
Duane Morris Takeaway: This week’s episode of the Class Action Weekly Wire features Duane Morris partners Jerry Maatman and Daniel Spencer with their analysis of a California federal judge’s decision to reject a $28 million attorney fee request as part of a $150 million securities fraud class action settlement.
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Episode Transcript
Jerry Maatman: Thank you, loyal blog listeners and readers, for being here again with us for the next episode of our weekly podcast, The Class Action Weekly Wire. I’m Jerry Maatman of Duane Morris, and joining us today is Daniel Spencer, my colleague and partner from Duane Morris’ Los Angeles office. Welcome, Daniel.
Daniel Spencer: Thanks, Jerry. Great to be here.
Jerry: Today we’re talking about a pretty seminal ruling of a settlement and an attorneys’ fee award in litigation entitled In Re Zoom Securities Litigation in the Northern District of California. This was a case where the court gave preliminary approval to a $150 million settlement, but then during the final approval hearing took a hard look at a very hefty attorneys’ fees request from class counsel, whereby they asked for $28 million, or roughly 18.75% of the settlement fund. This would have translated into a multiplier under pertinent case law of over 10 times the amount of time actually spent. The court called this problematic. What’s your take on this, Daniel, from your viewpoint in practicing law in California?
Daniel: I’ll tell you, Judge Donato did not mince words on this one. He described the hourly rate of roughly $7,900 an hour as an “eye-watering figure”, commenting that it had no place in a straightforward securities class action. Instead, he went with the lodestar method, applied a multiplier of four, which is still pretty generous, and awarded $10.4 million in fees, plus an additional $262,000 in costs.
Jerry: So, this was a securities fraud class action brought under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 of the SEC about Zoom allegedly misleading investors about its security practices. But the judge emphasized when considering the fee petition, that as class actions go, this one settled fairly quickly with a minimum of risk and toil, and that discovery was limited and actually no depositions had been taken, no motion for class certification was filed, no expert reports were produced, and there was no summary judgment practice.
Daniel: Yeah, that’s exactly right. And class counsel had reported approximately 3,500 hours of work, which is not insignificant, but the judge compared it to other work wherein the same firm had invested over 43,000 hours handling complex motions, depositions, and trial prep, and still received a 2.5 multiplier on its lodestar. So, here they wanted four times that multiplier for a much lighter workload.
Jerry: The judge made a very important statement about a principle that I think is key to class action jurisprudence, and that is that the court, when reviewing a settlement or reviewing a petition for attorneys’ fees, has in essence a fiduciary obligation to the class to protect them, especially where a defendant makes no objection to the plaintiffs’ application for an award of attorneys’ fees. As the judge put it, there’s a “heightened duty to peer into the provision and scrutinize it closely.” Was this an aberrational ruling, or is this something front and center in class actions in California?
Daniel: It’s absolutely front and center, and I’ll tell you that the judge reminded everyone that the courts have a duty to guard against these type of windfall profits in these megafund cases or those with settlements exceeding $100 million. In doing so, he stressed that the 25% benchmark that they’re used to seeing is simply not appropriate for those types of situations. 18.75% of $150 million, he said, would produce exactly the kind of disproportionate result the Ninth Circuit had warned against in similar settlements.
Jerry: The judge also touched upon something known in the law as the percentage of recovery factors that analyzes the results achieved, the risks to the lawyers, the non-monetary benefits accorded to the class, and the contingency nature of the case. And the judge said while this was a solid outcome, it wasn’t exceptional. The case didn’t break new legal ground or face unusual challenges, and the benefit to the class was entirely monetary and the risks were fairly routine for this sort of case.
Daniel: And that’s exactly right. The judge also pointed out that plaintiffs’ counsel’s own billing showed barely five hours spent on the class certification and notice, which is pretty extraordinary for a securities case. His takeaway was that 18.75%, which was requested, was a formulaic application of the benchmark. In megafund settlements, the court’s got to guard against that mechanical percentage that yield windfalls. The judge used the lodestar method and applied a generous multiplier of four, set the fee at $10,419,000, and also directed that 75% or about $7.8 million could be paid immediately with the remaining 25% to be held pending the post-distribution accounting. So even with a multiplier of four, every timekeeper down the line was effectively being compensated at $2,900 per hour, which is more than a healthy rate by any measure.
Jerry: In this case, class counsel also sought a service award for the lead plaintiff of $48,750. Most of the class action settlements we see, the service awards are around $5,000 to $12,000. How did the court come out on the request for the service award here?
Daniel: Yeah, so in this one, he relied directly on the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, which prohibits incentive awards for lead plaintiffs in securities cases. A lead plaintiff can only recover reasonable costs and expenses, including lost wages. The declaration that plaintiff filed in support of that said he spent about 75 hours on the case and valued that at about $650 an hour. The court found no evidence tying that number to any actual costs or outcome.
Jerry: So, Daniel, what’s the big picture here for corporate practitioners when they’re looking at class action settlements or at the mediation table negotiating a class action resolution?
Daniel: So, really two lessons that you can take away from this case. First, don’t treat the 25% benchmark as a given, especially in these megafund settlements. And second, expect the judges to go through a rigorous lodestar cross-check, even in cases that are resolved efficiently. Judges are going to expect to see a clear correlation between the hours worked, complexity handled, and the fees requested by plaintiffs’ counsel.
Jerry: Well said, and thank you for your take on this case, Daniel. And thanks to our listeners for being here today. We’ll be breaking down this settlement and others in our upcoming Duane Morris Class Action Review scheduled for publication in the first week of January of 2026. So, thank you, Daniel, and thanks for all our listeners being with us today on our podcast.
Daniel: Thanks, Jerry. It’s a pleasure to be here.









