Class Action Defense

April 8, 2026April 8, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Webinar Recap: Mid-Year Review Of EEOC Litigation And Strategy – Fiscal Year 2026

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, and Daniel D. Spencer

Duane Morris Takeaways: We were honored to have so many loyal blog readers join us for our annual Mid-Year Review of EEOC Litigation And Strategy For Fiscal Year 2026 yesterday. The full video presentation, hosted by Jerry Maatman, Jennifer Riley, and Daniel Spencer, is below:

The EEOC’s fiscal year (“FY 2026”) spans from October 1, 2025, to September 30, 2026. Through the midway point, EEOC has filed 31 enforcement lawsuits, an uptick when compared to the 22 lawsuits filed in the first half of FY 2025, and the 14 lawsuits filed in the first half of FY 2024.. Traditionally, the second half of the EEOC’s fiscal year – and particularly in the final months of August and September – are when the majority of filings occur. However, an early analysis of the types of lawsuits filed, and the locations where they are filed, is informative for employers in terms of what to expect during the fiscal year-end lawsuit filing rush in September.

Cases Filed By EEOC District Offices

In addition to tracking the total number of filings, we closely monitor which of the EEOC’s 15 district offices are most active in terms of filing new cases over the course of the fiscal year. Some districts tend to be more aggressive than others, and some focus on different case filing priorities. The following chart shows the number of lawsuit filings by EEOC district office.

The most notable trend thus far is the 7 lawsuits filed by the Chicago District Office, followed by the 5 filings by the Philadelphia District Office, 3 filings by Indianapolis, 2 filings each for Atlanta, Birmingham, Houston, New York, Phoenix, and San Francisco, and one filing each for Charlotte, Los Angeles, Memphis, Miami, and St. Louis offices. Dallas has yet to see a lawsuit filing for FY 2026. By comparison, similarly in FY 2025 Chicago and Philadelphia led the pack in lawsuit filings, followed by Indianapolis, Phoenix, Houston, Atlanta, and Birmingham.

Analysis Of The Types Of Lawsuits Filed In First Half Of FY 2026

We also analyzed the types of lawsuits the EEOC filed throughout the first six months, in terms of the statutes and theories of discrimination alleged, in order to determine how the EEOC is shifting its strategic priorities. The chart below shows the EEOC filings by allegation type.

Title VII cases once again made up the majority of cases filed. They constituted 50% of all filings in FY 2026 (same as FY 2025, down from 58% of all filings in FY 2024, and significantly down from 68% of all filings in FY 2023). Overall, ADA cases made up the next most significant percentage of the EEOC’s FY 2026 filings for a total of 40%. This is up from 31% in FY 2025, yet similar to the 42% of filings in FY 2024. So far there has only been one filing under the ADEA in FY 2026, down from the uptick in ADEA filings in FY 2025. The EEOC filed 9 ADEA cases in FY 2025, compared to 6 age discrimination cases in FY 2024, 12 age discrimination cases in FY 2023, and 7 age discrimination cases in FY 2022. In the first six months of FY 2026, the EEOC filed 4 cases under the Pregnant Worker’s Fairness Act, on track compared to 6 filings in FY 2025 and 3 filings in FY 2024. So far, no cases filed under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. Notably absent from FY 2026’s filings are cases brought under the Equal Pay Act and Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act – two areas that the EEOC repeatedly has cited among its enforcement priorities prior to the second Trump Administration.

The graph set out below shows the number of lawsuits filed according to the statute under which they were filed (Title VII, Americans With Disabilities Act, Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Equal Pay Act, and Age Discrimination in Employment Act).

The industries impacted by EEOC-initiated litigation have also remained consistent in FY 2026. The chart below details that hospitality, healthcare, and retail employers have maintained their lead as corporate defendants in the last 18 months of EEOC-initiated litigation. In the first six months of FY 2026, two industries remained in the EEOC’s targets: Hospitality and Retail. On a percentage basis, Hospitality (Restaurants / Hotels / Entertainment) comprised 25.9% of filings, and Retail had 22.2% of filings. A key difference in FY 2025 compared to FY 2024 is Retail (22.2% of FY 2026 filings) overtaking Healthcare (18.5% of FY 2026 filings) and Manufacturing (7.4% of FY 2026 filings) as the next most targeted industry. Transportation & Logistics entered double digit enforcement activity, at 18.5% of the filings. The remaining industry with at least 2 filings is Construction, representing 7.4% of the filings.

