Colorado Federal Court Compel Arbitration In Parking Lot Dispute, Finding Posted Signs Create Binding Contracts

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Tiffany Alberty, and Brett Bohan

Duane Morris Takeaways: On April 14, 2026, in Brant, et al v. Parking Revenue Recovery Services, Inc., Case No. 1:25-CV-01771 (D. Colo. Apr. 14, 2026), Judge Gordon P. Gallagher of the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado granted Defendant Parking Revenue Recovery Services, Inc.’s motion to compel arbitration. Plaintiffs, a group of parking lot customers who brought a putative class action, argued that they never agreed to arbitrate and that any arbitration clause was unconscionable. The Court rejected both arguments, finding that by parking in the lots, Plaintiffs assented to the terms posted on conspicuous signs — including a binding arbitration clause — and that the clause was not unconscionable. This ruling reinforces that businesses can form enforceable contracts, including arbitration agreements, through conspicuously posted signage, and that consumers who fail to read posted terms are nonetheless bound by them.

Case Background

Plaintiffs Brian Brant, Brooke Fitz, Robert Caldwell, and Mayenssi Montiel each parked at various parking garages managed by Defendant Parking Revenue Recovery Services, Inc. (“PRRS”) in Denver and Little Rock between 2023 and 2025. (ECF 36 at 1-2) At each of these lots, PRRS posted large red signs at the entrances, exits, and pay stations. (Id. at 2-14) The signs stated, in relevant part, “This is a Contract,” instructed customers to “Read these terms PRIOR to parking,” and included a capitalized, boldfaced “ARBITRATION” heading explaining that “[b]y parking on this Facility, you hereby agree that the sole remedy for all unresolved disputes is binding arbitration, and specifically waive the right to jury trial, class action and/or class arbitration”. (Id.)

Each of the Plaintiffs claimed they did not see the signs. (Id. at 7, 12, and 14.) Some faulted the location, lighting, and number of signs, while others argued there were no gates or speed bumps to slow drivers down enough to read the posted terms. (Id.)

The Court’s Order

The Court granted PRRS’s motion to compel arbitration, addressing both of Plaintiffs’ arguments against enforcement. (Id. at 16-21.)

First, as to whether a valid agreement to arbitrate existed, the Court noted that two other courts in Colorado had recently addressed the same issue with the same defendant. (Id. at 16.) Adopting the analysis of Chief Judge Daniel D. Domenico in Butler v. Asura Technologies USA, Inc., the Court held that a contract was formed when Plaintiffs manifested assent to the implied terms of the parking agreement by choosing to park in the lots. (Id. at 17.) The Court emphasized that the fundamental exchange — temporary use of a parking spot in exchange for a promise to pay — was sufficient to establish contract formation, and that the operator of a parking lot may modify or add to the basic terms by posting signs. (Id.) The Court analogized the posted signage to online “clickwrap” contracts, noting that users of such contracts are regularly bound by terms they never actually read. (Id. at 19.) Accordingly, whether Plaintiffs chose to read the signs was irrelevant because they agreed to the posted terms when they decided to park their cars on PRRS’s lots. (Id. at 18.)

The Court also rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that the arbitration clause was insufficiently specific because it lacked details regarding the scope, rules, or effect of any arbitration ruling. (Id. at 19.) Citing the Supreme Court of Colorado’s long-standing precedent in Guthrie v. Barda, 533 P.2d 487 (Colo. 1975), the Court held that a clause stating disputes “shall be submitted to binding arbitration” is sufficient and enforceable, even without additional procedural details. (Id.)

Second, the Court addressed Plaintiffs’ unconscionability defense. Applying the seven-factor test under Colorado law, the Court acknowledged that the first factor — a standardized agreement between parties with unequal bargaining power — may point toward unconscionability but noted that consumer contracts of adhesion are ubiquitous in modern commerce. (Id. at 20.) The remaining factors, however, weighed against a finding of unconscionability: Plaintiffs had the opportunity to review the terms before parking, the arbitration provision was written in large font against a contrasting red background and arbitration is a commercially reasonable method of dispute resolution. (Id.) The Court concluded bluntly that “if Plaintiffs did not wish to agree to the terms, they could have parked somewhere else.” (Id. at 21.)

The Court ordered the case stayed and administratively closed pending the conclusion of arbitration. (Id. at 22.)

Implications For Employers And Businesses

The Court’s decision in Brant v. Parking Revenue Recovery Services, Inc. affirms that conspicuously posted signage can create binding arbitration agreements with consumers, even in the absence of a signed written contract, a clickthrough mechanism, or any affirmative acknowledgment. For businesses that rely on physical signage to communicate contractual terms — including parking operators, event venues, and service providers — this decision provides a roadmap for drafting and displaying enforceable arbitration clauses. Specifically, businesses should ensure that their signs are prominently displayed, use clear language and contrasting formatting, and explicitly state that use of the premises constitutes acceptance of the posted terms, including arbitration. The decision also reinforces that a consumer’s failure to read posted terms does not relieve them of their contractual obligations, further underscoring the importance of adequate notice over actual knowledge.

The Class Action Weekly Wire – Episode 144: Class Action Litigation In The Digital Assets & Blockchain Sector

Duane Morris Takeaway: This week’s episode features Duane Morris partners Jerry Maatman and Mauro Wolfe and senior associate Hayley Ryan with their discussion of Duane Morris’ Digital Assets & Blockchain Class Action Review, highlighting several trends and developments shaping class action litigation in this space.

Check out today’s episode and subscribe to our show from your preferred podcast platform: Spotify, Amazon Music, Apple Podcasts, Podcast Index, Tune In, Listen Notes, iHeartRadio, Deezer, and YouTube.

Episode Transcript

Jerry Maatman: Welcome to our listeners. Thank you for being here for our weekly podcast series, the Class Action Weekly Wire. I’m Jerry Maatman, a partner at Duane Morris, and joining me today are my colleagues Mauro Wolfe and Hayley Ryan. Mauro is joining us for the first time – he’s our lead partner in Duane Morris’ Digital Assets and Blockchain Practice Group, a multidisciplinary group of over 50 lawyers providing a full suite of services to clients in the cryptocurrency, digital assets, and blockchain industries, both domestically and internationally. Thank you both for being on the podcast today.

Mauro Wolfe: Thank you, Jerry, very happy to be here.

