divided amongst those claimants, so claimants step forward and their cases are weighed, usually on a tiered system. In this instance, plaintiffs’ counsel is very bullish on the fact that Johnson & Johnson is not capping this at $5.5 billion. It will depend on the levels of participation and the qualifying claims. In addition, the settlement applies only to current plaintiffs and does not resolve claims that may potentially arise in the future.

Jerry: Well, maybe the price of a settlement is making everybody equally unhappy or happy, but if you look at the recent trial results, it’s easy to see why both sides of the V in this case concluded that settlement was preferable to continued litigation.

Sharon: Right, the most recent case was tried in June, and that was in Los Angeles, and there was verdict was rendered in favor of Johnson & Johnson after a six-week trial of an ovarian cancer bellwether case. And then earlier this year, an Oklahoma jury also sided with the company in a mesothelioma case involving alleged asbestos-containing talc products. At the same time, the plaintiffs have secured notable victories as well, including a $65.5 million verdict that was recently upheld in a case involving a woman who alleged that Johnson & Johnson’s talc products caused her exposure to asbestos and contributed to her cancer. And also another prior Los Angeles plaintiff obtained a $40 million verdict in a bellwether trial. So, the mixed outcomes really create uncertainty for both sides, and trials are expensive, appeals take very long time, sometimes years, and neither party can fully predict how the juries are going to respond, particularly with the complex science.

Jerry: Sharon, from a broader perspective, what do you think this settlement tells us about, the mass tort space going forward into the later half of 2026?

Sharon: Well, there should be a whole lot less tort cases, but, first, I think mostly expert testimony remains the centerpiece for modern mass tort litigation. Regardless of the size of the case, the ability to establish reliable scientific causation often determine whether claims survive Daubert or Frye challenges. And second, the settlement pressure increases dramatically when courts begin to scrutinize expert evidence. The MDL court’s recent rulings appear to have created a pivotal inflection point in these proceedings, particularly for the plaintiffs who faced not having specific causation experts. And then, finally, after years of litigation and multiple trial victories for both sides, global resolution is probably the most attractive option because of the uncertainty in what the outcomes would be.

Jerry: Final question for you, do you think this is the end of the talc litigation story?

Sharon: It’s the end of a major chapter of the talc litigation story. Settlement still requires substantial participation by all the plaintiffs and there may be implementation issues as the claims proceed. Also, remember that this is only for the existing claimants, and there could be future claimants. And then I think If the participation threshold is met, this is going to be one of the most consequential resolutions in mass tort history and could bring some closure to a significant portion of the ovarian talc litigation involving cosmetic talc.

Jerry: Sharon, thanks so much for joining us on this week’s edition of the Class Action Weekly Wire. This has been a great discussion, and thank you for your detailed analysis, kind of inside baseball look at the settlement. Thanks to our listeners. We’re glad you were here to tune in to another edition of our weekly podcast series.

Sharon: Thank you, Jerry, for inviting me to speak on this topic.

Duane Morris Takeaway: This week’s episode features Duane Morris partner Jennifer Riley and associate Elizabeth Underwood with their analysis of a ruling from the Eighth Circuit affirming a district court’s judgment in favor of an employer following a jury verdict rejecting a hostile work environment claim brought by the EEOC and an intervenor employee.

Check out today’s episode and subscribe to our show from your preferred podcast platform: Spotify, Amazon Music, Apple Podcasts, Podcast Index, Tune In, Listen Notes, iHeartRadio, Deezer, and YouTube.

Episode Transcript

Jennifer Riley: Thank you for being here again for the next episode of our weekly podcast, the Class Action Weekly Wire. I’m Jennifer Riley, partner at Duane Morris, and joining me today is my colleague, Elizabeth Underwood. Thank you so much for being on the podcast today, Elizabeth.

Elizabeth Underwood: Great to be here, Jen. Thanks for having me.

Jennifer: Today, we’re discussing a significant new decision from the Eighth Circuit involving employer liability for workplace harassment. So, this is an important decision for employers. It reinforces what courts expect of employers when responding to harassment complaints. And just as importantly, it also talks about what an employer must know about a situation before liability can attach. So, let’s start with the basics. Elizabeth, can you tell our listeners what happened in this case?

Elizabeth: Sure. The case is EEOC v. Sun Chemical Corporation, decided by the Eighth Circuit on August 4, 2026. The EEOC and an employee, Bryan Banks, brought a Title VII hostile work environment claim after a coworker directed the N-word at Banks multiple times during a workplace confrontation. Banks immediately reported the incident. Sun Chemical investigated, suspended the coworker for five days without pay, warned that any future misconduct could result in termination, and also issued Banks a written warning for profanity use during the confrontation. The EEOC later sued, arguing that Sun Chemical’s response and its efforts to prevent the harassment in the first place were insufficient. After a jury trial, however, the jury found in favor of the employer, and the EEOC appealed.

Jennifer: And I understand the appeal wasn’t really about whether the incident happened or whether it didn’t happen. Instead, the appeal really focused on the legal instructions given to the jury, right?

Elizabeth: Exactly. The EEOC argued that the jury instructions were too narrow. Specifically, it claimed the instructions focused only on whether Sun Chemical responded appropriately after learning about the harassment, rather than whether the company should have prevented the harassment from occurring. The instructions required the plaintiffs to prove that Sun Chemical knew or should have known about the harassing conduct and failed to take prompt and appropriate corrective action. The EEOC argued that there was another theory of liability, that the employer had failed to prevent the harassment before it happened.

Jennifer: How did the Eighth Circuit respond to those arguments?

Elizabeth: Interestingly, the Eighth Circuit didn’t decide whether the jury instructions were perfect. Instead, it assumed, for the sake of argument, that the EEOC’s theory could apply, and then held that there simply wasn’t enough evidence to support it. The court explained that even under the EEOC’s theory, an employer must have actual or constructive knowledge of ongoing harassment and fail to take remedial action reasonably calculated to stop it. In other words, employers can’t prevent misconduct that they have no reason to anticipate.

