Fifth Circuit Reverses Dismissal Of Adtech Class Action On Narrow Grounds, Finding Sufficient Factual Allegations Of Disclosure Of PHI

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Justin Donoho, Hayley Ryan, and Tyler Zmick

Duane Morris Takeaways:  On October 23, 2026, in Rand, et al. v. Eyemart Express, LLC, 2026 WL 3180055 (5th Cir. Oct. 23, 2026), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed an order by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas in which the district court had dismissed a class action brought by website users alleging that a prescription eyewear seller’s use of website advertising technology (“adtech”) violated the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”) and other laws. 

This ruling is significant in that it shows that in the hundreds of adtech class actions across the nation seeking millions (or billions) in dollars in statutory damages under the ECPA and other laws, courts ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions and drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to plaintiffs may find plausible allegations that a website operator in fact transmitted private information to an adtech company, such that website owners seeking to challenge adtech class actions under Rule 12(b)(6) may find more success
in foregoing such factual challenges to well-pled allegations and instead pressing more legal arguments such as that alleged adtech transmissions do not plausibly allege an “interception” or a “criminal or tortious purpose” under the ECPA. 

Background

This case is one of a legion of class actions that plaintiffs have filed nationwide alleging that Meta Pixel, Google Analytics, and other similar software embedded in defendants’ websites secretly captured plaintiffs’ web-browsing data and sent it to Meta, Google, and other online advertising agencies and/or data analytics companies.  In these adtech class actions, the key issue is often a claim brought under the ECPA on the theory that hundreds of thousands of website visitors times $10,000 per claimant in statutory damages equals a huge amount of damages.  Plaintiffs have filed the bulk of these types of lawsuits to date against healthcare providers, but they have filed suits against companies that span nearly every industry including education, retailers, and consumer products.  Several of these cases have resulted in multimillion-dollar settlements, several have been dismissed, and the vast majority remain undecided.

To state a claim for violation of the ECPA, also known as the federal wiretap act, a plaintiff must show an intentional interception of the contents of an electronic communication.  The ECPA is a one-party consent statute, meaning that there is no liability under the statute for any party to the communication “unless such communication is intercepted for the purposes of committing a criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or any State.”  18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d)); 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d).

In Rand, plaintiffs, Meta users who had already shared their names, photos, and other personal information through their Facebook accounts, brought suit against a seller of prescription eyewear.  According to the plaintiffs, the eyewear seller installed the Meta Pixel on its website, thereby transmitting to Meta, allegedly without the plaintiffs’ consent, the following data about their visits to the website: (1) search terms and web browsing activities, as to those plaintiffs who used the site to search and browse for prescription glasses (the “Search Plaintiffs”); (2) prescription information, as to plaintiffs who made purchases on the site (the “Prescription Plaintiffs”); and (3) as to both sets of plaintiffs, an anonymized identifier sufficient for Meta to link these search terms, web-browsing activities, and prescription information to the plaintiffs’ Facebook profiles and send them targeted advertisements.  Id. at *2.

The plaintiffs also alleged that these allegedly transmitted data types met the definition of individually identifiable health information (“IIHI”) protected under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”).

Further, the plaintiffs alleged that these alleged data transmissions of IIHI without consent violated the ECPA, the Missouri Wiretap Act, and Illinois Eavesdropping act, and constituted an intrusion upon seclusion and breach of contract.

The district court dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), finding that the Search Plaintiffs failed to state a claim for relief because they did not allege that they shared any IIHI with the eyewear seller.  As to the Prescription Plaintiffs, the district court acknowledged that they allegedly shared IIHI with the eyewear seller by entering their prescription information but found that they had failed to plausibly allege that any IIHI was disclosed to Meta.  Without sufficient allegations that any plaintiff’s IIHI was shared with Meta, the district court concluded that each of the plaintiffs’ claims necessarily failed.  Id. at *1-2.

On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the district court’s dismissal order should be reversed and their class action complaint reinstated because they adequately alleged both that they shared their IIHI with the defendant and that the Pixel on defendant’s website conveyed that IIHI to Meta without their knowledge or consent.

The Fifth Circuit’s Decision

The Fifth Circuit agreed with the plaintiffs and reversed, finding, first, that the district court erred in finding lack of any plausible allegations that the Search Plaintiffs did not share any IIHI with the defendant.  As the Fifth Circuit explained, the defendant conceded that the information received through the Pixel was individually identifiable because through Facebook, the information was linked to specific users.  Id. at *5.   Moreover, the Fifth Circuit found that the Search Plaintiffs adequately alleged that they shared information relating to their health conditions or the provision of healthcare by using website.  Specifically, the Fifth Circuit found that while the Search Plaintiffs did not allege the transmission of diagnoses or symptoms, “IIHI is not so narrow” and also includes information collected from an individual that “relates to” an individual’s health or condition, to the provision of healthcare to an individual, or the individual’s payment for healthcare.  Thus, taking the plaintiffs’ allegations as true, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court erred in finding that the Search Plaintiffs had not shared any IIHI with the defendant.  Id. at *5-7.

Second, the Fifth Circuit found that the district court also erred in finding that the plaintiffs failed to plead that their IIHI was shared with Meta.  The district court had considered a figure from the complaint representing an example of transmitted data (created by the plaintiffs’ attorney, not representing plaintiffs’ activity), reasoning that it did not sufficiently specify transmission of the either plaintiffs’ data or any prescription information.  Accordingly, the district court found that the complaint did not sufficiently allege that any IIHI was shared with Meta.  Id. at *7.  The Fifth Circuit disagreed. It opined that IIHI is not so narrow that it applies only to specific prescription information and includes, also, interactions on the website relating to plaintiffs’ health.  Moreover, the Fifth Circuit found that the figure in the complaint was provided only by way of example and did not contradict other factual allegations that the Fifth Circuit found alleged the transmission of data to Meta relating to the “Prescription Plaintiffs’ actual purchases.”  Id.

For these reasons, the Fifth Circuit reversed the dismissal order and remanded for further proceedings.

Implications For Companies

Rand is a cautionary tale for defendant website operators seeking to dismiss adtech class actions under Rule 12(b)(6) on the basis that plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege that the defendant transmitted the plaintiffs’ private data to an adtech company. 

While whether any given plaintiff’s private data was in fact transmitted to an adtech company by a website operator remains an individualized issue dependent on browser type, social media account login status, and cookie blocking features, which courts have found sufficiently individualized to prevent named plaintiffs from establishing the defendant’s liability to alleged class members under Rule 23 (as we blogged about here and here), courts must, however, take any allegations of adtech transmissions as true for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6).