Hayley Ryan: Thanks for having me, Jerry.

Jerry: Today on the podcast, we are discussing the publication of a brand-new desk reference, the Duane Morris Digital Assets and Blockchain Class Action Review. Listeners can find the e-book version of the publication on our blog, the Duane Morris Class Action Defense Blog. Hayley, could you tell our listeners a bit about the desk reference publication?

Hayley: Absolutely, Jerry. So, Duane Morris just released the first in a series of industry-focused class action publications called the Digital Assets and Blockchain Class Action Review – 2026. This publication analyzes the key related rulings and developments in 2025, and the significant legal decisions and trends impacting class action litigation in this industry for 2026. We hope that companies and employers will benefit from this resource in compliance with these evolving laws and standards.

Jerry: It seems like crypto litigation is everywhere right now. What’s driving that?

Mauro: First, Jerry, that’s exactly right. So, by 2025, litigation involving digital assets and blockchain companies really moved from sidelines to center stage in the area of complex financial litigation. One of the big drivers, quite frankly, is the current policy environment, and specifically what I’m referring to is, look, enforcement cases at the federal level, specifically by the SEC, is at a historic drop, you know, in excess of 30 to 40%. And what that means is that private plaintiffs are stepping in to fill the gap. We saw a huge surge in class actions last year as dozens filed, and it’s not just token issuers anymore. The net has widened significantly as to the targets of these class action cases.

Jerry: So, who specifically are the targets, now that we’re in 2026?

Hayley: Yeah, Jerry, so pretty much everyone in the ecosystem. So early on, lawsuits focused on token issuers and promoters, but now we’re seeing claims against crypto exchanges, blockchain developers, fintech platforms, Bitcoin ATM operators, and even decentralized protocol creators.

Mauro: And, major exchanges like Coinbase have been frequent defendants. I mean, plaintiffs are alleging things like operating unregistered securities under the SEC laws, listing tokens that are later characterized as securities, a lot going on.

Jerry: So private lawsuits are almost foreshadowing regulatory enforcement in this space?

Mauro: Exactly, and sometimes it’s even getting ahead of it. In fact, certainly getting ahead of it in the context of this administration, and referring to the SEC and CFTC enforcement regimes.

Jerry: What sort of claims are we talking about, then, in this space?

Hayley: Well, we’re talking about a wide range of claims, Jerry, but the most common include the sale of unregistered securities, misstatements or omissions, consumer protection violations, and data privacy breaches.

Mauro: And then, of course, there’s a long tail that includes, you know, breaches of contract, unjust enrichment, negligence, and even RICO claims. The plaintiffs’ bar is, as you know very well, Jerry, they’re very creative.

Jerry: Nothing if not innovative, that’s for sure. Why is it, then, that unregistered securities claims are so popular, for the plaintiffs’ bar?

Hayley: It’s a good question, Jerry. It’s because they’re powerful and easier to prove. You don’t need to show fraud, just that a security was sold without proper registration. So, that opens the door to rescission claims, and also class certification is often easier.

Jerry: Let’s talk about one of the key legal developments: centralized versus decentralized exchanges.

Mauro: Yeah, this was huge in ‘25. So, courts in the Second Circuit, for example, started drawing a clear distinction. If an exchange is centralized, meaning its intermediary’s transactions can potentially be liable as a statutory seller. If it’s decentralized, just coding, facilitating transactions, courts have been more hesitant to impose liability. In those cases, plaintiffs struggle to show the platform to actually a seller under the securities laws.

Jerry: Well, the million-dollar question, or maybe the billion-dollar question, is what counts as a security in digital assets?

Hayley: So, Jerry, that is still hotly contested. Courts are often sidestepping it when they can, but 2025 did bring some clarity. For example, Congress passed the Genius Act, which says fiat-backed stablecoins themselves are not securities. But, and this is key, transactions involving them still might be. Courts are still relying heavily on the Howey test, which asks whether there’s an investment contract based on expectation of profits from others’ efforts.

Jerry: In terms of your analysis of rulings in 2025, are there any standout decisions?

Mauro: Yeah, there are a couple of major rulings. One court found that selling stablecoins during a de-pegging event didn’t qualify as a security under Howey. Another reaffirmed that selling certain quote-unquote bridge tokens to institutional investors did not constitute an unregistered securities offering and refused to revisit $125 million-dollar penalty. And importantly, courts are not backing off prior rulings, just because regulatory attitude shifts, and that’s a big deal. And I would be remindful of folks to keep in mind that there is a really important case that predates ‘25, which is the Loper-Bright case from the U.S. Supreme Court in 2024. And that’s important because in the 6-3 decision on June 28th of ’24, the Supreme Court officially overruled the Chevron deference, which is a 40-year-old legal doctrine that previously required federal courts to defer to federal agencies reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous law. In other words, the courts historically had to defer to reasonable decisions made by the federal agency who was the expert on the area. That no longer is true, which I think opens up the door for court decisions in a variety of areas, including the securities laws and fraud.

Jerry: Very interesting. What about class certification? That’s obviously the Holy Grail in class actions. How did courts rule over the past 12 months in either granting or denying plaintiffs’ motions to certify a class in this space?

Hayley: Though two federal courts granted certification in part, specifically for unregistered securities claims, but they rejected certification for things like consumer protection and unjust enrichment claims, which tend to have more individualized issues.

Jerry: Also, again, it seems that those security claims are leading the charge. Let’s shift to regulations. The SEC made waves with something called Project Crypto. What should our listeners know about that?

Mauro: So, in 2025, in late ‘25, SEC Chairman Paul Atkins came out with a proposed framework, that recently, in the past couple months, had been released in an interpretive guidance. And the purpose of the Project Crypto was designed to provide more clarity, at least from the regulator’s perspective, of what is and is not a security. It’s built around, sort of, three key ideas: token taxonomy, categorizing assets like digital commodities, digital securities, digital tools, utility tokens, tokenized securities. And a temporal view of securities – that is, meaning a token might start out as a security, but not remain one forever. And tailored regulation, what the SEC refers to as fit for purpose. And that’s focusing on capital-raising activities, not necessarily crypto activities. And all of that is important for two reasons. One, the Project Crypto was in the release of the interpretive guidance a couple months ago. It was important because it was the first joint interpretive guidance on these issues issued by the CFTC and the SEC jointly. That was historic – outlining what is and is not a security, and what are these other categories. And it’s really important in order to give clarity and guidance to the markets, which will be hotly contested, no doubt, by the federal securities class action lawyers.

