Split Panel of Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court Prescribes Three-Year Statute Of Limitations For Wage & Hour Claims

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Shannon Noelle, and Olga A. Romadin

Duane Morris Takeaways:  On October 21, 2026, in Commonwealth Dep’t of Lab. & Indus. v. Accuserv Pharmacy, Inc., No. 1280 C.D. 2024, 2026 WL 3147305 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Oct. 21, 2026), a split Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court reversed a lower court ruling that a six-year limitations period governs wage claims under the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act (“PMWA”). The Commonwealth Court held that the three-year statute of limitations in the Wage Payment and Collection Law (“WPCL”) applies, reasoning that the two statutes must be read together and that the PMWA’s three-year record retention mandate reflects a deliberate legislative choice.

The ruling is a notable change for Pennsylvania wage & hour litigation, as it cuts the potential look-back period in half and limits claims that can be brought under the wage & hour statute.

Background

On April 3, 2023, the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry, Department of Labor and Industry, Bureau of Labor Law Compliance (“Department of Labor”), brought a lawsuit against Accuserv Pharmacy, Inc., North Huntingdon Medical, Inc. and Marvin Sheffler (“Defendants” or “Employers”), on behalf of 20 employees in the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County, alleging that the Employers had failed to pay overtime wages for work performed by the employees between 2017 and 2019 in violation of the PMWA. Id. at 2. In response, Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the claims were time-barred under the WPCL’s three-year limitations period. Id. at 2. The trial court sided with the Department of Labor and denied the judgment on the pleadings based on the argument that no statute of limitations existed, or, if one did, the statute of limitations was six years, concluding that the Pennsylvania legislature could easily have incorporated the WPCL’s limitations period into the PMWA but had not, finding a series of federal district court decisions applying the three-year period unpersuasive because those decisions lacked supporting analysis. Id. at 3. The trial court certified the question for interlocutory appeal, and the Commonwealth Court granted the appeal. Id. at 4. The Commonwealth Court then reversed the trial court’s decision.

The Commonwealth Court’s Decision

As a threshold matter, the Commonwealth Court rejected the Department of Labor’s argument that no limitations period applied. Id. at 8-10. Writing for the majority of a split court, Judge Mary Hannah Leavitt noted that the Department of Labor’s argument had relied on an Illinois appellate decision that held that an enforcement action by the state on behalf of the general public was not time-limited, but the Commonwealth Court determined that the PMWA did not authorize the Pennsylvania Secretary of Labor and Industry to sue on behalf of the general public. Id. Instead, under the statute the Secretary may sue only at an employee’s request and assignment, acting as trustee and exercising the employee’s individual rights. Id. at 9-10.

Turning to the merits, the Commonwealth Court held that Section 13 of the PMWA and the WPCL are in pari materia under Section 1932 of the Statutory Construction Act because they relate to the same class of persons (employers and employees) and the same act (recovery of unpaid wages). Id. at 19, 23. The Commonwealth Court found that both statutes create a civil action for unpaid wages, permit recovery of attorneys’ fees and costs, and authorize the Secretary to take an assignment of the claim in trust for the employee. Id. at 12. The Commonwealth Court found it significant that the PMWA contains a three-year record retention mandate but no limitations period, while the WPCL contains a three-year limitations period but no record retention mandate. Id. In the Court’s view, that alignment was “neither arbitrary nor coincidental but deliberate,” and the Department of Labor’s position on the matter had “zero effect” to the PMWA’s record retention requirement. Id. at 23.

The Commonwealth Court rejected the Department of Labor’s attempt to distinguish the statutes, including citing to the WPCL’s civil penalties and coverage of labor organizations, explaining that those provisions do not bear on an employee’s private action to recover wages. Id. at 19-21. It also rejected the argument that PMWA violations are harder to detect and therefore warrant a longer statute of limitations period, observing that any wage calculation can be nuanced and that federal courts have held the three-year period may be tolled where an employer fails to post the required PMWA notice. Id. at 22. The Commonwealth Court further pointed to Pennsylvania Superior Court precedent recognizing that wage claims may be pled under both statutes, and to the Colorado Supreme Court’s 2025 decision in By the Rockies, LLC v. Perez, 2025 CO 56, which applied that state’s wage claim limitations period to minimum wage claims and described a contrary result as “illogical.” Id. at 23-25, 32.

Finally, the Commonwealth Court held that the trial court had erred by applying the six-year catch-all without analyzing the nature of the claim, as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court required in Ash v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 593 Pa. 523 (2007). Id. at 24-26. The Commonwealth Court rejected the Department of Labor’s argument that a statute’s remedial nature alone warrants the six-year period. Id. at 28-30. The Commonwealth Court reasoned that the employees’ claim arose from an employment agreement and was more akin to a contract action, but that in any event the WPCL is the more specific and appropriate statute to read together with the PMWA. Id. at 30-32.

Implications For Employers

For Pennsylvania employers, the Accuserv decision is a decisive victory that precludes a six-year limitations period which would otherwise double the lookback period for claims under the PMWA, and, with it, the size of putative classes and potential damages exposure in class actions. The decision also aligns the limitations period with employers’ three-year record retention obligations, reducing the risk of defending stale claims after payroll records have been lawfully discarded. A shorter limitations period may be the critical component of a successful defense that limits the scope of any putative class actions.

California Court Of Appeal Severs Overbroad And One-Sided Terms Rather Than Voiding Employment Arbitration Agreement

By Eden E. Anderson, Rebecca Bjork, and Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Duane Morris Takeaways: On November 12, 2026, the California Court of Appeal certified for publication its October 19 decision in Salazar v. CN Motor Company LLC, Case No. B344433, wherein it reversed a trial court’s denial of an employer’s motion to compel arbitration. The Court of Appeal found that an adhesive arbitration agreement carried only a low degree of procedural unconscionability, thereby rejecting the trial court’s findings of oppression and surprise based on the employee’s limited English proficiency, the time pressure he claimed, and the agreement’s font and format. Although the Court of Appeal agreed that the agreement’s “of any nature” scope, its extension to the employer’s “Affiliates,” and its one-sided procedure for initiating arbitration were substantively unconscionable, it severed those terms, enforced the remainder of the agreement, and ordered individual arbitration. Id. at 26-27.

The Salazar decision is a must read for any employer drafting or seeking to enforce an arbitration agreement under California law and it is now published authority on which any employer seeking to enforce an arbitration agreement may rely.
 

Case Background

When he applied for employment with CN Motors, Luis Salazar signed an agreement that required arbitration of “all disputes of any nature” relating to his employment “or any other relationship/interaction with the Company and its Affiliates,” and defined “Affiliates” to include, among others, the company’s attorneys, independent contractors, joint venturers, and “parties affiliated with its employee benefit and health plans.” Id. at 3-4. It also mandated that Salazar initiate arbitration by personally delivering a letter to both the General Manager and the Controller, whereas the employer had the option to send such a letter to Salazar. The agreement contained a severability clause.

Salazar subsequently filed a wage and hour class action lawsuit against CN Motor. The trial court denied CN Motor’s motion to compel arbitration. It found moderate-to-high procedural unconscionability, crediting Salazar’s declaration that he felt pressured to sign with little time to review, that Spanish was his preferred language but the documents were in English, and that the agreement’s text was small and dense. It further found the agreement substantively unconscionable due to its overbroad scope, its lack of mutuality as to the parties covered, its supposedly infinite duration, and its one-sided procedure for initiating arbitration. Concluding that these defects went to the core of the agreement, the trial court declined to sever the offending terms. 

