Category: Class Action Weekly Wire

Duane Morris Takeaway: This week’s episode features Duane Morris partner Jerry Maatman and senior associates Michael Rosenblatt and Anna Sheridan with their analysis of a key ruling from the District of Maryland in a consumer protection class action finding the company’s arbitration unenforceable yet dismissing the lawsuit for failure to state a plausible claim for relief.

Check out today’s episode and subscribe to our show from your preferred podcast platform: Spotify, Amazon Music, Apple Podcasts, Podcast Index, Tune In, Listen Notes, iHeartRadio, Deezer, and YouTube.

Episode Transcript

Jerry Maatman: Hello, everyone, and thank you for being here again for the next episode of the Duane Morris Class Action Weekly Wire. I’m Jerry Maatman, a partner at Duane Morris, and welcome to Anna Sheridan and Mike Rosenblatt, who will be appearing on the podcast today. Thanks so much for both being here.

Anna Sheridan: Glad to be here, Jerry.

Mike Rosenblatt: Thanks for having me, Jerry.

Jerry: Today, we’re discussing a recent ruling out of the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland involving Vivid Seats and allegations of so-called “drip pricing.” The case is Cheezum v. Vivid Seats, and it presents a very interesting combination of consumer protection law and arbitration issues. Anna, let’s start with the background. What is this lawsuit about?

Anna: The plaintiff, Laura Cheezum, alleged that Vivid Seats violated the Maryland Consumer Protection Act by advertising ticket prices that did not include mandatory fees, and then revealing the additional charges later in the purchasing process. According to the complaint, she selected two tickets advertised at $225 each, expecting to pay around $450 total. By the time she reached the final checkout screen, mandatory fees increased the purchase price to more than $600. She claimed that Vivid Seats used countdown timers and other pressure tactics during checkout and characterized the pricing model as “drip pricing.”

Mike: The lawsuit was filed after Maryland enacted a law targeting hidden ticket fees. The plaintiff sought to represent Maryland consumers who purchased tickets through the platform after the law took effect, arguing that Vivid Seats failed to disclose the full ticket price at the outset of the transaction.

Jerry: This sounds like a prototypical consumer fraud class action involving online pricing and disclosures, but as I read the opinion, it took a very interesting turn with respect to the issue of arbitration.

Mike: It certainly did. Vivid Seats, they first tried to compel arbitration based on its online terms of use. The company argued that when plaintiff completed her purchase, she agreed to those terms, which contained both an arbitration provision and a class action waiver.

Anna: The court, however, refused to enforce the arbitration agreement. Judge Matthew Maddox found that the agreement lacked consideration because Vivid Seats retained the unilateral right to modify its terms of use at any time without providing notice to customers. The terms stated that modifications became effective immediately, and that continued use of the website constituted acceptance. The court concluded that this allowed Vivid Seeds to change its obligations whenever it wanted, which rendered its promises illusory and made the arbitration provision unenforceable.

Jerry: That’s a very significant ruling by the federal court in Maryland. Kind of a trend we’re continuing to see as courts closely scrutinize online arbitration agreements, particularly where modification rights and provisions are drafted so broadly in favor of the manufacturer or of the company.

Mike: That’s exactly right. The court noted specifically that customers could only opt out after the changes had already been made, and there was no requirement that Vivid Seats provide advance notice. So, that was a critical flaw, and as a result, the motion to compel arbitration was denied.

Jerry: Despite defeating arbitration, nonetheless, the plaintiff ultimately didn’t win when it came to the decision with respect to the motion to dismiss. What happened there?

Anna: Well, the court held that the plaintiff had not adequately alleged reliance or injury under the Maryland Consumer Protection Act. To pursue a private claim under that statute, a consumer must show that a deceptive practice caused an actual loss. The court focused on the fact that the plaintiff admittedly saw the final ticket price, including all the fees, before completing the transaction, so she chose to proceed with the purchase, knowing all of those facts and that’s really the key takeaway from the merit portion of the decision. The court reasoned that because the plaintiff knew that the total price was what it was before she clicked “buy”, it cannot reasonably infer that she would have abandoned the purchase absent the alleged misrepresentations. So, the judge stated that the “only reasonable inference” was that she voluntarily completed the transaction with knowledge of the higher price and as a result, the court found that she failed to plausibly allege an identifiable loss caused by the alleged deceptive conduct. The complaint was dismissed without prejudice, meaning that she may seek leave to amend and attempt to cure the deficiencies.

Jerry: I thought it was interesting that this case also illustrates kind of the aggressive tactics and the innovative strategy of the plaintiff’s class action bar, insofar as in this particular case, the plaintiffs’ lawyer asked the court to certify a legal question to Maryland’s highest court regarding interpretation of the state’s anti-drip-pricing statute. What happened with respect to that request?

Mike: So, the court declined that request as well. The plaintiff argued that Maryland’s ticketing statute might provide an independent basis for relief. Judge Maddox concluded that the statutory framework was sufficiently clear, and that the Maryland Consumer Protection Act already provides the mechanism for consumers to pursue claims. So, he found no reason to believe the Maryland Supreme Court would interpret the statute as creating a separate private right of action.

Jerry: Let’s talk about what this means at a very high level for businesses both in Maryland and nationwide with respect to consumer fraud class actions.

Anna: Well, companies should pay very close attention to their arbitration agreements. The court’s arbitration analysis may prove just as important as its consumer protection analysis. Businesses that reserve broad rights to modify its online terms and conditions without advance notice risk having their arbitration provisions struck down as illusory. Companies should review modification clauses to ensure that they provide meaningful notice and preserve mutual obligations.

Mike: And companies should really note that while the plaintiff lost here, the court didn’t endorse drip pricing practices. So, the dismissal largely turned on pleading deficiencies related to reliance and injury. So, businesses should not assume that last minute disclosures of fees will defeat every consumer claim. States continue to enact disclosure requirements, and regulators remain focused on pricing transparency, and plaintiffs will likely continue testing these statutes in class litigation.

Anna: I also think the ruling highlights the importance of documenting consumer disclosures during online transactions. The court relied heavily on the fact that the plaintiff saw the total price before completing her purchase. Companies with clear checkout disclosures may be better positioned to challenge causation and reliance allegations at the fleeting stage.

Jerry: Those are all excellent points and takeaways because the decision certainly provides a helpful reminder that companies face risks in two different directions. On the one hand, arbitration agreements need to be scrutinized must be carefully drafted to remain enforceable under current interpretations of state and federal law. And on the other hand, transparent pricing practices and robust disclosures can provide a strong defense against consumer fraud allegations.