Jerry: Well, this sure sounds like a shift away from “everything is a security.” Where is all this heading, in your opinion?

Hayley: Though 2026 will definitely bring more litigation without a doubt, the combination of regulatory uncertainty and evolving case law is certainly fueling continued filings, Jerry.

Mauro: Yeah, and Jerry, from my perspective, you know, we’re going to see more clarity, guidance from the federal regulators, but it’s likely to result in lots of court and private litigation about that interpretive guidance. Now, I mentioned Loper for a reason, right? So that means that the courts are not really bound by whatever the SEC says or doesn’t say about what the law is. So, it’s going to be really interesting, and I think it’s going to generate a lot of litigation, because there’s a lot of money, as you put it, billions at stake, for the parties that are right on the issues.

Jerry: Well, that’s fascinating stuff, but sure feels like we’re watching an entirely new area of law being built or unfolded in real time. So thanks, Mauro and Hayley, for being here today, and thank you for loyal listeners for tuning in. Please stop by our blog for a free copy of the Digital Assets and Blockchain Class Action Review e-book.

Hayley: Thank you for having me, Jerry, and thank you, listeners.

Mauro: Thanks, everyone. Appreciate the time.

The New Hospitality Class Action Review – 2026 Is Now Available!

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, and Gregory Tsonis

Duane Morris Takeaway: We’re excited to officially announce the release of the all-new Hospitality Class Action Review – 2026, a new desk reference resource designed to help legal professionals and businesses better understand the evolving landscape of class action law this quickly evolving industry.

As the hospitality industry continues to evolve in a landscape shaped by shifting labor laws, consumer protection regulations, and data privacy concerns, class action litigation has become an increasingly significant area of exposure. This new publication offers a comprehensive, practical guide to understanding and managing these complex legal challenges.

Hotels, restaurants, and travel-related businesses face a growing wave of class actions—ranging from wage and hour disputes to hidden fee allegations and data breach claims. This book breaks down these trends and provides actionable insight into how organizations can proactively mitigate risk and respond effectively when litigation arises. The Duane Morris Class Action Team created this new resource offering clear, practical insights into the rules, trends, and key considerations that define class action practice in the hospitality industry. This is the second book in our new series focusing on industry-specific class action litigation, and dives deep into industry-specific procedures, recent case developments, and strategic considerations.

The Hospitality Class Action Review – 2026 is now available here.

Stay tuned to the Class Action Weekly Wire for more information on this new addition to the Duane Morris Class Action Review series.

The Class Action Weekly Wire – Episode 143: Class Action Epicenters: Key Developments In California, Illinois, and New York

Duane Morris Takeaway: This week’s episode features Duane Morris partners Jerry Maatman, Jennifer Riley, and Daniel Spencer with their discussion of a new desk reference series from the Duane Morris Class Action Defense Team analyzing key developments in California, Illinois, and New York.

Check out today’s episode and subscribe to our show from your preferred podcast platform: Spotify, Amazon Music, Apple Podcasts, Podcast Index, Tune In, Listen Notes, iHeartRadio, Deezer, and YouTube.

Episode Transcript

Jerry Maatman: Welcome, loyal blog listeners. Thank you for being here for our weekly podcast series, The Class Action Weekly Wire. I’m Jerry Maatman, a partner at Duane Morris, and joining me today are my colleagues and partners, Daniel Spencer of our Los Angeles office, and Jennifer Riley of our Chicago, Los Angeles, and San Francisco offices. Welcome.

Jennifer Riley: Thanks, Jerry. Happy to be part of the podcast today.

Daniel Spencer: Yeah, thanks for having me, Jerry.

Jerry: Today on the podcast, we’re discussing three of the most significant jurisdictions for class action litigation, what are called epicenters of class action filings – and that would be California, New York, and Illinois – and a brand new set of resources and desk references designed to make sense of it all: the California, New York, and Illinois class action reviews for 2026 put together by Duane Morris Class Action Defense lawyers with over 125 years of collective experience. Jen, can you tell us about these desk references and the skinny on each of them?

Jennifer: Absolutely, Jerry. We are very excited about this launch. These are new, state-specific class action reviews. They are comprehensive desk references designed to help legal professionals and companies better understand the landscape of class action law and developments in California, New York, and Illinois. Those states are true epicenters for class action litigation. A significant number of cases are filed and decided in each of those states each year, so they often set the tone for broader legal trends that we then see nationwide.

Jerry: That makes a lot of sense in terms of having available desk references on the three jurisdictions where most class actions are filed. Daniel, from your perspective, why is it important for corporate counsel to stay on top of developments in these particular geographic areas?

Daniel: Well, as you know, Jerry, class action litigation just plays a major role in shaping everything from consumer protection laws, employment practices, and even corporate accountability. Each state has its own nuances and different procedural rules, different judicial interpretations, and evolving case law in each of these areas – and it creates a real challenge for clients and for corporate counsel who are looking at this landscape. Even experienced practitioners can find it difficult to stay current, especially when the landscape is constantly shifting.

Jerry: So that’s where these reviews come in, both hard copies and as e-books that can be put on a computer.

Daniel: Exactly, and we created this collection of reviews to simplify that process. Each volume provides a clear, practical insights into the rules, the trends, and strategic considerations that define class action practice for these specific states.

Jennifer: And to build on that, each review also dives deep into the state-specific procedures in play, highlights recent case developments, as well as offers guidance on how to approach some of those complex litigation challenges that class actions present. Whether you are advising clients, litigating a case, or just trying to deepen your knowledge in this area, these resources are designed to be accessible as well as actionable.

Jerry: I got a call last week from a client who actually had the desk reference on her phone. She said he used it while she was traveling and was able to answer a question while she was traveling – actually from New York to California. And she was able to get the answer in the most recent case. So, definitely a great goal for these desk references.

Jennifer: Absolutely, that’s a great example, and that’s definitely our goal. We wanted to create something that supports better decision-making and helps professionals navigate this increasingly complex area with confidence.

Jerry: Well, great, thanks so much. Before we wrap up, where can listeners find these tools and desk references?

