Category: EEOC Litigation

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., George J. Schaller, and Ryan T. Garippo

Duane Morris Takeaways:  On June 4, 2026, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the “EEOC”) announced its National Enforcement Plan (the “NEP”) for fiscal years 2025 – 2029.  The NEP reflects the EEOC’s new priorities under President Donald Trump and formally rescinds the agency’s strategic objections during President Joseph Biden’s administration. 

Employers should take note of this development as it is clear that the NEP signals a forthcoming crackdown on: (1) employers’ diversity, equity, and inclusion (“DEI”) programs; (2) instances of “anti-American” bias; (3) efforts to limit “single-sex spaces” for transgender individuals; and (4) failures to provide religious accommodations.

The EEOC’s National Enforcement Plan

As readers of this blog will know, the EEOC looks and acts differently under President Trump than it did under President Biden.  President Biden’s strategic priorities, which we wrote about here, here, and here, largely focused on discrimination resulting from the use of artificial intelligence, preventing systemic harassment, enforcing equal pay obligations, and protecting historically marginalized groups.  President Trump’s EEOC is a lot different.

On June 4, 2026, the EEOC’s Chair Andrea Lucas (R) and Commissioner Brittany Panuccio (R) rolled out the agency’s new NEP over the objection of Commissioner Kalpana Kotagal (D).  The NEP describes the agency’s areas of strategic focus because “it is not feasible for the [EEOC] to devote the same amount of resources to each charge.”  (NEP at 2.)  Thus, “the agency must continue to be strategic about the matters it prioritizes to maximize the agency’s impact.”  (Id.)  To that end, the EEOC identified four major areas where it intends to be more proactive in its enforcement efforts, each of which is discussed more fully below.

First, the EEOC stated an explicit intention to attempt to “[r]emedy[] DEI-related race and sex discrimination.”  (Id. at 6.)  In particular, the EEOC cited the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services, 605 U.S. 303 (2025), Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, Missouri, 601 U.S. 346 (2024), and Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 600 U.S. 181 (2023) as the basis for its decision.  As a result, we expect to see continued efforts from President Trump’s administration to crackdown on DEI programs both in the workplace and in higher education.

Second, the EEOC states that it plans to prosecute claims with an intent to “protect[] American workers from anti-American national origin discrimination.”  (NEP at 6.)  This prosecutorial decision tracks with last year’s first-of-its-kind settlement against LeoPalace Resort, which we blogged about here, where a group of American workers alleged that they were subject to less favorable treatment than their Japanese colleagues.  We can also expect these enforcement actions to continue throughout the second Trump administration.

Third, the EEOC intends to ensure access for women to “single-sex spaces at work” due to the “binary nature of sex.”  (Id.)  This objective continues to signal a rollback of President Biden’s efforts to enforce protections in favor of transgender workers, and tracks with the agency’s decision last year to dismiss all lawsuits seeking to enforce such protections.  As readers will recall, we blogged about the decision to dismiss these lawsuits here because they were purportedly based on “gender ideology extremism.”  This area is one where there is the potential for a significant uptick in EEOC enforcement actions and investigations.

Fourth, the EEOC stated its continued commitment to “religious liberty rights” including the right “to receive religious accommodations and be free from religious discrimination, harassment, and related retaliation.”  (Id.)  As we explained here, however, employers can expect certain types of religious bias to be policed more heavily than others.  In accordance with President Trump’s policy platform, EEOC Chair Lucas has explicitly cited “antisemitism” as the basis for the current emphasis on religious discrimination.  This enforcement priority tracks with recent appellate court decisions, such as EEOC v. Center One, LLC, No. 22-2943, 2024 WL 379956, at *4 (3d Cir. Feb. 1, 2024), where the Third Circuit held that forcing an employer to work on Yom Kippur and Rosh Hashanah could create “’intolerable’ conditions of discrimination.”  Thus, the EEOC is signaling its intent to continue to build on precedent like Center One in the religious discrimination space.

Implications For Employers

Employers should take note of these enforcement priorities as it previews the types of cases that the EEOC intends to pursue both through investigations and litigation.  Thus, if they have not already, corporate counsel should consider whether any revisions are necessary to their organization’s DEI programs as well as to any policies concerning differential treatment provided based on national origin, sex, or religion.

Further, if an organization receives notice of an EEOC charge or subpoena – particularly one targeting a pattern, practice, or policy based on the above-mentioned objectives – it should take such allegations extremely seriously and contact experienced counsel to help them navigate the process.

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Tiffany Alberty, and Brett Bohan

Duane Morris Takeaways: On June 3, 2026, in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Psychological Dimensions, No. 1:26-MC-00072 (D. Colo. June 3, 2026), Senior Judge R. Brooke Jackson of the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado denied the EEOC’s application for an order to show cause as to why two administrative subpoenas served on Psychological Dimensions should not be enforced. The EEOC sought information regarding a pre-offer psychological assessment administered to job applicants for the Arapahoe County Sheriff’s Office. The Court concluded that the subpoenas sought information that had nothing to do with the discrimination allegedly suffered by the charging party and declined to hold that the EEOC’s investigative authority is unlimited.