Mike: Right, and note that because the dismissal was without prejudice, this may not be the last chapter in the litigation.

Jerry: That’s for sure, and we’ll continue to monitor developments in this case and other consumer fraud cases nationwide. Well, that’s all for today’s episode. Anna and Mike, thanks so much for joining us, and thank you to our listeners.

Mike: Thanks for having me, Jerry, and thank you listeners.

Anna: Thank you everyone for listening.

Duane Morris Takeaway: This week’s episode features Duane Morris partner Jerry Maatman, senior associate Kat Alphonso, and associate Caitlin Capriotti with their analysis of a ruling from the Ninth Circuit rejecting a game platform’s motion to compel arbitration, finding the defendant’s delay in seeking arbitration over nearly a year of litigation waived any right to arbitrate.  

Check out today’s episode and subscribe to our show from your preferred podcast platform: Spotify, Amazon Music, Apple Podcasts, Podcast Index, Tune In, Listen Notes, iHeartRadio, Deezer, and YouTube.

Episode Transcript

Jerry Maatman: Hello everyone, and thank you for being here again for the next episode of the Class Action Weekly Wire. I’m Jerry Maatman, a partner at Duane Morris, and joining me today are my colleagues Kat Alphonso and Caitlin Capriotti. Thanks so much for both of you being on the podcast.

Kat Alphonso: Glad to be here, Jerry.

Caitlin Capriotti: Thanks for having me, Jerry.

Jerry: Today, we’re discussing a recent Ninth Circuit decision that addresses an issue we hear about frequently in the context of class action litigation, that being arbitration, and more specifically, when a company can lose the right to compel arbitration by litigating in court too long. The case is Uhl, et al. v. Roblox Corporation from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in San Francisco. The ruling arose out of litigation against the company involving allegations that children using the company’s gaming platform were targeted by adult predators. Kat, can you start us off with some background about the case?

Kat: Absolutely. So, the lawsuit was brought by a parent, Damien Uhl, who alleged that his daughter was exposed to inappropriate communications from an adult posing as a friend on the Roblox platform. The complaint was one of several actions alleging that Roblox failed to adequately protect minors despite representing that it had safeguards in place for younger users. Instead of immediately moving to compel arbitration, Roblox removed the case to federal court and filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the merits. The company litigated for nearly a year before eventually seeking to compel arbitration based on arbitration provisions contained in its terms of service. The district court denied the motion to compel, concluding that Roblox had waived any right that it had to arbitrate, and Roblox appealed the ruling to the Ninth Circuit.

Jerry: Caitlin, how did the Ninth Circuit approach these issues on appeal, and why did it ultimately affirm the district court’s decision that denied the motion to compel arbitration?

Caitlin: The majority focused on the Ninth Circuit’s two-part waiver test. Under prior circuit precedent. A party waives its right to arbitrate when it knows of its right to compel arbitration, and then engages in conduct that is inconsistent with the exercise of that right. The Ninth Circuit found both elements satisfied. First, the panel concluded that Roblox knew it had a right to arbitrate from the outset. The company acknowledged that all versions of its terms of service during the relevant period contained arbitration provisions because the complaint alleged that the plaintiff’s daughter had used Roblox since 2017, and that purchases were regularly made on that platform, the court found Roblox possessed enough information to know that an arbitration provision potentially applied. Second, the court found that Roblox acted inconsistently with that right. Rather than moving to compel arbitration and seeking limited discovery if necessary, Roblox chose to litigate the case in court. It removed the action from state court, briefed jurisdictional issues, pursued a merits-based motion to dismiss, and waited approximately 11 months before filing its arbitration motion. The panel characterized those actions as inconsistent with a party seeking to arbitrate.

Jerry: One fact that seemed particularly important to the Ninth Circuit was an internal litigation email that surfaced during the proceedings. Kat, could you explain to our listeners why that email became a significant piece of evidence in the court’s analysis?

Kat: Yes, this email was actually really central to the outcome. Roblox argued that it could not originally move to compel arbitration because it lacked the username necessary to determine which version of the arbitration agreement governed the dispute. But the court pointed to an August 2024 email in which Roblox told plaintiffs’ counsel that it did indeed intend to seek arbitration, even though it still did not have a username, and would pursue targeted discovery later to determine which terms applied. The majority viewed that communication as highly damaging to Roblox’s position. According to the court, the email essentially demonstrated that Roblox knew it could seek arbitration without first obtaining the username, and as a result, the court concluded that Roblox could have filed its motion much earlier instead of spending almost a year litigating in court.

Jerry: That’s a very interesting, analysis. The majority also seem to be troubled by the sequence of events. How did that play in the Ninth Circuit’s ultimate decision?

Caitlin: The Ninth Circuit stated that Roblox pursued dismissal on the merits first, and then only turned to arbitration after the District Court rejected its attempt to dispose of the claims in court. The opinion contains some fairly strong language on that point. The court explained that a party cannot ask a district court to dismiss a complaint on the merits while simultaneously holding arbitration in reserve as a backup strategy in case the judicial approach does not work out. According to the majority, that type of litigation tactic is inconsistent with a genuine intent to arbitrate.

Jerry: Well, the Ninth Circuit’s decision was not unanimous. What did the dissent have to say on these issues?

Kat: So, Judge Bumatay dissented and took a very different view of the record. He argued that the Ninth Circuit had never previously held that a party must file a motion to compel arbitration and seek discovery simultaneously in order to preserve arbitration rights. In his view, Roblox lacked sufficient information and identified the specific arbitration agreement at issue, and should have not been penalized for waiting until it could determine that information. Judge Bumatay also criticized the majority for relying on Roblox’s motion to dismiss and removal efforts, noting that the Ninth Circuit precedent had never held that filing a non-jurisdictional motion to dismiss automatically results in waiver, and he argued that removing a case through federal court may actually be consistent with invoking protections under the Federal Arbitration Act. Ultimately, he viewed Roblox conduct as a forfeiture resulting from delay, rather than an intentional waiver of a known right.

Jerry: Well, let’s retreat to a 100,000-foot view and discuss and examine the practical implications of this ruling. Caitlin, what are the lessons learned for companies, that have, arbitration programs with class action waivers in terms of when and how to invoke those provisions to defend themselves in litigation?

