Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. – Class Action Defense

May 15, 2026May 15, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Third Circuit Holds That Unauthorized Collection Of Credit Card Information Via Session Replay Code Confers Article III Standing, Creating Split Of Authority

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Justin Donoho, and Hayley Ryan

Duane Morris Takeaways: On May 11, 2026, in In Re BPS Direct, LLC; Cabela’s, LLC Wiretapping Litigation, No. 23-3235, 2026 WL 1280969 (3d Cir. May 11, 2026), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed a federal district court’s dismissal of a class action alleging that defendants’ use of session replay code, a form of website analytics technology, violated federal and state privacy laws. The Third Circuit held that two plaintiffs who made purchases on the defendants’ websites had standing to sue because the session replay code collected their credit card information without consent, an alleged injury the Third Circuit deemed analogous to the common law tort intrusion upon seclusion. Id. at *6-7.

This ruling is significant in that it shows that in class actions seeking millions (or billions) in dollars in statutory damages under federal and state data privacy laws for alleged use of session replay code, the Third Circuit has distinguished itself from California District Courts, which have held that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in credit card information collected by session replay code. Companies operating in the Third Circuit should take note as the legal risk of session replay code has meaningfully shifted in that jurisdiction.

Background

Many companies embed their websites with session replay code and other similar software such as Google Analytics and the Meta Pixel in order to perform website analytics and/or targeted advertising. All of these various technologies capture users’ browsing behaviors and cryptographically transmit this data to algorithms residing on the software providers’ servers. Upon entry into the algorithm, this data is typically anonymized, aggregated, and not alleged to have been viewed or accessible by any human. In addition, session replay code (unlike other website analytics and advertising technologies) is typically alleged to record and store “videos” of “all mouse movements, clicks, scrolls, zooms, window resizes, keystrokes, [and] text entries,” so that the session replay provider can provide that information back to the company “in a format that [the company] can use for its business purposes.” Id. at *1, 5. Plaintiffs across the country have filed multitudes of class actions challenging these various website analytics and advertising practices under federal and state privacy laws, targeting companies in virtually every industry, including healthcare, retail, education, and consumer products. Some cases have resulted in multimillion-dollar settlements, others have been dismissed, and the vast majority remain undecided. In these session replay and other data privacy class actions, the central question is often whether the specific data captured is sufficiently sensitive or personally identifying to establish a cognizable legal injury.

In In re BPS Direct, LLC, eight named plaintiffs sued the defendant retailers, alleging that session replay code embedded on their websites captured users’ interactions, including “mouse clicks and movements, keystrokes, search terms, substantive information inputted …, pages and content viewed …, scroll movement[s], and copy and paste actions.” Id. at *2. Plaintiffs asserted claims under the federal Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq., and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 et seq., along with several state and common law causes of action. Id.

The plaintiffs fell into two groups. Two plaintiffs made purchases on the defendants’ websites and entered his or her “name, address, and payment and billing information” into text fields. Id. The remaining six plaintiffs browsed the websites without making purchases and did not enter any personally identifying information while browsing the websites. Id.

Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of Article III standing under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The District Court granted the motion, dismissing the non-purchasing plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice, finding that, after two attempts, they could not establish concrete harm “because they did not make purchases on the Websites or engage in any activity prompting their browsers to send highly sensitive personal information such as medical diagnosis information or financial data from banks or credit cards.” 705 F. Supp. 3d 333, 367 (E.D. Pa. 2023). The claims of the two purchasing plaintiffs were dismissed without prejudice. Id. Rather than amend, those two plaintiffs filed a notice of intent to stand on their allegations, and all eight plaintiffs appealed. 2026 WL 1280969, at *2-3.

The Third Circuit’s Decision

The Third Circuit reversed the dismissal of the purchasing plaintiffs’ claims and modified the dismissal of the non-purchasing plaintiffs’ claims from with prejudice to without prejudice. Id. at *1.

The Third Circuit analyzed standing under two analogous common law torts: (1) public disclosure of private facts, and (2) intrusion upon seclusion. It held that none of the plaintiffs had standing under the first theory. As to the non-purchasing plaintiffs, their browsing data was neither sensitive nor personally identifiable. As to the purchasing plaintiffs, their information was not publicly disclosed. Id. at *4-5.

The Third Circuit held that only the two purchasing plaintiffs had standing under the intrusion upon seclusion theory. Id. at *3. Under that common law tort, “[o]ne who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.” Id. at *5 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B (1977)). The Third Circuit concluded that the two purchasing plaintiffs had entered “personal or sensitive” information – specifically their “complete credit card or debit card numbers” – when making purchases on the defendants’ websites. Id. at *7. The Third Circuit reasoned that “[j]ust as media consumption is sensitive and historically private, so is a person’s complete credit card or debit card number.” Id.

Accordingly, the Third Circuit held that these two plaintiffs had standing based on their allegations that defendants embedded session replay code in their websites, allowing third-party adtech providers to “surreptitiously record their billing and payment information absent consent.” Id.