Jennifer: That does seem to be the key takeaway. So, what evidence did the EEOC rely on to argue that Sun Chemical should have known?

Elizabeth: The EEOC pointed to one prior incident in which the same employee had allegedly used the N-word toward another Black employee. But the court said that single prior incident was not enough to put the company on notice that the employee was a serial harasser, or that ongoing racial harassment was occurring. The court distinguished situations where employers received repeated complaints or observe a pattern of misconduct. Here, there simply wasn’t enough evidence that management knew, or reasonably should have known, that additional harassment was likely.

Jennifer: The Eighth Circuit also spent some time discussing the employer’s disciplinary response, if I recall, correct?

Elizabeth: It did. The EEOC argued that the company should have taken stronger action after the earlier incident. The Eighth Circuit acknowledged that Sun Chemical’s response could have been stronger but emphasized that Title VII doesn’t require employers to terminate an employee after a first offense in order to demonstrate an adequate remedial response. The court noted that the employee had more than 30 years of service without a prior history of harassment, and that the company documented its discipline and warned that future misconduct could lead to termination. So, the court looked at the totality of the circumstances, rather than applying a one-size-fits-all approach.

Jennifer: There was also an argument about alleged unreported uses of a similar slur in workplace conversations if I recall. How did the court handle that?

Elizabeth: So, the Eighth Circuit rejected that argument, because there wasn’t enough evidence that those alleged comments had ever been reported to management, without reports or facts suggesting management reasonably should have known; the court found there wasn’t enough to establish constructive knowledge. That’s an important point, because constructive knowledge isn’t based on speculation. There has to be enough information that a reasonable employer would recognize a probability that harassment is occurring.

Jennifer: What a great decision. So, let’s talk about what employers should take away from the ruling.

Elizabeth: Well, there are several practical lessons. First, employers should continue to maintain clear anti-harassment policies and multiple reporting avenues. Those reporting mechanisms are critical because an employer generally cannot address contracts it doesn’t know about.

Second, every complaint should be investigated promptly and documented carefully. Courts continue to examine not only whether employers responded, but whether the response was reasonably calculated to stop future misconduct.

Third, progressive discipline remains important. While immediate termination may be appropriate in some situations, this decision reinforces that Title VII does not automatically require firing an employee after a first incident. Courts will consider the severity of the conduct, the employee’s disciplinary history, prior complaints, and the employer’s overall response.

Fourth and finally, documentation matters. Employers should carefully document complaints, investigations, disciplinary decisions, and the reasons supporting those decisions. That record often becomes critical years later during litigation.

Jennifer: Thanks so much, Elizabeth, for that great overview. I feel like this decision is really an important reminder that Title VII requires employers to take workplace harassment seriously, but it also, at the same time, recognizes the practical limitations on employer liability. The Eighth Circuit made clear here that employers are expected to respond promptly and effectively to known harassment, but they’re also not liable for failing to prevent misconduct that they really had no actual or constructive reason to anticipate. For employers, I think that means the best defense continues to be strong policies, effective reporting procedures, prompt investigations, appropriate corrective action, and thorough documentation.

Elizabeth, again, thank you so much for walking us through this important decision, and thank you to our listeners. We are glad you tuned in to another edition of the Class Action Weekly Wire.

Elizabeth: Thanks, Jen, and thank you, listeners. It was a pleasure to be here.

Duane Morris Takeaway: This week’s episode features Duane Morris partner Jerry Maatman and senior associate Hayley Ryan with their analysis of the $1.5 billion settlement set to resolve a class action brought by authors alleging artificial intelligence developer Anthropic pirated their work to train its large language model.

Check out today’s episode and subscribe to our show from your preferred podcast platform: Spotify, Amazon Music, Apple Podcasts, Podcast Index, Tune In, Listen Notes, iHeartRadio, Deezer, and YouTube.

Episode Transcript

Jerry Maatman: Thank you, loyal listeners, for being here again for the next episode of our weekly podcast series entitled The Class Action Weekly Wire. I’m Jerry Maatman, a partner at Duane Morris, and joining me today is my colleague, Hayley Ryan. Thanks so much for being here on the podcast today.

Hayley Ryan: Great to be here, Jerry. Thanks for having me.

Jerry: Today, we’re discussing one of the most significant class action settlements ever, a copyright class action settlement that was recently approved for $1.5 billion between Anthropic and a class of authors and copyright holders whose books were allegedly downloaded from online piracy libraries and used in connection with AI training. The court, in its settlement approval order, called it the largest copyright class action settlement in the history of American jurisprudence. Hayley, let’s start with the basics. What was the case about?

Hayley: Yeah, Jerry, so the case was brought by authors and copyright holders against Anthropic. Plaintiffs allege that Anthropic downloaded hundreds of thousands of copyrighted books from the online repositories Library Genesis, or LibGen, and Pirate Library Mirror, often referred to as PiLiMi. The settlement class included copyright owners of books appearing on a specific works list, containing approximately 482,000 works that Anthropic had downloaded from those sources.

Jerry: As I understand it, in the history of the case, the judge, a federal district court judge in the Northern District of California, granted final settlement approval on July 20, 2026.

Hayley: That’s right, Jerry. The court concluded that the settlement satisfied Rule 23’s requirements and was fair, reasonable, and adequate. The court viewed the settlement as providing substantial value to the class. According to the court’s order, the average recovery is expected to be approximately $3,000 per word. The court stated that this amount is roughly four times the statutory minimum damages available for ordinary copyright infringement, and about 15 times the minimum for innocent infringement.

Jerry: As is inevitable in large class action settlements, I understand that some objectors lodged objections to the settlement, claiming that the settlement amount should have been larger, is that right?

Hayley: Yes, they sure did, Jerry. Several objectors pointed out that copyright law allows statutory damages of up to $150,000 per work in certain circumstances. The court concluded that continued litigation carried substantial risks, including the possibility of losing at trial, appellate reversals, delays, and constitutional challenges to a massive statutory damages award.