Caitlin: So, there are several important takeaways. First, companies that intend to rely on arbitration agreements need to evaluate that strategy immediately upon receiving a complaint. This decision demonstrates that courts are increasingly willing to scrutinize litigation conduct and timing when determining whether arbitration rights have been waived. Defendants should be cautious about pursuing merits-based motions before addressing arbitration. Here, the Ninth Circuit repeatedly stated that Roblox sought dismissal with prejudice before moving to compel arbitration. That sequencing played a substantial role in the court’s waiver analysis. Finally, if a court believes additional information is needed to establish the applicability of an arbitration agreement, it should consider promptly moving to compel arbitration and requesting limited discovery rather than waiting months to raise the issue.

Kat: I would also add, Jerry, that the ruling illustrates a broader trend we’re seeing following the Supreme Court’s decision in Morgan v. Sundance. Courts are becoming more willing to find waiver without requiring plaintiffs to prove prejudice. That means defendants face greater risk when they actively litigate before invoking arbitration. For companies with online terms of service, consumer arbitration agreements, or even employee arbitration programs, early case assessment is more important than ever. Delays that might have once been excused can now create a significant risk that arbitration rights will be lost altogether.

Jerry: Well, well said. Those are excellent takeaways. Certainly, to me, the decision underscores and is a valuable reminder that arbitration is simply not a defense to keep in one’s back pocket or in reserve. Companies and litigants who want the benefits of arbitration must act consistently, promptly, and pretty quick from that choice at the beginning of litigation. Once a defendant chooses to litigate substantive issues, beware, because they are going to be subject to an argument from plaintiffs’ counsel in these class actions that the defendant has waived the right to compel arbitration.

Well, Kat and Caitlin, thank you so much for being our guest today and providing your insights on this most significant Ninth Circuit ruling, and thank you to our listeners for tuning in for another episode of the Class Action Weekly Wired. We look forward to bringing you more updates on important developments in the class action world. Until next time, thanks so much for tuning in and listening.

Caitlin: Thanks for having me, Jerry, and thanks, listeners.

Kat: Thank you, everyone, for listening.

Duane Morris Takeaway: This week’s episode features Duane Morris partner Jerry Maatman and special counsel Justin Donoho and Tyler Zmick with their analysis of significant settlement agreement resolving a DOJ enforcement lawsuit against TikTok under the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (“COPPA”).

Check out today’s episode and subscribe to our show from your preferred podcast platform: Spotify, Amazon Music, Apple Podcasts, Podcast Index, Tune In, Listen Notes, iHeartRadio, Deezer, and YouTube.

Episode Transcript

Jerry Maatman: Hello everyone, and thank you for being here again for our next episode of the Class Action Weekly Wire. I’m Jerry Maatman, a partner at Duane Morris, and joining me today are my colleagues Justin and Tyler. Thanks so much for being here today on our podcast.

Justin Donoho: Glad to be here, Jerry.

Tyler Zmick: Thank you for having me, Jerry.

Jerry: Today, we’re discussing one of the most significant privacy enforcement settlements we’ve seen in years. TikTok has agreed to pay $400 million to resolve allegations that it violated the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, known as COPPA, by collecting personal information from children under the age of 13, without allegedly complying with federal regulations and requirements. According to the U.S. Department of Justice, this is one of the largest recoveries ever, in terms of monies collected under the COPPA. It’s also accompanied by a separate effort by the government to vacate a 2019 consent decree that had governed the predecessor of TikTok for years. Justin, let’s start with the headline. What happened here in this litigation?

Justin: Thank you, Jerry. The government announced a $400 million settlement with TikTok to resolve allegations that the company knowingly allowed children under 13 to create accounts on the platform and collected personal information from those users without obtaining parental consent as required by COPPA. The settlement reportedly requires TikTok to pay $300 million immediately, and another $100 million if, and when, a federal court vacates a consent decree that was entered against Musical.ly, TikTok’s predecessor, in 2019. The settlement resolves a lawsuit that the DOJ filed in 2024 following a referral from the Federal Trade Commission.

Jerry: So, I take it this is not a new issue that TikTok has faced on the litigation front?

Justin: No, not at all. This really represents the latest chapter in a dispute that goes back nearly a decade. The original allegations involved Musically, the video sharing platform that TikTok acquired and eventually merged into its current product. The government has consistently maintained that the children’s privacy and data collection practices were at the center of both the 2019 case and the more recent litigation.

Jerry: Tyler, if you look at the allegations at issue in this lawsuit. What exactly was the Department of Justice asserting?

Tyler: So, the government’s allegations were serious and extensive. The DOJ claimed that TikTok knowingly permitted large numbers of children under the age of 13 to create standard accounts and interact on the primary TikTok platform. According to the DOJ, TikTok collected various forms of personal data from those users without notifying their parents or obtaining their parents’ consent, as required under COPPA. The government also alleged that TikTok’s efforts to identify underage users were ineffective, and basically that the company failed to delete the children’s accounts and information when the parents requested it.

Jerry: I take it, then, that these allegations overlapped with obligations in the 2019 consent decree, and so that prior order was at issue here, too.

Tyler: That’s exactly right, Jerry, and that’s what made the later enforcement action so notable. The government claimed that despite the 2019 settlement and the compliance obligations imposed by that agreement, deficiencies remained in TikTok systems for identifying children under 13 and preventing the unlawful data collection. So, from a regulator’s perspective, allegations involving children’s data are really one of the most serious privacy issues a company can face. COPPA has been a major enforcement priority for years, and when regulators believe a company has repeatedly failed to comply with the law, penalties can become significant.

Jerry: I take it that helps explain, at least in part, how we got from a $5.7 million settlement with the consent decree in 2019 to a $400 million settlement in 2026. And the settlement certainly reflects and manifests the seriousness of the alleged conduct at issue and the government’s continued focus on children’s privacy protections. Let’s turn to another aspect, which I think is the most interesting one of the story. Justin, it seems very unusual for the government to collect $400 million, and at the same time tell a court that an existing consent decree should be removed. Why would they do that, and what was at issue there?

Justin: Thanks, Jerry. Yes, the government’s position is that the circumstances today are dramatically different from those that existed when the original consent decree was entered in 2019. In the motion filed with the court, the DOJ emphasized that the original decree addressed conduct involving Musical.ly, and predecessor entities that existed years before the current structure of TikTok’s U.S. operations. The government also points to major changes in ownership and corporate governance. According to the filing, TikTok USA’s operations are now controlled by a newly formed U.S.-based entity known as TikTok US, following a restructuring and divestiture process. The government argues that this represents a fundamentally different organization than the one that engaged in the historical conduct that led to the original settlement.