Courts typically give wide berth to the EEOC with its administrative, pre-lawsuit subpoenas, but this ruling illustrates that courts may impose meaningful limits on the EEOC’s subpoena power where the information sought bears no connection to the harm alleged by the individual claimant.

Case Background

On June 10, 2020, Jessica Roe applied for a position as a Public Information Liaison at the Arapahoe County Sheriff’s Office (“ACSO”). (ECF 20 at 1) The application process included both pre-offer and post-offer phases. During the pre-offer phase, Ms. Roe completed a 430-plus question psychological examination, sometimes referred to as a “Job Suitability Assessment,” administered by Psychological Dimensions, a contractor to the ACSO. (Id.) Ms. Roe also took a polygraph test, provided writing samples, and participated in interviews. (Id. at 2) Following these steps, Ms. Roe was informed she was one of three finalists, had additional interviews, and was offered the job contingent upon further medical, psychological, and background investigation. (Id.)

In the post-offer phase, Ms. Roe completed another extensive psychological examination and met with the Chief Psychologist of Psychological Dimensions. (Id.)During that meeting, she disclosed a mental health diagnosis, a mental health provider, and additional information regarding prescriptions she had been given. (Id.) She was also asked to release information for the diagnosing doctors. (Id.) However, when Psychological Dimensions attempted to verify the information, the diagnosing provider could not confirm Ms. Roe had been a patient or provide records to Psychological Dimensions due to its document retention policy, so the psychologist was unable to “pass” her. (Id.) On September 14, 2020, the ACSO rescinded the job offer because Ms. Roe did not pass the post-offer psychological exam. (Id.)

On June 4, 2021, Ms. Roe filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC, alleging retaliation and discrimination based on sex in violation of Title VII and disability in violation of the ADA. (Id. at 3) Nearly three years later, on March 20, 2024, Ms. Roe filed an Amended Charge to expand the allegations to include discrimination based on race, color, sex, religion, national origin, retaliation, age, disability, genetic information, and pregnancy, invoking additional federal statutes. (Id.)

On August 28, 2025, as part of its investigation, the EEOC served two administrative subpoenas on Psychological Dimensions — one pursuant to the ADEA and one pursuant to the ADA and Title VII. (Id.) The subpoenas required Psychological Dimensions to produce the Job Suitability Assessments and related communications for all individuals who answered affirmatively that they had experienced workplace sexual harassment, filed formal complaints against an employer, been involved in lawsuits, or appeared in legal proceedings. (Id. at 4)

On September 10, 2025, Psychological Dimensions objected to the subpoenas, arguing that the information was not relevant, that compliance would be unduly burdensome (requiring at least 1,500 hours), that the request infringed on the privacy and HIPAA rights of non-parties, and that the request sought proprietary trade secrets. (Id.) The parties were unable to resolve the dispute, and the EEOC filed an application for an order to show cause. (Id. at 5)

The Court’s Order

The Court denied the EEOC’s application on procedural and substantive grounds.

As an initial matter, the EEOC argued that Psychological Dimensions’ objections were both procedurally defective and untimely. (Id.) The EEOC noted that the September 10, 2025, objection letter identified only the ADEA subpoena, and there is no administrative procedure for objecting to ADEA subpoenas. (Id.) The EEOC also pointed out that objections to subpoenas issued pursuant to the ADA or Title VII are due within five days after service, making Psychological Dimensions’ objections untimely. (Id. at 5-6) The Court acknowledged the untimeliness — the objections were filed thirteen days after service — but declined to treat this delay as dispositive. (Id.)

Turning to the substance of the subpoenas, the Court identified what it characterized as a “bigger problem.” (Id. at 6) The Court recognized that the four questions in the Job Suitability Assessment potentially punished applicants for exercising their rights under discrimination laws, and the subpoenas sought information to determine whether persons who answered “yes” to those questions were consistently denied employment at the ACSO. (Id. at 7) However, that information had “no application to the charging party, Ms. Roe.” (Id.) The Court’s rationale was that it was undisputed that Ms. Roe answered “no” to all four questions, was found suitable for the position, made the short list of three finalists, and was offered the job. (Id.) The reasons her offer was rescinded were found in the post-offer evaluation, not in the pre-offer Job Suitability Assessment.

Ultimately, the Court determined it was “unwilling to hold that the EEOC’s authority to investigate discrimination in the workplace is unlimited, or that an individual’s claim that she lost a job opportunity due to discrimination opens the door to compelling a third party to produce information that has nothing to do with the discrimination allegedly suffered by the claimant.” (Id. at 7-8) For this reason, the Court denied the EEOC’s application for an order to show cause on its two administrative subpoenas. (Id. at 8)

Implications For Employers

The Court’s decision in Psychological Dimensions is a significant ruling for employers and third-party contractors who face EEOC subpoenas during the investigation of discrimination charges. The decision signals that courts may impose meaningful limits on the scope of the EEOC’s investigative subpoena power where the information sought lacks a nexus to the actual harm alleged by the charging party.

This case demonstrates that, although the EEOC’s subpoena power is broad, it is not boundless. Where the EEOC seeks to expand an investigation beyond the facts that are relevant to the charging party’s claims, courts may be willing to deny enforcement of those subpoenas. Employers who receive subpoenas that they believe extend beyond the scope of the underlying charge should carefully consider whether the information sought bears a meaningful connection to the claimant’s allegations and should be prepared to articulate that disconnect to a court.