Jerry: One thing that stood out to me was the participation rate among class action members. I’ve seen settlements where the participation rate is under 3%. What did their data analytics look like in this particular settlement?

Hayley: Yes, Jerry, so here, the participation rate was extraordinarily high. By April of 2026, claims have been submitted for more than 91% of the works on the works list. The court noted that this level of participation was far above what is typically seen in class actions. The settlement administrator received only 350 timely opt-outs, covering just 1,802 works, despite notice reaching hundreds of thousands of potential class numbers. The court also noted that only 54 objectors or comments were filed, and several class members affirmatively supported the settlement.

Jerry: Notice program in a class action settlement is always important, but let’s talk about it in the context of this case, where there were an enormous amount of authors and copyright holders.

Hayley: Yes, Jerry, so the notice program was extensive. The settlement administrator gathered contact information from publishers, authors organizations, copyright records, ISBN databases, commercial sources, and internet searches. Notice was sent to nearly 595,000 potential class members, and the court found that notice reached owners associated with more than 99.5% of the works on the works list. The campaign also included industry publications, newspapers, press coverage, newsletters, as well as social media outreach.

Jerry: The scope of a release in a class action settlement review process is always important. How did it play out in this particular case?

Hayley: Absolutely. So, the settlement only releases claims related to works appearing on the specific works list, and only for certain past conduct. The judge emphasized that class members are not releasing claims concerning future conduct. They’re also not releasing claims based on AI outputs. So, the settlement focused primarily on alleged downloading and copying of works that occurred before August 25, 2025.

Jerry: Class action settlements of this ilk also often involve injunctive, programmatic, or non-monetary relief. How did that play out in the settlement approval process?

Hayley: Yes, Jerry, so Anthropic agreed to destroy the pirated copies of class members’ works that had been downloaded from LibGen and PiLiMi, subject to preservation obligations and other legal requirements. The court viewed that destruction obligation as a significant benefit to the class.

Jerry: And then, inevitably, in all class action settlements, a portion of the amount of the settlement is devoted to attorneys’ fees. I found this opinion on settlement approval particularly interesting insofar as attorneys’ fees approval issues was concerned.

Hayley: Yes, it really is, Jerry. Class counsel initially sought 20% of the settlement fund, which would have been $300 million. They later reduced that request to 12.5%, or $187.5 million. Even after that reduction, the court found the request too high.

Jerry: That’s certainly a significant amount of money to be paid to law firms for prosecuting a class action. Is this because, was the court’s opinion because this is the type of settlement that would fall into the category of what’s called a megafund class action settlement?

Hayley: Exactly, Jerry. The judge concluded that applying a percentage of the fund approach would generate a windfall for class counsel. So, instead, the court used the lodestar method. Class counsel reported approximately $27 million in lodestar fees, and the court applied a multiplier of 3.75. So, that resulted in a fee award of just over $101.5 million, which equates to roughly 6.8% of the settlement fund.

Jerry: Well, an enormous fee, one of the largest of 2026 thus far in any class action settlement, but certainly significantly less than what plaintiffs’ counsel had requested. The named plaintiffs, I assume, also requested service awards?

Hayley: Yes, they did. So, the class representatives asked for $50,000 each. The court found that amount to be excessive, although the representatives devoted substantial time and effort to the litigation, the judge concluded there was no showing of retaliation risk comparable to some employment class actions. So, the court instead awarded $15,000 to each of the three class representatives.

Jerry: Bottom line, Hayley, what are your biggest takeaways for corporate counsel from this decision?

Hayley: So, Jerry, courts remain willing to approve extraordinarily large settlements involving AI-related copyright claims when the settlement provides meaningful and immediate value to the class. However, the fee ruling reinforces that courts will scrutinize attorney’s fees in megafund settlements and may depart significantly from the traditional 25% benchmark.

Jerry: In following, class actions that are filed and settled, I think there’s one more takeaway, maybe, and that’s that this settlement resolves historic claims never before brought involving a defined set of books, but it leaves the door open and invites future litigation involving AI outputs and future conduct in privacy situations. So, it probably won’t be the last major case we see in this particular space.

Well, Hayley, thank you so much for this great discussion and your thought leadership in this area. Thanks for the detailed analysis of this important settlement, and thanks for being here today. Along with our listeners, thank you for joining us for this latest installment of the Class Action Weekly Wire.

Hayley: Thanks, Jerry, and thank you, listeners, it was a pleasure to be here.

Duane Morris Takeaway: This week’s episode features Duane Morris partners Jerry Maatman and Jennifer Riley with their analysis of class certification data in the first six months of 2026 and their prognostications for trends shaping the remainder of the year.

Read our full mid-year settlement review here and class certification data here.

Check out today’s episode and subscribe to our show from your preferred podcast platform: Spotify, Amazon Music, Apple Podcasts, Podcast Index, Tune In, Listen Notes, iHeartRadio, Deezer, and YouTube.

Episode Transcript

Jerry Maatman: Hello, everyone, and welcome to the next episode of the Class Action Weekly Wire. I’m Jerry Maatman, and with me today for a special mid-year review of class certification numbers is Jen Riley. Jen, welcome back to the show.

Jennifer Riley: Thanks, Jerry, it’s great to be here, especially with so much going on in the class action space this year.

Jerry: Well, here we are, halfway through 2026. Let’s start with the big picture. Courts ruled on more than 155 class certification motions in just the first half of the year, and plaintiffs were successful in 63% of those situations. That’s quite a difference from the year before, isn’t it?

Jennifer: It is. Last year, the success rate was 68%, so we’re seeing a notable downtick. An even bigger change that we saw in 2024, 2023, and 2022, when certification success rates hit 69%, 72%, and 74%, respectively. So, the trajectory so far this year suggests that plaintiffs might not be as successful as they have been in the past.