Jerry: I guess it underscores the notion that no corporation is static, change is inevitable, and the same as in the law, and here’s an argument about how something should be modified or adjusted, just seven years after the 2019 decree.

Justin: Yes, that’s exactly the DOJ’s argument. They contend that the consent decree imposes requirements that go beyond the underlying statutory requirements contained in the COPPA itself, and that continued enforcement is no longer necessary or equitable, given the changes that have occurred.

Jerry: A very seminal aspect of the agreement, however, is that the statement that TikTok remains subject to COPPA regardless of what happens to the consent decree.

Justin: Correct. The DOJ makes clear that vacating the decree would not eliminate TikTok’s obligation to comply with federal privacy laws. According to the motion, TikTok would still be fully subject to the COPPA FTC enforcement authority, and future government actions if violations occur.

Jerry: Let’s talk about the broader issues and implications here. Tyler, what should corporate counsel and compliance professionals take away from this settlement, and what do you see as the most important lesson here?

Tyler: Well, the first takeaway here is simple: privacy enforcement remains a top regulatory priority. A $400 million settlement sends a powerful message that regulators view children’s privacy as an area warranting substantial penalties when they believe that companies fail to comply with the law. The second takeaway is that compliance programs matter. The government’s court filings repeatedly highlight measures that TikTok says it implemented after the original settlement, including enhanced age verification systems, artificial intelligence tools designed to identify underage users, human moderation teams, and efforts to remove accounts that appear to belong to children under the age of 13.

Jerry: I guess, in other words, regulators are looking beyond written policies and increasingly expect organizations to implement audit, operational controls, technological safeguards, monitor systems, and have a governance framework that demonstrates actual compliance in practice. A company, for instance, can’t simply point to an employee handbook and say, “We have a policy.” Governmental regulators want evidence that compliance controls are functioning in effect and have a causative impact on behavior. What about for companies involved in mergers, acquisitions, and restructuring, which certainly seem to be the backdrop here in the difference between 2019 consent decree and the 2026 settlement?

Tyler: That is another important lesson. Businesses often assume that changing ownership structures can eliminate historical regulatory concerns. This settlement shows that regulatory obligations and scrutiny can follow a company for years. Successor entities may still need to address legacy issues, regulatory settlements, and historical compliance failures. At the same time, this settlement suggests that regulators may be willing to account for meaningful remediation efforts and significant organizational changes when evaluating future remedies.

Jerry: Before we sign off on this week’s episode, how about your final thoughts in this area?

Justin: I’ll start. Jerry, what stands out to me is that this case reflects a balance between accountability and remediation. The government obtained a substantial monetary recovery for alleged historical violations, while also recognizing that the company has undergone significant changes in ownership, management, compliance functions, and privacy practices. The settlement appears designed to achieve both of these objectives.

Tyler: From my point of view, the biggest lesson is that privacy compliance has evolved into a core enterprise risk management function. It’s no longer solely a legal issue. It’s also a governance issue. It’s a technology issue. And increasingly, it is a board-level issue. Organizations that collect consumer data, especially data involving kids, should expect regulators to closely scrutinize how they obtain consent, how they manage their personal information, how they verify user age, and how they respond to consumer requests.

Jerry: Well, thanks so much. Those are great insights from both of you. The settlement certainly is a story we’ll continue to follow, both on our blog and in the Class Action Weekly Wire, as the court considers the government’s request to vacate the 2019 consent decree and as companies continue to evaluate what this record-setting settlement means in terms of privacy compliance moving forward. So, thanks so much for being here today, both Justin and Tyler, and thanks to our listeners for tuning in.

Tyler: Thanks for having me, Jerry. Thank you, listeners.

Justin: Thanks, everybody. Thanks everyone for listening.

Duane Morris Takeaway: This week’s episode features Duane Morris partner Jerry Maatman and special counsel Tyler Zmick with their analysis of a dismissal of a proposed Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”) class action and its implications for corporate defendants.  

Check out today’s episode and subscribe to our show from your preferred podcast platform: Spotify, Amazon Music, Apple Podcasts, Podcast Index, Tune In, Listen Notes, iHeartRadio, Deezer, and YouTube.

Episode Transcript

Jerry Maatman: Thank you, loyal listeners, for being here again for the next episode of our weekly podcast, The Class Action Weekly Wire. I’m Jerry Maatman, a partner at Duane Morris, and joining me today is my colleague, Tyler Zmick. Thanks so much for being on the podcast, Tyler.

Tyler Zmick: Great to be here, Jerry. Thanks for having me.

Jerry: Today, we’ll be discussing an important new decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit that could have significant and far-reaching implications for biometric privacy litigation under the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act. which goes by the acronym BIPA. The case is G.T. v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.

Tyler: This is really a fascinating decision, Jerry, just because the Seventh Circuit has addressed a question that had been percolating in ports for years now, and that question is, when does a tech company actually “possess”, “collect”, or “obtain” biometric data under BIPA?

Jerry: I think that’s kind of at the heart of most of these cases, certainly at this one, isn’t it?

Tyler: Exactly right. So, the plaintiffs in this case allege that Samsung violated BIPA through a photo gallery application that comes pre-installed on Samsung devices. According to the complaint, Samsung’s gallery app, it automatically scans photos that are stored on the device, it then identifies faces, creates facial geometry templates based on those faces, which are then used to group people into, basically, photo galleries based on who appears in the photos. And so, the plaintiffs argued that these facial templates qualify as biometric data, and that Samsung collected and stored that information without providing the disclosures or obtaining the written consent required by BIPA.

Jerry: At first glance, having defended many of these cases with you over the years, that sounds like a fairly straightforward and traditional BIPA litigation allegation.

Tyler: It does. I think the critical distinction in this case is where the biometric data was actually maintained, and who controlled it. So, the plaintiffs in this case acknowledged that the face templates were stored on users’ personal devices. They nevertheless claim that Samsung exercised control over the templates, because Samsung is the one that designed the software, licensed the operating system, and controlled how the data was processed and stored.

Jerry: I take it in this particular instance, the Seventh Circuit, however, was not persuaded by the plaintiffs.