The Decision

The Court of Appeal reversed. On procedural unconscionability, the Court of Appeal held that substantial evidence did not support the trial court’s findings of oppression or surprise. The only time pressure Salazar described related to documents he signed after he signed the arbitration agreement, and oppression must exist at the time the agreement is executed. Similarly, Salazar offered no evidence that he told CN Motor he had difficulty with English or asked for a translation before he signed the agreement two weeks before starting work. Nor was there surprise, because capitalized warnings bookended the agreement, and the 11-point font was readable. The agreement thus reflected only the low degree of procedural unconscionability. 

On substantive unconscionability, the Court of Appeal disagreed that the agreement was of infinite duration, but agreed that its scope was overbroad and that it lacked mutuality. The phrases “of any nature” and “any other relationship/interaction with the Company and its Affiliates,” along with examples such as assault, battery, and tort claims, required Salazar to arbitrate claims unrelated to his employment and against parties with tenuous connections to CN Motor. Id. at pp. 21-22. The Court of Appeal also found that the “must”/“may” letter procedure for initiating arbitration was one-sided without justification. Id. at 22-24. It deemed the substantive unconscionability high.

Even so, the Court of Appeal held that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to sever. Because the offending provisions were entirely severable, removing them would cure the unconscionability without rewriting the contract. The Court of Appeal therefore struck all offending terms, including multiple phrases, a sentence, and a paragraph. It directed the trial court to compel arbitration of Salazar’s individual claims, and to address on remand his challenge to the agreement’s class action waiver, which the trial court had not reached.

Implications For Employers

The Salazar decision offers both good news and a warning for employers.

On the positive side, it confirms that courts should sever unconscionable terms when they can be cleanly excised rather than discard an entire arbitration agreement, and that an employee’s limited English proficiency does not establish oppression unless the employer knew of it when the agreement was signed. It also shows the value of conspicuous, capitalized warnings and a readable font.

At the same time, employers should review their arbitration agreements to ensure they are expressly limited to claims arising from the employment relationship, do not extend to a broad universe of affiliates, and impose mutual procedures for initiating arbitration. Here, those drafting choices led to a finding of high substantive unconscionability, and a less clean agreement may not have been salvageable through severance.

Pennsylvania Superior Court Shoes In Consent Framework For State Wiretap Claims

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer Riley, and Olga A. Romadin

Duane Morris Takeaways:  On October 23, 2026, in Thompson v. C. & J. Clark America, Inc., No. 74 WDA 2026, 2026 Pa. Super. LEXIS 557 (Pa. Super. Ct. Oct. 23, 2026), the Pennsylvania Superior Court vacated a lower court’s grant of summary judgment to footwear retailer C. & J. Clark America, Inc. (“Clarks”) in a putative class action alleging that a third-party analytics vendor “wiretapped” visitors’ interactions with the retailer’s website in violation of Pennsylvania’s Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act (“WESCA”) and constituted common law invasion of privacy. The Superior Court rejected the trial court’s holding that communicating over the internet amounts to consent to interception, and adopted the framework articulated in Popa v. Harriet Carter Gifts, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 3d 592 (W.D. Pa. 2025), in its entirety, holding that a reasonably conspicuous privacy policy disclosing third-party tracking can establish implied consent under WESCA’s all-party consent exception. The decision underscores an emerging line of state court rulings scrutinizing online privacy policies more closely, with wider implications for litigation to be brought against companies with an online presence.

Background

On February 14, 2023, Plaintiff, a consumer, brought a putative class action against Clarks in the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County alleging that the shoe retailer, through third-party vendor Content Square, wiretapped the electronic communications of visitors to its website, including their “mouse movements, clicks, keystrokes … URLs of web pages visited, and/or other electronic communications,” in violation of WESCA and common law invasion of privacy.  Id. at *1-2. Plaintiff claimed that after visiting the Clarks website on her phone and browsing for sandals, she received unwanted, targeted ads for sandals, including for those sold by Clarks. Id. at *6-7. Plaintiff’s complaint stated that she had not entered her name, email address, or payment information, did not create an account on the website, and did not use the chat function. Id. Further, Plaintiff claimed that she never reviewed the website’s terms of use nor the cookie policy. Id. at *7.

The Court of Common Pleas dismissed her common law invasion of privacy claim on preliminary objections but allowed her to proceed on her WESCA claim. Id. at *2. On December 5, 2025, it granted summary judgment to Clarks. Id. at *8. In a 3-5 decision relying on Commonwealth v. Proetto, 2001 PA Super 95, 771 A.2d 823 (Pa. Super. 2001), Commonwealth v. Cruttenden, 619 Pa. 123, 58 A.3d 95 (Pa. 2012), Commonwealth v. Diego, 2015 PA Super 143, 119 A.3d 370 (Pa. Super. 2015), and Commonwealth v. Byrd, 661 Pa. 85, 235 A.3d 311 (Pa. 2020), the Court of Common Pleas held that a website visitor need not have known that she was being tracked or by whom, and that her “‘very act’ of sending an electronic communication over the Internet amounted to her express consent to recording.” Id. at *15-16. The Court of Common Pleas determined that “when [plaintiff] surfed the Internet for summer sandals and clicked on the Clarks America website, she should have known that Clarks America or another acting on its behalf was tracking her activity.” Id. at *16.

Plaintiff appealed, and the Superior Court vacated the summary judgment and remanded the matter back to the Court of Common Pleas.

The Superior Court’s Decision

On October 23, 2026, the Superior Court issued its decision after considering (1) whether the Court of Common Pleas erred in finding that a website visitor gives their express consent to being wiretapped through the act of sending an electronic communication over the internet; (2) whether the Court of Common Pleas erred in finding that Clarks’ third-party vendor was its agent and thus permitted to circumvent WESCA’s all-party consent requirement; and (3) whether the Court of Common Pleas erred in holding that Plaintiff had failed to make a prima facie showing sufficient to allow a trier of fact to find that her communications with Clarks’ website were unlawfully intercepted by the third party vendor. In an opinion written by Judge Mary P. Murray and joined by Judges Mary Jane Bowes and Judith F. Olson, the Superior Court found that the Court of Common Pleas had erred on the issue of consent, and found the last question moot, and thus vacated and remanded the decision.

The Superior Court, finding a dearth of Pennsylvania case law applying WESCA to the circumstances at issue,  based its decision on what it referred to as a “highly instructive” 2025 ruling in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania entitled Popa v. Harriet Carter Gifts, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 3d 592 (W.D. Pa. 2025) (“Popa II”), which followed a reversal of summary judgment granted in Popa v. Harriet Carter Gifts, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 3d 535 (W.D. Pa. 2021) (“Popa I”), to a defendant in a putative class action alleging similar claims, reversed by the Third Circuit in Popa v. Harriet Carter Gifts, Inc., 52 F.4th 121 (3d Cir. 2022) (“Popa III”). Id. at *28.  In Popa II, the Third Circuit held that “there is no sweeping direct-party exception to civil liability under WESCA,” reasoning that the General Assembly’s 2012 amendment codifying a narrow intended-recipient carve-out for law enforcement limited Proetto and Cruttenden to their facts. Id. at *31. On remand, the District Court in Popa III had held that the plaintiff constructively consented to third-party tracking because the defendant retailer’s privacy statement adequately disclosed third-party data collection and was reasonably conspicuous in the website’s footer. Id. at *33-44.