Implications For Companies

This ruling puts the Third Circuit at odds with California District Courts, which have reached the opposite conclusion in two session replay cases. See Thomas v. Papa Johns Int’l, Inc., 2024 WL 2060140, at *5 (S.D. Cal. May 8, 2024) (plaintiff’s “name, address, credit card number(s), and billing information” collected via session replay is “not information over which society is prepared to recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy”); Saleh v. Nike, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 3d 503, 525 (C.D. Cal. 2021) (collection via session replay of a website user’s “payment card information, including card number, expiration date, and CCV code” without consent was insufficient to constitute an invasion of privacy).

In the Third Circuit, session replay is no longer just an analytics tool – it carries significant legal risk for website operators. Companies facing session replay class actions in the Third Circuit should shift their litigation strategy accordingly and consider moving beyond standing arguments, including demonstrating that plaintiffs cannot meet their burden of proof on the elements of the claims asserted.

Given the volume of session replay and similar litigation pending nationwide and the significant statutory damages at stake, this decision warrants close attention from any company whose website uses session replay code or similar technologies.

May 13, 2026May 13, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Wisconsin Federal Court Remands Privacy Class Action Lawsuit Based On Lack Of No Injury From Google Analytics Data Tracking

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Bernadette M. Coyle, and Andrew P. Quay

Duane Morris Takeaways: On May 1, 2026, in Brahm, et al. v. Hospital Sisters Health System, et al., No. 23-CV-444, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96866 (W.D. Wis. May 1, 2026), Judge William M. Conley of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin remanded a putative class action to state court after finding that Plaintiffs lacked Article III standing to pursue claims that healthcare defendants’ use of Google Analytics on patient portals resulted in unauthorized disclosure of protected health information (“PHI”) to Google. Id. at *2-3. The Court held that Plaintiffs’ lack of evidence of actual harm, together with their theory of future harm, was insufficient to confer standing. Id. at *3. The decision reinforces the growing trend among federal courts requiring proof that disclosed data was actually used to identify individuals, not merely that such identification was theoretically possible.

Case Background

The Defendant healthcare companies operate public websites and authenticated MyChart patient portals as “MyHSHS” and “MyPrevea,” which allow patients to log in with a username and password to access their medical records, schedule appointments, and pay bills. Id. at *4. Between at least 2016 and 2023, Defendants deployed Google Analytics tracking technology on their public websites, within patient portals on their websites, and on MyPrevea’s login page and app. Id. at *6. Whenever a user visits Defendants’ websites or portals, Google Analytics gathers information about the user’s interactions and shares certain transmissions with Google. Id. at *7.

Plaintiffs asserted that Google Analytics routinely disclosed patients’ identities and protected health care information to third-party websites like Google without the patients’ knowledge or consent. Id. at *1. Plaintiffs alleged that they began seeing Facebook advertisements related to their specific medical conditions after visiting Defendants’ portals or websites. Id. at *5. However, Plaintiffs also searched about their medical conditions or treatment online and have had their personal information involuntarily exposed to third parties by entities unrelated to the litigation. Id. None of the Plaintiffs had ever tried or intended to sell their PHI, nor did they claim to have suffered any out-of-pocket expenses as a result of Defendants’ allegedly wrongful disclosures. Id. at *10. Nonetheless, they sought actual damages based on the alleged “diminished sales value of their PHI,” as well as statutory and nominal damages. Id.

Plaintiffs alleged claims for violation of federal and state wiretapping statutes, as well as Wisconsin common and statutory laws for breach of duty of confidentiality, breach of implied contract to protect privacy, public disclosure of private facts, and unjust enrichment. Id. at *3. Plaintiffs moved to certify four subclasses, while Defendants moved for summary judgment as to all claims. Id.

The Court’s Opinion

The Court addressed the “threshold question” of Article III standing on its own initiative, noting that Defendants’ summary judgment motion called Plaintiffs’ standing into question and standing “is jurisdictional and cannot be waived” and must be “secured at each stage of the litigation.” Id. at *12. While the Court had previously allowed the original named Plaintiff to proceed past the motion to dismiss stage because it found her allegations of injury sufficient at the pleading stage, the Court explained that with a full record at the summary judgment stage, Plaintiffs failed to present sufficient evidence of a concrete injury-in-fact on multiple grounds. Id.

First, as to Plaintiffs’ tort claims for invasion of privacy and breach of fiduciary duty, the Court found no evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that their patient identity or PHI was actually disclosed to Google, disclosed by Google, or used by Google inappropriately. Id. at *17. Plaintiffs’ evidence did not establish that any of the disclosed anonymous information was actually used by Google or another third party to identify them. Id.

Despite Plaintiffs’ expert opining that Google’s systems had the “technical capability and documented practice” of linking information to specific individuals, the Court determined that the capabilities of Google’s systems were insufficient to demonstrate what it actually did. Id. at *19. Further, Plaintiffs failed to proffer evidence showing that Defendants caused Plaintiffs’ PHI to be shared, as opposed to other third parties or Plaintiffs themselves through their own voluntary internet disclosures. Id. at *20.

Relying on the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Dinerstein v. Google, LLC, 73 F.4th 502 (7th Cir. 2023), the Court emphasized that Plaintiffs “must still present sufficient evidence that Google Analytics actually worked as allegedly intended, which they have failed to do in this case,” and therefore, Plaintiffs failed to show a concrete injury to support standing under Article III. 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96866, at *23. The risk of Google or other third parties identifying Plaintiffs at a later date by leveraging the data obtained from Defendants was “not sufficiently imminent to obtain relief in federal court.” Id.