Tyler: It was not, correct. Judge Lee, writing for the panel, focused heavily on the BIPA’s statutory language. Specifically, the court examined the words “possession”, “collect”, “capture”, and “obtain”, and concluded that each term requires some degree of control over the actual biometric data itself. The court relied on Illinois Supreme Court precedent, including in Cothron v. White Castle, providing that to collect, capture, and obtain biometric data all involves gaining control over the data. According to the Seventh Circuit, simply providing a tool that can generate biometric information is not the same thing as actually controlling that data.

Jerry: That’s a critical and important distinction. The court essentially separates the technology from the data generated from the technology.

Tyler: That’s right, and the opinion repeatedly emphasizes that distinction. The court found that Samsung may have designed the software and manufactured the devices, but the complaint did not plausibly allege that Samsung itself could access, modify, use, or control the facial geometry data stored on customers’ phones. In fact, the court said that the plaintiffs were essentially conflating two separate activities: providing a tool versus using the tool.

Jerry: My sense is that this language from the Seventh Circuit is apt to be quoted in BIPA litigation for years to come. One thing I found critically important, and certainly interesting, was the Seventh Circuit’s discussion of the concept of cloud storage.

Tyler: Absolutely. The plaintiffs argued that because Samsung had previously offered cloud backup services through a product called Samsung Cloud, that it was reasonable to infer that facial templates were also being uploaded to Samsung-controlled servers. This was sort of their backup theory. The court rejected that theory, finding that the complaint lacked factual allegations supporting that inference. The judges noted that plaintiffs could not simply speculate that biometric data reached Samsung’s servers because photographs might be backed up to the cloud. That part of the opinion is important because it reinforces federal pleading standards, and it reinforces the idea that plaintiffs need factual allegations showing that biometric data was actually controlled by a defendant.

Jerry: Let’s talk about the broader, overall significance of this ruling. What does it mean for companies that are developing software involving facial recognition, biometric authentication, or artificial intelligence?

Tyler: This is absolutely a significant defense victory. For years, many BIPA lawsuits have focused on the mere existence of biometric functionalities within tech products. Plaintiffs would often argue that if a company created software that analyzes facial geometry, let’s say, then BIPA liability automatically followed. Seventh Circuit rejected that theory in the Samsung decision and instead, the court held that there must be a plausible allegation that a defendant exercised control over the actual biometric data. If the data remains entirely on the user’s personal device, as is the case here, and the company cannot access or use the data, then the company falls beyond BIPA’s statutory reach under those facts.

Jerry: In your view, then, does this ruling create a safe harbor or a potentially important limitation on BIPA exposure?

Tyler: It does. Obviously, plaintiffs’ lawyers are going to try to, be creative in pleading their way around it, but, for device manufacturers, software developers, and tech providers, the opinion does provide a roadmap for reducing risk. Companies that design privacy-protective systems where biometric information stays local on a user’s device have stronger defenses against BIPA claims now. The Seventh Circuit, again, repeatedly stressed Samsung never possessed, accessed, modified, or used the actual biometric data, and those facts played a central role in the outcome here.

Jerry: Well, the plaintiffs’ class action bar is nothing if not innovative. Do you have a sense that this means that BIPA plaintiffs will stop bringing these sorts of cases against technology companies?

Tyler: I don’t think we should expect the cases to stop. What I expect, though, is a shift in litigation strategy. I think that plaintiffs and attorneys will focus much more heavily on whether biometric data is transmitted to company servers, shared with third parties, used for analytics, or otherwise controlled by a company. In other words, I think future cases may turn less on the mere existence of biometric technology, and more on the flow and location of biometric data.

Jerry: That’s an excellent point, and a critical distinction. Another aspect of the opinion that struck me was the Seventh Circuit’s decision of the purpose of the BIPA. The court looked back at the statute’s origins and emphasized that the BIPA was designed to regulate the collection and storage of biometric information by entities that actually possess and use that data.

Tyler: That’s correct, and the court compared Samsung’s situation to the classic BIPA cases, which involved, generally, fingerprint-based timekeeping systems, amusement park entry systems, and payment authentication platforms. In those cases, you have a company that directly gathered biometric information from individuals and maintained that information for operational purposes. According to the Seventh Circuit, Samsung’s alleged conduct was fundamentally different from those facts, because the biometric data remained at all times on the user’s device, so the Seventh Circuit concluded that extending BIPA to those facts would move really beyond statute’s core purpose.

Jerry: Well, thank you, Tyler, for joining us on this week’s episode of the Class Action Weekly Wire and lending your thought leadership and expertise to this area. To me, this decision certainly is one of the more significant ones involving the interpretation of BIPA from the Seventh Circuit in recent years and provides very valuable guidance in terms of the limits of biometric privacy liability for manufacturers and software developers. Well, thank you to our listeners for tuning in, and we’ll continue tracking the latest developments in biometric class action privacy litigation and workplace laws.

Tyler: Thanks, Jerry. Thank you, listeners. It was a pleasure to be here.

Duane Morris Takeaway: This week’s episode features Duane Morris partners Jerry Maatman and Sharon Caffrey with their analysis of a proposed $5.5 billion settlement aimed to resolve thousands of lawsuits alleging Johnson & Johnson’s talc-based products caused ovarian cancer.

Check out today’s episode and subscribe to our show from your preferred podcast platform: Spotify, Amazon Music, Apple Podcasts, Podcast Index, Tune In, Listen Notes, iHeartRadio, Deezer, and YouTube.

Episode Transcript

Jerry Maatman: Thank you for being here again for the next episode of our weekly podcast, the Class Action Weekly Wire. I’m Jerry Maatman, a partner at Duane Morris, and joining me today is my partner and colleague, Sharon Caffrey. Thanks so much for being on the podcast today.

Sharon Caffrey: Thank you, Jerry, it’s great to be here.

Jerry: Today, we’ll be discussing Johnson & Johnson’s recent announcement that it has agreed to pay approximately $5.5 billion to settle thousands of lawsuits alleging that its products containing talcum powder caused ovarian cancer. Sharon, I know this story has been unfolding for quite a while. What exactly happened here?

Sharon: Yeah, this is certainly one of the most significant settlements we’ve seen in the mass tort arena. Johnson & Johnson announced that it has reached a proposed agreement to resolve the claims against it brought by roughly 70,000 plaintiffs in federal talc multi-district litigation, which is pending in New Jersey, along with some related state court proceedings. Under the agreement, the company has agreed to commit at least $5.5 billion to compensate claimants. Importantly, though, the settlement is conditioned on participation by at least 95% of those plaintiffs. So, while it’s a major breakthrough, there are still some procedural hurdles before the settlement becomes final.