Jerry: Seems to me what’s interesting, behind the numbers is the downturn isn’t across the board, it really depends on the subject matter area at issue in the class action.

Jennifer: Exactly. So, certification rates are all over the place. FCRA, TCPA, RICO, and WARN class certification decisions have all been small in number, with only one or two rulings in each of those areas, but all of them have been granted. So, 80% of class certification motions and securities fraud cases have been granted. Then on the flip side, less than half of certification motions and privacy were granted, and the one ruling on a class certification and products liability was denied.

Jerry: That really does run the gamut, and its very statute-oriented or subject matter oriented. Let’s talk about wage and hour or Fair Labor Standards Act conditional certification. Does that continue to be the most active area litigation in this space?

Jennifer: It does. From January through June, courts issued 69 rulings in FLSA matters. 67 of those were first stage motions for conditional certification, and plaintiffs won 39. So, that’s a success rate of only 58%, which is way down from the 76% in 2025 and the 79% we saw in 2024.

Jerry: When I look at those numbers and look at the locations, it’s striking how those rulings are congregated in certain geographic areas. A large chunk came from the Second and Ninth Circuits – places like New York City and San Francisco and Los Angeles, which tend to be more favorable to the plaintiffs’ bar.

Jennifer: That’s absolutely right. And at the decertification stage, the usual trend where defendants succeed more often hasn’t really been playing out this year. We’ve seen only two decertification rulings so far, and plaintiffs won one of those. So, it’s 50-50 so far this year.

Jerry: One of the key takeaways for me from this mid-year data analytics analysis is how much locations impact where cases get filed. We’re seeing very few rulings, for instance, from the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits: only five in total. Any thoughts on why this is going on?

Jennifer: Great question. So, I think it’s likely a strategic move by the plaintiffs. Those circuits have adopted stricter standards for conditional certification, really making them less appealing venues. So, plaintiffs may be shifting, shifting their filings toward more lenient circuits to give them a better chance of success.

Jerry: If more circuits would follow the lead of the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits, and start abandoning the traditional two-step certification process established in the Lusardi case out of New Jersey in 1987, that could have a big impact on where cases are brought and how they’re treated by the courts.

Jennifer: Absolutely. The mid-year numbers show us that venue selection, subject matter, and timing are all very critical in class action strategy. And with the FLSA continuing to dominate, we’ll be watching closely to see how courts respond in the second half of the year.

Jerry: Well, we’ll have the final data and full analysis in the Duane Morris Class Action Review for 2027 coming out in the first week of January of next year, so stay tuned. We’ll be back with more insights then. Jen, thanks as always for being here and for giving us your analysis of these trends on class certification.

Jennifer: Thank you, Jerry, and thanks to our listeners for tuning in.

Duane Morris Takeaway: This week’s episode features Duane Morris partners Jerry Maatman and Jennifer Riley with their analysis of class action settlement data in the first six months of 2026 and their prognostications for trends shaping the remainder of the year.

Read the full mid-year settlement review in our previous blog post.

Check out today’s episode and subscribe to our show from your preferred podcast platform: Spotify, Amazon Music, Apple Podcasts, Podcast Index, Tune In, Listen Notes, iHeartRadio, Deezer, and YouTube.

Episode Transcript

Jerry Maatman: Hello, everyone, and welcome to the next episode of the Class Action Weekly Wire. I’m Jerry Maatman, and with me today for the special mid-year review of class action settlements is Jen Riley. Jen, welcome back. Here we are halfway through 2026. What’s the big picture look like in the class action settlement space?

Jennifer Riley: Thanks, Jerry. Well, it’s been quite a ride. The data confirms essentially what we’ve been tracking since 2022. We are in a new era for class action litigation. Corporate defendants have been facing unprecedented settlement exposures. The total value of class action in government enforcement settlements hit $79 billion in 2025 that follows $66 billion in 2022, $51.4 billion in 2023, and $42 billion in 2024. As of mid-2026, we have already reached over $53 billion.

Jerry: That’s an enormous number. So, what we’re talking about is over $200 billion in just the last few years.

Jennifer: That’s exactly right. It is the largest multi-year span of settlements in U.S. legal history, and if current trends hold up, 2027 may end up ahead of the prior four years.

Jerry: Where are we seeing the biggest dollar amounts generated in these class action settlements?

Jennifer: Well, antitrust has historically had high settlements, and it is leading the charge this year with over $34 billion in settlements. Products liability and mass torts also have had big settlements this year, and has been no different in that area either, with almost $9 billion so far. Securities fraud settlements are also on track with last year’s numbers, and they’ve reached almost $2 billion so far.

Jerry: I know you track this space on a daily basis, 24-7. Any standout billion-dollar settlement cases come to mind?

Jennifer: So, there have been a few major ones. I would say the In Re College Athlete NIL Litigation is a big one. That one hit $2.78 billion alone. It finally gave athletes retroactive compensation for missed name, image, and likeness opportunities. So, that’s a historic shift in the landscape there. Also, worth noting that Purdue Pharma’s $7.4 billion opioid-related settlement. Just last week, Purdue announced that it is preparing to send an updated bankruptcy plan and proposed settlement to a vote following broad sign-on by all U.S. states and territories.

Jerry: These seem to be landmark figures. Are we seeing any high numbers of billion-dollar cases in and of themselves?

Jennifer: We are. So, there have been three billion-dollar settlements so far in 2026. That brings us to 45 total settlements over a billion dollars since 2022. That is the most in any four-and-a-half-year period ever.

Jerry: By your examination and analysis, are there any particular industries or sectors that are showing either surprising or emerging exposures in this area?

Jennifer: Great question. Data breach and privacy settlements have become increasingly prominent. Apple agreed to a $250 million settlement in a class action to resolve claims alleging that it misled millions of iPhone buyers by falsely touting AI capabilities for its Siri Voice Assistant 2024. Also, government enforcement settlements are on the rise. One of the billion-dollar settlements so far this year is an agreement with the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection and EI DuPont to resolve the state’s claims over contamination caused by the manufacture and discharge of forever chemicals.