Second, as to the breach of implied contract claim, the Court found that Plaintiffs lacked standing because their asserted pecuniary harm based on the diminished sales value of their PHI or nominal damages, without any actual harm, was an injury in law and not an injury-in-fact as required by Article III. Id. at *24-25.

Third, Plaintiffs alternatively asserted unjust enrichment, arguing that Defendants retained without compensation Plaintiffs’ PHI and then disclosed this information to third parties for Defendants’ own gain. Id. at *26. However, the Court found that without any evidence of improper disclosure, Plaintiffs’ alleged pecuniary injury was “simply speculative and insufficient to confer standing.” Id. at *27.

Fourth, the wiretapping claims likewise failed. Although Plaintiffs sought statutory damages, the Court held that a statutory violation on its own does not confer standing without an underlying concrete, particularized injury. Id. at *28 (citing TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 427 (2021)).

Having found that Plaintiffs lacked standing as to all claims, the Court remanded the case to Wisconsin state court for further proceedings. Id.

Implications For Companies

Brahm reinforces that plaintiffs challenging tracking technology must present actual evidence identifying what allegedly private information was disclosed and cannot rely on abstract and speculative alleged injuries to confer Article III standing. Asserting an Article III standing defense remains an effective defense that companies should consider throughout litigation, balanced against the prospect of the case continuing in state court.

May 12, 2026May 12, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Announcing The First Edition Of The Insurance Class Action Review – 2026!

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. and Jennifer A. Riley

Duane Morris Takeaway: The rise of class action litigation has fundamentally transformed the modern legal landscape, and we are proud to announce the publication of the Insurance Class Action Review – 2026, a comprehensive new resource examining the evolving risks, trends, and defense strategies shaping class action litigation across the insurance sector.

The class action mechanism is unparalleled among procedural rules in terms of its impact on the American legal system. Its ability to exponentially expand the potential damages associated with a single claim has elevated class litigation into one of the most consequential forces confronting corporate defendants. In many instances, the mere threat of class certification can alter litigation strategy, settlement dynamics, and business operations on a massive scale.

For insurers, these risks have become increasingly complex and far-reaching. Class action litigation now touches nearly every aspect of the insurance business, from premium calculations and claims handling practices to cybersecurity breaches, artificial intelligence underwriting models, and climate-related coverage disputes. As insurers continue to collect and process enormous volumes of consumer data while operating under overlapping contractual, statutory, and regulatory frameworks, they face unprecedented exposure to collective litigation. The Insurance Class Action Review – 2026 was developed to help legal and business leaders navigate this rapidly changing environment. The book also examines how broader societal and economic forces are reshaping litigation risk. Digital transformation has dramatically increased the amount of sensitive consumer information maintained by insurers, while catastrophic weather events, inflationary pressures, and shifting healthcare and labor markets have intensified scrutiny of claims practices and pricing models.

Looking ahead, the future of insurance class action litigation will likely be shaped by forces extending well beyond traditional coverage disputes. Artificial intelligence, digital surveillance technologies, climate risk, ESG initiatives, and expanding state consumer protection regimes are already redefining the contours of collective litigation. As these developments continue, class actions will remain a central mechanism through which courts, consumers, regulators, and the insurance industry negotiate questions of fairness, transparency, and economic responsibility.

Because the stakes in class litigation are often existential, corporate defendants must approach these cases from a broad vantage point with thoughtful, proactive, and multi-faceted defense strategies. We developed the Insurance Class Action Review – 2026 eBook as a one-of-a-kind resource to help insurers, corporate counsel, risk professionals, and litigators better understand the rapidly evolving class action landscape and prepare for the challenges ahead. Get your copy today!

May 5, 2026May 5, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Introducing The Energy, Oil, And Gas Class Action Review – 2026: A Guide To Litigation In A Transforming Industry

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. and Jennifer A. Riley

Duane Morris Takeaway: The global energy landscape in 2025 stands at a moment of profound transformation. Oil and gas companies—long the backbone of industrial development and economic growth—now operate under intensifying scrutiny from regulators, investors, and an increasingly litigious public. As markets evolve and the long-term consequences of decades of extraction become more visible, class action litigation has emerged as one of the most powerful mechanisms for accountability and redress.

It is against this backdrop that Duane Morris has published the Energy, Oil, And Gas Class Action Review – 2026. It arrives as a timely and essential resource for understanding the rapidly shifting legal terrain. This new publication examines the complex and fast-developing world of energy class action litigation, offering a comprehensive look at how both plaintiffs and defendants are adapting their strategies. The industry now operates within a landscape shaped by scientific uncertainty, geopolitical volatility, and the accelerating transition to alternative energy sources.

The Energy, Oil, And Gas Class Action Review – 2026 captures these developments in a structured, accessible format and offers practitioners, in-house counsel, and industry stakeholders a clear understanding of where litigation risk is heading.

Download your copy today and stay ahead of the curve in in this industry.