Jerry: One aspect of the settlement that stood out to me is that Johnson & Johnson maintains that its talc products are safe and do not cause cancer. So, this isn’t a situation where a company is admitting any liability.

Sharon: That’s exactly correct. Throughout the litigation, Johnson & Johnson has been consistent in arguing that its talc products do not contain asbestos and do not cause ovarian cancer. The company’s been unwavering on that position and in announcing the settlement, Johnson & Johnson characterized the agreement as a practical business decision rather than a concession on the merits. The company emphasized that it remains confident in the science supporting its products and believes it would have continued to prevail if these cases continued to move forward.

Jerry: That confidence also seems to be reinforced by some recent developments in the litigation itself.

Sharon: That’s correct, and in fact, the timing of the settlement is especially interesting, because it comes on the heels of a significant ruling in the multi-district litigation. Just last week, the federal court overseeing the MDL ordered the plaintiffs to demonstrate that they could produce admissible expert testimony linking talc to ovarian cancer. Without that evidence, the plaintiffs faced the possibility that their remaining claims would be dismissed. And that ruling followed the withdrawal of two key causation experts for the plaintiffs in Bellwether cases. Johnson & Johnson argued that those developments highlighted the fundamental problems for plaintiffs, proving that talc exposure caused a specific individual’s ovarian cancer.

Jerry: Certainly, when you talk about settlement of major litigation leverages everything, and it seems to me that the legal landscape might have been shifting in favor of Johnson & Johnson and against the plaintiffs here.

Sharon: Yeah, based on the specific causation issues that the plaintiffs were facing, that is accurate. Company representatives were pointing to those expert challenges at this time once the courts engaged in some more scrutiny of those experts. They essentially argued that plaintiffs were increasingly facing an uphill battle to establish specific causation, which is one of the most difficult things in product liability litigation.

Jerry: Well, $5.5 billion is what it is, and so the plaintiffs also claim victory here.

Sharon: Oh, of course they did. Plaintiffs’ leadership described the settlement as a landmark achievement and characterized it as long-delayed justice for women and families who have been waiting years for compensation. One of the more compelling points made by plaintiffs’ counsel was that the litigation is stretched on for more than a decade. During that time, many claimants have faced serious health issues, and some, unfortunately, have passed away before seeing a resolution of their claims. From that perspective, plaintiffs view this settlement as delivering certainty and compensation after years of legal battles.

Jerry: In terms of mass tort resolutions and class action litigation, an interesting feature, if not an unusual feature, that stood out to me was the fact that the settlement is uncapped. Could you explain to our listeners and viewers what that means?

Sharon: Sure. Usually, when there is a settlement of a mass tort, there is a fund, a specific fund, that is created for eligible claimants. And, it’s a fixed amount that must be divided amongst those claimants, so claimants step forward and their cases are weighed, usually on a tiered system. In this instance, plaintiffs’ counsel is very bullish on the fact that Johnson & Johnson is not capping this at $5.5 billion. It will depend on the levels of participation and the qualifying claims. In addition, the settlement applies only to current plaintiffs and does not resolve claims that may potentially arise in the future.

Jerry: Well, maybe the price of a settlement is making everybody equally unhappy or happy, but if you look at the recent trial results, it’s easy to see why both sides of the V in this case concluded that settlement was preferable to continued litigation.

Sharon: Right, the most recent case was tried in June, and that was in Los Angeles, and there was verdict was rendered in favor of Johnson & Johnson after a six-week trial of an ovarian cancer bellwether case. And then earlier this year, an Oklahoma jury also sided with the company in a mesothelioma case involving alleged asbestos-containing talc products. At the same time, the plaintiffs have secured notable victories as well, including a $65.5 million verdict that was recently upheld in a case involving a woman who alleged that Johnson & Johnson’s talc products caused her exposure to asbestos and contributed to her cancer. And also another prior Los Angeles plaintiff obtained a $40 million verdict in a bellwether trial. So, the mixed outcomes really create uncertainty for both sides, and trials are expensive, appeals take very long time, sometimes years, and neither party can fully predict how the juries are going to respond, particularly with the complex science.

Jerry: Sharon, from a broader perspective, what do you think this settlement tells us about, the mass tort space going forward into the later half of 2026?

Sharon: Well, there should be a whole lot less tort cases, but, first, I think mostly expert testimony remains the centerpiece for modern mass tort litigation. Regardless of the size of the case, the ability to establish reliable scientific causation often determine whether claims survive Daubert or Frye challenges. And second, the settlement pressure increases dramatically when courts begin to scrutinize expert evidence. The MDL court’s recent rulings appear to have created a pivotal inflection point in these proceedings, particularly for the plaintiffs who faced not having specific causation experts. And then, finally, after years of litigation and multiple trial victories for both sides, global resolution is probably the most attractive option because of the uncertainty in what the outcomes would be.

Jerry: Final question for you, do you think this is the end of the talc litigation story?

Sharon: It’s the end of a major chapter of the talc litigation story. Settlement still requires substantial participation by all the plaintiffs and there may be implementation issues as the claims proceed. Also, remember that this is only for the existing claimants, and there could be future claimants. And then I think If the participation threshold is met, this is going to be one of the most consequential resolutions in mass tort history and could bring some closure to a significant portion of the ovarian talc litigation involving cosmetic talc.

Jerry: Sharon, thanks so much for joining us on this week’s edition of the Class Action Weekly Wire. This has been a great discussion, and thank you for your detailed analysis, kind of inside baseball look at the settlement. Thanks to our listeners. We’re glad you were here to tune in to another edition of our weekly podcast series.

Sharon: Thank you, Jerry, for inviting me to speak on this topic.

Duane Morris Takeaway: This week’s episode features Duane Morris partner Jennifer Riley and associate Elizabeth Underwood with their analysis of a ruling from the Eighth Circuit affirming a district court’s judgment in favor of an employer following a jury verdict rejecting a hostile work environment claim brought by the EEOC and an intervenor employee.

Check out today’s episode and subscribe to our show from your preferred podcast platform: Spotify, Amazon Music, Apple Podcasts, Podcast Index, Tune In, Listen Notes, iHeartRadio, Deezer, and YouTube.