Notable 2026 Lawsuit Filings

Disability Discrimination

In EEOC v. Schneider National, Inc., Case No. 26-CV-905 (D. Md. Mar. 4, 2026), the EEOC filed an action alleging that the defendant, Schneider National, Inc., a nationwide transportation and logistics company, violated the ADA when it refused to reasonably accommodate an applicant with PTSD by denying her request to bring her service dog to work, and withdrawing its job offer because of her disability. The EEOC asserted that the defendant extended a conditional offer of employment to the job candidate. However, next day, after learning that she had post-traumatic stress disorder and needed her service dog, the company withdrew her job offer pending further review. In response to Schneider’s request for additional information, the woman disclosed that her dog was certified as a service animal, trained to alleviate and prevent symptoms of PTSD, and had successfully accompanied her in the truck while she trained and obtained her Class A commercial driver’s license. The EEOC asserted that the defendant refused to allow her to drive with her service dog as an accommodation.

Religious Discrimination

In EEOC v. Blue Eagle Contracting, Inc., Case No. 26-CV-226 (D. Nev. Mar. 31, 2026), the EEOC filed an action against the defendant, a bulk mail delivery contractor for the U.S. Postal Service, alleging religious discrimination in violation of Title VII when it allegedly failed to return a Christian employee truck driver to a weekday shift so he could attend Sunday morning church services. According to the EEOC’s lawsuit, the defendant hired the driver, who informed supervisors of his religious obligations on Sundays stemming from his Christian faith. He was assigned a weekday delivery route, which he worked for several months until he volunteered on an emergency basis to fill a Sunday morning shift after a coworker unexpectedly resigned. The driver reminded his supervisors multiple times that he needed to attend church services on Sunday mornings and said he was only willing to work Sunday mornings until a replacement driver for the weekend shift was hired. The EEOC asserted that although the defendant hired a replacement, it continued to schedule the driver for Sunday shifts, while the replacement drove the weekday shift. The driver ultimately resigned from his position, and the EEOC alleged that the defendant’s failure to accommodate the drivers sincerely held religious beliefs ultimately compelled him to leave his job.

Race Discrimination

In EEOC v. Ourisman Cars Management Company, LLC, et al.), Case No. 26-CV-1233 (D. Md. Mar. 27, 2026), the EEOC brought an action alleging race discrimination after a finance manager at one of the defendants’ car dealerships repeatedly used racially offensive language toward Black salesmen in 2023. Employees reported the behavior to management multiple times, but the EEOC alleged the company did not take sufficient corrective action. The conduct continued, and two employees ultimately left their jobs. The EEOC asserted that the company’s conduct violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.

In EEOC v. Nike, Case No. 26-MC-128 (E.D. Mo. Feb 4, 2026), the EEOC filed a complaint to enforce a subpoena related to claims alleging race discrimination against white workers through DEI programs. The agency seeks to compel Nike’s compliance with a May 2024 subpoena then-commissioner Andrea Lucas issued pointing to workforce representation quotas.

Release Of Enforcement Statistics

On April 6, 2026, the EEOC published its FY 2027 Agency Performance Plan (“APP”) and FY 2025 Agency Performance Report (“APR”). The EEOC reported $660 million recovered through administrative enforcement and litigation for 17,680 alleged victims of discrimination. It also reported $528 million recovered through pre-litigation enforcement process (the highest amount in the agency’s 60-year history), $104.6 million for federal employees and applicants, $55 million recovered as a result of systemic investigations, $27 million through resolution of 120 merits lawsuits, $10.8 million obtained through the resolution of 13 systemic lawsuits, and six new systemic lawsuit filings.