The Superior Court found that the record raised a genuine issue of fact as to whether Content Square tracked Plaintiff’s communications, and that such tracking would constitute an interception under WESCA. Id. at *47. The Superior Court agreed with the Court of Common Pleas that under WESCA § 5704(4), consent turns on an objective, “reasonable user” standard: “whether a reasonable Internet user in [plaintiff’s] position knew or should have known that the contents of her communications with the Clarks website would be acquired by a third party,” and that actual knowledge is not required. Id. at *47-48. But the Superior Court held that the Court of Common Pleas erred with its application of the statute. Id. at *48.  It found that the lower court’s conclusion that a sender’s ignorance of the recipient’s identity is irrelevant was in error because of the reliance on Proetto and Cruttenden, which had involved two-party communications with police officers posing as the intended recipient, and a 2012 amendment to WESCA licensed only police officers to do so. Id. at *48-50. As the Superior Court observed, “misrepresenting one’s identity in order to receive communications appears to be a prerogative belonging to police officers.” Id. at *49.

The Superior Court found that the Court of Common Pleas had removed Proetto’s language on the “very act of sending a communication over the Internet” being consent from its context, which, in Proetto was a chat room message received in recorded form by its intended recipient. Id. at *51-53. The Superior Court explained that “Proetto and its progeny do not support the blanket ruling, which implies that any person sending any form of communication over the Internet inherently consents to the acquisition of that communication’s contents by anyone who happens to be listening/recording.” Id. at *52. The Superior Court found that the Court of Common Pleas erred by failing to apply the reasonable person standard to the particular form of communication at issue, here, a shopper’s interaction with a retail website, and by failing to consider whether a reasonable person would be aware that someone other than the intended recipient might acquire the communication. Id. at *52-53.

The Superior Court agreed with Clark’s reasoning, relying on Popa III, that “a reasonably prudent person has a lower expectation of privacy on the Internet, particularly with respect to the kind of non-sensitive data involved here.” Id. at *55. While acknowledging that WESCA is content-neutral and that a violation does not require sensitive information, the Superior Court held that the “innocuous nature” of the data is relevant to the reasonable person standard. Id. at *55.

The Superior Court then held that a website privacy policy may convey implied consent to an interception if it “disclose[s] the nature of the interception to a reasonable reader” and is “reasonably conspicuous” on the webpage. Id. at *57. It found Clarks’ privacy policy to have satisfied the first prong because it disclosed that Clarks and its “third party partners” used cookies, pixel tags, and web beacons to “track the actions of users,” and that third parties “may place cookies on your browsers for purposes of tracking consumer behavior.” Id. at *57-61. The Superior Court found the policy “rife with references to the involvement of third parties,” and concluded that “reasonable readers of the Privacy Policy would know that the content of their communications with the Clarks website would be intercepted by third parties.” Id. at *61-62. The Superior Court rejected the opinions of Plaintiff’s expert that the policy did not cover Content Square because it applied only to data collected by “www.clarksusa.com” because the Superior Court found that such a technical distinction “would not be appreciable by an average Internet user,” and it agreed with Popa III that WESCA does not require a privacy policy to “reveal granular details about the identity of the ‘third parties’ or the specific type of cookies used.” Id. at *62.

The Superior Court adopted Popa III’s rejection of Plaintiff’s argument that tracking begins before a user can reach the privacy policy. Id. at *63. It further refused to import the heightened, “unambiguous manifestation of assent” standard that the Superior Court had applied to online arbitration agreements in Duffy v. Tatum, 354 A.3d 14 (Pa. Super. 2026), explaining that Plaintiff waived no constitutional right and that the alleged infringement “is of such low stakes” that the Third Circuit had found it insufficient to confer Article III standing. Id. at *63-65. The Superior Court thus held that “a website’s browsewrap privacy policy, if reasonably conspicuous, may be sufficient to demonstrate that a reasonable user should know about the data-collection practices disclosed in the policy, thereby conferring implied consent under WESCA section 5704(4).” Id. at *66.

Ultimately, however, the Superior Court rejected Clark’s contention that a link to its privacy policy was conspicuously located at the center of the bottom of its website because it was not supported by evidence in the record. Id. at *68. Thus, viewing the record in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Superior Court could not conclude that Clarks had met its burden for consent. Id. The Superior Court therefore vacated without prejudice and remanded, authorizing the parties to supplement the record. Id. at *70.

Implications For Companies

With the decision in Thompson, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania has laid out the governing framework for WESCA class actions in Pennsylvania courts via Popa. Courts in the state are instructed to more closely scrutinize whether website users have been reasonably apprised of a site’s privacy policy, and whether such policies inform users of any tracking they are subject to. A simple click or scroll is, under this ruling, may no longer be argued as consent to be tracked. The key takeaway for companies operating websites utilizing tracking software or third party vendors include the importance of preparing a conspicuous and clear privacy policy that discloses use of such technology and/or vendors, and that a visible and accessible privacy policy may be the centerpiece of a defense of consent in wiretapping litigation.

EEOC Rescinds Its Long-Standing Criminal History Guidance In 2-1 Vote

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Karla V. Mardueño, and Christian J. Palacios

Duane Morris Takeaways:  On October 28, 2026, the Commissioners of the EEOC voted 2-1 to rescind its Enforcement Guidance on the Consideration of Arrest and Conviction Records in Employment Decisions Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (the “Guidance”), a document that has shaped how employers screen job applicants with criminal records for over a decade. The rescission, which the Commission announced on October 29, 2026, is effective immediately, and the Guidance has already been removed from the agency’s website.

The rescission is significant because it marks the latest step in the Commission’s retreat from disparate impact enforcement. Despite this rescission, Title VII’s disparate impact provisions remain on the books, and private plaintiffs remain free to bring such claims.

Background

On April 25, 2012, the Commission published the Guidance, which explained how an employer’s use of arrest and conviction records could violate Title VII under two theories. See U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, Enforcement Guidance on the Consideration of Arrest and Conviction Records in Employment Decisions Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (Apr. 25, 2012). Under a “disparate treatment theory,” an employer violates Title VII by treating applicants with comparable criminal records differently on the basis of race or national origin. Under a “disparate impact theory,” a facially neutral criminal history policy may still violate Title VII if it disproportionately excludes applicants of a particular race or national origin and is not “job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.” See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). The Guidance was premised, in large part, on concerns that broad criminal record exclusions could disproportionately screen out Black and Hispanic applicants, given disparities in arrest and incarceration rates.

To help employers satisfy the business necessity defense, the Guidance recommended that employers develop “targeted screens” that consider at least three factors: (1) the nature and gravity of the offense or conduct; (2) the time elapsed since the offense or completion of the sentence; and (3) the nature of the job held or sought. The Guidance also encouraged employers to provide applicants who are screened out with an “individualized assessment,” giving those individuals an opportunity to provide information (such as evidence of rehabilitation, references, or a successful post-conviction work history) that might change the hiring decision. The Guidance further distinguished between arrests and convictions, cautioning that an arrest, standing alone, does not establish that criminal conduct has occurred. Finally, the Guidance included numerous hypothetical scenarios illustrating lawful (and unlawful) uses of background checks, and it recommended that employers eliminate blanket policies that exclude applicants based on any criminal record.

The EEOC’s Rescission 

On October 28, 2026, the Commission voted to rescind the Guidance. The rescission passed along party lines, with Chair Andrea R. Lucas and Commissioner Brittany Bull Panuccio, both Republican appointees, voting in favor, and Commissioner Kalpana Kotagal, the Commission’s sole Democratic appointee, voting against. In its announcement, the Commission emphasized that the rescission does not restore the policy statements that the Guidance superseded, nor does it require employers to abandon any lawful practices they may have adopted in response to the Guidance. See EEOC Press Release, EEOC Votes to Rescind Enforcement Guidance on Arrest and Conviction Records (Oct. 29, 2026). Chair Lucas stated that the vote “reaffirms the agency’s commitment to enforce Title VII consistent with the Constitution and the limits Congress placed on the EEOC’s authority.” Id. She further cautioned that “[r]escinding this guidance does not give employers license to engage in unlawful discrimination – Title VII continues to prohibit discrimination based on race or national origin, including employment requirements that are proxies for intentional discrimination. The EEOC will continue to vigorously enforce these protections in accordance with the law.” Id.