Stay tuned to the Class Action Weekly Wire for more information on the Energy, Oil, And Gas Class Action Review – 2026 coming soon!

May 4, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Seventh Circuit Holds That Refusing To Register An Arbitration Agreement With The AAA Is Not A “Refusal To Arbitrate” Under The FAA

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, and Hayley Ryan

Duane Morris Takeaways: On May 1, 2026, in Bernal et al. v. Kohl’s Corporation et al., No. 24-2806, 2026 WL 1193991 (7th Cir. May 1, 2026), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed a federal district court’s denial of a petition to compel arbitration, holding that the defendant’s refusal to register its arbitration agreement with the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”), which caused the AAA to close the arbitration proceedings, did not constitute a “refusal to arbitrate” under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). The Seventh Circuit reasoned that because the parties had delegated that procedural question to the AAA, the district court had no authority to compel arbitration.

This decision is a significant win for businesses facing mass arbitration campaigns, particularly where arbitration agreements incorporate the AAA’s Consumer Arbitration Rules. The decision offers a concrete mechanism to avoid the steep filing fees such campaigns generate.

Background

Plaintiffs purchased products through Kohl’s website in 2020 and 2022 and agreed to arbitration provisions that required all disputes to be resolved through binding arbitration before the AAA under its rules, including the AAA’s Consumer Arbitration Rules. Id. at * 1. The arbitration agreement also delegated to the arbitrator exclusive authority “to resolve any dispute related to the interpretation, applicability, enforceability or formation of” the arbitration agreement. Id.

In December 2022, Plaintiffs’ counsel initiated the pre-arbitration process by serving Kohnl’s with approximately 10,000 notices of dispute, followed by an additional 44,656 notices in April 2023. These claims alleged that Kohl’s marketing practices violated California’s consumer protection laws. Id. at *2. This is a classic mass arbitration strategy in which plaintiffs’ firms file thousands of individual demands to exploit mandatory per-claim filing fees paid by corporate defendants.

On May 22, 2023, while settlement discussions were ongoing, Kohl’s modified its terms and conditions to designate the National Arbitration and Mediation tribunal (rather than the AAA) as the arbitration forum for all claims. That same day, Plaintiffs filed formal individual demands with the AAA and paid all applicable filing fees. Id. Under AAA Consumer Arbitration Rule R-12, however, a business must register its arbitration clause and pay administrative fees for the AAA to administer consumer arbitrations. Kohl’s declined to do so. As a result, the AAA exercised its discretion to decline administration, closed the cases, and refunded Plaintiffs’ filing fees. Id. at *3.

Plaintiffs then filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, which was later transferred to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin pursuant to the forum selection clause, petitioning the court to compel Kohl’s to register its arbitration agreement with the AAA, pay all necessary filing fees, and proceed to arbitration. Id.

The District Court’s Ruling

The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin denied the petition. Relying on Wallrich v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 106 F.4th 609 (7th Cir. 2024), the district court found that the parties had bargained for the AAA to apply and interpret its own Consumer Arbitration Rules. Id. at *3. When the AAA exercised that discretion by closing Plaintiffs’ cases upon Kohl’s non-registration, the court concluded it lacked authority to override that decision. Id.

Plaintiffs filed an interlocutory appeal, arguing that Kohl’s refusal to register its agreement constitutes a refusal to arbitration in violation of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). Id.

The Seventh Circuit’s Decision

The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Id. at *7. It held that the AAA’s exercise of discretion in closing Plaintiffs’ cases “flowed directly from the parties’ agreement granting AAA that power, leaving nothing for the district court to compel under the Federal Arbitration Act.” Id.

Under the FAA, a party seeking to compel arbitration must establish: (1) an enforceable written arbitration agreement; (2) a dispute falling within the scope of the agreement; and (3) a refusal to arbitrate. Id. at *4 (citing Wallrich, Inc., 106 F.4th at 617-18). The Seventh Circuit’s analysis centered on the third element, i.e. whether Kohl’s non-registration constituted a refusal to arbitrate. Id.

The Seventh Circuit characterized the AAA’s registration requirement as a “forum-specific procedural gateway” matter – the kind of matter parties implicitly delegate to the arbitration provider when they agree to arbitrate under its rules. Id. at *6 (citing Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 85–86 (2002)). Citing Howsam, 537 U.S. at 85, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that, absent contrary language in the arbitration agreement, parties who agree to AAA arbitration intend to withhold registration disputes from judicial review. Id. Because the AAA exercised its own discretion (consistent with the parties’ agreement) in closing the cases, there was “nothing for the district court to compel” under the FAA. Id. at *7.

The Seventh Circuit also relied on its prior decision in Wallrich, which held that a defendant’s failure to pay AAA fees, which resulted in termination of the arbitration, did not constitute a refusal to arbitrate where the outcome flowed from the parties’ agreed-upon procedures.

The Dissent

Judge Joshua P. Kolar dissented. In his view, Kohl’s non-registration “was a conscious step to depart from its agreement to arbitrate,” not a procedural question delegated to the AAA. Id. at *8. Judge Kolar warned that the majority’s reasoning stretches Wallrich’s holding too far and effectively converts “any bilateral agreement to arbitrate under AAA’s Consumer Rules into something of a unilateral option-to-arbitrate for business.” Id. at *9. Judge Kolar would have compelled Kohl’s to register so that the AAA could initiate proceedings. Id.