Takeaways For Employers

We anticipate that the EEOC will continue to aggressively pursue its strategic priority areas in FY 2026. There is no reason to believe that the annual “September surge” is not coming, in what could be another precedent-setting year. We will continue to monitor EEOC litigation activity on a daily basis, and look forward to providing our blog readers with up-to-date analysis on the latest developments.

April 6, 2026April 6, 2026 by Class Action Defense

Announcing The Expansion Of The Duane Morris Class Action Review Series With The All-New Digital Assets And Blockchain Class Action Review – 2026!

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, Mauro M. Wolfe, and Justin Donoho

Duane Morris Takeaway: We’re excited to officially announce the release of the all-new Digital Assets And Blockchain Class Action Review – 2026, a new desk reference resource designed to help legal professionals and businesses better understand the evolving landscape of class action law this quickly evolving industry.

With digital assets and blockchain technology continuing to proliferate and the current Presidential Administration maintaining policy goals of reducing enforcement priorities relating to sales of digital assets, crypto class action litigation is multiplying at an increasing rate. The year 2025 was a busy one in the crypto class action litigation landscape, with many new class actions filed, key decisions issued, and large settlements reached, auguring continued trends of further developments in this fast-growing area. This eBook examines key trends, decisions, and settlements regarding these emerging issues.

By 2025, class action litigation involving digital assets, blockchain, and fintech companies had evolved from a peripheral phenomenon into a central feature of complex financial litigation. The Duane Morris Class Action Team created this new resource offering clear, practical insights into the rules, trends, and key considerations that define class action practice in the Digital Assets And Blockchain industry. This is the first in our new series focusing on industry-specific class action litigation, and dives deep into industry-specific procedures, recent case developments, and strategic considerations.

The Digital Assets And Blockchain Class Action Review – 2026 is now available here.

Stay tuned to the Class Action Weekly Wire for more information on this new addition to the Duane Morris Class Action Review series.

April 3, 2026April 3, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

“A Matter Of Consent” – Ninth Circuit Finds Non-Mutual Offensive Collateral Estoppel Inappropriate In Invalidating Individual Arbitration Agreements Under The Federal Arbitration Act

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jamar D. Davis, and Caitlin Capriotti

Duane Morris Takeaways: On April 1, 2026, in Laura O’Dell et. al. v. Aya Healthcare Services, Inc., No. 25-1528, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 9420 (9th Cir. Apr. 1, 2026), a panel for the Ninth Circuit held that the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California erred in relying on non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel to preclude the enforcement of hundreds of arbitration agreements based select arbitral awards from unappointed arbitrators for different parties. This decision reaffirms the principle of consent set forth in the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) and the Ninth Circuit’s preference (in line with the FAA) for enforcement of valid arbitration agreements in individualized proceedings.

Case Background

Aya Healthcare Services, Inc. (“Aya”) is an agency the pairs traveling nurses and other supporting clinicians with hospitals in need. In 2022, four former employees filed a putative class action against Aya for allegedly reducing their pay mid-contract, asserting breach of contract, fraudulent inducement, state wage-and-hour violations, and violations under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). As a condition of employment, all employees signed arbitration agreements to resolve any employment-related disputes outside of the court system. Aya moved to compel arbitration, and the U. S. District Court for the Southern District of California (the “District Court”) granted the motion and compelled all four named plaintiffs to arbitration.

Aya proceeded to arbitrate with each of the four plaintiffs in four separate arbitrations. Each plaintiff challenged the validity of the arbitration agreements, and the delegation clause assigned the arbitrator (rather than the court) authority to decide whether the arbitration agreement was valid. Two arbitrators ruled the arbitration agreements were unconscionable, and two arbitrators ruled the arbitration agreements were valid. By the time the parties moved the District Court to confirm their respective arbitral awards, 255 additional plaintiffs had opted-in to the case pursuant to a collective action procedure under the FLSA. Aya moved to compel each of these plaintiffs to arbitration. In response, a newly assigned district judge raised sua sponte the issue of whether collateral estoppel barred Aya from enforcing the additional arbitration agreements against the opt-in plaintiffs. Ultimately, the District Court denied Aya’s motion to compel arbitration.