For these reasons, adtech class action defendants bringing Rule 12(b)(6) motions often argue for and sometimes achieve dismissal of ECPA claims, instead, on the basis of no plausibly alleged interception, when an internet-based communication is allegedly forwarded to an adtech company as opposed to being intercepted mid-flight, and no plausibly alleged criminal or tortious purpose where the plaintiffs fail to allege that the defendant had the purpose to violate any statute but allege a purpose rather to engage in advertising or data analytics.  (See, e.g., our prior blog entry discussing one of these successful dismissals, here.)  Notably, the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Rand did not address these arguments.  Website owners facing adtech ECPA class actions would do well to press such arguments where appropriate.

Corporate counsel seeking to deter ECPA litigation should also keep in mind the following best practices (discussed in more detail in our prior blog post, here): (1) add or update arbitration clauses to deter class actions and mitigate the risks of mass arbitration; (2) update website terms of use, data privacy policies, and vendor agreements; and (3) audit and adjust uses of website advertising technologies.

Illinois Federal Court Denies Class Certification In Employer Wiretapping And Eavesdropping Case Due To Lack Of Common Evidence Of Call Recording

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Justin R. Donoho, and Hayley Ryan

Duane Morris Takeaways:  On October 15, 2026, in Alholm, et al. v. The Vrdolyak Law Group, LLC, No. 22-CV-1820, 2026 WL 3082834 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 15, 2026), Judge Georgia N. Alexakis of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied class certification in a case brought by former employees against a law firm alleging that the company secretly recorded their telephone conversations in violation of the federal wiretap act, Tennessee’s wiretap act, and Illinois’ eavesdropping act.  The ruling is significant as it shows that while plaintiffs’ circumstantial evidence of one plaintiff’s call recordings and of the employer’s history of surveillance may suffice to withstand summary judgment on plaintiffs’ individual claims for illegal wiretapping and eavesdropping, Rule 23 requires more evidence than that in order for plaintiffs to show that the central issue of whether alleged class members’ calls were recorded is a common question that can be resolved in one stroke with common evidence.  Further, the ruling shows that absent such common evidence on the central issue of whether a company recorded any or all of the calls made over its system, proposed classes of people who had conversations over the system cannot satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement.

Background

In Alholm, former employees of a law firm brought suit against their former employer alleging that the firm secretly recorded their telephone conversations while each was employed there.  They brought class claims for illegal wiretapping under 18 U.S.C. § 2511 and section 39-13-601 of the Tennessee Code, and for illegal eavesdropping under section 5/14-1 of chapter 720 of the Illinois Compiled Statutes.

The company answered the complaint, the parties engaged in discovery, and the court denied summary judgment to the company and ordered the setting of a trial date.  In so holding, the court found a genuine factual dispute as to whether the employer actually intercepted and eavesdropped upon the plaintiffs’ calls and did so intentionally, based on conflicting circumstantial evidence submitted by both parties as to whether the company recorded the plaintiffs’ calls.  Alholm, et al. v. Vrdolyak L. Grp., LLC, 2026 WL 1194954 (N.D. Ill. May 1, 2026).

On the one hand, Plaintiffs submitted evidence consisting of call recordings of one of the former employees purportedly discovered on the system by one of the former employees, evidence that the phone system has a call recording feature that only would have been activated at the request of the employer, and evidence from which the court found that “a reasonable jury could conclude that [the company] had a history of intentionally monitoring its employees and that its call recording was the result of defendant’s conscious objective rather than the product of a mistake or an accident.”  Id. at *13.

But the court found other evidence pointing the other way, including testimony from the phone system provider that the system could record a call on an individual phone line if the user of the line dialed a specific key code during the call.  In addition, the phone system provider testified that the call recording could have been turned on only for the one named plaintiff who had found the recordings of the allegedly intercepted calls.  Further, the phone system provider testified that the employer never asked it to activate the system’s call-recording function, that the function had never been activated, and that the system lacked the storage capacity and processing power to record employer’s high volume of calls.  Members of the employer’s senior leadership also testified that they never authorized the recording of calls.  Id.

Before trial, the plaintiffs moved for class certification, seeking to certify classes consisting of all employees, clients, and potential clients of the employer who had a telephone conversation between November 1, 2019, and January 28, 2020, with a person using the employer’s telephone system.

The Court’s Decision

The Court found that the central question of the case of whether calls made over the company’s phone system were recorded was an individualized issue that predominated over any common issues and, accordingly, denied class certification for lack of predominance, without deciding any other Rule 23 requirement.

As the Court explained, for all three wiretapping and eavesdropping claims, the question “that towers over all others” is whether calls made over the company’s phone system were recorded.  Alholm, 2026 WL 3082834, at *3. 

So, first, the Court considered whether that question can be answered, yes or no, using common evidence. 

The Court found that the plaintiffs lacked common evidence of call recordings.  First, it found that evidence of the company’s pervasive surveillance through the use of video cameras and encouragement of employees to monitor subordinates might be admissible for showing intent but not for establishing actual recording of calls made over the phone system.

Second, the court ruled that the recordings of only one plaintiff’s calls did not constitute common evidence of class-wide recordings because plaintiffs lacked any “glue” holding these calls “together with the calls of the other class members—some fact showing that if [one plaintiff]’s calls were recorded then those of other class members were as well.”  Id. at *5.  For example, the court noted conflicting testimony from the phone system’s administrators as to whether the system could only record calls on a system-wide basis.  Moreover, additional testimony showed that recordings could be made on the phone system not just by the company and its system administrators but also individually by end users.  Id. at *6-9.

For these reasons, the Court determined that the plaintiffs lacked common evidence of call recording by the company. 

Further, the Court opined that because this question of whether the company recorded any or all of the calls made over its system is the central issue in the case and, owing to a lack of common evidence, is not a common once, “the proposed class cannot satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement, and the class cannot be certified.”  Id. at *9. 

Finally, the Court held that because the plaintiffs’ failure to satisfy predominance was enough to preclude class certification, the Court declined to assess whether the proposed class satisfied the other requirements of Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(3).  Id. at * 10.

Implications For Companies

Alholm provides powerful precedent for any company opposing certification of wiretapping and eavesdropping class actions involving alleged call recordings where plaintiffs lack common evidence to show a class-wide practice of making call recordings. 

This precedent is also key for limiting any large statutory penalties under wiretapping and eavesdropping statutes ($10,000 under the federal wiretap act, for example) to only such penalties sought individually by any named plaintiffs who have filed a complaint and amassed enough evidence to go to trial on whether the company recorded their own individual phone calls. 