Daniel: The California, New York, and Illinois class action reviews are now available on the Duane Morris Class Action Defense Blog. We encourage everyone to explore this series and see how it can support their work, broaden their perspective on class action law.

Jerry: Fantastic. Jen and Daniel, thanks so much for joining us today on the Class Action Weekly Wire and walking us through this set of desk references that are designed for our loyal listeners. And thank you for stopping in and hope you’ll visit our Duane Morris Class Action Defense Blog and download the new e-books.

Jennifer: Thanks for having me, Jerry, and thanks to all of our listeners.

Daniel: Yeah, thanks again, Jerry, and thanks to everybody who’s tuning in for the Class Action Weekly Wire.

Webinar Recap: Mid-Year Review Of EEOC Litigation And Strategy – Fiscal Year 2026

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, and Daniel D. Spencer

Duane Morris Takeaways: We were honored to have so many loyal blog readers join us for our annual Mid-Year Review of EEOC Litigation And Strategy For Fiscal Year 2026 yesterday. The full video presentation, hosted by Jerry Maatman, Jennifer Riley, and Daniel Spencer, is below:

The EEOC’s fiscal year (“FY 2026”) spans from October 1, 2025, to September 30, 2026. Through the midway point, EEOC has filed 31 enforcement lawsuits, an uptick when compared to the 22 lawsuits filed in the first half of FY 2025, and the 14 lawsuits filed in the first half of FY 2024.. Traditionally, the second half of the EEOC’s fiscal year – and particularly in the final months of August and September – are when the majority of filings occur. However, an early analysis of the types of lawsuits filed, and the locations where they are filed, is informative for employers in terms of what to expect during the fiscal year-end lawsuit filing rush in September.

Cases Filed By EEOC District Offices

In addition to tracking the total number of filings, we closely monitor which of the EEOC’s 15 district offices are most active in terms of filing new cases over the course of the fiscal year. Some districts tend to be more aggressive than others, and some focus on different case filing priorities. The following chart shows the number of lawsuit filings by EEOC district office.

The most notable trend thus far is the 7 lawsuits filed by the Chicago District Office, followed by the 5 filings by the Philadelphia District Office, 3 filings by Indianapolis, 2 filings each for Atlanta, Birmingham, Houston, New York, Phoenix, and San Francisco, and one filing each for Charlotte, Los Angeles, Memphis, Miami, and St. Louis offices. Dallas has yet to see a lawsuit filing for FY 2026. By comparison, similarly in FY 2025 Chicago and Philadelphia led the pack in lawsuit filings, followed by Indianapolis, Phoenix, Houston, Atlanta, and Birmingham.

Analysis Of The Types Of Lawsuits Filed In First Half Of FY 2026

We also analyzed the types of lawsuits the EEOC filed throughout the first six months, in terms of the statutes and theories of discrimination alleged, in order to determine how the EEOC is shifting its strategic priorities. The chart below shows the EEOC filings by allegation type.

Title VII cases once again made up the majority of cases filed.  They constituted 50% of all filings in FY 2026 (same as FY 2025, down from 58% of all filings in FY 2024, and significantly down from 68% of all filings in FY 2023). Overall, ADA cases made up the next most significant percentage of the EEOC’s FY 2026 filings for a total of 40%.  This is up from 31% in FY 2025, yet similar to the 42% of filings in FY 2024. So far there has only been one filing under the ADEA in FY 2026, down from the uptick in ADEA filings in FY 2025. The EEOC filed 9 ADEA cases in FY 2025, compared to 6 age discrimination cases in FY 2024, 12 age discrimination cases in FY 2023, and 7 age discrimination cases in FY 2022.   In the first six months of FY 2026, the EEOC filed 4 cases under the Pregnant Worker’s Fairness Act, on track compared to 6 filings in FY 2025 and 3 filings in FY 2024.  So far, no cases filed under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.  Notably absent from FY 2026’s filings are cases brought under the Equal Pay Act and Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act – two areas that the EEOC repeatedly has cited among its enforcement priorities prior to the second Trump Administration. 

The graph set out below shows the number of lawsuits filed according to the statute under which they were filed (Title VII, Americans With Disabilities Act, Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Equal Pay Act, and Age Discrimination in Employment Act).

The industries impacted by EEOC-initiated litigation have also remained consistent in FY 2026. The chart below details that hospitality, healthcare, and retail employers have maintained their lead as corporate defendants in the last 18 months of EEOC-initiated litigation.  In the first six months of FY 2026, two industries remained in the EEOC’s targets: Hospitality and Retail. On a percentage basis, Hospitality (Restaurants / Hotels / Entertainment) comprised 25.9% of filings, and Retail had 22.2% of filings. A key difference in FY 2025 compared to FY 2024 is Retail (22.2% of FY 2026 filings) overtaking Healthcare (18.5% of FY 2026 filings) and Manufacturing (7.4% of FY 2026 filings) as the next most targeted industry.  Transportation & Logistics entered double digit enforcement activity, at 18.5% of the filings. The remaining industry with at least 2 filings is Construction, representing 7.4% of the filings.

Notable 2026 Lawsuit Filings

Disability Discrimination

In EEOC v. Schneider National, Inc., Case No. 26-CV-905 (D. Md. Mar. 4, 2026), the EEOC filed an action alleging that the defendant, Schneider National, Inc., a nationwide transportation and logistics company, violated the ADA when it refused to reasonably accommodate an applicant with PTSD by denying her request to bring her service dog to work, and withdrawing its job offer because of her disability. The EEOC asserted that the defendant extended a conditional offer of employment to the job candidate. However, next day, after learning that she had post-traumatic stress disorder and needed her service dog, the company withdrew her job offer pending further review. In response to Schneider’s request for additional information, the woman disclosed that her dog was certified as a service animal, trained to alleviate and prevent symptoms of PTSD, and had successfully accompanied her in the truck while she trained and obtained her Class A commercial driver’s license. The EEOC asserted that the defendant refused to allow her to drive with her service dog as an accommodation.