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Tiffany Alberty, and Bernadette Coyle

Duane Morris Takeaways: On June 1, 2026, in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. A&A Appliance, Inc., No. 1:23-CV-2456 (D. Colo. June 1, 2026), Chief Judge Daniel D. Domenico of the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado granted Defendant A&A Appliances, Inc.’s (“A&A”) motion to deem the EEOC’s claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation, entitling the employer to seek a full award of attorneys’ fees.  This decision is an important read for corporate counsel facing employment discrimination cases, particularly EEOC-initiated litigation.  The ruling demonstrates that the federal agency can face fee-shifting consequences when it pursues claims that lack evidentiary support from their inception.

Case Background

Defendant A&A Appliance, Inc. (“A&A”) employed Karima Javanzad from February 2019 to June 2020.  During the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic, Ms. Javanzad sought a 12-week FMLA leave for varied reasons, including her own possible COVID-19 infection, her son’s illness, and a gastrointestinal condition.  A&A approved the medical leave retroactively, covering mid-March through early June 2020.  Over the following weeks, A&A and Ms. Javanzad exchanged emails, calls, and texts about when her leave would expire and whether an extension was possible.  When Ms. Javanzad did not return to work after her leave ran out, A&A terminated her employment on June 10, 2020, explaining that it had offered to extend her leave only if the original FMLA-triggering condition warranted it, and that her gastrointestinal disorder (unrelated to COVID-19) did not qualify.

Ms. Javanzad subsequently filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC in December 2020, asserting that A&A had discriminated against her based on her disability and retaliated against her for seeking a reasonable accommodation.  Following its investigation, the EEOC concluded there was reasonable cause to believe A&A violated the ADA and attempted to resolve the matter through conciliation.  After those efforts failed, the EEOC filed suit in September 2023 claiming: (1) failure to accommodate, (2) disparate treatment, and (3) retaliation under the ADA.

In September 2025, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of A&A on every claim, concluding that the EEOC had not demonstrated that A&A was ever on notice of a qualifying disability that required accommodation under the ADA.  A&A then moved for an order deeming the EEOC’s claims frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation so that it could recover its full attorney’s fees.

The Court’s Decision

Chief Judge Domenico granted A&A’s motion.  The Court applied the standard from Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978), which permits an award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant in an ADA case where the court finds that the plaintiff’s claim was “frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.”  Id. at 422.

The Court applied three factors from the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Walker v. NationsBank of Florida, N.A., 53 F.3d 1548 (11th Cir. 1995), which the Tenth Circuit has affirmed: (1) whether the plaintiff established a prima facie case; (2) whether the defendant offered to settle; and (3) whether the trial court dismissed the case prior to trial or held a full-blown trial on the merits.  All three factors weighed in A&A’s favor — the EEOC failed to establish a prima facie case, A&A offered to settle, and the case was dismissed on summary judgment before trial.

The Court rejected the EEOC’s argument that the Christiansburg Garment standard is met only when a party “utterly fails to produce any evidence in support of material issues necessary to withstand summary judgment.”  The Court explained that while the EEOC presented some evidence that Ms. Javanzad had a disability and requested leave, it failed to present evidence for the critical element of A&A’s knowledge of the claimed disability.  As the Court emphasized, “[a] ‘health condition’ does not equate to a qualifying disability under the ADA” and “knowledge of a health condition is not necessarily knowledge of a disability.” 

Importantly, the Court found that the EEOC had multiple years before initiating the action in September 2023 to investigate the facts and apply established case law.  The EEOC’s own initial complaint showed that it knew Ms. Javanzad was diagnosed with vocal cord paralysis and gastritis after her June 9 endoscopy, and thus presumably after her June 10 termination, and that she was diagnosed with COVID-19 after termination.  These facts undermined the EEOC’s assertion that its evidence changed throughout discovery.  Moreover, fact discovery closed in July 2024, seven months before the dispositive motion deadline, and A&A raised issues of factual and legal deficiencies throughout litigation prior to summary judgment.

Finally, the Court noted that the EEOC is not a “regular plaintiff” and that courts may consider distinctions between the Commission and private plaintiffs.  Quoting the Fifth Circuit, the Court observed that the EEOC “owes duties to employers as well: a duty reasonably to investigate charges, a duty to conciliate in good faith, and a duty to cease enforcement attempts after learning that an action lacks merit.”  EEOC v. Agro Distribution, LLC, 555 F.3d 462, 473 (5th Cir. 2009).  The Court concluded: “Ms. Javanzad might have been excused from pressing these issues.  The EEOC is not.” For these reasons, the Court entitled A&A to reasonable attorney’s fees.

Implications For Employers

For employers facing EEOC-initiated litigation, this decision underscores the importance of raising factual and legal deficiencies early, consistently and persistently throughout discovery, as the Court credited A&A’s efforts to put the EEOC on notice of the weaknesses in its case.  This decision also reinforces that while there is a high threshold for establishing entitlement to attorney’s fees, prevailing defendants are not without recourse when the EEOC presses claims lacking foundational evidentiary support.