The District Court applied the doctrine of non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel to preclude the enforcement of the arbitration agreements between Aya and the 255 employees. This doctrine was “non-mutual” because a party different from the party in the original action is seeking preclusion and “offensive” because the new party is using a prior award as a sword (rather than a shield). However, the District Court only gave the collateral estoppel effect to the two decisions finding the arbitration agreements unconscionable, and awarded no such power to the decisions holding the arbitration agreements as valid. The Ninth Circuit reviewed the motion to compel arbitration de novo.

The Ninth Circuit’s Decision

The Ninth Circuit held that the District Court’s novel application of an equitable preclusion doctrine did not preclude the enforcement of the arbitration agreements because application of the doctrine runs contrary to FAA’s intention to enforce the agreed upon terms of valid arbitration agreements in individualized proceedings. “Precluding an arbitration that the parties had agreed to – because a different arbitrator in a different proceeding had concluded that an agreement between different parties was unconscionable – would render the parties’ consent meaningless,” wrote U.S. Circuit Judge Eric C. Tung (emphasis in original). This goes against the fundamental requirement that each arbitration agreement requires individualized resolution. The Ninth Circuit also stated that “the application of non-mutual offensive issue preclusion would also violate the principle of consent that the [Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”)] incorporates.” Id. at *8. When parties enter arbitration agreements, the FAA serves to have those agreements enforced. Further, even when the validity of an arbitration agreement is at issue, the issue-preclusion doctrine is not a “generally applicable contract defense.” Id.

Further, the Ninth Circuit determined that the District Court’s order effectively transformed individual arbitration proceedings into a bellwether class action to which the parties never agreed. This also goes to the issue of consent. The Ninth Circuit cited the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U.S. 497 (2018), and Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010), as holding that imposing a class action without the parties’ consent (or adequacy of representation) and where the parties had agreed to individual arbitration is a violation of the FAA. Allowing one arbitration proceeding to preclude hundreds or thousands of arbitration agreements, as the logic of the District Court suggests, regardless of adequacy of representation, would strip the resulting class action from all its important protective features.

As a result, the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

Implications For Employers

This decision reaffirms the strength of the FAA and reiterates the Ninth Circuit’s preference for enforcing arbitration agreements on an individualized basis.

District court judges who may have personal preferences against arbitration cannot destroy the FAA with novel doctrines inconsistent with the FAA.

April 3, 2026April 3, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Seventh Circuit Holds BIPA Amendment Applies Retroactively, Reversing Three Illinois Federal Court Decisions

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Hayley Ryan, and Tyler Zmick

Duane Morris Takeaways: On April 1, 2026, in Clay et al. v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. et al., Nos. 25-2185 et al., 2026 WL 891902 (7th Cir. Apr. 1, 2026), a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed three federal district court decisions and held that the August 2, 2024, amendment to Section 20 of the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”) applies retroactively to cases pending at the time of enactment. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the amendment is remedial because it governs damages rather than liability and, therefore, applies retroactively under Illinois law.

This decision is a watershed win for BIPA defendants in the class action space. It significantly curtails potential exposure by confirming that plaintiffs may recover, at most, $5,000 in statutory damages for intentional violations or $1,000 for negligent violations per person, rather than on a per-scan basis that previously threatened astronomical liability.

Background

As the Seventh Circuit observed, “BIPA has become a font of high-stakes litigation.” Id. at *1. In response to the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in Cothron v. White Castle Sys., Inc., 216 N.E.3d 918, 926 (Ill. 2023), which held that BIPA claims accrue “with every scan or transmission” of biometric information, the Illinois General Assembly amended Section 20 of the BIPA in August 2024 to clarify the scope of recoverable damages. The amendment provides, in relevant part, that a private entity that collects or discloses “the same biometric identifier or biometric information from the same person using the same method of collection…has committed a single violation…for which the aggrieved person is entitled to, at most, one recovery under this Section.” 740 ILCS 14/20(b) (emphasis added).