Religious Discrimination

In EEOC v. Blue Eagle Contracting, Inc., Case No. 26-CV-226 (D. Nev. Mar. 31, 2026), the EEOC filed an action against the defendant, a bulk mail delivery contractor for the U.S. Postal Service, alleging religious discrimination in violation of Title VII when it allegedly failed to return a Christian employee truck driver to a weekday shift so he could attend Sunday morning church services. According to the EEOC’s lawsuit, the defendant hired the driver, who informed supervisors of his religious obligations on Sundays stemming from his Christian faith. He was assigned a weekday delivery route, which he worked for several months until he volunteered on an emergency basis to fill a Sunday morning shift after a coworker unexpectedly resigned. The driver reminded his supervisors multiple times that he needed to attend church services on Sunday mornings and said he was only willing to work Sunday mornings until a replacement driver for the weekend shift was hired. The EEOC asserted that although the defendant hired a replacement, it continued to schedule the driver for Sunday shifts, while the replacement drove the weekday shift. The driver ultimately resigned from his position, and the EEOC alleged that the defendant’s failure to accommodate the drivers sincerely held religious beliefs ultimately compelled him to leave his job.

Race Discrimination

In EEOC v. Ourisman Cars Management Company, LLC, et al.), Case No. 26-CV-1233 (D. Md. Mar. 27, 2026), the EEOC brought an action alleging race discrimination after a finance manager at one of the defendants’ car dealerships repeatedly used racially offensive language toward Black salesmen in 2023. Employees reported the behavior to management multiple times, but the EEOC alleged the company did not take sufficient corrective action. The conduct continued, and two employees ultimately left their jobs. The EEOC asserted that the company’s conduct violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.

In EEOC v. Nike, Case No. 26-MC-128 (E.D. Mo. Feb 4, 2026), the EEOC filed a complaint to enforce a subpoena related to claims alleging race discrimination against white workers through DEI programs. The agency seeks to compel Nike’s compliance with a May 2024 subpoena then-commissioner Andrea Lucas issued pointing to workforce representation quotas.

Release Of Enforcement Statistics

On April 6, 2026, the EEOC published its FY 2027 Agency Performance Plan (“APP”) and FY 2025 Agency Performance Report (“APR”). The EEOC reported $660 million recovered through administrative enforcement and litigation for 17,680 alleged victims of discrimination. It also reported $528 million recovered through pre-litigation enforcement process (the highest amount in the agency’s 60-year history), $104.6 million for federal employees and applicants, $55 million recovered as a result of systemic investigations, $27 million through resolution of 120 merits lawsuits, $10.8 million obtained through the resolution of 13 systemic lawsuits, and six new systemic lawsuit filings.

Takeaways For Employers

We anticipate that the EEOC will continue to aggressively pursue its strategic priority areas in FY 2026. There is no reason to believe that the annual “September surge” is not coming, in what could be another precedent-setting year. We will continue to monitor EEOC litigation activity on a daily basis, and look forward to providing our blog readers with up-to-date analysis on the latest developments.

Announcing The Expansion Of The Duane Morris Class Action Review Series With The All-New Digital Assets And Blockchain Class Action Review – 2026!

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, Mauro M. Wolfe, and Justin Donoho

Duane Morris Takeaway: We’re excited to officially announce the release of the all-new Digital Assets And Blockchain Class Action Review – 2026, a new desk reference resource designed to help legal professionals and businesses better understand the evolving landscape of class action law this quickly evolving industry.

With digital assets and blockchain technology continuing to proliferate and the current Presidential Administration maintaining policy goals of reducing enforcement priorities relating to sales of digital assets, crypto class action litigation is multiplying at an increasing rate. The year 2025 was a busy one in the crypto class action litigation landscape, with many new class actions filed, key decisions issued, and large settlements reached, auguring continued trends of further developments in this fast-growing area. This eBook examines key trends, decisions, and settlements regarding these emerging issues.

By 2025, class action litigation involving digital assets, blockchain, and fintech companies had evolved from a peripheral phenomenon into a central feature of complex financial litigation. The Duane Morris Class Action Team created this new resource offering clear, practical insights into the rules, trends, and key considerations that define class action practice in the Digital Assets And Blockchain industry. This is the first in our new series focusing on industry-specific class action litigation, and dives deep into industry-specific procedures, recent case developments, and strategic considerations.

The Digital Assets And Blockchain Class Action Review – 2026 is now available here.

Stay tuned to the Class Action Weekly Wire for more information on this new addition to the Duane Morris Class Action Review series.

“A Matter Of Consent” – Ninth Circuit Finds Non-Mutual Offensive Collateral Estoppel Inappropriate In Invalidating Individual Arbitration Agreements Under The Federal Arbitration Act

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jamar D. Davis, and Caitlin Capriotti

Duane Morris Takeaways: On April 1, 2026, in Laura O’Dell et. al. v. Aya Healthcare Services, Inc., No. 25-1528, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 9420 (9th Cir. Apr. 1, 2026), a panel for the Ninth Circuit held that the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California erred in relying on non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel to preclude the enforcement of hundreds of arbitration agreements based select arbitral awards from unappointed arbitrators for different parties. This decision reaffirms the principle of consent set forth in the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) and the Ninth Circuit’s preference (in line with the FAA) for enforcement of valid arbitration agreements in individualized proceedings.

Case Background

Aya Healthcare Services, Inc. (“Aya”) is an agency the pairs traveling nurses and other supporting clinicians with hospitals in need. In 2022, four former employees filed a putative class action against Aya for allegedly reducing their pay mid-contract, asserting breach of contract, fraudulent inducement, state wage-and-hour violations, and violations under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). As a condition of employment, all employees signed arbitration agreements to resolve any employment-related disputes outside of the court system. Aya moved to compel arbitration, and the U. S. District Court for the Southern District of California (the “District Court”) granted the motion and compelled all four named plaintiffs to arbitration. 

Aya proceeded to arbitrate with each of the four plaintiffs in four separate arbitrations. Each plaintiff challenged the validity of the arbitration agreements, and the delegation clause assigned the arbitrator (rather than the court) authority to decide whether the arbitration agreement was valid. Two arbitrators ruled the arbitration agreements were unconscionable, and two arbitrators ruled the arbitration agreements were valid. By the time the parties moved the District Court to confirm their respective arbitral awards, 255 additional plaintiffs had opted-in to the case pursuant to a collective action procedure under the FLSA. Aya moved to compel each of these plaintiffs to arbitration. In response, a newly assigned district judge raised sua sponte the issue of whether collateral estoppel barred Aya from enforcing the additional arbitration agreements against the opt-in plaintiffs. Ultimately, the District Court denied Aya’s motion to compel arbitration.