Implications for Companies

Bernal has immediate practical significance for companies facing mass arbitration exposure under AAA arbitration agreements. By simply declining to register its arbitration agreement with the AAA, a company can cause the AAA to close the proceedings without judicial recourse, at least in the Seventh Circuit. Businesses with AAA arbitration clauses in their consumer-facing agreements should assess whether this strategy is available and appropriate given their specific contractual language and forum.

That said, the dissent’s warning deserves attention. If other circuits adopt Judge Kolar’s reasoning, or if the AAA amends its rules in response, the window this decision opens may narrow. Companies should monitor developments carefully and consult counsel before relying on non-registration as a mass arbitration defense.

May 4, 2026May 4, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

The Disorganization Defense: North Carolina Federal Judge Finds That Litigation Practices Of Plaintiffs’ Counsel Are Sufficient Grounds To Deny Class And Collective Certification

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, Betty Luu, and Ryan T. Garippo

Duane Morris Takeaways: On April 22, 2026, in Ayers, v. GKN Driveline North America, Inc., No. 23-CV-00581, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89819 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 22, 2026), Chief Judge Catherine Eagles of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina denied several motions to certify various claims as class and collective actions under the Fair Labor Standards Act (the “FLSA”) and the North Carolina Wage And Hour Act (the “NCWHA”). This decision underscores the responsibility of plaintiffs’ counsel to manage a case and present the court with a viable plan to bring their clients’ claims through trial. Otherwise, plaintiffs’ counsel runs the risk that the court will not certify these claims at all.

Case Background

This decision emerges in the context of a series of seven-year-long lawsuits against GKN Driveline North America, Inc. (“GKN”), the supplier of all-wheel-drive and other automotive components, for several major automotive manufactures. Plaintiffs James Ayers, John Carson, and Tameka Ferges (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) brought three separate wage-and-hour lawsuits, asserting claims under the FLSA and the NCWHA. Plaintiffs alleged that GKN required them to perform work off the clock, including before and after shifts, and during unpaid meal breaks.

In 2018, Plaintiffs filed an earlier case against GKN. In that case, Plaintiffs alleged GKN had two policies that resulted in underpayment of their wages: (1) a “time rounding” policy; and (2) an “automatic deduction” policy for meal breaks. The Court originally conditionally certified an FLSA collective action and a Rule 23 class action under both of those theories. But the court ultimately decertified both the FLSA collective and the Rule 23 class, finding that “individual issues would swamp any attempt to resolve the claims on the class or collective basis.” Id. at *5

After that decision, Plaintiffs – represented by the same counsel – refiled three similar lawsuits, which split the claims based on GKN’s plant locations, but otherwise left the theories mostly intact. Plaintiffs then filed renewed motions for class and collective certification in each of the three actions and again asked the Court to allow them to proceed on a representative basis. The Court’s opinion, for all three cases, followed.

The Court’s Decision

In her 28-page opinion, Chief Judge Eagles of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina denied Plaintiffs’ motions based largely on manageability grounds.

Chief Judge Eagles explained that “manageability principles are explicit in the requirements for a proposed Rule 23(b)(3) class” and that “wider case management concerns remain relevant in the collective context.” Id. at 13. Thus, it is generally a plaintiff’s attorney’s responsibility to present the court with an “organized presentation of claims, organized discovery and motions practice, and organized submission of evidence.” Id. But here, Plaintiff’s counsel failed to present a manageable class or collective in at least four different ways.

First, and perhaps most fundamentally, Chief Judge Eagles found that “plaintiffs propose no efficient method of resolving class-wide liability and individual damages across three different subclasses.” Id. at *18. Although Plaintiffs’ theory was premised on the notion that GKN had a “de facto off-the-clock” policy, Plaintiffs did not explain how they planned to “efficiently prove that each and every nonexempt employee was subject to that de facto policy and, even more crucially, how each class member was injured by this policy.” Id. at *18-19. Chief Judge Eagles found this omission troubling given that “plaintiffs have had years to think about these problems” and could not present the court with a manageable solution. Id. at *19. But Chief Judge Eagles did not stop there.

Second, having dispensed with the omissions in Plaintiffs’ theory of case manageability, Chief Judge Eagles turned to Plaintiffs’ counsel who she reasoned has “not demonstrated the organization, diligence, and mindset required to prosecute a complex case.” Id. at *21. Chief Judge Eagles explained that because she often had to prompt Plaintiffs’ counsel to prosecute the case, via supplemental briefing and discovery, she had lost confidence in their ability to manage the docket. This problem was compounded by Plaintiffs’ counsel’s filing of “several ‘emergency’ motions and amended ‘emergency motions’” which underscored their inability to “handle ordinary litigation problems.” Id. at *21-22.