In sum, as Aholm demonstrates, a former employee’s circumstantial evidence that the employer recorded his or her calls, even if sufficient to go to trial on the former employee’s individual claims, alone, may not suffice for that former employee to represent and go to trial on behalf of other former employees, who may need to prove their own call recordings individually.

Ohio Supreme Court Holds Trial Courts May Address Every Class Certification Requirement Even After Finding One Unmet

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Kathryn Brown, and Brett Bohan

Duane Morris Takeaways: On October 22, 2026, in Hilton v. City of Lorain, Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-4114 (Ohio Oct. 22, 2026), the Supreme Court of Ohio unanimously reversed an intermediate appellate decision that had faulted a trial court for denying class certification in a “confusing and seemingly contradictory” opinion. Id. ¶ 7. The trial court had found two of the seven certification prerequisites under Ohio Civil Rule 23 lacking but went on to find the other five were satisfied. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that addressing every requirement, rather than stopping after finding one requirement is not met, is consistent with the “rigorous analysis” that class certification demands. Id. ¶ 1.

For defendants facing class claims under Ohio law, the decision clarifies that a well-reasoned denial of certification will not be undone on appeal because the trial court addressed every requirement for class certification.

Case Background

Appellees brought a putative class action against the City of Lorain and related entities in Ohio state court. Id. ¶ 2. They claimed that the city had charged unlawful rates and fees for water and wastewater services. Id. Appellees moved to certify a class of “[a]ll ratepayers who were charged water and sanitary sewer rates, fees and charges by the City of Lorain since May 7, 2012.” Id.

Under Ohio Civil Rule 23, a class may be certified only if seven prerequisites are met: (1) an identifiable class with an unambiguous definition; (2) named representatives who belong to the class; (3) numerosity; (4) common questions of law or fact; (5) typicality; (6) adequate representation; and (7) satisfaction of one of the Rule 23(B) categories. Id. ¶ 3. Appellees relied on Rule 23(B)(3), which requires common questions to predominate and a class action to be the superior method of resolving the disputes. Id. ¶ 5.

The Lorain County Court of Common Pleas denied certification on two grounds. Id. ¶ 4. First, the court concluded that the proposed class was neither identifiable nor clearly defined. Id. Specifically, it was unclear whether the class covered everyone who had been charged fees or only those who paid them, and appellees had offered no means of identifying class members “going back from over a decade earlier.” Id. (emphasis in original). Second, the court found predominance and superiority lacking, since the court would have to determine, member by member, whether each person paid an unlawful charge and in what amount. Id. ¶¶ 5-6. The trial court nonetheless addressed the remaining five requirements for class certification and found that they had all been satisfied. Id. ¶ 7.

The Ninth District Court of Appeals reversed. Id. The court reasoned that the trial court could not logically find the class undefined while simultaneously finding that appellees belonged to it, that it was numerous, and that common, typical claims existed among members. Id. The court held that these “seemingly contradictory findings” amounted to an abuse of discretion and remanded to the trial court. Id. The city appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio. Id. ¶ 8.

The Ohio Supreme Court’s Opinion

The Supreme Court of Ohio unanimously reversed the appellate court’s ruling. Id. ¶ 19. The court reaffirmed that a trial court must conduct a “rigorous analysis” of a class certification motion, that a plaintiff’s failure on any single requirement defeats certification, and that a trial court’s certification ruling stands unless the court abused its discretion. Id. ¶¶ 10-11. The court also stressed that appellate courts should be especially cautious before overturning a trial court decision that denied class certification. Id. ¶ 11.

The city argued that the trial court’s decision was not contradictory and that the court had simply assumed, for the sake of argument when addressing the remaining requirements, that the class had been defined properly. Id. ¶ 12. The city warned that requiring the trial court to end its analysis once it found one element unsatisfied could lead to piecemeal litigation. Id. The trial court “would have to determine, one at a time, whether each of the other six requirements had been met; this process could result in six appeals and six remands.” Id. Appellees countered that an analysis that is confusing and internally inconsistent cannot be “rigorous” for purposes of satisfying Ohio law. Id. ¶ 13.

The Supreme Court of Ohio sided with the city. Id. ¶ 14. Although the trial court’s decision could have been clearer, it included sufficient language to show that the trial court had addressed the remaining five requirements of the class certification analysis as if the two unsatisfied requirements had been satisfied. Id. ¶ 15. The Supreme Court further explained that judicial economy favors resolving all seven requirements in a single ruling whenever possible. Id. ¶ 16. It cautioned, however, that there may be cases in which the failure of one requirement prevents a court from meaningfully evaluating the other six requirements. Id.

The Supreme Court of Ohio remanded the case to the Ninth District Court of Appeals to address the appellees’ remaining assignments of error in the trial court’s ruling.

Implications For Companies

The Hilton decision is required reading for businesses defending class actions under Ohio law. The Supreme Court of Ohio’s unanimous ruling establishes that a trial court does not jeopardize a denial of class certification by analyzing every Rule 23 prerequisite, even after it concludes that one requirement has not been satisfied. Because of the deference owed to trial courts that decline to certify a class, class action defendants should build a thorough record on each Rule 23 requirement so that the trial court may issue a complete, well-supported decision that gives appellate courts multiple independent grounds on which to affirm.

Additionally, although not the focus of the opinion, the Hilton decision illustrates how, in cases involving long look-back periods and individualized damages questions, class-definition and predominance challenges can defeat certification. Where determining class membership or liability would require account-by-account review, those issues can be decisive.

California Court Of Appeal Finds That An Employment Arbitration Agreement Entered Into “Freely And Voluntarily” Actually Was Forced, Illegal, And Invalid Under California Law

By Eden E. Anderson, Rebecca Bjork, and Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Duane Morris Takeaways: On October 22, 2026, the California Court of Appeal held in Molina, et al. v. Triumph Residential Services, Inc., Case No. B350252, that requiring an employee to sign an arbitration agreement as a condition of employment is illegal under California Labor Code section 432.6.  Thus, when an arbitration agreement is not otherwise enforceable under the FAA, an arbitration agreement that is a condition of employment is unenforceable under California law.  The Court of Appeal further found that, even though the arbitration agreement at issue stated on its face that it was voluntary, it actually was not. 

The Molina decision is a must read for any employer seeking to compel arbitration under California law, as it teaches important lessons on the evidence an employer should submit with its motion. 

Case Background

At the time of her hire with Triumph Residential Services (Triumph), Tiffany Molina signed an arbitration agreement which stated that she was “freely and voluntarily” agreeing to arbitration of claims arising out of her employment.  Id. at 4.  After her employment ended, Ms. Molina filed a wage and hour class action lawsuit against Triumph.  Triumph moved to compel individual arbitration and to dismiss the class claims pursuant to a class action waiver in the arbitration agreement.  The parties agreed that their arbitration agreement was not governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), and thus Triumph sought to enforce the arbitration agreement under California law.  With its motion to compel, Triumph submitted a declaration asserting that Ms. Molina “was free to accept the Arbitration Agreement, attempt to negotiate out of it or look for other employment.”  Id. at 4.