Jerry: Let’s talk antitrust. You referred to that before. What’s the headline here?

Jennifer: So, the antitrust sector is very active, with notable cases against the NCAA, as I mentioned earlier, as well as Visa, MasterCard, and RealPage. There is a sustained focus on wage suppression and market manipulation. Those have been key areas of concern for regulators, as well as for plaintiffs.

Jerry: Are you seeing the same sort of similar energy from the Planum sparred compared to past years?

Jennifer: Absolutely. In fact, the size and pace of these settlements suggests that plaintiffs’ attorneys are pushing harder than ever, likely encouraged by that sheer size of recent wins.

Jerry: When you look at the trends and the data analytics, do you see any areas that are cooling off in 2026?

Jennifer: Great question. So, civil rights settlements have been fairly low this year. We’re also seeing some slowdown in TCPA-related cases, although final settlement approval for $28 million was granted in a case against SiriusXM Radio to resolve claims alleging that it made telephone calls to people on the Do Not Call Registry, or Sirius’ internal Do Not Call Registry. But overall, most sectors are either holding steady or are growing.

Jerry: Any closing thoughts to what should be uppermost on the mind of corporate counsel in this area?

Jennifer: Yeah, so I would say the bottom line is that corporate defendants are operating in a legal environment where large-scale class actions, whether driven by consumers, employees, investors, or regulars, are pretty much a constant and a very costly risk. We’re in a high-stakes phase of class action litigation, and there’s really no indication that it’s slowing down or going to slow down in the foreseeable future.

Jerry: Well, Jen, thanks as always for your insights, and thanks to our listeners for tuning in. We will be sure to keep you updated with new developments on these settlement numbers. It sounds like for the upcoming Duane Morris Class Action Review – 2027 edition, is going to be a must-read.

Jennifer: I think it definitely will be. Thanks, Jerry, and thank you to our listeners.

Duane Morris Takeaway: This week’s episode features Duane Morris partner Jerry Maatman and associates Christian Palacios and Andrew Quay with their discussion of key ruling issued by the Ninth Circuit reversing a California federal judge’s order denying a motion to compel arbitration.

Check out today’s episode and subscribe to our show from your preferred podcast platform: Spotify, Amazon Music, Apple Podcasts, Podcast Index, Tune In, Listen Notes, iHeartRadio, Deezer, and YouTube.

Episode Transcript

Jerry Maatman: Hello, everyone, and thank you for being here again for the next episode of the Class Action Weekly Wire. I’m Jerry Maatman, a partner at Duane Morris, and joining me today are my colleagues, Christian and Andrew. Thank you both for being on our podcast.

Christian Palacios: Glad to be here, Jerry.

Andrew Quay: Thanks for having me, Jerry.

Jerry: Today, we’ll be discussing a very significant ruling by the Ninth Circuit that California employers, and really any employer using arbitration agreements, should be paying attention to. It’s the case of Cocom v. ABM Aviation. Christian, let’s start with the basics. What happened in this case?

Christian: So, this case involved a former airport janitor who filed a California wage and hour class action against his employer, ABM Aviation. Like many employers, ABM required employees to sign an arbitration agreement at the beginning of their employment. When the lawsuit was filed, ABM moved to compel arbitration. The district court denied the motion, finding the arbitration agreement procedurally and substantively unconscionable under California law, relying heavily on a 2024 California Court of Appeals decision called Cook v. University of Southern California. ABM appealed, and the Ninth Circuit reversed.

Jerry: So, this wasn’t about whether the arbitration agreement itself is enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act. The question here was whether this particular agreement was so unfair under California law, that it couldn’t be enforced. Andrew, why did the district court think the agreement was unconscionable and therefore unenforceable?

Andrew: That’s right, Jerry. The district court focused on several provisions. First, it believed the agreement covered essentially every conceivable dispute between the employee and the company, and not just employment claims. Second, because it interpreted the agreement that broadly, it concluded the agreement lasted indefinitely. Third, it thought the agreement unfairly favored the employer because numerous affiliated entities and employees could invoke arbitration against the employee, while the employee supposedly had fewer reciprocal rights. Finally, the court concluded the agreement improperly waived certain forms of public injunctive relief; and looking at all those provisions together, the district court found the agreement was permeated with illegality and declined to even sever the problematic parts of it.

Jerry: Christian, the Ninth Circuit saw things differently. What was the outcome there?

Christian: It really did see things differently. The central issue was one of contract interpretation. The district court essentially read the phrase, including but not limited to, as making the arbitration agreement unlimited in scope. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, saying that’s not how California contract interpretation works. Instead, the Ninth Circuit applied the doctrine of Ejusdem generis, a long-standing principle that says when general language is followed by a list of specific examples, the general language is interpreted in light of those examples. Here, every specific example in the arbitration agreement involved employment-related disputes, wage claims, discrimination, retaliation, wrongful termination, labor code claims, and similar employment issues. Because of that, the court held the agreement should be interpreted as covering employment disputes, not unrelated personal disputes years after the employment ended.

Jerry: Andrew, that sure seems like a pretty important distinction from Cook. Could you explain that for our listeners?

Andrew: Probably the biggest takeaway here. So, in Cook, the arbitration agreement expressly stated that covered claims, “whether or not arising out of employment.” It also specifically listed non-employment tort claims. So, the California Court of Appeals imagines scenarios like a former employee needing to arbitrate a medical malpractice claim at a university hospital or a defamation claim years after employment ended. The Ninth Circuit said that’s simply not what ABM’s agreement did. ABM’s agreement focused exclusively on employment-related claims, and that distinction changed almost every aspect of the unconscionability analysis.

Jerry: It also addressed durational issues, too, didn’t it?

Christian: That’s right. Once the court concluded the agreement only applied to employment-related claims, the duration issue largely disappeared. Employment claims naturally stop accruing when employment ends, and applicable statutes of limitations eventually cut off any remaining claims. So, unlike the agreement in Cook, this agreement wasn’t truly perpetual.