Third, Chief Judge Eagles characterized Plaintiffs’ counsel’s Rule 23 analysis as the product of an unreliable “narrator of the record.” Id. at *22-23. She described Plaintiffs’ counsel’s submissions as “inaccurate at best and misrepresentations at worst.” Id. at *23. Similarly, for the FLSA claims, Chief Judge Eagles held that the “factual representations about the evidence in the plaintiffs’ briefing on an FLSA collective do not always hold up to scrutiny.” Id. at *31-32. These inaccuracies did not give her confidence that Plaintiffs’ counsel would be able to present a manageable case through trial.

Fourth, as to the FLSA claims, Chief Judge Eagles concluded by finding that “the plaintiffs have not proposed any plan, much less a workable plan, for the aggregation of all these claims.” Id. at *31. For example, Chief Judge Eagles highlighted that plaintiffs “have not explained how they will manage presenting evidence on all the different work activities at issue and [across] three different plants.” Id. She noted that – although it is often possible for plaintiffs’ counsel to create such theories — “[i]f they are unable to make the required showing after over seven years of litigation, there is no reason to think they will be able to do so by the time these cases are called for trial.” Id. at *33.

In short, Chief Judge Eagles explained that she “has certified several dozen class actions over the past fifteen years and is familiar with how to deal with disagreements between parties about managing and trying common and individual issues.” Id. at *26. “The problem here is not that management might be hard” but rather “that the plaintiffs proffer no plan for management . . . [a]nd the Court has no confidence that counsel will devise a workable plan.” Id. Thus, the motions were denied in their entirety.

Implications For Employers

Ayers presents two key lessons for corporate counsel grappling with how to manage these complex cases.

The first lesson is that the value of class and collective claims often can hinge on the identity and competency of opposing counsel. Where plaintiffs’ counsel is savvy, competent, and organized, the value of otherwise weaker claims can go up. In these cases, competent plaintiffs’ counsel can often be the difference in whether a class is certified, which is often the difference between millions of dollars of potential of exposure and not. Thus, corporate counsel should weigh the competency of his or her adversaries when assessing the risk that a putative class or collective action poses.

The second lesson is that hiring experienced defense counsel and developing an aggressive litigation strategy are critical for success in such cases. In Ayers, Chief Judge Eagles observed defense counsel’s strategy and explained “it has been clear for years that GKN intended to hold the plaintiffs to their burden of proof at every stage on every issue, as is their right.” Id. at *22, n.13. As a result, any delay by GKN ultimately did not negate the deficiencies by Plaintiffs’ counsel. It takes experienced counsel to toe this line and keep the focus on a plaintiff’s conduct. Corporate counsel should consider such experience when deciding who is best to represent their organizations.

April 30, 2026April 30, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Georgia Federal Court Holds That To Establish Article III Standing To Sue In Data Breach Class Actions, The Named Plaintiffs’ Injury-In-Fact Requirement Demands Nuanced And Detailed Pleadings

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Rebecca S. Bjork, and Ryan Garippo

Duane Morris Takeaways: On April 23, 2026, in Hall v. Bitcoin Depot, Inc., Case No. 25-CV-04317 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 23, 2026), Judge William Ray of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia dismissed a putative class action alleging that users of Bitcoin Depot’s cryptocurrency ATMs were at significant risk of identity theft and attendant personal, social and financial harms due to a data breach. The District Court held that the Named Plaintiff did not properly plead a cognizable injury sufficient to confer Article III standing to sue, due to not pleading any specific misuse of his data. The decision clarifies the legal standards within the Eleventh Circuit regarding standing requirements in data breach class action cases, thus providing helpful and nuanced guidance for defendants facing similar lawsuits. This is especially true because the dismissal was granted without prejudice, affording the Named Plaintiff an opportunity to cure his defective pleading and potentially setting the stage for further litigation on this issue.

Case Background

Quincey Hall sued Bitcoin Depot, Inc. in federal court in the Northern District of Georgia on behalf of a putative class of consumers who used the company’s cryptocurrency ATMs. Id. at 2. After a data breach occurred affecting the ATMs, approximately 26,000 individuals’ personally identifiable information was exposed online. Id. After being notified by Bitcoin Depot that his information was amongst that involved in the breach, Hall filed his class action lawsuit as a “proposed representative of a class of individuals ‘impacted by [Bitcoin Depot’s] failure to safeguard, monitor, maintain and protect’ their personal information prior to the data breach.” Id.

Hall’s Complaint alleged that because of the data breach, he and the putative class members are “at [a] significant risk of identity theft and various other forms of personal, social and financial harm.” Id. at 3. He alleged that Bitcoin Depot is liable for common law tort and contract claims, as well as for violations of the Georgia Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act and he sought both monetary damages and injunctive relief. Id.

Bitcoin Depot filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) based both on a failure to state a claim and for lack of standing to sue under Article III of the Constitution. Id.

The Court’s Decision

Judge Ray granted Bitcoin Depot’s motion to dismiss the complaint and he did so without prejudice, allowing the Named Plaintiff an opportunity to correct his defective pleading. Id. at 10. The court’s analysis of the legal requirements for standing in data breach cases is clarifying because it demonstrates that nuance matters when considering whether the injury-in fact requirement for Article III standing is properly pled.

First, the court explained that to constitute a case or controversy within the meaning of Article III, the plaintiff must have standing to sue (id. at 3), and in the context of a class action lawsuit “only one named plaintiff must have standing as to any particular claim in order for it to advance.” Id. at 5 (citation omitted).