In opposing the motion, Ms. Molina argued that California Labor Code section 432.6 made her arbitration agreement unlawful.  Labor Code section 432.6 makes it illegal (indeed, criminal) for an employer to impose an arbitration agreement on an employee as a “condition of employment.”  It also prohibits an employer from requiring an employee to take any affirmative action to opt out of an arbitration agreement.  Usually, when the FAA governs an arbitration agreement, Labor Code section 432.6 is preempted.  However, as noted, here the parties agreed the FAA did not apply.  Ms. Molina asserted, without any evidentiary support of her own, that her arbitration agreement had been forced upon her as a condition of employment. 

The trial court denied Triumph’s motion, concluding that Labor Code section 432.6 invalidated the arbitration agreement.  Even though the arbitration agreement on its face stated it was “freely and voluntarily” signed, the trial court deemed that insufficient to show the agreement was voluntary and not a condition of employment.  It determined that the employer bears the burden of proof to establish a valid an enforceable agreement to arbitrate, and that Triumph failed to offer evidence that its employees were not required to sign the arbitration agreement. 

The Decision

In a decision certified for publication, the Court of Appeal affirmed.  It held that the only exception to Labor Code section 432.6’s application is when an arbitration agreement is otherwise enforceable under the FAA.  Because Ms. Molina’s arbitration agreement was not enforceable under the FAA, then the agreement had to be voluntary to be enforceable under California law. 

Without addressing which party bears the burden of proof, the Court of Appeal further held that the evidence established Ms. Molina’s arbitration agreement was not voluntary even though it said on its face that it was.  And on this point, Triumph’s declaration proved fatal because it stated that Ms. Molina’s choices were to either “accept the Arbitration Agreement . . . or look for other employment.”  Id. at 4.  That meant the agreement was unlawfully a condition of employment.  Id. at 15.  Additionally, Triumph’s declaration stated that Ms. Molina could “negotiate out of” the agreement, which too violated Labor Code section 432.6 because it signified that Ms. Molina had to take affirmative action to avoid signing the arbitration agreement presented to her.  Id.  Because Ms. Molina’s arbitration agreement was not voluntary and not enforceable under the FAA, it was “illegal (indeed, criminal)” and unenforceable under California law.  Id. at 8.

Implications For Employers

The Molina decision teaches an important lesson to any employer seeking to enforce an arbitration agreement that is not governed by the FAA.  Even if an arbitration agreement states that it is voluntary, the employer should proffer additional evidence to confirm that employees are not required to sign, e.g., a declaration indicating that some employees do not sign.  In this instance, the employer offered a declaration stating the exact opposite, and sandbagged its own motion as a result. 

Second Circuit Revives Shelved Grocery Workers’ Waiting Time Suit

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, and Olga A. Romadin

Duane Morris Takeaways: On October 13, 2026, in Santos v. Lidl US, LLC, No. 25-2357 (2d Cir. Oct. 13, 2026), the Second Circuit vacated a district court’s dismissal of a grocery worker’s time-shaving claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and the New York Labor Law (“NYLL”). The Second Circuit held that waiting time is compensable under the FLSA when an employer requires an employee to report to work at a specific time and be ready to work when there is no work to do for reasons beyond the employee’s control. It also declined to consider fifteen minutes of unpaid time a week as de minimis when argued at the pleading stage. For employers with shift workers, the ruling signals a narrowing of the Portal-to-Portal Act defense and gives plaintiffs’ lawyers a new basis for bringing collective actions in the Second Circuit.

Background

On January 26, 2024, Plaintiff Sandra Santos brought a class and collective action alleging that her employer, Lidl US, LLC (“Lidl”), had engaged in the unlawful practice known as “time-shaving” in violation of the FLSA and NYLL. Plaintiff, a store clerk and stocker at the grocer’s West Babylon, New York location, alleged that Lidl required her and other opening-shift employees to report to work fifteen minutes before the listed start time, though they were not always able to clock in until their shift start time or later, and that as a result they were not paid overtime. Plaintiff sought to represent a collective under the FLSA and a class under the NYLL.

On September 10, 2025, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed both claims with prejudice after holding that the Portal-to-Portal Act barred the FLSA claim and that because the NYLL claim was coextensive with it, it was barred, too. Plaintiff appealed, and the Second Circuit vacated and remanded to the District Court.

The Appeals Court’s Decision

Writing for the majority, Judge Beth Robinson cited to U.S. Department of Labor regulation 29 C.F.R. § 790.7(h) interpreting the Portal-to-Portal Act, writing that the regulation distinguished between when an employee voluntarily arrives early and conducts a “preliminary” activity, and when an employee is required to report at a set hour, is ready to work, and has no work to do for reasons beyond their control, where the employee is doing something “integral” to their principal activities. Id. at 1.  Under the § 790.7(h), the former is not compensable, but the latter is. Judge Robinson then cited to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 (2005), which determined courts were required to apply a separate analysis on compensable work time where workers had been required to report at a specific time to begin donning protective gear prior to starting their shift only to find that no protective gear was available, including evaluating whether the donning was “integral” to the job they were hired to perform. Id. at 12.

In its defense, Lidl argued that Alvarez and § 790.7(h) were abrogated by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk, 574 U.S. 27 (2014), which held that time spent waiting to go through a security line was a noncompensable postliminary activity because it was not a “principal” activity for which the workers were employed. Id. at 14. The Second Circuit declined to read the decision so broadly, writing that Busk did not “address the distinct scenario of a worker engaged to wait.” Id. at 15. Citing to Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126 (1944), Judge Robison wrote that an employee may be hired specifically to wait, and Busk did not upend the principle that “[r]eadiness to serve may be hired, quite as much as service itself.” Id. at 16.

Lidl responded that this is limited to workers such as firefighters and limousine drivers, but the Court of Appeals was unconvinced, writing that it found “no such limit in the text of § 790.7(h).” Id.

Finally, the Second Circuit rejected Lidl’s alternative argument that the time workers spent waiting was de minimis, writing that it could not “conclude from our precedents that fifteen minutes of uncompensated work time a week is de minimis.” Id. at 17.