Jerry: What about the concept of mutuality? That’s a concept employers hear about frequently in this space.

Andrew: Mutuality basically asks whether both sides are giving up similar rights. The employee argued that affiliates, officers, directors, employees, vendors, and clients could enforce the arbitration agreement against him, but he couldn’t as easily enforce it against them. Again, the Ninth Circuit said context matters here. Because the agreement only covered employment-related disputes, any claim involving those third parties would still have to arise out of the employment relationship. The Ninth Circuit explained that this is very different from forcing employees to arbitrate completely unrelated personal disputes with company affiliates years later.

Jerry: The Ninth Curcuit opinion also discusses PAGA waivers and the concept of public injunctive relief. What did the court do there?

Christian: Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit didn’t actually decide whether those provisions were enforceable. Instead, it assumed that even if those provisions were invalid under California law, they could simply be severed because of the agreement’s severability clause. That represents a fairly employer-friendly approach because courts sometimes refuse to enforce arbitration agreements if they believe illegal provisions infect the entire contract. Here, the Ninth Circuit concluded that wasn’t the case.

Jerry: Let’s turn to the practical side of this Ninth Circuit decision. If you’re advising employers in the wake of Cocom, what lessons should they take away from this ruling?

Andrew: The biggest lesson here is careful drafting. Employers should avoid language suggesting that arbitration extends to every conceivable dispute between the parties. The safest approach is to expressly limit covered claims to those arising out of employment or the employment relationship. That helps avoid the problems that doomed the agreements in Cook and similar California cases.

Christian: I’d add that employers should also revisit older arbitration agreements. Many agreements drafted years ago contain broad, any and all claims language that may have seemed harmless at the time but now creates litigation risk under California’s unconscionability doctrine. It’s worth reviewing those agreements to make sure the scope is appropriately limited and definitely include a well-written severability clause.

Jerry: Well, great insights from both of you, Andrew and Christian. The ABM decision by the Ninth Circuit is a great reminder to companies to review their arbitration agreements to ensure that they’re clearly limited to employment-related disputes and to update agreements to reflect evolving notions of California law, rather than relying upon forms drafted years ago. So, thanks so much for being here today with us, Christian and Andrew, and thank you to our listeners for tuning in.

Andrew: Thanks for having me, Jerry, and thank you, listeners.

Christian: Thanks, everyone, for listening.

Duane Morris Takeaway: This week’s episode features Duane Morris partner Jerry Maatman, special counsel Adam Brown, and associate Elizabeth Underwood with their discussion of key ruling issued in the ongoing Mobley v. Workday litigation challenging the use of AI tools in employment practices.

Check out today’s episode and subscribe to our show from your preferred podcast platform: Spotify, Amazon Music, Apple Podcasts, Podcast Index, Tune In, Listen Notes, iHeartRadio, Deezer, and YouTube.

Episode Transcript

Jerry Maatman: Hello, everyone, and thank you for being here again on the next episode of the Class Action Weekly Wire. I’m Jerry Maatman, a partner at Duane Morris, and joining me today are my colleagues, Adam Brown and Elizabeth Underwood. Thanks so much for being on the podcast today.

Elizabeth Underwood: Glad to be here, Jerry.

Adam Brown: Thanks for having me, Jerry.

Jerry: Today, we’re discussing a significant decision in a rapidly evolving area of artificial intelligence and employment law. The case is Mobley v. Workday, and it involves a June 2026 decision from the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs in this lawsuit allege that Workday’s AI-driven applicant screening tools disproportionately screen out applicants based on race, age, disability, and other protected categories. While this isn’t a final ruling on the merits, the court’s decision on Workday’s motion to dismiss contains several important takeaways for employers, especially those using artificial intelligence in recruiting and hiring. With that background, Adam, can you start by giving our listeners a quick overview of the case?

Adam: Absolutely, Jerry. The plaintiffs in this case are a group of job applicants who allege that they applied for positions through employers. They used Workday’s applicant screening platform. According to the complaint, Workday’s AI and machine learning tools evaluated, ranked, and in some cases automatically rejected applicants. The plaintiffs claimed those tools had a disparate impact on protected groups, including older workers, individuals with disabilities, and certain racial groups. This latest ruling focused primarily on procedural issues. Workday asked the court to dismiss portions of the third amended complaint, arguing that the plaintiff still hadn’t adequately connected their claims to California, and that several new allegations exceeded the scope of what the Court previously allowed them to amend. The court granted some portions of Workday’s motion but denied most of it.

Jerry: Well, there are rulings, there are cases, and then there are cases, and I would say this is one of the most closely watched employment discrimination class action cases in the United States. Elizabeth, what do you see as the important takeaways from the ruling?

Elizabeth: The biggest takeaway is that the court allowed the plaintiffs’ California Fair Employment and Housing Act, or FEHA, claims to proceed. That’s significant because many of the plaintiffs are not California residents and applied for jobs located outside California. Workday argued that California employment law shouldn’t apply to those circumstances. The company essentially said there wasn’t a sufficient nexus between the alleged discrimination and California. The court disagreed.

Jerry: Adam, why would the court disagree with respect to that, what many would call an extraterritorial, type of argument?

Adam: Well, the plaintiffs had revised their complaint to allege that Workday’s AI screening systems were designed, developed, maintained, trained, and operated from Workday’s California headquarters. The court stated that the plaintiffs weren’t simply alleging that Workday happened to be headquartered in California. Instead, they alleged that the actual screening, scoring, and rejection decisions generated by the AI tools originated from California-based operations. At the pleading stage, the court found those allegations sufficient. What’s particularly notable is that the court viewed Workday as potentially being directly responsible for discriminatory conduct, rather than merely acting as a passive software vendor.

Jerry: That seems like a very major point of the decision. What did the court say about Workday’s role here?