Second, the court explained that to demonstrate standing, a named plaintiff must show that “[he] has suffered ‘an injury in fact that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical[.]’” Id. Furthermore, when seeking damages specifically, the court explained that “the mere risk of future harm, standing alone, cannot qualify as a concrete harm.” Id. (quoting TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 436 (2021). And for injunctive relief, too, the named plaintiff must establish that there is a “substantial risk that, in the near future, they will suffer an injury.” Id.

Third, the court applied these standards to the allegations in the Named Plaintiff’s complaint and held that those allegations were insufficient to establish Article III standing. Hall had only pled a risk of identity theft and the resulting potential adverse impacts on him and putative class members. He had not pled any facts that his specific information had been leaked to known criminal dark websites that in similar circumstances have survived motions to dismiss in data breach cases. Id. at 9 (citing, inter alia, Green-Cooper v. Brinker, Int’l., Inc., 73 F. 4^th883, 889 (11^th Cir. 2023).) In short, the Named Plaintiff had failed to allege that there was any misuse of his stolen identity data, and that was fatal to his pleading under the established rules for Article III standing.

Implications For Data Breach Class Action Defendants

Data breach class actions are abundant, as corporate counsel working in this space know. As such, it is crucial for all to have an understanding of the possible defenses available at the pleading stage to reduce litigation risk and force potentially meritless claims to a second round of pleading and motion to dismiss practice. Understanding how district courts analyze nuances in plaintiffs’ pleadings relating to this important area of the law – Article III standing – is critical to launching a successful defense to any such claims.

April 28, 2026April 28, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Introducing the Transportation, Automotive, and Logistics Class Action Review – 2026!

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. and Jennifer A. Riley

Duane Morris Takeaway: In an era where the transportation industry underpins global commerce, from last-mile delivery networks to international logistics, legal risk has never been more complex or consequential. Class action litigation, in particular, has emerged as a powerful force shaping how transportation, automotive, and logistics companies operate, manage risk, and plan for the future. Against this backdrop, Duane Morris is proud to announce the first edition of the Transportation, Automotive, and Logistics Class Action Review.

This new publication is designed to provide a comprehensive, data-driven overview of class action litigation trends specific to the transportation sector. Building on the broader framework established by leading annual reviews of class action activity—which analyze hundreds of decisions and billions of dollars in settlements each year—the Review narrows the focus to one of the most dynamic and heavily litigated industries in the modern economy.

Class actions have long been recognized as high-stakes litigation, capable of reshaping business models and imposing significant financial exposure. By aggregating claims across large groups of plaintiffs, these cases can exponentially increase potential damages and create industry-wide ripple effects. Nowhere is this more evident than in transportation, where evolving workforce models, regulatory frameworks, and technological change continue to generate new legal challenges.

Recent litigation trends highlight the growing complexity of the space. For example, courts have wrestled with the scope of the “transportation worker exemption” under federal arbitration law, producing inconsistent rulings that affect employers ranging from trucking companies to warehouse operators. At the same time, issues involving wage-and-hour compliance, independent contractor classification, accessibility requirements, and data privacy are increasingly finding their way into class action complaints.

The Transportation, Automotive, and Logistics Class Action Review captures these developments in a structured, accessible format and offers practitioners, in-house counsel, and industry stakeholders a clear understanding of where litigation risk is heading.

Download your copy today and stay ahead of the curve in transportation, automotive, and logistics class action litigation.

Stay tuned to the Class Action Weekly Wire for more information on the Transportation, Automotive, and Logistics Class Action Review – 2026 coming soon!

April 21, 2026April 21, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Introducing The Healthcare Class Action Review – 2026: A Deep Dive Into Healthcare Litigation Trends

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. and Jennifer A. Riley

Duane Morris Takeaway: The healthcare industry continues to face a rapidly evolving class action landscape, and 2025 has proven to be a pivotal year. For that reason, we are pleased to announce the publication of our latest industry-focused eBook, the Healthcare Class Action Review – 2026. From data privacy disputes to billing transparency and pharmaceutical liability, class action litigation is reshaping how healthcare organizations operate and manage risk.

The Healthcare Class Action Review – 2026 is a comprehensive new eBook that examines the most significant developments in healthcare-related class actions over the past year. Healthcare organizations today operate at the intersection of regulation, innovation, and patient expectations. Class action litigation involving healthcare companies, including hospitals, healthcare providers, pharmaceutical companies, biotechnology firms, medical device and health technology companies, and diagnostic and testing companies has evolved from a peripheral phenomenon into a central feature of complex class action litigation. The Healthcare Class Action Review – 2026 offers a clear, structured analysis of these trends, helping legal professionals, compliance teams, and industry leaders stay informed and prepared.

As enforcement intensifies and plaintiffs’ strategies become more sophisticated, understanding class action risk is no longer optional—it’s essential. The Healthcare Class Action Review – 2026 equips readers with the knowledge needed to anticipate challenges and respond effectively in an increasingly complex legal environment.

Download your copy today and stay ahead of the curve in healthcare litigation.