The District Court applied the doctrine of non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel to preclude the enforcement of the arbitration agreements between Aya and the 255 employees. This doctrine was “non-mutual” because a party different from the party in the original action is seeking preclusion and “offensive” because the new party is using a prior award as a sword (rather than a shield). However, the District Court only gave the collateral estoppel effect to the two decisions finding the arbitration agreements unconscionable, and awarded no such power to the decisions holding the arbitration agreements as valid. The Ninth Circuit reviewed the motion to compel arbitration de novo.

The Ninth Circuit’s Decision

The Ninth Circuit held that the District Court’s novel application of an equitable preclusion doctrine did not preclude the enforcement of the arbitration agreements because application of the doctrine runs contrary to FAA’s intention to enforce the agreed upon terms of valid arbitration agreements in individualized proceedings. “Precluding an arbitration that the parties had agreed to – because a different arbitrator in a different proceeding had concluded that an agreement between different parties was unconscionable – would render the parties’ consent meaningless,” wrote U.S. Circuit Judge Eric C. Tung (emphasis in original). This goes against the fundamental requirement that each arbitration agreement requires individualized resolution. The Ninth Circuit also stated that “the application of non-mutual offensive issue preclusion would also violate the principle of consent that the [Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”)] incorporates.” Id. at *8. When parties enter arbitration agreements, the FAA serves to have those agreements enforced. Further, even when the validity of an arbitration agreement is at issue, the issue-preclusion doctrine is not a “generally applicable contract defense.” Id.

Further, the Ninth Circuit determined that the District Court’s order effectively transformed individual arbitration proceedings into a bellwether class action to which the parties never agreed. This also goes to the issue of consent. The Ninth Circuit cited the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U.S. 497 (2018), and Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010), as holding that imposing a class action without the parties’ consent (or adequacy of representation) and where the parties had agreed to individual arbitration is a violation of the FAA. Allowing one arbitration proceeding to preclude hundreds or thousands of arbitration agreements, as the logic of the District Court suggests, regardless of adequacy of representation, would strip the resulting class action from all its important protective features.

As a result, the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

Implications For Employers

This decision reaffirms the strength of the FAA and reiterates the Ninth Circuit’s preference for enforcing arbitration agreements on an individualized basis.

District court judges who may have personal preferences against arbitration cannot destroy the FAA with novel doctrines inconsistent with the FAA.

Seventh Circuit Holds BIPA Amendment Applies Retroactively, Reversing Three Illinois Federal Court Decisions

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Hayley Ryan, and Tyler Zmick

Duane Morris Takeaways: On April 1, 2026, in Clay et al. v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. et al., Nos. 25-2185 et al., 2026 WL 891902 (7th Cir. Apr. 1, 2026),  a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed three federal district court decisions and held that the August 2, 2024, amendment to Section 20 of the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”) applies retroactively to cases pending at the time of enactment. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the amendment is remedial because it governs damages rather than liability and, therefore, applies retroactively under Illinois law.

This decision is a watershed win for BIPA defendants in the class action space. It significantly curtails potential exposure by confirming that plaintiffs may recover, at most, $5,000 in statutory damages for intentional violations or $1,000 for negligent violations per person, rather than on a per-scan basis that previously threatened astronomical liability.

Background

As the Seventh Circuit observed, “BIPA has become a font of high-stakes litigation.” Id. at *1.  In response to the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in Cothron v. White Castle Sys., Inc., 216 N.E.3d 918, 926 (Ill. 2023), which held that BIPA claims accrue “with every scan or transmission” of biometric information, the Illinois General Assembly amended Section 20 of the BIPA in August 2024 to clarify the scope of recoverable damages. The amendment provides, in relevant part, that a private entity that collects or discloses “the same biometric identifier or biometric information from the same person using the same method of collection…has committed a single violation…for which the aggrieved person is entitled to, at most, one recovery under this Section.” 740 ILCS 14/20(b) (emphasis added).

The consolidated appeals arose from three cases asserting typical BIPA theories. Plaintiff Reginald Clay alleged that Union Pacific violated Section 15(b) by requiring repeated fingerprint scans to access the company’s facilities. Plaintiffs John Gregg and Brandon Willis alleged that their employers used biometric timekeeping systems in violation of Sections 15(a), (b), and (d).

The Seventh Circuit emphasized the extraordinary financial stakes. Plaintiff Clay alleged approximately 1,500 fingerprint scans – translating to $7.5 million in potential damages for a single plaintiff if damages were calculated on a per-scan basis.  2026 WL 891902 at *2.  In contrast, the putative class claims in Plaintiff Willis’ case exposed the defendant to billions of dollars in potential liability. Id.  The three interlocutory appeals posed the same legal question: whether the 2024 amendment to BIPA Section 20 applies retroactively to limit such exposure.

The Seventh Circuit’s Decision

The Seventh Circuit answered that question with a definitive “yes.” It held that the amendment to Section 20 applies retroactively to pending cases. Id. at *3. 

Applying Illinois retroactivity principles, the Seventh Circuit explained that where the legislature is silent on the temporal reach of the amendment, as here, courts look to Section 4 of the Illinois Statute on Statutes, which, in turn, directs the court to determine whether the amendment is substantive or procedural. Id. (citing Perry v. Dep’t of Fin. & Pro. Regul., 106 N.E.3d 1016, 1026-27 (Ill. 2018)). 

The Seventh Circuit concluded that the amendment is remedial and, therefore, procedural, because it governs damages rather than underlying liability. Id. at *4.  Central to this determination was the statutory text and structure. The legislature amended Section 20, which addresses liquidated damages, rather than Section 15, which sets forth the substantive requirements governing the collection and disclosure of biometric data.  The Seventh Circuit emphasized that the amendment does not alter “the rights, duties, and obligations of persons to one another,” which are the defining characteristics of substantive changes. Id. (citing Perry, 106 N.E.3d at 1034). Instead, the amendment focuses exclusively on the remedies available once a violation has been established.