Judge Richard J. Sullivan’s Dissent

In his dissent, Judge Sullivan wrote that the majority’s holding was in conflict with the Portal-to-Portal Act and with the U.S. Supreme Court’s precedent, concluding that the wait time at issue was neither “integral” nor “indispensable” to plaintiff’s work as a grocery store clerk because Lidl could have eliminated it without affecting the principal activities of stocking or customer service. Id. at 23.  Judge Sullivan further wrote that § 790.7(h) applies only when waiting is an unusual break from routine, not a routine part of preliminary activities. Id. at 26.

Takeaways for Employers

The Second Circuit’s holding shows the enduring reluctance of the Second Circuit to broaden its reading of the U.S. Supreme Court Busk ruling on non-compensable waiting time, even when it sets new limits the Portal to Portal Act in determining compensable and non-compensable waiting time.  Employers scheduling workers to arrive prior to shift start are cautioned that this may trigger a finding that such workers are “engaged to wait,” and should tread cautiously in relying on the Portal-to-Portal Act to preclude litigation or utilizing a de minimis defense argument to limit damages.

Webinar Replay: Year-End Review of EEOC Litigation and Strategy

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, and Daniel D. Spencer

Duane Morris Takeaway: Thank you to all the loyal blog readers and followers who joined us for our Year-End EEOC Litigation and Strategy Review webinar! In this 30-minute program, Duane Morris partners Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, and Daniel D. Spencer  analyzed the latest impact of enforcement litigation at the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, including its new National Enforcement Plan and strategic priorities established in fiscal year 2026 and the enforcement lawsuits filed over the past 12 months, and discussed how employers can navigate the EEOC’s latest enforcement initiatives and implement strategies designed to minimize the risk of drawing the agency’s scrutiny.

If you were unable to attend the webinar, it is now available on our podcast channel. Click to watch below and stay tuned for important EEOC trends and developments throughout the year.

Ninth Circuit Finds Article III Standing In Class Action Where The Only Harm Is The Act Of Unauthorized Disclosure Of Sensitive Information

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jamar Davis, and Caitlin Capriotti

Duane Morris Takeaways: On October 9, 2026, in Melissa Black and Miles Black v. IEC Group, Inc., No. 25-5952, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 30906 (9th Cir. Oct. 9, 2026), a panel for the Ninth Circuit, via an opinion written by Judge Eric. C. Tung, reversed the decision by the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho dismissing a privacy class action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction for lack of injury. In the reversal, the Ninth Circuit held that the unauthorized disclosure of sensitive facts about Plaintiffs’ health that they entrusted Defendant to keep private is akin to a breach of confidence or contract. The act of disclosure, even without a formal privacy right, is an intangible harm sufficient for Article III standing. The case was remanded back to the District Court for further proceedings.

The decision is a must read for corporate counsel dealing with privacy class actions.

Case Background

Plaintiffs Miles and Melissa Black (“Plaintiffs”) receive health insurance from a plan administered by Defendant IEC Group, Inc. (“IEC”). Id. at *3. In August 2023, IEC sent Plaintiffs a letter informing them that some of their information was disclosed to unauthorized parties when an associate emailed a spreadsheet containing Plaintiffs’ sensitive health information to “on or more [plan] members.” Id. at *4. Information disclosed included: (1) first and last names, (2) unique tracking numbers, (3) provider names, (4) claim numbers, (5) dates of service, and (6) the amounts billed or paid. Id.

Plaintiffs brought a class action against IEC in the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho claiming that when Plaintiffs entrusted their sensitive health information to IEC as a condition of their healthcare plan administration, IEC expressly and impliedly promised – through its Privacy Policy – to keep the information confidential and to not disclosure it to any third party without their consent, and to use reasonable methods to prevent such disclosure. Id. Plaintiffs allege that IEC breached those promises when they disclosed the confidential information without authorization, depriving Plaintiffs the benefit of their bargain and diminishing the value of the services rendered. Id.

The District Court granted IEC’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because it concluded that Plaintiffs did not suffer an injury in fact and thus did not have Article III standing. Id. at *5. The District Court held that to allege a concrete injury from disclosure of personal information, the Plaintiffs must show that the nature of the information disclosed, the context of the disclosure, and other alleged injuries associated with the disclosure demonstrate an imminent and substantial injury. Id.

The Ninth Circuit’s Analysis

The Ninth Circuit reversed. It began its ruling by reiterating the long-held standard that an “injury in fact” includes both tangible harms, such as physical harms or monetary loss, and traditionally recognized intangible harms, such as “reputational harms” or “harms specificized by the Constitution itself.” Id. at *6. The Ninth Circuit also opined that “Congress’s ‘judgement is also instructive and important,’ as that body is ‘well positioned to identify intangible harms that meet minimum Article III requirements.’” Id. at *7 (citing Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 341 (2016)).

In this case, the harm Plaintiffs alleged consisted of the unauthorized disclosure of sensitive facts about their health that they entrusted to IEC to keep private. Id. At this stage of litigation, there is no dispute that the disclosed information was sensitive to Plaintiffs nor that IEC promised Plaintiffs to keep this information private. Id. Thus, the harm that Plaintiffs allege from the disclosure resembled a breach of confidence and breach of contract, which courts have long held provides basis for a lawsuit. Id.

Under a breach of confidence claim, a defendant is liable for “the unconsented, unprivileged disclosure to a third party of nonpublic information that the defendant has learned within a confidential relationship. Id (citing Kamal v. J. Crew Grp., Inc., 918 F.3d 102, 114 (3d Cir. 2019)). The panel described cases going back to 1614 England to demonstrate this long held cause of action. See id *8-12. Ultimately, for a breach of confidence, “a trust betrayed is the harm.” Id. at *12 (emphasis in original). Further, the Ninth Circuit held that a privacy right is not necessary to find a breach of confidence claim. Id. at 13. A “breach of contract” claim only reinforces the breach of confidence standing. Id. at 15. Here, Plaintiffs have alleged a confidential relationship grounded in promises made by IEC, and a breach of those promises. Id.

Finally, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that Congress has confirmed that disclosure of private health information is a concrete injury through other legislation. Id. at 16. Congress passed the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and subsequent amendments to protect certain sensitive health information from improper disclosure. Id. While HIPAA does not provide a private cause of action, it does prohibit disclosure of private health information and even provides criminal liability for “knowingly ‘disclos[ing] individually identifiable health information to another person.’”Id (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6(a)(3)). Congress has made the determination that this information is sensitive enough to warrant statutory protection. Id. Thus, a disclosure of the private health information is a harm sufficient for Article III standing.