Episode Transcript

Jennifer Riley: Thank you for being here again for the next episode of our weekly podcast, the Class Action Weekly Wire. I’m Jennifer Riley, partner at Duane Morris, and joining me today is my colleague, Elizabeth Underwood. Thank you so much for being on the podcast today, Elizabeth.

Elizabeth Underwood: Great to be here, Jen. Thanks for having me.

Jennifer: Today, we’re discussing a significant new decision from the Eighth Circuit involving employer liability for workplace harassment. So, this is an important decision for employers. It reinforces what courts expect of employers when responding to harassment complaints. And just as importantly, it also talks about what an employer must know about a situation before liability can attach. So, let’s start with the basics. Elizabeth, can you tell our listeners what happened in this case?

Elizabeth: Sure. The case is EEOC v. Sun Chemical Corporation, decided by the Eighth Circuit on August 4, 2026. The EEOC and an employee, Bryan Banks, brought a Title VII hostile work environment claim after a coworker directed the N-word at Banks multiple times during a workplace confrontation. Banks immediately reported the incident. Sun Chemical investigated, suspended the coworker for five days without pay, warned that any future misconduct could result in termination, and also issued Banks a written warning for profanity use during the confrontation. The EEOC later sued, arguing that Sun Chemical’s response and its efforts to prevent the harassment in the first place were insufficient. After a jury trial, however, the jury found in favor of the employer, and the EEOC appealed.

Jennifer: And I understand the appeal wasn’t really about whether the incident happened or whether it didn’t happen. Instead, the appeal really focused on the legal instructions given to the jury, right?

Elizabeth: Exactly. The EEOC argued that the jury instructions were too narrow. Specifically, it claimed the instructions focused only on whether Sun Chemical responded appropriately after learning about the harassment, rather than whether the company should have prevented the harassment from occurring. The instructions required the plaintiffs to prove that Sun Chemical knew or should have known about the harassing conduct and failed to take prompt and appropriate corrective action. The EEOC argued that there was another theory of liability, that the employer had failed to prevent the harassment before it happened.

Jennifer: How did the Eighth Circuit respond to those arguments?

Elizabeth: Interestingly, the Eighth Circuit didn’t decide whether the jury instructions were perfect. Instead, it assumed, for the sake of argument, that the EEOC’s theory could apply, and then held that there simply wasn’t enough evidence to support it. The court explained that even under the EEOC’s theory, an employer must have actual or constructive knowledge of ongoing harassment and fail to take remedial action reasonably calculated to stop it. In other words, employers can’t prevent misconduct that they have no reason to anticipate.

Jennifer: That does seem to be the key takeaway. So, what evidence did the EEOC rely on to argue that Sun Chemical should have known?

Elizabeth: The EEOC pointed to one prior incident in which the same employee had allegedly used the N-word toward another Black employee. But the court said that single prior incident was not enough to put the company on notice that the employee was a serial harasser, or that ongoing racial harassment was occurring. The court distinguished situations where employers received repeated complaints or observe a pattern of misconduct. Here, there simply wasn’t enough evidence that management knew, or reasonably should have known, that additional harassment was likely.

Jennifer: The Eighth Circuit also spent some time discussing the employer’s disciplinary response, if I recall, correct?

Elizabeth: It did. The EEOC argued that the company should have taken stronger action after the earlier incident. The Eighth Circuit acknowledged that Sun Chemical’s response could have been stronger but emphasized that Title VII doesn’t require employers to terminate an employee after a first offense in order to demonstrate an adequate remedial response. The court noted that the employee had more than 30 years of service without a prior history of harassment, and that the company documented its discipline and warned that future misconduct could lead to termination. So, the court looked at the totality of the circumstances, rather than applying a one-size-fits-all approach.

Jennifer: There was also an argument about alleged unreported uses of a similar slur in workplace conversations if I recall. How did the court handle that?

Elizabeth: So, the Eighth Circuit rejected that argument, because there wasn’t enough evidence that those alleged comments had ever been reported to management, without reports or facts suggesting management reasonably should have known; the court found there wasn’t enough to establish constructive knowledge. That’s an important point, because constructive knowledge isn’t based on speculation. There has to be enough information that a reasonable employer would recognize a probability that harassment is occurring.

Jennifer: What a great decision. So, let’s talk about what employers should take away from the ruling.

Elizabeth: Well, there are several practical lessons. First, employers should continue to maintain clear anti-harassment policies and multiple reporting avenues. Those reporting mechanisms are critical because an employer generally cannot address contracts it doesn’t know about.

Second, every complaint should be investigated promptly and documented carefully. Courts continue to examine not only whether employers responded, but whether the response was reasonably calculated to stop future misconduct.

Third, progressive discipline remains important. While immediate termination may be appropriate in some situations, this decision reinforces that Title VII does not automatically require firing an employee after a first incident. Courts will consider the severity of the conduct, the employee’s disciplinary history, prior complaints, and the employer’s overall response.

Fourth and finally, documentation matters. Employers should carefully document complaints, investigations, disciplinary decisions, and the reasons supporting those decisions. That record often becomes critical years later during litigation.

Jennifer: Thanks so much, Elizabeth, for that great overview. I feel like this decision is really an important reminder that Title VII requires employers to take workplace harassment seriously, but it also, at the same time, recognizes the practical limitations on employer liability. The Eighth Circuit made clear here that employers are expected to respond promptly and effectively to known harassment, but they’re also not liable for failing to prevent misconduct that they really had no actual or constructive reason to anticipate. For employers, I think that means the best defense continues to be strong policies, effective reporting procedures, prompt investigations, appropriate corrective action, and thorough documentation.

Elizabeth, again, thank you so much for walking us through this important decision, and thank you to our listeners. We are glad you tuned in to another edition of the Class Action Weekly Wire.

Elizabeth: Thanks, Jen, and thank you, listeners. It was a pleasure to be here.

Duane Morris Takeaway: This week’s episode features Duane Morris partner Jerry Maatman and senior associate Hayley Ryan with their analysis of the $1.5 billion settlement set to resolve a class action brought by authors alleging artificial intelligence developer Anthropic pirated their work to train its large language model.

Check out today’s episode and subscribe to our show from your preferred podcast platform: Spotify, Amazon Music, Apple Podcasts, Podcast Index, Tune In, Listen Notes, iHeartRadio, Deezer, and YouTube.