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, and Daniel D. Spencer

Duane Morris Takeaways: We were honored to have so many loyal blog readers join us for our annual Mid-Year Review of EEOC Litigation And Strategy For Fiscal Year 2026 yesterday. The full video presentation, hosted by Jerry Maatman, Jennifer Riley, and Daniel Spencer, is below:

The EEOC’s fiscal year (“FY 2026”) spans from October 1, 2025, to September 30, 2026. Through the midway point, EEOC has filed 31 enforcement lawsuits, an uptick when compared to the 22 lawsuits filed in the first half of FY 2025, and the 14 lawsuits filed in the first half of FY 2024.. Traditionally, the second half of the EEOC’s fiscal year – and particularly in the final months of August and September – are when the majority of filings occur. However, an early analysis of the types of lawsuits filed, and the locations where they are filed, is informative for employers in terms of what to expect during the fiscal year-end lawsuit filing rush in September.

Cases Filed By EEOC District Offices

In addition to tracking the total number of filings, we closely monitor which of the EEOC’s 15 district offices are most active in terms of filing new cases over the course of the fiscal year. Some districts tend to be more aggressive than others, and some focus on different case filing priorities. The following chart shows the number of lawsuit filings by EEOC district office.

The most notable trend thus far is the 7 lawsuits filed by the Chicago District Office, followed by the 5 filings by the Philadelphia District Office, 3 filings by Indianapolis, 2 filings each for Atlanta, Birmingham, Houston, New York, Phoenix, and San Francisco, and one filing each for Charlotte, Los Angeles, Memphis, Miami, and St. Louis offices. Dallas has yet to see a lawsuit filing for FY 2026. By comparison, similarly in FY 2025 Chicago and Philadelphia led the pack in lawsuit filings, followed by Indianapolis, Phoenix, Houston, Atlanta, and Birmingham.

Analysis Of The Types Of Lawsuits Filed In First Half Of FY 2026

We also analyzed the types of lawsuits the EEOC filed throughout the first six months, in terms of the statutes and theories of discrimination alleged, in order to determine how the EEOC is shifting its strategic priorities. The chart below shows the EEOC filings by allegation type.

Title VII cases once again made up the majority of cases filed.  They constituted 50% of all filings in FY 2026 (same as FY 2025, down from 58% of all filings in FY 2024, and significantly down from 68% of all filings in FY 2023). Overall, ADA cases made up the next most significant percentage of the EEOC’s FY 2026 filings for a total of 40%.  This is up from 31% in FY 2025, yet similar to the 42% of filings in FY 2024. So far there has only been one filing under the ADEA in FY 2026, down from the uptick in ADEA filings in FY 2025. The EEOC filed 9 ADEA cases in FY 2025, compared to 6 age discrimination cases in FY 2024, 12 age discrimination cases in FY 2023, and 7 age discrimination cases in FY 2022.   In the first six months of FY 2026, the EEOC filed 4 cases under the Pregnant Worker’s Fairness Act, on track compared to 6 filings in FY 2025 and 3 filings in FY 2024.  So far, no cases filed under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.  Notably absent from FY 2026’s filings are cases brought under the Equal Pay Act and Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act – two areas that the EEOC repeatedly has cited among its enforcement priorities prior to the second Trump Administration. 

The graph set out below shows the number of lawsuits filed according to the statute under which they were filed (Title VII, Americans With Disabilities Act, Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Equal Pay Act, and Age Discrimination in Employment Act).

The industries impacted by EEOC-initiated litigation have also remained consistent in FY 2026. The chart below details that hospitality, healthcare, and retail employers have maintained their lead as corporate defendants in the last 18 months of EEOC-initiated litigation.  In the first six months of FY 2026, two industries remained in the EEOC’s targets: Hospitality and Retail. On a percentage basis, Hospitality (Restaurants / Hotels / Entertainment) comprised 25.9% of filings, and Retail had 22.2% of filings. A key difference in FY 2025 compared to FY 2024 is Retail (22.2% of FY 2026 filings) overtaking Healthcare (18.5% of FY 2026 filings) and Manufacturing (7.4% of FY 2026 filings) as the next most targeted industry.  Transportation & Logistics entered double digit enforcement activity, at 18.5% of the filings. The remaining industry with at least 2 filings is Construction, representing 7.4% of the filings.

Notable 2026 Lawsuit Filings

Disability Discrimination

In EEOC v. Schneider National, Inc., Case No. 26-CV-905 (D. Md. Mar. 4, 2026), the EEOC filed an action alleging that the defendant, Schneider National, Inc., a nationwide transportation and logistics company, violated the ADA when it refused to reasonably accommodate an applicant with PTSD by denying her request to bring her service dog to work, and withdrawing its job offer because of her disability. The EEOC asserted that the defendant extended a conditional offer of employment to the job candidate. However, next day, after learning that she had post-traumatic stress disorder and needed her service dog, the company withdrew her job offer pending further review. In response to Schneider’s request for additional information, the woman disclosed that her dog was certified as a service animal, trained to alleviate and prevent symptoms of PTSD, and had successfully accompanied her in the truck while she trained and obtained her Class A commercial driver’s license. The EEOC asserted that the defendant refused to allow her to drive with her service dog as an accommodation.