The appellees argued that the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in Cothron established that each biometric scan constitutes a separate “violation,” and that the amendment therefore effected a substantive change by transforming thousands of violations into a single recoverable event, thus “terminating millions of dollars of liability.” Id. at *4. The Seventh Circuit rejected this position, reasoning that it both misinterprets the statute and overstates Cothron’s holding. Id. at *5. The Court clarified that Cothron addressed only when claims accrue under Section 15 and did not consider the meaning of “violation” for purposes of damages under Section 20. Id.  According to the Seventh Circuit, that distinction was dispositive. Id.

Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit determined that the amendment does not alter the number of violations or the injuries alleged by plaintiffs but instead limits the damages that may be awarded for those violations.  As the Seventh Circuit explained, the amendment “simply changed the statutory award of damages available to plaintiffs, cabining the discretion of trial court judges when they fashion the remedy.” Id. at *6.  Accordingly, the Court held that the amendment is remedial in nature and applies retroactively. Id. at *7. It therefore reversed the district court decisions that had concluded otherwise. Id.

Implications for Companies

Clay is one of the most consequential BIPA defense rulings in years. It materially reshapes the litigation landscape in several key respects:

  • Caps on exposure: The decision eliminates the “per-scan” damages theory asserted by plaintiffs that drove outsized settlement pressure and bet-the-company risk.
  • Immediate impact on pending cases: Defendants in ongoing litigation now have strong grounds to limit damages and revisit class certification, settlement posture, and jurisdictional arguments.
  • Strategic leverage: The ruling provides powerful leverage in motion practice and settlement negotiations, particularly where plaintiffs previously relied on inflated damages models.
  • Deterrence of new filings: By significantly reducing potential recoveries, Clay may dampen the volume of new BIPA filings and recalibrate plaintiffs’ bar incentives.

In sum, Clay delivers a decisive, defense-friendly interpretation of BIPA’s damages framework. Companies facing biometric privacy claims should promptly assess how this ruling affects their litigation strategy and potential exposure.

The Class Action Weekly Wire – Episode 142: New York Federal Court Denies Certification Of An FLSA Collective Action

Duane Morris Takeaway: This week’s episode features Duane Morris partner Jerry Maatman and associates Olga Romadin and Elizabeth Underwood with their discussion of a key ruling in the Southern District of New York denying certification of an FLSA collective action.

Check out today’s episode and subscribe to our show from your preferred podcast platform: Spotify, Amazon Music, Apple Podcasts, Podcast Index, Tune In, Listen Notes, iHeartRadio, Deezer, and YouTube.

Episode Transcript

Jerry Maatman: Thank you, loyal blog listeners and readers, for joining us for the next episode of our weekly podcast series, The Class Action Weekly Wire. I’m Jerry Maatman, a partner at Duane Morris, and joining me today on the podcast are my colleagues Elizabeth Underwood and Olga Romadin. Thanks so much for being here.

Elizabeth Underwood: Great to be here, thank you for having me.

Olga Romadin: Thanks, Jerry. Always good to be on the podcast.

Jerry: Today, we’re going to unpack a major recent decision from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York that’s getting quite a bit of attention in the wage and hour area. It involves a failed attempt by a plaintiff’s counsel to conditionally certify an FLSA collective action against a medical school. Elizabeth, could you set the stage for our listeners on this case?

Elizabeth: Sure, Jerry. This case involves a study coordinator who sued a medical school and related entities, claiming they misclassified him and others as learned professionals, exempt from overtime compensation under the FLSA. He wanted to bring a collective action on behalf of similarly situated research and study coordinators who allegedly weren’t paid overtime.

Jerry: And as I understand it, the ruling at question involved not a preliminary preemptive motion to dismiss, but rather a motion for conditional certification of a collective action, to, in essence, certify this wage in our case.

Olga: Exactly. The case had already gone through some discovery, and that’s important because it affected the standard the court applied when evaluating whether to conditionally certify the collective.

Jerry: Let’s talk about the standard, Elizabeth. I know that that standard around the United States is in flux. What did the Southern District of New York opine on in terms of that standard?

Elizabeth: Sure, so typically at step one of the FLSA certification process, plaintiffs just need to make a modest factual showing that they, and others, are similarly situated. But here, because discovery had already taken place, the court applied a more demanding modest plus standard.

Jerry: That’s not quite, then, like, a Rule 56 summary judgment standard, but it’s certainly more than the usual kind of ‘breathe on a mirror’ standard, where plaintiffs have enjoyed, from the analytics we keep, about an 80% success factor.

Olga: Right. The court expected more developed evidence, not just general allegations or a couple of declarations.

Jerry: In this particular case, what did the plaintiffs offer in support of their motion to conditionally certify the collective action?

Elizabeth: They relied on two declarations and six job descriptions to argue that coordinators were uniformly misclassified and performed similar duties.

Jerry: That’s a little thin, doesn’t sound like much, given the scope that the plaintiff was aiming for in terms of the size of the case.

Olga: It wasn’t. He was trying to represent hundreds of employees across dozens of departments. The court found that his evidence just didn’t capture that breadth or demonstrate meaningful similarity in job duties.

Elizabeth: The defendants came in with much more robust evidence, including 49 job descriptions, showing a wide range of responsibilities. Some coordinators were doing basic data collection, while others were designing clinical studies, making medical recommendations, or interacting directly with patients.

Olga: And the court emphasized that those differences mattered. The roles varied in terms of intellectual rigor, autonomy, and educational requirements, and all this was relevant to whether the learned professional exemption applies.

Jerry: By my way of thinking, having done this for about 35 years, that’s a really key point, because often an employer will ascribe a label to a certain job and classify everyone under that label in the same way, and for the court to determine that simple matter of labeling doesn’t render everybody similarly situated, I think it’s a very key finding by the court.

Olga: Yeah, and it kind of backfired. The plaintiff relied on testimony from the employer’s vice president of human resources, but that testimony actually reinforced the idea that job duties varied widely across coordinators.

Elizabeth: So instead of showing uniformity, it highlighted differences. And the court specifically noted that this undermined the plaintiffs’ argument for collective treatment.

Jerry: So, the bottom line with the court ruling is no conditional certification.

Olga: Correct. The court denied conditional certification, finding the plaintiff failed to meet even the modest plus standards.

Jerry: Let’s turn to the implications of this ruling and the broader meaning of it in terms of the wage and hour space. What should the employers take away from this particular decision?

Elizabeth: So, one big takeaway is the importance of detailed, accurate job descriptions. The employer’s ability to produce dozens of descriptions showing meaningful differences across roles was critical in this case.