Although the Commission’s announcement framed the rescission in terms of constitutional and statutory limits, without expressly naming disparate impact liability, the decision fits within the current administration’s retreat from disparate impact enforcement. In April 2025, President Trump issued an executive order titled “Restoring Equality of Opportunity and Meritocracy,” which directed federal agencies to deprioritize disparate impact enforcement and to pursue the elimination of disparate impact liability to the extent possible. See Exec. Order No. 14281, Vol. 90, Fed. Reg. 17537, Apr. 28, 2025. In June 2026, the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) issued an opinion concluding that the EEOC’s interpretation of Title VII’s disparate impact provisions was unconstitutional, and that opinion expressly addressed background checks. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice OLC, Constitutionality of Disparate-Impact Liability Under Title VII (June 9, 2026).

Implications for Employers

Although the rescission marks a significant shift in the EEOC’s enforcement posture, Title VII’s disparate impact framework remains the law because it is codified in the statute itself. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k). An employer facing a disparate impact challenge must still demonstrate that its criminal history screen is “job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.” Id. As a practical matter, the EEOC will likely continue to pursue disparate treatment claims involving criminal background checks, while declining to pursue disparate impact charges and instead issuing right-to-sue letters. Private plaintiffs, however, remain free to bring both disparate treatment and disparate impact claims, and the plaintiffs’ bar may well step in to fill the enforcement vacuum left by the Commission.

Further, the rescission has no effect on the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), which imposes its own procedural requirements on employers that obtain background checks from third-party consumer reporting agencies. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681b(b)(2)-(3), 1681m(a). Nor does it affect the growing landscape of state and local fair chance and “ban-the-box” laws, many of which impose obligations that mirror, or exceed, the recommendations in the Guidance. In short, while the rescission signals a different federal enforcement approach, the legal risks associated with criminal history screening remain alive, and employers should continue to monitor state and local laws to ensure compliance.

New York Federal Judge Denies Preliminary Approval Of FLSA Settlement Due To Proposed Publicity Provision And Attorneys’ Fees And Costs Requests

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Rebecca S. Bjork, and George J. Schaller

Duane Morris Takeaways: On October 28, 2026, in Cervantes, et al. v. Careathome Medical Practice, P.C., d/b/a Vesta Healthcare, et al., 26 Civ. 570, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 247415 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2026), Judge Arun Subramanian of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York denied preliminary approval of a Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) proposed settlement and requests for attorneys’ fees and costs related to an action brought pursuant to the California Labor Code and FLSA. 

For companies faced with FLSA litigation, they should be aware of the standards courts employ in approving FLSA settlements.  Notably, courts assess the value of the settlement compared with similar settlements approved in the circuit, courts rarely allow “publicity” provisions that deny plaintiffs from making truthful statements about the lawsuit, and courts require documentation when approving attorneys’ fees and costs requests.

Background And Proposed Settlement

Plaintiff Jocelyn Cervantes brought this putative collective action against Careathome Medical Practice, P.C., d/b/a Vesta Healthcare and Careathome Medical Practice (CA), P.C. (collectively “Defendants”) alleging that Defendants violated the FLSA and California Labor Code.  Cervantes asserts that she, and the putative collective, were not compensation for 15-20 minutes of “unpaid work before the start of each shift.”  Id. at 3, fn. 1.  Defendants provides at home health care services nationwide.

The parties agreed to a proposed settlement agreement regarding the FLSA claims.  Under the proposed settlement agreement, the key terms included a “release by opt-in plaintiffs of any claims” against Defendants in exchange for a pro rata payment from a total settlement fund of $100,700.  Of that $100,700 proposed total settlement, “7,500 will be paid to named plaintiff Jocelyn Cervantes as a service award, $14,299 will go toward costs the settlement administrator incurs . . . and $35,728.80 will be paid to Cervantes’ counsel for costs and attorneys’ fees, leaving a net settlement fund of $43,172.20.”  Id. at 1.

The proposed settlement agreement also contained “a ‘publicity’ provision whereby plaintiffs’ counsel and named plaintiff ‘agree that they shall not, directly or indirectly, whether verbally, in writing or otherwise, issue any press releases, make any statements to the media, advertise in any media, or make any other public statements regarding the existence of nature of this Agreement or its terms and conditions.’”  Id. at 5.  The parties moved for approval of the settlement agreement.

The Court’s Decision

The Court denied the parties motion for approval of the settlement agreement finding the “publicity” provision inappropriate and finding the attorneys’ fees and costs had no supporting documentation and was “unreasonably high.”  Id. at 5-6. 

First, the Court explained the proposed settlement amount compared to the possible range of recovery was “comparable to other settlements approved in this circuit.”  Id. at 4.  Plaintiff estimated that the maximum amount recoverable based on the claims alleged is “approximately $630,860” based on damages for 218 potential plaintiffs.  Id. at 3, fn. 1.  Defendants agreed to a settlement in the total gross amount of “$100,700, representing approximately 16% of the maximum possible recovery.”  Id. at 3. 

The Court found the proposed settlement amount was “fair and reasonable in light of the risks and expenses of continued litigation, both sides were represented by experienced counsel, and there [was] no evidence of fraud or collusion between the parties.”  Id. at 4.  The Court also noted that even if Cervantes prevailed at trial that “defendants’ serious financial problems suggest that a judgment could be difficult or impossible to collect in full.”  Id. at 5.

Second, the Court determined the “publicity” provision ran afoul of the “well-settled principle” that “an FLSA plaintiff ordinarily cannot—as a matter of public policy—be prohibited from making truthful public statements concerning his lawsuit, its settlement, or the underlying facts.”  Id.  It explained this case was not “the very rare case . . . where confidentiality terms in a settlement agreement would be appropriate” and therefore rejected the provision.  Id. at 6.

Finally, the Court rejected Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees and costs requests as unreasonable.  In rejecting Plaintiff’s costs request, the Court stated the motion “contains no explanation or documentation for the costs plaintiff’s counsel seeks to recoup” and that it could not “adjudicate or approve” reasonableness of costs where “counsel made no effort to explain or document.”  Id. at 6-7. 

As to Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees request, the Court initially reasoned “the proposed fee is unreasonably high” where Plaintiff’s fee request represented “a whopping 77.67% as a percentage of the fund less costs and service awards.”  Id. at 7.  The Court also determined Plaintiff’s counsel “failed to submit adequate documentation supporting the request for fees.”  Id.  Counsel submitted billing records “documenting 18.4 hours of work performed through May 19, 2026” and after that date only attested to “performing ‘substantial additional work,’” without providing supporting documentation on specific tasks performed.  Id. at 8.  The Court held that Plaintiff’s “conclusory, after-the-fact ‘estimate’ of total hours worked, untethered from any specific dates or tasks,” did not meet the documentation required and gave no factual basis to assess reasonableness.  Id.

The Court found that the proposed settlement agreement did not meet FLSA approval requirements and denied Plaintiffs’ request for attorneys’ fees and costs.  Id. at 9.  However, the Court explained the parties may either (i) “submit a revised settlement, request for conditional certification as an FLSA collective, and proposed attorneys’ fees for preliminary approval under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)”; or (ii) if they do not go “the conditional certification route, they may also pursue an offer of judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 68(a).”  Id.   

Implications For Companies

Cervantes illustrates standards that courts routinely follow in assessing FLSA settlement agreements and attorneys’ fees and costs requests.  Here, the Court could not assess reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs without proper documentation and the proposed “publicity” provision was deemed inappropriate.