Stay tuned to the Class Action Weekly Wire for more information on the Healthcare Class Action Review – 2026 coming soon!

April 17, 2026April 17, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Colorado Federal Court Compel Arbitration In Parking Lot Dispute, Finding Posted Signs Create Binding Contracts

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Tiffany Alberty, and Brett Bohan

Duane Morris Takeaways: On April 14, 2026, in Brant, et al v. Parking Revenue Recovery Services, Inc., Case No. 1:25-CV-01771 (D. Colo. Apr. 14, 2026), Judge Gordon P. Gallagher of the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado granted Defendant Parking Revenue Recovery Services, Inc.’s motion to compel arbitration. Plaintiffs, a group of parking lot customers who brought a putative class action, argued that they never agreed to arbitrate and that any arbitration clause was unconscionable. The Court rejected both arguments, finding that by parking in the lots, Plaintiffs assented to the terms posted on conspicuous signs — including a binding arbitration clause — and that the clause was not unconscionable. This ruling reinforces that businesses can form enforceable contracts, including arbitration agreements, through conspicuously posted signage, and that consumers who fail to read posted terms are nonetheless bound by them.

Case Background

Plaintiffs Brian Brant, Brooke Fitz, Robert Caldwell, and Mayenssi Montiel each parked at various parking garages managed by Defendant Parking Revenue Recovery Services, Inc. (“PRRS”) in Denver and Little Rock between 2023 and 2025. (ECF 36 at 1-2) At each of these lots, PRRS posted large red signs at the entrances, exits, and pay stations. (Id. at 2-14) The signs stated, in relevant part, “This is a Contract,” instructed customers to “Read these terms PRIOR to parking,” and included a capitalized, boldfaced “ARBITRATION” heading explaining that “[b]y parking on this Facility, you hereby agree that the sole remedy for all unresolved disputes is binding arbitration, and specifically waive the right to jury trial, class action and/or class arbitration”. (Id.)

Each of the Plaintiffs claimed they did not see the signs. (Id. at 7, 12, and 14.) Some faulted the location, lighting, and number of signs, while others argued there were no gates or speed bumps to slow drivers down enough to read the posted terms. (Id.)

The Court’s Order

The Court granted PRRS’s motion to compel arbitration, addressing both of Plaintiffs’ arguments against enforcement. (Id. at 16-21.)

First, as to whether a valid agreement to arbitrate existed, the Court noted that two other courts in Colorado had recently addressed the same issue with the same defendant. (Id. at 16.) Adopting the analysis of Chief Judge Daniel D. Domenico in Butler v. Asura Technologies USA, Inc., the Court held that a contract was formed when Plaintiffs manifested assent to the implied terms of the parking agreement by choosing to park in the lots. (Id. at 17.) The Court emphasized that the fundamental exchange — temporary use of a parking spot in exchange for a promise to pay — was sufficient to establish contract formation, and that the operator of a parking lot may modify or add to the basic terms by posting signs. (Id.) The Court analogized the posted signage to online “clickwrap” contracts, noting that users of such contracts are regularly bound by terms they never actually read. (Id. at 19.) Accordingly, whether Plaintiffs chose to read the signs was irrelevant because they agreed to the posted terms when they decided to park their cars on PRRS’s lots. (Id. at 18.)

The Court also rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that the arbitration clause was insufficiently specific because it lacked details regarding the scope, rules, or effect of any arbitration ruling. (Id. at 19.) Citing the Supreme Court of Colorado’s long-standing precedent in Guthrie v. Barda, 533 P.2d 487 (Colo. 1975), the Court held that a clause stating disputes “shall be submitted to binding arbitration” is sufficient and enforceable, even without additional procedural details. (Id.)

Second, the Court addressed Plaintiffs’ unconscionability defense. Applying the seven-factor test under Colorado law, the Court acknowledged that the first factor — a standardized agreement between parties with unequal bargaining power — may point toward unconscionability but noted that consumer contracts of adhesion are ubiquitous in modern commerce. (Id. at 20.) The remaining factors, however, weighed against a finding of unconscionability: Plaintiffs had the opportunity to review the terms before parking, the arbitration provision was written in large font against a contrasting red background and arbitration is a commercially reasonable method of dispute resolution. (Id.) The Court concluded bluntly that “if Plaintiffs did not wish to agree to the terms, they could have parked somewhere else.” (Id. at 21.)

The Court ordered the case stayed and administratively closed pending the conclusion of arbitration. (Id. at 22.)

Implications For Employers And Businesses

The Court’s decision in Brant v. Parking Revenue Recovery Services, Inc. affirms that conspicuously posted signage can create binding arbitration agreements with consumers, even in the absence of a signed written contract, a clickthrough mechanism, or any affirmative acknowledgment. For businesses that rely on physical signage to communicate contractual terms — including parking operators, event venues, and service providers — this decision provides a roadmap for drafting and displaying enforceable arbitration clauses. Specifically, businesses should ensure that their signs are prominently displayed, use clear language and contrasting formatting, and explicitly state that use of the premises constitutes acceptance of the posted terms, including arbitration. The decision also reinforces that a consumer’s failure to read posted terms does not relieve them of their contractual obligations, further underscoring the importance of adequate notice over actual knowledge.