Elizabeth: So, Workday argued that if an employer customer wouldn’t be liable under FEHA, then Workday shouldn’t be liable either. The court rejected that argument and explained that under California law, an entity acting as an employer’s agent can be directly liable for its own discriminatory conduct when performing employment-related functions on behalf of employers. In other words, the court treated Workday not merely as a software provider, but as a company that allegedly participated in employment decision-making through its screening technology. That distinction could have implications well beyond this case.

Jerry: Let’s talk about the practical implications of a ruling like that. What are the takeaways that employers should note from this ruling?

Adam: There are a couple of important takeaways from this. First, employers should recognize that courts are increasingly willing to scrutinize AI tools used in hiring. Historically, employers might have viewed applicant screening software as a neutral technology solution, but courts are now looking much more closely at whether those systems could create disparate impact on protected groups. Second, employers cannot assume that liability concerns end with the vendor. Even though Workday is the defendant here, the allegations highlight the risks associated with relying on automated screening tools without understanding how they function or whether they create adverse impacts.

Jerry: Elizabeth, to me, another important and interesting aspect of the decision involved its discussion of disability discrimination. Could you give our listeners some insights on that?

Elizabeth: Sure, so one plaintiff alleged discrimination based on physical disabilities, specifically asthma and cancer survivorship. The complaint alleged that AI hiring tools may identify proxy indicators associated with health conditions, things like employment gaps, medical leave history, or patterns that suggest treatment and recovery. The plaintiffs contended that the algorithm can infer disability-related characteristics from those proxies, even when disability information isn’t directly provided. Importantly, Workday did not challenge the sufficiency of those allegations in this motion. Instead, it argued that the plaintiff wasn’t permitted to add those theories. The court rejected that procedural argument and allowed the disability claim to proceed. For employers, that’s another reminder that AI systems can potentially create risk, even when they don’t explicitly ask about protected characteristics.

Jerry: Well, bottom line is, the court didn’t deny the motion in its entirety. What claims, indeed, were thrown out?

Adam: Yeah, that’s correct. One of the plaintiffs attempted to add a new race-based disparate impact claim that was focused on alleged discrimination against Asian American applicants, but the court found that theory had not been properly asserted in earlier versions of the complaint, and so it exceeded the scope of the amendment the Court had authorized, and as a result, that claim was dismissed.

Adam: The court also just struck allegations suggesting that Workday should be liable as an employer based on its own hiring practices. Concluding that that theory had not previously been pleaded and wasn’t authorized by the amendment order. So, while the plaintiffs won most of the major issues, Workday did succeed in narrowing the case in several respects.

Jerry: Well, as we wrap up this episode of the Class Action Weekly Wire, what are some of the broader lessons you think employers should take, both from this case and from this ruling?

Adam: I see at least three major lessons. First, AI governance is becoming a core employment law issue. Second, employers need visibility into how automated screening systems operate. Including what data they use, how candidates are ranked, and whether outcomes are regularly audited for disparate impact. Third, contractual protections with vendors are becoming increasingly important. Employers should review representations, warranties, indemnification provisions, audit rights, and compliance obligations relating to AI-enabled employment tools.

Elizabeth: I would add one more point. This decision reflects a growing judicial willingness to treat AI-driven employment decisions as employment practices subject to traditional discrimination laws. The technology may be new, but courts are applying familiar legal principles, including disparate impact, agency liability, and anti-discrimination statutes to evaluate these systems. Employers should expect continued scrutiny from courts, regulators, and plaintiffs’ attorneys in this area.

Jerry: Well, great insights from both of you, Elizabeth and Adam. The Mobley vs. Workday case is certainly another reminder that while artificial intelligence may streamline recruiting and employment-related decisions. It certainly doesn’t eliminate legal risk. In some respects, it may create new legal risks that employers need to manage and mitigate. So, we’ll continue monitoring developments in this case and the broader landscape of AI-related employment litigation in the class action space. Well, thanks so much for being with me today, Adam and Elizabeth, and thanks to our listeners for tuning in.

Adam: Thank you, Jerry, for having me.

Elizabeth: Thanks, everyone, have a great week.

Duane Morris Takeaway: This week’s episode features Duane Morris partner Jerry Maatman and special counsel Eden Anderson and Rebecca Bjork with their discussion of significant arbitration developments in class actions.

Check out today’s episode and subscribe to our show from your preferred podcast platform: Spotify, Amazon Music, Apple Podcasts, Podcast Index, Tune In, Listen Notes, iHeartRadio, Deezer, and YouTube.

Episode Transcript

Jerry Maatman: Thank you, loyal blog readers and podcast listeners for joining us for our next episode of our weekly series and podcast called The Class Action Weekly Wire. I’m Jerry Maatman of Duane Morris, and joining me today are my colleagues, Eden Anderson and Rebecca Bjork. Thank you so much for being here today on the podcast.

Eden Anderson: Great to be here, Jerry.

Rebecca Bjork: Thanks for having me, Jerry.

Jerry: Today, we wanted to discuss and explore trends and important rulings in the area of arbitration and class action litigation. Arbitration has been one of the areas where each year seems to bring new rulings and new gloss to the Federal Arbitration Act. We saw significant Supreme Court decisions this past year, and California courts also continue to reshape the relationship between arbitration and representative actions brought under the PAGA. Eden, when you look at the last 18 months, what stands out to you?

Eden: Yeah, Jerry, two things stand out. First, the Supreme Court continues to refine the scope of the Federal Arbitration Act’s transportation worker exemption. And second, California courts are still trying to answer some fundamental questions about how arbitration affects representative PAGA claims.

Jerry: Let’s start with the U.S. Supreme Court. The biggest arbitration decision so far this year is probably Flowers Foods vs. Brock. Rebecca, what was that case all about?

Rebecca: That case involved delivery drivers who distributed bakery products for a company named Flowers Foods, and the drivers argued that they fell within the transportation worker exemption in Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act and therefore could not be compelled to arbitrate under that act. The company argued that the drivers were making local deliveries only, and were not the kind of interstate transportation workers Congress had in mind when it created that exemption.