Companies faced with FLSA actions, and negotiating settlement agreements, should be mindful of the reasonableness standard courts use when construing such settlement agreements.

New Jersey Federal Court Affirms “Modest Factual Showing” Required During Conditional Certification Of FLSA Collective Action

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Shannon Noelle, and Olga A. Romadin

Duane Morris Takeaways: On October 12, 2026, Judge Brian R. Martinotti of the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey denied an employer’s Rule 72 objection of Magistrate Judge Michael A. Hammer’s decision granting conditional certification in Dotson, et al. v. TZ Insurance Solutions LLC, Case No. 2:25-CV-13323 (D.N.J. Oct. 12, 2026).   Three named plaintiffs, former and current sales agent employees of the insurance company-defendant, brought a collective action alleging the Company violated the FLSA by failing to compensate them for time spend logging in and out of computer systems and excluded non-discretionary bonus and commission payments from the regular rate of pay.   The Company challenged the Magistrate Judge’s conditional certification decision on the basis that it did not adequately consider the Company’s declarations regarding its timekeeping process and certified an overbroad collective action not requested in the complaint that included non-remote and remote employees.  These arguments were rejected as was the Company’s request for interlocutory review of whether the two-step framework is applicable in the Third Circuit.  The Court opined that a two-step process applies requiring only a “modest factual showing” at the first, conditional certification stage during which Plaintiffs can rely on declarations establishing that “similarly situated plaintiffs do in fact exist” that were affected by a common employer policy.

Case Background

Plaintiffs Kimberly Dotson, Jennifer Connor, and Amenda McConnell brought a putative collective action individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, against TZ Insurance Solutions LLC (“TZ Insurance,” or “Defendant”), alleging violations under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and common law by failing to compensate them for all time worked.  Id. at 2.  Plaintiffs, current and former hourly insurance sales agents that all worked remotely, specifically alleged that TZ Insurance did not pay them for required pre-shift, meal-period, and post-shift bootup and boot-down work, and that it underpaid their overtime by leaving non-discretionary bonus and commission payments out of their regular rate of pay.  Id.

The Company moved to dismiss the claims, but the District Court denied the motion.  Id.  On February 11, 2026, Plaintiffs moved for conditional certification.  On July 29, 2026, Magistrate Judge Michael A. Hammer granted the motion.  On August 12, 2026, the Company challenged the ruling. It advanced three arguments challenging the Magistrate Judge’s decision, including:  (1) it failed to consider Defendants’ declarations explaining its timekeeping process for Sales Agents and detailing two studies it commissioned to estimate the time it takes Sales Agents to bootup and log-in or shut down and log out of computer systems; (2) it was overbroad in conditionally certifying a group of non-remote and remote Sales Agents that are not similarly situated; and (3) included a breach of contract claim that could not be certified under the FLSA because it was not pled as such in the complaint.  Id. at 4. The Company also requested, in the alternative, for certification of an interlocutory appeal on the question of whether the two-step framework for FLSA actions applies in the Third Circuit.  Id. Defendants’ three arguments were denied as was its request for interlocutory certification of whether the two-step framework applies.   

The Court’s Ruling

As to the Company’s first challenge, the Court, in rejecting the argument, found that the first stage of conditional certification requires only a “modest factual showing” to demonstrate a “factual nexus between the manner in which the employer’s alleged policy affected him or her and the manner in which it affected the proposed collective” and that “similarly situated plaintiffs do in fact exist.” Id. at 5.  This factual showing, to be clear, is a low threshold requiring just “something beyond mere speculation.” Id.  As such, the Court found that Defendants’ declarations regarding timekeeping processes went to the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims as the evidence “seeks to disprove Plaintiffs’ allegations of the timekeeping process Defendant required them to perform and the amount of time the processes took.” Id. at 6-7.  Moreover, on the modest factual showing front, the Court found that though Magistrate Judge Hammer’s “conclusion was based on Plaintiffs’ declarations, courts in this circuit have consistently found declarations sufficient to satisfy Plaintiff’s burden of demonstrating similarly situated plaintiffs exist.”  Id. This portion of the Court’s opinion underscores the leniency of the modest factual showing standard; whereas, Plaintiffs’ declarations were sufficient to meet their burden, Defendants’ declarations were insufficient to rebut their showing. 

In rejecting the Company’s second challenge, the Court found that “Plaintiffs’ declarations alleged the same policies applied to all Sales Agents” and that the Company’s declarations did not dispute this point, either.  Id. at 7. The Court also noted that Plaintiffs submitted job postings for the Sales Agent position, which listed uniform responsibilities for remote and location-specific Sales Agents.  Id. All of which the Court reasoned supported the Magistrate Judge’s finding that Sales Agents were subject to the same treatment, “amounting to the required modest factual showing.”  Id. The Court clarified, “Judge Hammer was not yet required to determine [if] the members of the collective were in fact similarly situated to the named plaintiffs.” Id.

As to the Company’s third challenge, the District Court found that Plaintiffs did allege that the Company’s failure to include commissions and non-discretionary bonus payments into the regular rate of pay violated the FLSA disagreeing with Defendant’s claim that such a claim was not asserted in the operative complaint.  Id. at 8. The Court also found that the claim that Magistrate Judge Hammer certified was separate and distinct from the breach of contract claim — i.e., Plaintiffs alleged that they were not paid commissions in breach of their sales agent agreements and also alleged that such commissions were not factored into the regular rate of pay resulting in an underpayment of overtime pay.  Id. at 9. The second allegation was certified as part of the FLSA collective action.  Id. The Court further noted that the Third Circuit has rejected the argument that the regular rate of pay under the FLSA always has to be “actual wages.”  Id. Therefore, Plaintiffs simply brought two concurrent claims as they are permitted to do under applicable case law.  Id.

Finally, as to the Company’s request, in the alternative, that the Court certify the question of whether a two-step framework applies for interlocutory review, the Court declined to do so. It opined that this a settled area in the of law in the Third Circuit. Id. at 12.

Implications for Companies

The District Court’s decision in Dotson reinforces the Third Circuit’s firm adherence to the “modest factual showing” standard and the leniency in applicable of this standard as a practical matter.  In opposing conditional certification, employers would be well-advised to submit detailed declarations and documents showing differences in policies applicable to the proposed collective (remote vs. non-remote and locale-specific) and should also draft job postings carefully to avoid what could be viewed as concessions in litigation.

Click To Arbitrate: Washington Federal Court Compels Wage-And-Hour Class Action To Individual Arbitration

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jamar D. Davis, and Caitlin Capriotti

Duane Morris Takeaways: On October 21, 2026, in Arturo Palacios, Jr. v. RDO Equipment Co., No. 1:26-CV-03120 (E.D. Wash. Oct. 21, 2026), Judge Rebecca L. Pennell of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Washington granted an employer’s motion to compel individual arbitration in a putative wage-and-hour class action. The Court held that the employee explicitly agreed to the arbitration provision contained in the employer’s handbook via an electronic dialog box acknowledgment, notwithstanding the employee’s declaration that he did not remember that he clicked the dialog box. The Court also rejected the employee’s arguments that the agreement was invalid because he was unsophisticated and that the agreement was unilateral.

The decision offers employers a useful roadmap for structuring and implementing electronic arbitration agreements contained in employee handbooks.

Case Background

Plaintiff Arturo Palacios, Jr. (“Plaintiff”) worked for RDO Equipment Co. (“RDO”) as a parts specialist from approximately February 2022 through September 2025. Arturo Palacios, Jr. v. RDO Equipment Co., No. 1:26-CV-03120 (E.D. Wash. Oct. 21, 2026), at *2. In early 2025, RDO electronically distributed an employee handbook containing a “Mediation and Arbitration” provision that required employment-related claims to be submitted to non-binding mediation and, if necessary, final and binding arbitration. Id. The provision also covered disputes concerning arbitrability and incorporated the American Arbitration Association’s Employment Dispute Resolution Rules. Id. at *3.