Religious Discrimination

In EEOC v. Blue Eagle Contracting, Inc., Case No. 26-CV-226 (D. Nev. Mar. 31, 2026), the EEOC filed an action against the defendant, a bulk mail delivery contractor for the U.S. Postal Service, alleging religious discrimination in violation of Title VII when it allegedly failed to return a Christian employee truck driver to a weekday shift so he could attend Sunday morning church services. According to the EEOC’s lawsuit, the defendant hired the driver, who informed supervisors of his religious obligations on Sundays stemming from his Christian faith. He was assigned a weekday delivery route, which he worked for several months until he volunteered on an emergency basis to fill a Sunday morning shift after a coworker unexpectedly resigned. The driver reminded his supervisors multiple times that he needed to attend church services on Sunday mornings and said he was only willing to work Sunday mornings until a replacement driver for the weekend shift was hired. The EEOC asserted that although the defendant hired a replacement, it continued to schedule the driver for Sunday shifts, while the replacement drove the weekday shift. The driver ultimately resigned from his position, and the EEOC alleged that the defendant’s failure to accommodate the drivers sincerely held religious beliefs ultimately compelled him to leave his job.

Race Discrimination

In EEOC v. Ourisman Cars Management Company, LLC, et al.), Case No. 26-CV-1233 (D. Md. Mar. 27, 2026), the EEOC brought an action alleging race discrimination after a finance manager at one of the defendants’ car dealerships repeatedly used racially offensive language toward Black salesmen in 2023. Employees reported the behavior to management multiple times, but the EEOC alleged the company did not take sufficient corrective action. The conduct continued, and two employees ultimately left their jobs. The EEOC asserted that the company’s conduct violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.

In EEOC v. Nike, Case No. 26-MC-128 (E.D. Mo. Feb 4, 2026), the EEOC filed a complaint to enforce a subpoena related to claims alleging race discrimination against white workers through DEI programs. The agency seeks to compel Nike’s compliance with a May 2024 subpoena then-commissioner Andrea Lucas issued pointing to workforce representation quotas.

Release Of Enforcement Statistics

On April 6, 2026, the EEOC published its FY 2027 Agency Performance Plan (“APP”) and FY 2025 Agency Performance Report (“APR”). The EEOC reported $660 million recovered through administrative enforcement and litigation for 17,680 alleged victims of discrimination. It also reported $528 million recovered through pre-litigation enforcement process (the highest amount in the agency’s 60-year history), $104.6 million for federal employees and applicants, $55 million recovered as a result of systemic investigations, $27 million through resolution of 120 merits lawsuits, $10.8 million obtained through the resolution of 13 systemic lawsuits, and six new systemic lawsuit filings.

Takeaways For Employers

We anticipate that the EEOC will continue to aggressively pursue its strategic priority areas in FY 2026. There is no reason to believe that the annual “September surge” is not coming, in what could be another precedent-setting year. We will continue to monitor EEOC litigation activity on a daily basis, and look forward to providing our blog readers with up-to-date analysis on the latest developments.

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., George J. Schaller, and Andrew P. Quay

Duane Morris Takeaways: On March 9, 2026, in EEOC v. TCI of Alabama, LLC, Case No. 25-CV-89, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47895 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 9, 2026), Judge Corey L. Maze of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama dismissed a third-party complaint seeking to enforce indemnity provisions between Defendant-TCI and third-party staffing firms with the aim of indemnifying TCI from liability under Title VII.  The Court held that parties cannot contract away their responsibilities under Title VII in light of its comprehensive remedial scheme. 

The Court’s decision illustrates that corporate defendants cannot shift potential Title VII liability through contracted indemnity clauses entered into by staffing firms that refer employees.

Case Background

TCI of Alabama, LLC (“TCI”) disposes and recycles PCB contaminated items at various plants and employs laborers to do so.  Id. at *3.  To hire laborers, since 2020, TCI has “relied exclusively on third-party temporary staffing agencies” who refer qualified applicants.  Id.

The EEOC investigated TCI after the Commission learned that TCI allegedly refused to recruit and hire qualified women for laborer positions.  Id.  Following its investigation, the EEOC issued TCI a letter of determination, found reasonable cause to believe that TCI violated Title VII, and invited TCI to conciliate.  Id.  The Parties did not reach a conciliation agreement, and the EEOC filed the instant lawsuit.  Id. 

The EEOC’s lawsuit brought one claim for sex discrimination under Title VII.  Id. at *3-4.  According to the EEOC, TCI “intentionally excluded from employment a class of qualified females seeking employment as laborers in favor of hiring equally or less qualified male applicants.”  Id. at *4.  The EEOC maintained that TCI refused to hire women for numerous reasons including that TCI instructed third party staffing agencies, Orin Staffing, LLC, Personnel Staffing, Inc., and WorkSmart Staffing, Inc. (the “Staffing Firms”) not to refer women for its laborer positions because “among other reasons, women would ‘distract’ male workers and increase the risk of sexual harassment in the workplace.”  Id. 