Implications for Companies

This case highlights the importance of maintaining confidentiality when handling sensitive personal information of their employees and customers. The Ninth Circuit has held that even if a private cause of action regarding privacy for a specific kind of sensitive information does not exist, unauthorized disclosure is itself harm in the context of Article III. Employers must ensure that their security protocols and storage of sensitive information passes muster in the digital age in order to avoid potential liability

Washington Supreme Court Rejects Privacy Class Action And Holds That Hospital’s Use Of Meta Pixel Does Not Violate State Privacy Act

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, and Ryan T. Garippo

Duane Morris Takeaways:  On October 8, 2026, in Baker, et al. v. Seattle Children’s Hospital, No. 104590-5, 2026 WL 3023818 (Wash. Oct. 8, 2026), Justice Theodore J. Angelis of the Supreme Court of the State of Washington held that a hospital’s use of Meta Pixel’s advertising technology ( “Meta Pixel”) on its public website did not violate the Washington Privacy Act (“WPA”) because the plaintiffs’ website searches involved communications between a single individual and a website, and were not between “two or more individuals” as required by the WPA.  The decision is a significant win for companies that use website advertising technologies, like Meta Pixel, but its import may be limited to claims brought under Washington state law.

Case Background

Seattle Children’s Hospital (“SCH”) operates a public website that provides general information about the hospital, including a directory of health care professionals, hours of operation for clinics, and descriptions of health conditions.  The website also uses free software, called Meta Pixel, that allows websites to review visitors’ clicks, text searches, and page views.  Meta Pixel also allegedly relays content of such searches to Meta Platforms, Inc., which links that information to the Facebook or Instagram account of the website visitor for targeted advertising.

In 2023, Carly Baker, Amber Shavies, and Janssen Ramos Savoie (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed a putative class action against SCH.  Each of the Plaintiffs was a parent who alleged that they visited SCH’s public website to search for information regarding “their children’s medical conditions and for clinic operating hours, as well as visiting the patient portal, MyChart, to communicate with doctors and view their children’s electronic records and medical histories.”  Id. at *2.  SCH disputed that Meta Pixel was ever installed on the hospital’s MyChart patient portal and Plaintiffs “subsequently clarified that their claims targeted only the use of Pixel on SCH’s publicly available website.”  Id. at *2, n.5.

SCH moved to dismiss the complaint and argued, inter alia, that Plaintiffs’ searches and queries on the website were not “private communications” as defined by the WPA.  The trial court granted SCH’s motion to dismiss and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.  Plaintiffs appealed and the Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal on the ground that navigation of a website is not a “communication” as defined by the WPA.  See Baker v. Seattle Children’s Hosp., 35 Wash. App. 2d 1018 (2025).  Plaintiffs then petitioned the Washington Supreme Court for review and the petition was granted.

The Supreme Court’s Decision

In a unanimous result, Justice Angelis, writing for the majority of the Washington Supreme Court, affirmed the trial court’s dismissal but on a different basis than the Court of Appeals.

Instead of determining whether the Plaintiffs’ website activity constituted a “private communication,” the Supreme Court focused on a different part of the WPA’s text.  Justice Angelis explained that it is unlawful for “any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or the state of Washington” to intercept or record any “[p]rivate communication . . . between two or more individuals.”  RCW 9.73.030(1)(a).

Justice Angelis reasoned that, because only communications “between two or more individuals” are unlawful, SCH would need to be an “individual” for Plaintiffs’ theory to work.  Id.  But SCH is not an individual.  The WPA draws a distinction between “individuals” on the one hand and entities such as “partnership[s], corporation[s], association[s], or the state of Washington,” on the other.  Id.  Thus, because SCH is a corporation and “only one individual was involved in each communication, the [P]laintiffs do not have a claim under the WPA.”  Baker, 2026 WL 3023818, at *3.

Justice Angelis, however, took care to point out that it was immaterial that the WPA is “one of the most restrictive electronic surveillance laws ever promulgated” and that certain federal and California laws may prohibit such conduct.  Id. at *4 (quotations omitted).  He explained that those federal and state cases are “not instructive given the significant differences between the state and federal statutory schemes” and declined to consider such precedent.  Id. (quotations omitted).

Notably, Justice González and Justice Whitener wrote separately to concur in the result but express the view that “private communications transmitted between an individual and individuals working for a corporation are protected by” WPA.  Id. (González, J., concurring).  Instead, Justice González would have held that these communications were not between “two or more individuals” because the “parents’ private communications were directed at a server that returned stored content and not at another individual.”  Id. at *5 (González, J., concurring).  Thus, to Justice González, the material distinction was not a communication with a corporation but the nature of the underlying technology itself.

But nonetheless, the Washington Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the trial court’s dismissal with prejudice.

Implications For Companies

The Baker decision is a meaningful development for Washington companies that deploy advertising technologies, such as Meta Pixel, on their public-facing websites.  Although the unique language of the WPA likely makes this decision distinguishable from claims brought under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act or California Invasion of Privacy Act, this holding should knock out nearly all claims under the WPA as a matter of law.

Justice González’s concurrence, however, serves as a cautionary note.  Even though the majority opinion would seem to imply that you could never apply the WPA to communications with a corporation under any circumstances, there is at least a possibility that under different facts (e.g., such as communications directed to an individual staff member) the Washington Supreme Court would reach a different result.  Nonetheless, Baker is undoubtedly a tremendous win for Washington companies and corporate counsel should continue to monitor this blog to stay apprised of developments in class actions involving Meta Pixel litigation and digital privacy law.

California Legislature Halts Class Actions Alleging That Common Website Advertising Technologies Are Pen Registers And Trap And Trace Devices

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Justin R. Donoho, and Hayley Ryan

Duane Morris Takeaways:  On September 30, 2026, California Governor Newsome signed Senate Bill 690, which amends the California Invasion of Privacy Act (“CIPA”) to eliminate the private right of action under California Penal Code § 638.51 for pen register and trap-and-trace device claims arising from website, online application, and mobile application activity. Under the amended statute, only the California Attorney General may bring such claims against private actors. The law takes effect on January 1, 2027, and it applies retroactively to any pending claim in an action commenced within two years before that date. For the thousands of companies now facing CIPA § 638.51 class actions and demand letters over the use of pixels, cookies, and similar website advertising technologies (“adtech”), Senate Bill 690 offers significant and fast relief. It is not, however, the end of CIPA litigation. The wiretapping provision (§ 631) and the eavesdropping provision (§ 632), which plaintiffs have also used in adtech cases, are untouched.

The bill’s final form is much narrower than the version first introduced. As introduced, Senate Bill 690 would have exempted all processing of personal information for a “commercial business purpose” as defined by the California Consumer Privacy Act (“CCPA”) from civil and criminal liability under all three sections of the CIPA. See Assembly Committee On Privacy And Consumer Protection Committee Report (July 1 , 2026) (“Committee Report”) at 6-7. The analysis in our blog post covers the legal landscape that led to the bill, the scope and mechanics of the enacted statute, how the bill narrowed during the legislative process, and what corporate counsel and class action practitioners should do now.