According to RDO’s electronic records, on February 4, 2025, Plaintiff electronically checked a dialog box to acknowledge that he reviewed and agreed to be bound by the terms of the arbitration and mediation procedures. Id. In 2026, Plaintiff filed a putative class action against RDO alleging wage and hour violations of Washington and federal law. Id. at *5. In response, RDO filed a motion to compel arbitration and stay proceedings, or in the alternative a motion to dismiss. Id. Plaintiff filed an opposition to RDO’s motion, along with a supporting declaration asserting that he did not recall checking the acknowledgement dialog box. Id. at *6. Plaintiff’s opposition broadly argued that no valid arbitration agreement existed and, alternatively, that if the agreement did exist it was unenforceable. Id.

The Court’s Decision

The Court granted RDO’s motion. Id. at *10. It explained that, under Washington law, an arbitration agreement contained in an employee handbook is enforceable only if the employee receives explicit notice of the provision. Id. (citing Burnett v. Pagliacci Pizza, Inc., 196 Wn.2d 38, 50 (2020)). The Ninth Circuit similarly requires that the choice to arbitrate be explicitly presented to and accepted by the employee. Id. (citing Nelson v. Cyprus Bagdad Copper Corp., 119 F.3d 756, 762 (9th Cir. 1997)).

Applying these principles, the Court concluded that Plaintiff explicitly agreed to arbitration. Id. Unlike cases where an arbitration provision was inconspicuously buried in lengthy text or fine print, RDO’s electronic platform called out the arbitration clause in a prominent dialog box and required Plaintiff to affirm his acceptance as part of his agreement to the handbook. Id. at *7. The Court further reasoned that Plaintiff’s inability to remember signing the agreement did not establish that he had not done so, particularly because he neither disputed the accuracy of RDO’s electronic records nor denied clicking on the dialog box. Id. (citing Patrick v. Running Warehouse, LLC, 93 F.4th 468, 477 (9th Cir. 2024)).

The Court also rejected Plaintiff’s argument that the arbitration agreement was illusory because RDO retained the unilateral ability to modify its Handbook. Id. at *8. While the Handbook permitted RDO to revise various policies, it expressly distinguished the mediation and arbitration provision by stating that it created a separate binding contractual obligation between RDO and its employees. Id. The Court therefore held that the arbitration agreement was valid and not illusory. Id.

Finally, the Court held that the parties clearly and unmistakably delegated questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator. Id. The mediation and arbitration provision of the handbook expressly covered “any dispute concerning the ability to arbitrate” and incorporated the AAA Employment Dispute Resolution Rules. Id. at *9. The Court explained that incorporation of the AAA rules constitutes clear and unmistakable evidence of an agreement to arbitrate arbitrability under Ninth Circuit precedent. Id. (citing Brennan v. Opus Bank, 796 F.3d 1125, 1130 (9th Cir. 2015)). Although Plaintiff argued that he was too unsophisticated to understand these provisions, the Court found no evidence regarding his sophistication or lack thereof and declined to presume that he was unsophisticated merely from his job description or pay rate. Id. The Court therefore granted RDO’s motion, delegated issues regarding the scope of arbitration to the arbitrator, denied the motion to dismiss as moot, and stayed the action pending completion of arbitration. Id.

Implications For Employers

The Palacios ruling provides several practical lessons for employers seeking to enforce arbitration agreements distributed through electronic employee handbooks. Most significantly, the decision demonstrates the value of making an arbitration provision conspicuous and requiring employees to take an affirmative step to acknowledge it. Reliable electronic records documenting an employee’s acceptance may also become important evidence of assent when the employee later claims not to remember agreeing to arbitration.

The decision also highlights the importance of distinguishing binding arbitration provisions from other, non-contractual handbook policies. RDO expressly identified its mediation and arbitration provision as creating contractual obligations, a distinction that proved important in defeating Plaintiff’s argument that the agreement was illusory. Employers likewise should pay close attention to delegation language. Here, the agreement both expressly covered disputes concerning arbitrability and incorporated the AAA rules, which supported the Court’s determination that threshold questions regarding arbitrability belonged to the arbitrator.

EEOC Lawsuit Challenging Women-Only Corporate Retreat Survives Dismissal

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Bernadette M. Coyle, and Andrew P. Quay

Duane Morris Takeaways: In EEOC v. Coca-Cola Beverages Northeast, Inc., No. 1:26-CV-115, 2026 WL 3093454 (D.N.H. Oct. 16, 2026), the Court denied the Defendant’s motion to dismiss an EEOC lawsuit alleging that a regional Coca-Cola bottler violated Title VII by excluding male employees from a company-sponsored, women-only networking event.  Applying the U.S. Supreme Court’s “some harm” standard from Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, the Court held that missed networking opportunities, the potential loss of paid time off, and the denial of perks such as a company-paid hotel stay, food, and beverages were enough to plausibly allege an adverse employment action.  The Court also rejected the employer’s argument that the event was a lawful effort to expand its pool of candidates for promotion, at least at the pleading stage.  The case comes as the Commission has made enforcing Title VII against diversity programs it deems discriminatory, including toward majority groups, a stated priority.

Case Background

The EEOC brought the lawsuit on behalf of a male production employee at Coca-Cola Beverages Northeast, Inc.’s (“Coca-Cola”) facility in Londonderry, New Hampshire.  Id. at *1.  Coca-Cola sponsored a two-day, women-only networking event, called the “Women’s Forum,” at the Mohegan Sun and Casino in Connecticut.  Id.  Coca-Cola characterized the event as a means of growing the number of qualified candidates for advancement.  Id.  The event included a social reception, team-building exercises, recreational activities, and speeches from executives about their career paths.  Id.

Only women received invitations.  According to the EEOC, the women who attended were excused from their normal work duties and paid their usual salary or wages without using paid time off, and Coca-Cola provided their hotel rooms, food, and beverages.  Id.  The EEOC alleged that male employees were not provided with any of the benefits associated with attending the event and would have attended if they had been invited.  Id.  In the EEOC’s view, shutting men out of the event meant they were treated less favorably than women in their compensation and the terms, conditions, and privileges of their employment, in violation of Title VII.  Id.

Coca-Cola moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), advancing three arguments: that the men suffered no legally cognizable injury from missing a single event; that the event was a permissible initiative to broaden the field of candidates ready for promotion; and that nothing in the complaint justified a punitive damages award.  Id. at *1-2.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court denied the motion to dismiss.

In 2024, the Supreme Court shifted the standard for Title VII discrimination claims and held that a plaintiff need only show “some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment,” and that the harm need not be “significant.”  Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346, 354-55 (2024).  The First Circuit has since read Muldrow to reach any employment event, however minor, that leaves the worker “worse off” in the terms or conditions of their employment.  Coca-Cola Beverages Northeast, Inc., 2026 WL 3093454, at *3 (citing Walsh v. HNTB Corp., 169 F.4th 330, 339 (1st Cir. 2026)).

The EEOC pointed to three categories of injury – (i) the male employees lost out on the event’s executive talks and networking; (ii) they did not receive the paid days away from work that the female employees enjoyed; and (iii) they went without the free lodging and meals that came with the trip.  Id. at *3.  Reading the complaint in the EEOC’s favor, the Court concluded that these allegations, taken together, were enough at the pleading stage to suggest that male employees may have been left worse off, even though the Court described the paid-time-off injury as only a potential one.  Id. at *4.  It also found it significant that the event was an official company function, which made it easier to link the unequal treatment to the men’s employment, particularly given the expansive way the Supreme Court has construed Title VII’s language.  Id.