TCI answered the complaint and then filed its own third-party complaint for breach of contract against the Staffing Firms.  Id.  TCI’s third-party complaint alleged the Staffing Firms “agreed via contracts” to lawfully refer qualified laborers to TCI.  Id.  The contracts also contained indemnification provisions, which required the Staffing Firms, as joint employers of referred employees, to indemnify TCI “for all claims caused by the [Staffing Firms’] breach of contract, including a breach caused by failing to follow the law when referring applicants.”  Id. at *4-5.

Accordingly, TCI contended that even if the EEOC’s allegations were true, the Staffing Firms’ compliance with TCI’s alleged unlawful instruction was itself “unlawful and violated Title VII.”  Id. at *5.  Therefore, the Staffing Firms exposed TCI to legal claims which TCI was indemnified for under their agreed contracts.  Id.

The EEOC and the Staffing Firms moved to dismiss TCI’s third-party complaint.  Id.  Their arguments for dismissal varied. Id.  The Court focused on one argument raised by the EEOC, whether Title VII preempts TCI’s breach of contract claim and therefore requires dismissal of TCI’s third-party complaint.  Id. at *6-7.

The Court’s Opinion

Judge Maze agreed with the EEOC that Title VII preempts TCI’s breach of contract claim and dismissed the third-party complaint with prejudice, explaining that any amendment would be futile.  Id. at *9.

Acknowledging Title VII’s “comprehensive remedial scheme,” the Court adopted the holding in EEOC v. Blockbuster, Case No. 07-CV-2612, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2889 (D. Md. Jan. 14, 2010), which held that parties accused of violating Title VII may not bring claims for indemnification against third parties “to skirt their own liability.”  TCI of Alabama, LLC,2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS47895, at *7.  In Blockbuster, the EEOC brought a Title VII action against the home video rental chain for failing to prevent and correct known sexual harassment at one of its warehouse facilities.  Blockbuster, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2889, at *1.  Blockbuster, like TCI here, filed a third-party complaint against a staffing firm that agreed to indemnify Blockbuster against any losses arising from any employment claim brought by its employees.  Id. The Court in Blockbuster granted judgment on the pleadings against Blockbuster and held that “[t]he primary goal of Title VII to eradicate discriminatory conduct would be thwarted if Blockbuster were permitted to contract around its obligations and shift its entire responsibility for complying with Title VII” to a third party.  Id.

The Court here agreed that the policy rationale in Blockbuster applied in greater force to TCI’s third-party indemnification claims given those claims rested on the EEOC’s allegation that TCI instructed staffing firms not to refer qualified women.  TCI of Alabama, LLC,2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS47895, at *8. “Federal public policy would be undermined,” the Court explained, “if TCI had the ability to tell others to help TCI violate federal law and then pay TCI if TCI got caught.”  Id.  Therefore, a contractual indemnity provision could not shield TCI from liability under Title VII.

Even though the EEOC’s lawsuit continues against TCI, the Staffing Firms involved in hiring are not off the hook.  In a footnote, the Opinion clarifies that if the Staffing Firms violated Title VII by complying with TCI’s unlawful request to not refer qualified women for laborer jobs, they too can face liability in another case.  Id. at *9, n. 2. 

Accordingly, the Court dismissed TCI’s third-party complaint with prejudice.

Implications For Businesses

EEOC v. TCI of Alabama, LLC demonstrates that corporate defendants cannot turn a blind eye to potential Title VII harms and attempt to contract away Title VII liability.  While indemnity clauses may appear all-encompassing, courts continue to decline coverage where Title VII violations are alleged. 

This Court agreed that public policy concerns control and remain critical in analyzing the scope of an indemnity provision in alleged gender-bias hiring under Title VII.  After TCI of Alabama, LLC, Companies contracting with outside staffing firms cannot rely on “shifting the blame” through indemnity provisions in contracts when faced with Title VII claims brought by the EEOC. 

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, and Daniel D. Spencer

Duane Morris Takeaway: Please join us for our webinar, Mid-Year Review of EEOC Litigation and Strategy, which will take place on Tuesday, April 7, 2026 at 11:30 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. Central. Click here to register to attend!

Join Duane Morris partners Jerry Maatman, Jennifer Riley and Daniel Spencer for a live panel discussion analyzing the latest impact of the dramatic changes at the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, including its new strategic priorities and the array of EEOC lawsuits filed in the first six months of fiscal year 2026. Moving through FY 2026 with significant changes implemented by the Trump administration, employers’ compliance with federal workplace laws and agency guidance remains a business imperative. Our virtual program will empower corporate counsel, human resource professionals and business leaders with key insights into the EEOC’s latest enforcement initiatives and provide strategies designed to minimize the risk of drawing the agency’s scrutiny.

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. and Jennifer A. Riley

Duane Morris Takeaways: Given the importance of compliance with workplace anti-discrimination laws for our clients, we are pleased to present the fourth annual edition of the Duane Morris EEOC And Government Enforcement Litigation Review – 2026. The EEOC And Government Enforcement Litigation Review – 2026 analyzes the EEOC’s and U.S. Department of Labor enforcement lawsuit filings in 2025 and the significant legal decisions and trends impacting this litigation for 2026.

Click here to bookmark or download a copy of the EEOC And Government Enforcement Litigation Review – 2026 e-book.