Olga: And not just having them – maintaining and organizing them so they can be used effectively in litigation.

Jerry: What about the strategy on the defense side in terms of encountering and opposing these sorts of motions?

Elizabeth: This case highlights the value of pushing for pre-certification discovery. If you can develop a factual record early, you may be able to trigger that higher modest plus standard. And, once you’re there, submitting your own evidence, such as varied job descriptions or testimony, can be very effective in defeating certification. Plaintiffs need more than surface-level evidence to move forward collectively.

Olga: And for employers, this is a reminder that variability in roles, if properly documented, can be a strong defense against collective actions.

Jerry: Well, those are great insights and analysis, Elizabeth and Olga, so thanks so much for joining us on our podcast this week, and I urge all of our listeners to keep checking the Duane Morris Class Action Defense Blog for updates such as this ruling, and we’ll make sure to keep everyone on top of new developments in both the wage and hour space and across the board on class action rulings. So, thanks for being here, and thanks to our listeners for tuning in.

Elizabeth: Thanks for having me, and thanks to the listeners for being here.

Olga: Thanks, everyone. Great to be here.

Three Theories, One Trimmed Down Class: Court Certifies Class and Collective Action For Travel Time and Bonus Program Claims

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jennifer A. Riley, Anna Sheridan, and Elisabeth Bassani

Duane Morris Takeaways: On March 31, 2026, in Justin Lawrence, et al, v. Sun Energy Services LLC d/b/a/ Deep Well Services, 2:23-CV-02155 (W.D. Pa, March 31, 2026), Judge Christy Criswell Wiegand of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania certified, but narrowed, a Rule 23 class action and FLSA collective action after narrowing the case to two of the three asserted theories and adding additional temporal restrictions. In a decision that threads the needle between plaintiffs’ ambition and Rule 23 reality, this is a strong reminder that courts will certify only what can be proven with common evidence, and nothing more.

Case Background

Plaintiff Justin Lawrence (“Lawrence” or “Plaintiff”) brought a hybrid action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and the New Mexico Minimum Wage Act alleging that oilfield company Deep Well Services failed to properly compensate employees in three ways, including: (1) by failing to pay for pre-shift travel to out of town jobsites; (2) by failing to compensate time spent in mandatory pre-shift safety meetings; and (3) by  excluding the bonuses paid to eligible employees when calculating employees’ rate of regular pay.

On October 15, 2024, the Court conditionally certified an FLSA collective action consisting of “current and former employees of Sun Energy Services LLC d/b/a Deep Well Services (“Deep Well”) who have worked in the United States as a Greenhat, Leadhand, Roughneck, or Snubbing Operator from [date certain three years prior to date of Notice] to the present and were not paid for out of town travel, were not paid for the time spent attending pre-shift safety meetings, or who did not have the amount of any quarterly bonus included in the calculation of their regular rate of pay in determining their overtime rate of pay.” Id. at *4. One hundred and fifty-five former or current employees opted in to the collective action.

The Court’s Decision

In a detailed 17-page opinion, Judge Weigand considered whether to certify the New Mexico claims as a class action (and/or to confirm final collective action certification under the FLSA) by analyzing the typicality, commonality, predominance, and superiority factors under each of the three theories put forth by Plaintiffs.

As an initial matter, the Court found that typicality was met for each claim. For Plaintiffs’ Travel Time and Bonus Computation claim, the Court held that commonality, predominance, and superiority were also met. This was found over Deep Well’s objection that the policy regarding payment of out-of-town travel changed in January 2025 allowing for payment of time spent driving to and from jobs but not time spent flying, making it difficult to calculate the amount of each class member’s damages. The Court found however that “differences in the amount of each class member’s damages are insufficient to defeat a finding that common issues predominate.” Id. at *9. The Court similarly found that since each individual member’s expected recover “is likely too meager to incentivize filing an individual action,”  “a class action is the superior method for adjudicating the travel time claim.” Id. at *9.

However, the Court was not convinced by Plaintiffs’ argument that “common evidence ‘binds together’ the putative class members’ claims regarding the pre-shift meetings.” Id. at *10. The Plaintiffs were unable to demonstrate a uniform policy of not paying employees for time spent in pre-shift safety meetings and relied only on deposition testimony that was contradicted elsewhere in the record. The Court also found that Plaintiffs would have to put forth individualized evidence to establish liability with respect to the safety meetings since Deep Well pays their employees an additional two hours of wages for every shift worked . The Court found that allowing the safety meeting claim to proceed as a class would result in countless mini-trials and found that Plaintiff failed to establish either superiority or predominance for the safety meeting claim.

Even after finding that two of the claims met all required elements to be certified, the Court found that the class definition was overly broad. The Court added a time constraint, narrowing the class definition to leave out the safety meeting claims, added language to narrow the class to “only those members whose claims are not barred by the applicable statute of limitations,” and distinguished normal commute time from out-of-town commuting time requiring an overnight stay.  Id. at 14.

Mirroring the ruling for the Rule 23 class certification motion, the Court gave final certification for the collective action relative to the time travel claim and the bonus claim. The Court found that the members of the collective action were similarly situated. Id. at 15. Although the Plaintiffs worked in four different positions, the Court found that they all performed similar enough functions to be found “similarly situated.” Most importantly, however, the Court reasoned that the members of the collective action “challenge the same uniform employer practices” of failing to pay for job time and failure to include the bonus into the regular rate of pay. Id. at 16. Even with the “considerably less stringent” similarly situated requirements under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), the Court concluded that Plaintiff had failed to meet his burden under § 216(b) with respect to the safety meeting claim as there was no company-maintained general practice. As a result, the Court narrowed the collective action to the same class definition.

Implication for Companies

The Lawrence decision shows that courts are not passively evaluating certification – they are scrutinizing it based on the evidentiary record. The Court’s decision not to certify the class under the safety meeting theory shows that difference in how work is performed (across locations, supervisors, or time periods) can be powerful tools at certification, especially when it leads to individualized determinations. 

For employers, the message is clear: attack overbreadth early and often. Even if certification is not defeated outright, narrowing the class can materially reduce exposure.

© 2009- Duane Morris LLP. Duane Morris is a registered service mark of Duane Morris LLP.

The opinions expressed on this blog are those of the author and are not to be construed as legal advice.

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