Coca-Cola also argued that event was a lawful effort to encourage female employees to pursue advancement, and that attending it had no bearing on who was actually promoted.  Id.  The Court rejected this argument, explaining that the EEOC did not attack Coca-Cola’s promotion decisions.  Id. at *5.  Instead, the agency’s theory is that the particular method Coca-Cola chose, a women-only event with paid time off and perks, took away opportunities and benefits from current male employees.  Id.  

As to punitive damages, the Court noted that the complaint did not appear to allege facts supporting an award of punitive damages.  Id.  However, the Court found dismissal of the EEOC’s request for punitive damages to be improper at the motion to dismiss stage because punitive damages are a form of relief rather than a claim and are not appropriately challenged by a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).  Id.

Implications For Employers

Employer-sponsored DEI programs are now squarely within the EEOC’s sights, and EEOC Chair Andrea Lucas has identified enforcing Title VII against diversity programs deemed discriminatory as a Commission priority. 

The decision also shows how Muldrow’s lower “some harm” threshold can make it easier for these challenges to survive the pleading stage.  Under that standard, networking access, paid time away from work, and event perks may be enough to plead an actionable injury when they are provided on the basis of sex.  A legitimate goal, such as expanding the pool of candidates for promotion, may not by itself be a defense if the means chosen ultimately deny current employees benefits because of a protected characteristic.  Employers still have arguments to press: the Court made clear that a plaintiff must show some disadvantageous consequence, and Coca-Cola may renew its arguments at summary judgment.

Employers should audit the eligibility criteria for their networking events, mentoring programs, conferences, and retreats.  They should make sure that these events are available without regard to sex or other protected characteristics.  Otherwise, an EEOC action may be on the horizon.

Fifth Circuit Reverses Dismissal Of Adtech Class Action On Narrow Grounds, Finding Sufficient Factual Allegations Of Disclosure Of PHI

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Justin Donoho, Hayley Ryan, and Tyler Zmick

Duane Morris Takeaways:  On October 23, 2026, in Rand, et al. v. Eyemart Express, LLC, 2026 WL 3180055 (5th Cir. Oct. 23, 2026), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed an order by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas in which the district court had dismissed a class action brought by website users alleging that a prescription eyewear seller’s use of website advertising technology (“adtech”) violated the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”) and other laws. 

This ruling is significant in that it shows that in the hundreds of adtech class actions across the nation seeking millions (or billions) in dollars in statutory damages under the ECPA and other laws, courts ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions and drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to plaintiffs may find plausible allegations that a website operator in fact transmitted private information to an adtech company, such that website owners seeking to challenge adtech class actions under Rule 12(b)(6) may find more success
in foregoing such factual challenges to well-pled allegations and instead pressing more legal arguments such as that alleged adtech transmissions do not plausibly allege an “interception” or a “criminal or tortious purpose” under the ECPA. 

Background

This case is one of a legion of class actions that plaintiffs have filed nationwide alleging that Meta Pixel, Google Analytics, and other similar software embedded in defendants’ websites secretly captured plaintiffs’ web-browsing data and sent it to Meta, Google, and other online advertising agencies and/or data analytics companies.  In these adtech class actions, the key issue is often a claim brought under the ECPA on the theory that hundreds of thousands of website visitors times $10,000 per claimant in statutory damages equals a huge amount of damages.  Plaintiffs have filed the bulk of these types of lawsuits to date against healthcare providers, but they have filed suits against companies that span nearly every industry including education, retailers, and consumer products.  Several of these cases have resulted in multimillion-dollar settlements, several have been dismissed, and the vast majority remain undecided.

To state a claim for violation of the ECPA, also known as the federal wiretap act, a plaintiff must show an intentional interception of the contents of an electronic communication.  The ECPA is a one-party consent statute, meaning that there is no liability under the statute for any party to the communication “unless such communication is intercepted for the purposes of committing a criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or any State.”  18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d)); 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d).

In Rand, plaintiffs, Meta users who had already shared their names, photos, and other personal information through their Facebook accounts, brought suit against a seller of prescription eyewear.  According to the plaintiffs, the eyewear seller installed the Meta Pixel on its website, thereby transmitting to Meta, allegedly without the plaintiffs’ consent, the following data about their visits to the website: (1) search terms and web browsing activities, as to those plaintiffs who used the site to search and browse for prescription glasses (the “Search Plaintiffs”); (2) prescription information, as to plaintiffs who made purchases on the site (the “Prescription Plaintiffs”); and (3) as to both sets of plaintiffs, an anonymized identifier sufficient for Meta to link these search terms, web-browsing activities, and prescription information to the plaintiffs’ Facebook profiles and send them targeted advertisements.  Id. at *2.

The plaintiffs also alleged that these allegedly transmitted data types met the definition of individually identifiable health information (“IIHI”) protected under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”).

Further, the plaintiffs alleged that these alleged data transmissions of IIHI without consent violated the ECPA, the Missouri Wiretap Act, and Illinois Eavesdropping act, and constituted an intrusion upon seclusion and breach of contract.

The district court dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), finding that the Search Plaintiffs failed to state a claim for relief because they did not allege that they shared any IIHI with the eyewear seller.  As to the Prescription Plaintiffs, the district court acknowledged that they allegedly shared IIHI with the eyewear seller by entering their prescription information but found that they had failed to plausibly allege that any IIHI was disclosed to Meta.  Without sufficient allegations that any plaintiff’s IIHI was shared with Meta, the district court concluded that each of the plaintiffs’ claims necessarily failed.  Id. at *1-2.

On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the district court’s dismissal order should be reversed and their class action complaint reinstated because they adequately alleged both that they shared their IIHI with the defendant and that the Pixel on defendant’s website conveyed that IIHI to Meta without their knowledge or consent.

The Fifth Circuit’s Decision

The Fifth Circuit agreed with the plaintiffs and reversed, finding, first, that the district court erred in finding lack of any plausible allegations that the Search Plaintiffs did not share any IIHI with the defendant.  As the Fifth Circuit explained, the defendant conceded that the information received through the Pixel was individually identifiable because through Facebook, the information was linked to specific users.  Id. at *5.   Moreover, the Fifth Circuit found that the Search Plaintiffs adequately alleged that they shared information relating to their health conditions or the provision of healthcare by using website.  Specifically, the Fifth Circuit found that while the Search Plaintiffs did not allege the transmission of diagnoses or symptoms, “IIHI is not so narrow” and also includes information collected from an individual that “relates to” an individual’s health or condition, to the provision of healthcare to an individual, or the individual’s payment for healthcare.  Thus, taking the plaintiffs’ allegations as true, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court erred in finding that the Search Plaintiffs had not shared any IIHI with the defendant.  Id. at *5-7.

Second, the Fifth Circuit found that the district court also erred in finding that the plaintiffs failed to plead that their IIHI was shared with Meta.  The district court had considered a figure from the complaint representing an example of transmitted data (created by the plaintiffs’ attorney, not representing plaintiffs’ activity), reasoning that it did not sufficiently specify transmission of the either plaintiffs’ data or any prescription information.  Accordingly, the district court found that the complaint did not sufficiently allege that any IIHI was shared with Meta.  Id. at *7.  The Fifth Circuit disagreed. It opined that IIHI is not so narrow that it applies only to specific prescription information and includes, also, interactions on the website relating to plaintiffs’ health.  Moreover, the Fifth Circuit found that the figure in the complaint was provided only by way of example and did not contradict other factual allegations that the Fifth Circuit found alleged the transmission of data to Meta relating to the “Prescription Plaintiffs’ actual purchases.”  Id.