Background

The CIPA was adopted in 1967 to criminalize wiretapping, eavesdropping, interception, and recording of telephone communications without court authorization. Section 637.2 confers a private right of action to any person injured by a violation of the CIPA. Available relief includes statutory damages of $5,000 per violation, three times the actual damages suffered by the plaintiff, if any, and injunctive relief. Section 637.2(c) specifically provides that plaintiffs do not need to show actual damages. The Assembly Committee on Privacy and Consumer Protection observed that, in the adtech context, these violations “can stack up rapidly, causing defendants to face potentially devastating liability.” See Committee Report at 7.

Recent adtech litigation has relied on three CIPA provisions: § 631 (wiretapping), § 632 (recording confidential communications), and § 638.51 (pen registers and trap-and-trace devices). Section 638.51 was added only in 2015, and according to the Assembly Committee on Privacy and Consumer Protection, the Legislature gave “little, if any, thought” to how it would apply online or interact with the CIPA’s private right of action. See Committee Report at 1. The Committee called the pen register and trap and trace device statute “a poster child for abusive lawsuits,” explaining that “[b]ecause the potential liability can be staggering, businesses generally settle this litigation hastily, encouraging vexatious litigants to continue blasting out demand letters.” See id. at 1.

The case law gave businesses little certainty.  For example, federal district courts in California are split as to whether third-party collection of website-user information may constitute a trap and trace device or pen register under § 638.51.  California state trial courts, by contrast, have mostly dismissed these claims, as in Licea v. Hickory Farms LLC, No. 23STCV26148, 2024 WL 1698147 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2024), Casillas v. Transitions Optical, Inc., No. 23STCV30742, 2024 WL 4873370 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sep. 9, 2024), and Sanchez v. Cars.com Inc., No. 24STCV13201, 2025 WL 487194 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 27, 2025). The Committee noted that there is no published California appellate authority applying § 638.51 to software. See Committee Report at 16. According to the bill’s sponsors, § 638.51 lawsuits rose from about 600 to nearly 4,000 after SB 690 was introduced, and tens of thousands of businesses received demand letters. See id. at 7.

What Does SB 690 Change?

SB 690 amends only § 637.2, the CIPA’s civil remedies provision. Its main features are as follows:

  • AG-Only Enforcement For Online Pen Register And Trap-And-Trace Claims. An action against a private actor for a violation of § 638.51 “alleged to arise from conduct occurring on an internet website, online application, or mobile application may be brought under this section only by the Attorney General.”
  • The Private Right Of Action Otherwise Remains. Subdivisions (a) and (b) of section 637.2 still authorize private suits for statutory damages, treble damages, and injunctive relief for all other CIPA violations, now subject only to the new subdivision (d) exception. The no-actual-damages provision in subdivision (c) also remains.
  • Retroactivity. The amendments “apply retroactively to any pending claim in an action commenced within two years before the operative date of that legislation.” The Committee explained that this provision is meant to relieve defendants in pen register lawsuits filed within the two-year period before January 1, 2027. It also stated that the amendments would not affect any case in which final judgment has been entered.
  • Severability. The Committee explained that a severability clause was added “in view of possible constitutional challenges to the retroactivity provisions.” See Committee Reportat 25.

Who And What Is Covered?

The carve-out is narrow and depends on four elements. First, it applies only to claims under § 638.51. Second, it applies only to actions against a “private actor.” Third, the claim must be “alleged to arise from conduct occurring on” a website, online application, or mobile application. Fourth, it removes only private standing. The underlying prohibition in § 638.51 remains, and the Attorney General may pursue violations using the remedies the CIPA already provides.

SB 690 does not define “private actor,” and it does not explain when conduct “arise[s] from conduct occurring on” a website or app. Defendants should expect plaintiffs to test those terms. Possible targets include back-end service providers to websites and apps, such as companies that provide payroll, shipping logistics, cybersecurity and antifraud technology, cloud storage, HR, and analytics and advertising tools, which the bill’s sponsors noted had also been sued.

How Did The Bill Change During The Legislative Process?

The introduced and enacted versions of SB 690 differ significantly. As introduced, the bill would have exempted any “commercial business purpose,” as defined by the CCPA, from both civil and criminal liability under the CIPA. The enacted version does much less: it removes private standing only for certain § 638.51 claims. The introduced bill would have changed CIPA §§ 631, 632, 632.7, and 638.51. The Committee’s amendments struck all changes to §§ 631, 632, 632.7, and 638.50, so the enacted law amends only § 637.2, the CIPA’s civil remedies provision. See Committee Report at 25-26.

The two versions also differ in reach. The original bill applied to all civil and criminal violations, was not limited to website activity, and could have covered any recording or interception of a confidential communication made for a commercial business purpose. Id. at 15. The enacted bill leaves criminal liability unchanged, focuses only on the civil private right of action against private actors, and is limited to conduct occurring on an internet website, online application, or mobile application. Further, the original bill did not provide for public enforcement, while the enacted version gives the California Attorney General standing to pursue these pen register and trap-and-trace violations using the remedies the CIPA already provides. The enacted version also adds two provisions the original bill did not have: retroactive application to pending claims in actions commenced within two years before the operative date, and a severability clause added in view of possible constitutional challenges to that retroactivity.

The Committee called the original bill “too blunt” and warned that the bill could “unintentionally shield wiretapping violations that involve highly offensive intrusions.” See Committee Report at 2, 25. The Committee also treated the trap and trace device and pen register statute differently from the other provisions, noting that trap and trace device and pen register cases usually involve “seemingly innocuous technical violations arising from ordinary operation of websites.” Id. at 2. By contrast, it found that §§ 631 and 632 cases often involve “highly offensive intrusions on users’ reasonable expectations of privacy, although they are not immune from abuse.” Id.  The narrowed bill passed the Legislature unanimously in late August 2026.

What SB 690 Does Not Do

Claims under Sections 631 (wiretapping) and 632 (eavesdropping), which carry the same $5,000 per-violation exposure, remain available to private plaintiffs in class action litigation. The Committee acknowledged that § 631 “continues to be challenging for courts to apply” to conduct occurring on websites. See Committee Report at 2. It concluded that targeted reform of § 631 “appears warranted, albeit not as urgent as reforms to the pen register statute.” Id. at 24. The Committee also noted that plaintiffs have moved toward other theories, including claims under California’s Comprehensive Computer Data Access and Fraud Act and the federal Electronic Communications Privacy Act. Id. at 25. In his signing message, Governor Newsom noted that “additional work in this area is needed, as CIPA contains other decades-old statutes that are also susceptible to abuse by overly aggressive litigants,” and “urge[d] the Legislature to take this on next year to ensure a fair balance between protecting private information and preventing rapacious litigation.”