Jerry: And how did the Supreme Court come out on that question?

Rebecca: Oh, the Supreme Court disagreed. The court focused on the role that the workers played in the movement of goods through interstate commerce, and the key takeaway is that a worker doesn’t necessarily have to cross state lines personally to qualify for the exemption. If the worker is participating in a continuous interstate flow of goods, the exemption may apply even when the worker’s own deliveries occur entirely within one state.

Eden: And that is what makes the decision important. A lot of businesses have assumed that local delivery drivers were safely within the FAA’s scope. Flowers Foods suggests the analysis is more nuanced than that. Employers with delivery networks, logistic operations, warehouse-to-consumer distribution systems, or similar models should be evaluating whether portions of their workforce might now fit within the transportation worker exemption.

Rebecca: And what’s interesting is that this case, Flowers Foods isn’t really an outlier. It’s part of a broader trend at the Supreme Court. Over the last several years, the court has repeatedly focused on the actual work being performed, rather than formal job titles or industry labels, and Flowers Foods continues that trajectory.

Jerry: So, if that’s the federal story at the Supreme Court level, what about California in terms of the state law story and the significant litigation that occurs within the Golden State?

Eden: Well, as our listeners know, under the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Viking River, out in California, individual PAGA claims can be separated from a PAGA action and compelled to arbitration. But after Viking River, plaintiffs here began trying to disclaim their individual PAGA claims, trying to avoid arbitration. And courts out here have been grappling with whether that’s a permissible tactic and whether if an individual PAGA claim is found to be meritless or non-viable, whether the plaintiff can still pursue representative PAGA claims on behalf of other employees.

Jerry: One of the most significant cases from California in 2025 surely is the CRST Expedited v. Superior Court case, where the employee voluntarily dismissed the individual PAGA claim and sought to continue litigating only in a representative capacity. The employer argued that once the individual claim was gone, the representative claim also had to go as well, but the Court of Appeal disagreed.

Eden: That’s right, Jerry. Faced with supposed ambiguity in the statute, the Court of Appeal interpreted PAGA very broadly, and concluded that plaintiffs can abandon their individual PAGA claims, sidestep arbitration altogether, and pursue only representative PAGA claims in court.

Jerry: So, the bottom line is the CRST decision effectively gave support to the notion that a plaintiff’s lawyer can litigate a headless PAGA theory successfully in court.

Rebecca: It was a significant victory for the plaintiffs’ bar, yes, because it suggested that representative claims might survive even after an individual claim is dismissed.

Rebecca: But that’s actually not the end of the story, because just two days later, another California appellate court reached the opposite conclusion. And that case was Williams v. Alacrity Solutions Group, and the court held that a plaintiff needed a viable and timely individual claim in order to pursue representative PAGA penalties. And because the plaintiff’s own claim was time-barred, that court concluded he could not proceed with the representative action.

Eden: Yeah, and we saw a similar approach in Leeper vs. Shipt. The plaintiff there also tried to avoid arbitration by disclaiming individual relief, and the Court of Appeal there held that all PAGA actions necessarily must include an individual claim. In the court’s view, you can’t simply disclaim an individual PAGA claim and proceed only in court on behalf of others: your individual PAGA claim has to be asserted and is subject to arbitration.

Jerry: Well, it sure seems like these issues and principles are on a collision course for the California Supreme Court at this point.

Rebecca: That’s exactly right, and that’s why the California Supreme Court’s upcoming review is so important. The Court has agreed to address two fundamental questions: first, does every PAGA action necessarily contain both an individual and a representative component? And second, can a plaintiff choose to pursue only the representative portion of a PAGA claim?

Jerry: Well, these sound like technical parsings of the statute, but my sense is there are enormous practical consequences that can stem from the outcome of this question.

Eden: That’s correct, Jerry. If the California Supreme Court approves headless PAGA actions, plaintiffs who signed arbitration agreements, will be able to bypass arbitration and proceed, directly with representative claims in court. It could also occur, though it seems contrary to the statute, that the court could find that a plaintiff who lacks a viable PAGA claim may nonetheless still pursue representative PAGA claims on behalf of others. On the other hand, if the court rejects a ‘headless’ PAGA theory, then individual PAGA claims will continue to be arbitrated, and if a plaintiff loses, then their case should be over. Oral argument in Leeper was supposed to occur in May, but the parties had a conflict, and the California Supreme Court doesn’t hear arguments all summer long, so even if argument occurs in September, we may not see a decision on this issue until year’s end. So, we have a ways to go before we will know the outcome.

Jerry: The bottom line, then, it isn’t just whether or not an employer has an enforceable arbitration agreement, it’s whether, under the pertinent case law, a plaintiffs’ lawyer can structure PAGA claims in such a way to avoid or bypass arbitration altogether. Well, before we wrap up, what are the practical takeaways in your advice for employers, given this mosaic of rulings?

Rebecca: Well, first, review your arbitration agreements, and especially if your workforce includes drivers, delivery personnel, others involved in moving goods through interstate commerce, because Flowers Foods may affect assumptions that you have had in place for many, many years regarding your arbitration program.

Eden: And second, continue viewing arbitration as an important tool, but not necessarily one that can be used in all PAGA cases.

Rebecca: And third, stay current in the law. This is a fast-moving area, and it’s an area where a single appellate decision can material change litigation strategy.

Jerry: Well, that’s a great summary from both of you. Eden and Rebecca, thanks so much for joining us today on The Class Action Weekly Wire, and thanks to all our loyal listeners for tuning in. We’ll continue to track developments on the arbitration front and it’ll culminate in Chapter 4 of the Duane Morris Class Action Review for 2027 to be published during the first week of January next year. Well, thanks so much for being here, and looking forward to being with you next time.

Eden: Thanks, Jerry, and thanks to the listeners.

Rebecca: Thanks for having us!