For these reasons, the Fifth Circuit reversed the dismissal order and remanded for further proceedings.

Implications For Companies

Rand is a cautionary tale for defendant website operators seeking to dismiss adtech class actions under Rule 12(b)(6) on the basis that plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege that the defendant transmitted the plaintiffs’ private data to an adtech company. 

While whether any given plaintiff’s private data was in fact transmitted to an adtech company by a website operator remains an individualized issue dependent on browser type, social media account login status, and cookie blocking features, which courts have found sufficiently individualized to prevent named plaintiffs from establishing the defendant’s liability to alleged class members under Rule 23 (as we blogged about here and here), courts must, however, take any allegations of adtech transmissions as true for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6).

For these reasons, adtech class action defendants bringing Rule 12(b)(6) motions often argue for and sometimes achieve dismissal of ECPA claims, instead, on the basis of no plausibly alleged interception, when an internet-based communication is allegedly forwarded to an adtech company as opposed to being intercepted mid-flight, and no plausibly alleged criminal or tortious purpose where the plaintiffs fail to allege that the defendant had the purpose to violate any statute but allege a purpose rather to engage in advertising or data analytics.  (See, e.g., our prior blog entry discussing one of these successful dismissals, here.)  Notably, the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Rand did not address these arguments.  Website owners facing adtech ECPA class actions would do well to press such arguments where appropriate.

Corporate counsel seeking to deter ECPA litigation should also keep in mind the following best practices (discussed in more detail in our prior blog post, here): (1) add or update arbitration clauses to deter class actions and mitigate the risks of mass arbitration; (2) update website terms of use, data privacy policies, and vendor agreements; and (3) audit and adjust uses of website advertising technologies.

Illinois Federal Court Denies Class Certification In Employer Wiretapping And Eavesdropping Case Due To Lack Of Common Evidence Of Call Recording

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Justin R. Donoho, and Hayley Ryan

Duane Morris Takeaways:  On October 15, 2026, in Alholm, et al. v. The Vrdolyak Law Group, LLC, No. 22-CV-1820, 2026 WL 3082834 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 15, 2026), Judge Georgia N. Alexakis of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied class certification in a case brought by former employees against a law firm alleging that the company secretly recorded their telephone conversations in violation of the federal wiretap act, Tennessee’s wiretap act, and Illinois’ eavesdropping act.  The ruling is significant as it shows that while plaintiffs’ circumstantial evidence of one plaintiff’s call recordings and of the employer’s history of surveillance may suffice to withstand summary judgment on plaintiffs’ individual claims for illegal wiretapping and eavesdropping, Rule 23 requires more evidence than that in order for plaintiffs to show that the central issue of whether alleged class members’ calls were recorded is a common question that can be resolved in one stroke with common evidence.  Further, the ruling shows that absent such common evidence on the central issue of whether a company recorded any or all of the calls made over its system, proposed classes of people who had conversations over the system cannot satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement.

Background

In Alholm, former employees of a law firm brought suit against their former employer alleging that the firm secretly recorded their telephone conversations while each was employed there.  They brought class claims for illegal wiretapping under 18 U.S.C. § 2511 and section 39-13-601 of the Tennessee Code, and for illegal eavesdropping under section 5/14-1 of chapter 720 of the Illinois Compiled Statutes.

The company answered the complaint, the parties engaged in discovery, and the court denied summary judgment to the company and ordered the setting of a trial date.  In so holding, the court found a genuine factual dispute as to whether the employer actually intercepted and eavesdropped upon the plaintiffs’ calls and did so intentionally, based on conflicting circumstantial evidence submitted by both parties as to whether the company recorded the plaintiffs’ calls.  Alholm, et al. v. Vrdolyak L. Grp., LLC, 2026 WL 1194954 (N.D. Ill. May 1, 2026).

On the one hand, Plaintiffs submitted evidence consisting of call recordings of one of the former employees purportedly discovered on the system by one of the former employees, evidence that the phone system has a call recording feature that only would have been activated at the request of the employer, and evidence from which the court found that “a reasonable jury could conclude that [the company] had a history of intentionally monitoring its employees and that its call recording was the result of defendant’s conscious objective rather than the product of a mistake or an accident.”  Id. at *13.

But the court found other evidence pointing the other way, including testimony from the phone system provider that the system could record a call on an individual phone line if the user of the line dialed a specific key code during the call.  In addition, the phone system provider testified that the call recording could have been turned on only for the one named plaintiff who had found the recordings of the allegedly intercepted calls.  Further, the phone system provider testified that the employer never asked it to activate the system’s call-recording function, that the function had never been activated, and that the system lacked the storage capacity and processing power to record employer’s high volume of calls.  Members of the employer’s senior leadership also testified that they never authorized the recording of calls.  Id.

Before trial, the plaintiffs moved for class certification, seeking to certify classes consisting of all employees, clients, and potential clients of the employer who had a telephone conversation between November 1, 2019, and January 28, 2020, with a person using the employer’s telephone system.

The Court’s Decision

The Court found that the central question of the case of whether calls made over the company’s phone system were recorded was an individualized issue that predominated over any common issues and, accordingly, denied class certification for lack of predominance, without deciding any other Rule 23 requirement.

As the Court explained, for all three wiretapping and eavesdropping claims, the question “that towers over all others” is whether calls made over the company’s phone system were recorded.  Alholm, 2026 WL 3082834, at *3. 

So, first, the Court considered whether that question can be answered, yes or no, using common evidence. 

The Court found that the plaintiffs lacked common evidence of call recordings.  First, it found that evidence of the company’s pervasive surveillance through the use of video cameras and encouragement of employees to monitor subordinates might be admissible for showing intent but not for establishing actual recording of calls made over the phone system.

Second, the court ruled that the recordings of only one plaintiff’s calls did not constitute common evidence of class-wide recordings because plaintiffs lacked any “glue” holding these calls “together with the calls of the other class members—some fact showing that if [one plaintiff]’s calls were recorded then those of other class members were as well.”  Id. at *5.  For example, the court noted conflicting testimony from the phone system’s administrators as to whether the system could only record calls on a system-wide basis.  Moreover, additional testimony showed that recordings could be made on the phone system not just by the company and its system administrators but also individually by end users.  Id. at *6-9.

For these reasons, the Court determined that the plaintiffs lacked common evidence of call recording by the company. 

Further, the Court opined that because this question of whether the company recorded any or all of the calls made over its system is the central issue in the case and, owing to a lack of common evidence, is not a common once, “the proposed class cannot satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement, and the class cannot be certified.”  Id. at *9. 

Finally, the Court held that because the plaintiffs’ failure to satisfy predominance was enough to preclude class certification, the Court declined to assess whether the proposed class satisfied the other requirements of Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(3).  Id. at * 10.

Implications For Companies

Alholm provides powerful precedent for any company opposing certification of wiretapping and eavesdropping class actions involving alleged call recordings where plaintiffs lack common evidence to show a class-wide practice of making call recordings. 

This precedent is also key for limiting any large statutory penalties under wiretapping and eavesdropping statutes ($10,000 under the federal wiretap act, for example) to only such penalties sought individually by any named plaintiffs who have filed a complaint and amassed enough evidence to go to trial on whether the company recorded their own individual phone calls. 

In sum, as Aholm demonstrates, a former employee’s circumstantial evidence that the employer recorded his or her calls, even if sufficient to go to trial on the former employee’s individual claims, alone, may not suffice for that former employee to represent and go to trial on behalf of other former employees, who may need to prove their own call recordings individually.

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The opinions expressed on this blog are those of the author and are not to be construed as legal advice.

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