Episode Transcript

Jerry Maatman: Thank you, loyal listeners, for being here again for the next episode of our weekly podcast series entitled The Class Action Weekly Wire. I’m Jerry Maatman, a partner at Duane Morris, and joining me today is my colleague, Hayley Ryan. Thanks so much for being here on the podcast today.

Hayley Ryan: Great to be here, Jerry. Thanks for having me.

Jerry: Today, we’re discussing one of the most significant class action settlements ever, a copyright class action settlement that was recently approved for $1.5 billion between Anthropic and a class of authors and copyright holders whose books were allegedly downloaded from online piracy libraries and used in connection with AI training. The court, in its settlement approval order, called it the largest copyright class action settlement in the history of American jurisprudence. Hayley, let’s start with the basics. What was the case about?

Hayley: Yeah, Jerry, so the case was brought by authors and copyright holders against Anthropic. Plaintiffs allege that Anthropic downloaded hundreds of thousands of copyrighted books from the online repositories Library Genesis, or LibGen, and Pirate Library Mirror, often referred to as PiLiMi. The settlement class included copyright owners of books appearing on a specific works list, containing approximately 482,000 works that Anthropic had downloaded from those sources.

Jerry: As I understand it, in the history of the case, the judge, a federal district court judge in the Northern District of California, granted final settlement approval on July 20, 2026.

Hayley: That’s right, Jerry. The court concluded that the settlement satisfied Rule 23’s requirements and was fair, reasonable, and adequate. The court viewed the settlement as providing substantial value to the class. According to the court’s order, the average recovery is expected to be approximately $3,000 per word. The court stated that this amount is roughly four times the statutory minimum damages available for ordinary copyright infringement, and about 15 times the minimum for innocent infringement.

Jerry: As is inevitable in large class action settlements, I understand that some objectors lodged objections to the settlement, claiming that the settlement amount should have been larger, is that right?

Hayley: Yes, they sure did, Jerry. Several objectors pointed out that copyright law allows statutory damages of up to $150,000 per work in certain circumstances. The court concluded that continued litigation carried substantial risks, including the possibility of losing at trial, appellate reversals, delays, and constitutional challenges to a massive statutory damages award.

Jerry: One thing that stood out to me was the participation rate among class action members. I’ve seen settlements where the participation rate is under 3%. What did their data analytics look like in this particular settlement?

Hayley: Yes, Jerry, so here, the participation rate was extraordinarily high. By April of 2026, claims have been submitted for more than 91% of the works on the works list. The court noted that this level of participation was far above what is typically seen in class actions. The settlement administrator received only 350 timely opt-outs, covering just 1,802 works, despite notice reaching hundreds of thousands of potential class numbers. The court also noted that only 54 objectors or comments were filed, and several class members affirmatively supported the settlement.

Jerry: Notice program in a class action settlement is always important, but let’s talk about it in the context of this case, where there were an enormous amount of authors and copyright holders.

Hayley: Yes, Jerry, so the notice program was extensive. The settlement administrator gathered contact information from publishers, authors organizations, copyright records, ISBN databases, commercial sources, and internet searches. Notice was sent to nearly 595,000 potential class members, and the court found that notice reached owners associated with more than 99.5% of the works on the works list. The campaign also included industry publications, newspapers, press coverage, newsletters, as well as social media outreach.

Jerry: The scope of a release in a class action settlement review process is always important. How did it play out in this particular case?

Hayley: Absolutely. So, the settlement only releases claims related to works appearing on the specific works list, and only for certain past conduct. The judge emphasized that class members are not releasing claims concerning future conduct. They’re also not releasing claims based on AI outputs. So, the settlement focused primarily on alleged downloading and copying of works that occurred before August 25, 2025.

Jerry: Class action settlements of this ilk also often involve injunctive, programmatic, or non-monetary relief. How did that play out in the settlement approval process?

Hayley: Yes, Jerry, so Anthropic agreed to destroy the pirated copies of class members’ works that had been downloaded from LibGen and PiLiMi, subject to preservation obligations and other legal requirements. The court viewed that destruction obligation as a significant benefit to the class.

Jerry: And then, inevitably, in all class action settlements, a portion of the amount of the settlement is devoted to attorneys’ fees. I found this opinion on settlement approval particularly interesting insofar as attorneys’ fees approval issues was concerned.

Hayley: Yes, it really is, Jerry. Class counsel initially sought 20% of the settlement fund, which would have been $300 million. They later reduced that request to 12.5%, or $187.5 million. Even after that reduction, the court found the request too high.

Jerry: That’s certainly a significant amount of money to be paid to law firms for prosecuting a class action. Is this because, was the court’s opinion because this is the type of settlement that would fall into the category of what’s called a megafund class action settlement?

Hayley: Exactly, Jerry. The judge concluded that applying a percentage of the fund approach would generate a windfall for class counsel. So, instead, the court used the lodestar method. Class counsel reported approximately $27 million in lodestar fees, and the court applied a multiplier of 3.75. So, that resulted in a fee award of just over $101.5 million, which equates to roughly 6.8% of the settlement fund.

Jerry: Well, an enormous fee, one of the largest of 2026 thus far in any class action settlement, but certainly significantly less than what plaintiffs’ counsel had requested. The named plaintiffs, I assume, also requested service awards?

Hayley: Yes, they did. So, the class representatives asked for $50,000 each. The court found that amount to be excessive, although the representatives devoted substantial time and effort to the litigation, the judge concluded there was no showing of retaliation risk comparable to some employment class actions. So, the court instead awarded $15,000 to each of the three class representatives.

Jerry: Bottom line, Hayley, what are your biggest takeaways for corporate counsel from this decision?

Hayley: So, Jerry, courts remain willing to approve extraordinarily large settlements involving AI-related copyright claims when the settlement provides meaningful and immediate value to the class. However, the fee ruling reinforces that courts will scrutinize attorney’s fees in megafund settlements and may depart significantly from the traditional 25% benchmark.

Jerry: In following, class actions that are filed and settled, I think there’s one more takeaway, maybe, and that’s that this settlement resolves historic claims never before brought involving a defined set of books, but it leaves the door open and invites future litigation involving AI outputs and future conduct in privacy situations. So, it probably won’t be the last major case we see in this particular space.

Well, Hayley, thank you so much for this great discussion and your thought leadership in this area. Thanks for the detailed analysis of this important settlement, and thanks for being here today. Along with our listeners, thank you for joining us for this latest installment of the Class Action Weekly Wire.

Hayley: Thanks, Jerry, and thank you, listeners, it was a pleasure to be here.