Implications For Companies

SB 690 should sharply reduce the volume of § 638.51 class actions and demand letters. In the short term, however, the plaintiffs’ bar may shift its claims rather than abandon them. Companies with any online presence, including websites, mobile applications, and online forms and applications, should consider the following steps.

  • Assess Pending § 638.51 Matters Now. For cases filed within the two-year retroactivity window, defendants should consider motions for judgment on the pleadings or dismissal once the law becomes operative on January 1, 2027, and should consider seeking stays in the meantime. Defendants should also reconsider their settlement posture on pen register-only demands.
  • Expect The Retroactivity Provision To Be Challenged. The Legislature added the severability clause because it anticipated constitutional challenges. Defendants should be prepared to defend retroactive application.
  • Expect Claims To Be Repleaded Under §§ 631 and 632. Plaintiffs asserting trap and trace device and pen register claims under § 638.51 are likely to recast adtech, claims as wiretapping or eavesdropping claims, particularly where descriptive URLs, search terms, or health information are involved, as adtech plaintiffs typically argue that such items constitute “contents” of a communication under § 631 and that transmission of such items to adtech companies constitutes “eavesdropping” or aiding and abetting eavesdropping under § 632. These claims still carry $5,000 per-violation statutory damages and remain suitable for class treatment.  Of course, adtech plaintiffs will continue to face numerous significant legal challenges regarding the merits and certifiability of their §§ 631 and 632 claims, as we blogged about here, here, and here.
  • Continue Auditing Website Advertising Technologies. The relief provided by SB 690 fails to limit exposure not only under the CIPA §§ 631 and 632 but also under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), the Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA), the Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act (WESCA), the Florida Security of Communications Act (FSCA), and other state and federal privacy statutes. Companies should continue to review and evaluate their adtech, data practices, consent mechanisms, and privacy notices, in light of rapidly evolving legal precedent regarding whether these old statutes apply to adtech, to ensure compliance with these other privacy laws.
  • Watch The 2027 Legislative Session. Given the Governor’s call for further reform, additional CIPA amendments are a realistic possibility.

Companies should consider Senate Bill 690 as a narrow solution providing limited relief to adtech defendants rather than a comprehensive reform. Companies that treat it that way will be better positioned for the next phase of CIPA class action litigation.

Ohio Federal Court Grants Conditional Certification Of A Wide Collective Action Against The Cleveland Clinic Foundation

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Kathryn Brown, and Olga A. Romadin

Duane Morris Takeaways: On September 24, 2026, Judge Christopher A. Boyko of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio granted Plaintiff’s motion for conditional certification of a proposed collective of workers alleging that time-rounding practices resulted in overtime violations in Garner v. Cleveland Clinic Foundation, Case No. 23-CV-2258 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 24, 2026).  Judge Boyko found that Plaintiff had met her burden to show a strong likelihood that workers were similarly situated because she provided testimony, declarations, and an expert opinion that demonstrated that workers across multiple positions and facilities were all subject to the same non-neutral rounding policy. The opinion should be required reading for companies defending wage & hour claims in courts within the Sixth Circuit.

Case Background

Plaintiff Deborah Garner brought a putative class and collective action on behalf of herself and all other similarly situated on November 21, 2023.  Plaintiff, a patient registrar and patient access specialist employed by Defendant, the Cleveland Clinic Foundation (“CCF”), alleged that CCF failed to pay non-exempt employees overtime at the statutory rate for all hours worked over forty, in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) as well as Ohio’s wage and hour laws.  Plaintiff additionally claimed that CCF failed to pay all wages owed to workers due to improper rounding and/or editing of hours worked in Defendant’s timekeeping software, and failed to keep accurate time records.  Id. at 1-2. 

On January 5, 2024, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint as well as a motion asking the Court to facilitate notice to other similarly-situated potential plaintiffs, and the Court granted the motion after striking Plaintiff’s class claims.

The Court’s Ruling

Judge Boyko granted Plaintiff’s motion to facilitate notice to putative collective members on determining that there was a strong likelihood that the proposed collective members are similarly situated because the plaintiffs had met their burden to show that non-exempt hourly employees were all subject to the same rounding policies.  Id. at 1.  Plaintiffs provided declarations of 5 opt-in plaintiffs, deposition testimony, and an expert opinion regarding CCF’s rounding policies and practices. Id. at 1-2. Plaintiff’s expert testified that CCF’s “rounding practices worked against the employees nearly 80 percent of the time.”  Id. at 20. 

Defendant argued that the scope of the proposed class and the variety of positions involved gave rise to individualized questions and issues, but the Court was unconvinced. Id. The Court determined that this evidence was enough to have “shown the rounding practice applied broadly to all the non-exempt employees” and was in line with the U.S. Supreme Court’s express determination that representative evidence in collective actions is permissible. Id.

However, the Court, citing to Plaintiff’s evidence, which showed that about 17% of employees suffered no injury, concluded that they lacked standing and were not similarly situated because they could claim no injury under the FLSA.  Id. at 21.

Defendants further argued that approximately 4.5% of CCF’s non-exempt hourly employees were subject to “flex rounding” or “quarter rounding” policies and were therefore not similarly situated because they were not subject to the general rounding policy at issue. The Court found that Defendant’s argument only supported Plaintiff’s argument that CCF had a system-wide rounding policy, and that it was not applied to “select employees or departments.”  Id. at 22.  The Court concluded that the evidence showed “a consistent, systemwide policy of rounding and that rounding heavily favored Defendant,” and therefore that Plaintiffs met their burden to show the putative collective was similarly situated, and granted Garner’s motion for a Court-facilitated notice.

Implications for Companies

In light of the opinion in Garner, companies with a workforce of non-exempt employees are well-advised to take stock of their timekeeping policies and practices, particularly when they operate multiple facilities and utilize timekeeping systems with rounding features.  Federal courts in the Sixth Circuit scrutinize any such policies to determine whether putative collective action members are subject to the same practices, and the likelihood of plaintiffs meeting the “strong likelihood” standard is greater when such policies are generally applicable across the employer’s sites and positions. A strong defense often features a showing that a company’s timekeeping policies and practices vary by position, department, and facility, and may be pointed to in arguing that putative collective members are not similarly situated enough to warrant collective-wide treatment.

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The opinions expressed on this blog are those of the author and are not to be construed as legal advice.

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