The Review explains the impact of the EEOC’s six enforcement priorities as outlined in its Strategic Enforcement Plan on employers’ business planning and how the direction of the Commission’s Plan should influence key employer decisions. The Review also contains a compilation of significant rulings decided in 2025 that impacted government-initiated litigation and a list of the most significant settlements in 2025.

We hope readers will enjoy this new publication. We will continue to update blog readers on any important EEOC developments and look forward to sharing further thoughts and analysis in 2026!

Stay tuned for key EEOC and government-enforcement related analysis on the Class Action Weekly Wire Podcast.

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Rebecca Bjork, and Anna Sheridan

Key Takeaways:  In EEOC v. Security Assurance Management Inc., No. 25-CV-00181, 2025 WL 2911781 (D.D.C. Oct. 14, 2025),  Judge Rudolph Contreras of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia refused to pare back the EEOC’s pregnancy and lactation claims against Security Assurance Management, Inc. (“SAM”), leaving all five causes of action under the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (PWFA) and both Title VII counts intact. Applying Rule 12(c), the Court held – in an order denying Defendant’s Partial Motion to Dismiss – the “heavy burden” on a defendant seeking judgment on the pleadings and determined that the EEOC’s theories — though factually overlapping — targeted distinct harms and therefore were not “duplicative.” The Court’s refusal to dismiss any of the EEOC’s PWFA counts sends a clear signal that defendants will face an uphill battle when trying to narrow pregnancy-related claims at the pleadings stage, particularly after filing an answer.

Case Background

The EEOC filed suit under Title VII and the PWFA on behalf of Simone Cooper, a special police officer who was reassigned after the client at her post did not want her working at the site while pregnant. (Compl. ¶ 17).  As the court summarized, the EEOC “brings this employment discrimination action against Security Assurance Management, Inc. pursuant to Title VII … and the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act,” alleging that SAM “disciplined and removed an employee, Simone Cooper (‘Ms. Cooper’), from her assignment due to her pregnancy-related condition and her need for accommodations.” Id. at *3.

After her maternity leave, Cooper was placed at a Hampton Inn post where she “was breastfeeding and had the pregnancy-related medical condition of lactation.” Id. The court noted that she “could nonetheless perform the essential functions of her job as an Unarmed Special Police Officer,” but SAM “repeatedly denied or ignored Ms. Cooper’s accommodation requests.” Id. The consequences were significant, as “Ms. Cooper leaked through her clothing during the workday on at least two occasions,” and because SAM provided no adequate space, “Ms. Cooper had to pump in her car in the Hampton Inn parking lot.” Id.

Despite outreach by Cooper, her union representative, and her attorney, the company allegedly did not engage in any interactive process. SAM eventually issued a written warning for “excessive absenteeism” that included days she was not scheduled and the day she left after leaking through her uniform. Id. at *4. She was later removed from the schedule entirely.

The complaint asserts seven claims, including two under Title VII and five under the PWFA for failure to accommodate, adverse action based on accommodation requests, denial of employment opportunities, retaliation, and interference. After it filed its Answer, SAM filed a partial motion to dismiss seeking dismissal of three of the counts as purportedly duplicative.

The Court’s Ruling

Because SAM filed an Answer before seeking dismissal, the court treated the request as a Rule 12(c) motion. As Judge Contreras explained, such a motion “will be granted only if Defendant can demonstrate that no material fact is in dispute and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” and at this early stage the movant “shoulders a heavy burden of justification.” Id. at *6.

The Court began with its definition, citing from Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran’s “duplicative claim test.” It explained that “duplicative claims are those that stem from identical allegations, that are decided under identical legal standards, and for which identical relief is available.” Id. at *7 (quoting Wultz, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1, 81 (D.D.C. 2010)).  SAM argued that several PWFA claims were repetitive, but after analyzing each count, the Court held otherwise.

Most notably, SAM asserted that the “Adverse Actions” claim duplicated the PWFA retaliation claim because both concerned similar employment decisions. Judge Contreras disagreed, emphasizing that the counts “assert different motivations for Defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct.” Id. at *8. The adverse-action theory centers on actions taken “on account of” Cooper’s accommodation requests, while retaliation requires adverse treatment because she opposed unlawful practices. “Because Count Two (Adverse Actions) and Count Four (Retaliation) arise from different allegations,” the court concluded, “the claims are not duplicative.” Id. at *9.

The Court applied the same reasoning to SAM’s attempt to collapse the PWFA adverse-action, denial-of-opportunities, and interference counts into the single failure-to-accommodate claim. Those theories, Judge Contreras explained, each addressed different harms and are evaluated under distinct legal standards. As a result, “none are duplicative,” and the Court denied the motion in full. Id. at* 7.

Implications For Employers

This opinion is a reminder that overlapping facts do not automatically render multiple statutory claims redundant — especially under the PWFA, where Congress created several discrete causes of action aimed at different workplace harms. Courts are giving each theory breathing room rather than collapsing them into a single “pregnancy discrimination” count.

Procedurally, the decision warns defendants against using post-Answer motions to trim suits. Under Rule 12(c), the movant faces a “heavy burden,” and close questions typically favor allowing the case to proceed to discovery.

Substantively, the facts the Court credited (removing a visibly pregnant worker at a client’s request, ignoring repeated lactation-related accommodation needs, forcing pumping in a car, and disciplining a worker for consequences of inadequate accommodations) are the kinds of scenarios likely to support claims not just under the PWFA, but also under Title VII.

The decision reinforces that the PWFA is a powerful, stand-alone statute with multiple actionable theories. Courts will not readily prune these claims at the pleading stage, and the EEOC is deploying them aggressively. Employers should treat pregnancy-related accommodation requests with the same rigor as disability accommodations – engage promptly, document communications, provide appropriate space and break time, and avoid client-driven decisions that move or remove pregnant workers.

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Adam D. Brown, and Elizabeth G. Underwood

Duane Morris Takeaways: On November 25, 2025, in Cross v. EEOC, No. 1:25-CV-3702, 2025 WL 3280764 (D.D.C. Nov. 25, 2025), Judge Trevor N. McFadden of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed an Amazon delivery driver’s lawsuit against the EEOC.  The lawsuit alleged that the EEOC illegally halted investigations of disparate impact claims following an executive order from President Trump.  The district court’s ruling is at least a short-term win for employers, demonstrating that a plaintiff who is not the subject of an EEOC action cannot easily resort to the federal courts to challenge the internal investigation and enforcement policies that caused the EEOC not to pursue theories of employer liability. The “win” is likely the first in a series of challenges to the EEOC’s stance on disparate impact litigation.

Case Background

The plaintiff in this case, Leah Cross, who worked as Amazon delivery driver for several months in 2022, was fired after she failed to satisfy Amazon’s delivery quota requirements.  In May 2023, Cross filed a sex-based charge of discrimination against Amazon with the Colorado Civil Rights Division, asserting violations of Title VII and Colorado state law.

Cross contended that Amazon’s delivery quotas and resulting bathroom limitations had a disparate impact on female Amazon employees.  Specifically, she alleged, Amazon enforced excessively high delivery quotas, which forced delivery drivers to forgo bathroom breaks.  According to Cross, this disparately impacted female delivery drivers because of their differing personal needs relative to male drivers.

In January 2024, the EEOC’s Denver office began investigating the charge.  But in April 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order 14281 titled “Restoring Equality of Opportunity and Meritocracy,” which instructed federal agencies to deprioritize enforcement of antidiscrimination laws based on disparate impact theories of liability.  That Executive Order also specifically directed the EEOC to examine all pending investigations of such claims and take appropriate action consistent with the new enforcement priorities.

In September 2025, the EEOC issued a memorandum requiring staff to close all investigations of disparate impact claims, which included Cross’s claims.  Thereafter, Cross filed a lawsuit against the EEOC, alleging that she “ha[d] been denied the benefit of a full investigation” by the Commission.  Cross v. EEOC, No. 1:25-CV-3702, 2025 WL 3280764, at *3 (D.D.C. Nov. 25, 2025).

Cross claimed the EEOC’s memorandum violated § 706(2) of the Administrative Procedure Act, arguing that: (1) the Commission acted contrary to Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act by “selectively exclud[ing] categories of discrimination from the charge-investigation process;” (2) the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously in abruptly changing its policy; (3) the Commission’s memorandum constituted a substantive rule that was “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations”; and (4) the Commission should have promulgated its memorandum through proper notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures.  Id.  Therefore, Cross sought a preliminary injunction requesting, among others, for her investigation to be reopened.

The Court’s Opinion

The Court held Cross failed to establish that she had standing to bring her claims and thus dismissed Cross’s claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, without addressing them on the merits.  To remedy Cross’s alleged injuries, the Court suggested that Cross could pursue a Title VII action directly against Amazon.

The Court determined that Cross did not show any judicially cognizable injury from the EEOC’s closure of her investigation.  Moreover, the Court opined that “even if that were the kind of injury capable of judicial resolution, Cross has not shown that a favorable ruling by this Court would redress that injury.”  Id. at *1.

The Court explained that “federal courts are ‘not the proper forum for resolving claims that the Executive branch’ should ‘bring more’ investigations and enforcement actions.”  Id. at *4 (quoting United States v. Texas, 599 U.S. 670, 680 (2023)). Under applicable case law recognizing this principle, the Court held, because Cross was not the subject of an EEOC enforcement action, she lacked standing to challenge the agency’s investigation and enforcement decisions. 

Implications For Companies

The Court’s ruling is a win for companies, confirming that federal courts currently are not willing to interfere with the EEOC’s internal investigation and enforcement policies regarding disparate impact claims.  Even more broadly, the Court’s order reinforces the substantial deference federal courts grant the EEOC in its internal decision-making processes, which could cut in different directions depending on the enforcement priorities and policies of a particular executive branch or EEOC leadership regime.

Crucially, however, employers are not in the clear.  Companies still should be proactive and continue to audit regularly their hiring and employment practices for potential disparate impact, which remains unlawful under both federal and state laws notwithstanding any vacillation in EEOC policy.  While the EEOC may choose to deprioritize pursuing disparate impact claims, a charging party who receives a Notice of Right to Sue letter still can file a private lawsuit in reliance on longstanding precedent regarding disparate impact.