The consolidated appeals arose from three cases asserting typical BIPA theories. Plaintiff Reginald Clay alleged that Union Pacific violated Section 15(b) by requiring repeated fingerprint scans to access the company’s facilities. Plaintiffs John Gregg and Brandon Willis alleged that their employers used biometric timekeeping systems in violation of Sections 15(a), (b), and (d).

The Seventh Circuit emphasized the extraordinary financial stakes. Plaintiff Clay alleged approximately 1,500 fingerprint scans – translating to $7.5 million in potential damages for a single plaintiff if damages were calculated on a per-scan basis. 2026 WL 891902 at *2. In contrast, the putative class claims in Plaintiff Willis’ case exposed the defendant to billions of dollars in potential liability. Id. The three interlocutory appeals posed the same legal question: whether the 2024 amendment to BIPA Section 20 applies retroactively to limit such exposure.

The Seventh Circuit’s Decision

The Seventh Circuit answered that question with a definitive “yes.” It held that the amendment to Section 20 applies retroactively to pending cases. Id. at *3.

Applying Illinois retroactivity principles, the Seventh Circuit explained that where the legislature is silent on the temporal reach of the amendment, as here, courts look to Section 4 of the Illinois Statute on Statutes, which, in turn, directs the court to determine whether the amendment is substantive or procedural. Id. (citing Perry v. Dep’t of Fin. & Pro. Regul., 106 N.E.3d 1016, 1026-27 (Ill. 2018)).

The Seventh Circuit concluded that the amendment is remedial and, therefore, procedural, because it governs damages rather than underlying liability. Id. at *4. Central to this determination was the statutory text and structure. The legislature amended Section 20, which addresses liquidated damages, rather than Section 15, which sets forth the substantive requirements governing the collection and disclosure of biometric data. The Seventh Circuit emphasized that the amendment does not alter “the rights, duties, and obligations of persons to one another,” which are the defining characteristics of substantive changes. Id. (citing Perry, 106 N.E.3d at 1034). Instead, the amendment focuses exclusively on the remedies available once a violation has been established.

The appellees argued that the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in Cothron established that each biometric scan constitutes a separate “violation,” and that the amendment therefore effected a substantive change by transforming thousands of violations into a single recoverable event, thus “terminating millions of dollars of liability.” Id. at *4. The Seventh Circuit rejected this position, reasoning that it both misinterprets the statute and overstates Cothron’s holding. Id. at *5. The Court clarified that Cothron addressed only when claims accrue under Section 15 and did not consider the meaning of “violation” for purposes of damages under Section 20. Id. According to the Seventh Circuit, that distinction was dispositive. Id.

Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit determined that the amendment does not alter the number of violations or the injuries alleged by plaintiffs but instead limits the damages that may be awarded for those violations. As the Seventh Circuit explained, the amendment “simply changed the statutory award of damages available to plaintiffs, cabining the discretion of trial court judges when they fashion the remedy.” Id. at *6. Accordingly, the Court held that the amendment is remedial in nature and applies retroactively. Id. at *7. It therefore reversed the district court decisions that had concluded otherwise. Id.

Implications for Companies

Clay is one of the most consequential BIPA defense rulings in years. It materially reshapes the litigation landscape in several key respects:

Caps on exposure: The decision eliminates the “per-scan” damages theory asserted by plaintiffs that drove outsized settlement pressure and bet-the-company risk.
Immediate impact on pending cases: Defendants in ongoing litigation now have strong grounds to limit damages and revisit class certification, settlement posture, and jurisdictional arguments.
Strategic leverage: The ruling provides powerful leverage in motion practice and settlement negotiations, particularly where plaintiffs previously relied on inflated damages models.
Deterrence of new filings: By significantly reducing potential recoveries, Clay may dampen the volume of new BIPA filings and recalibrate plaintiffs’ bar incentives.

In sum, Clay delivers a decisive, defense-friendly interpretation of BIPA’s damages framework. Companies facing biometric privacy claims should promptly assess how this ruling affects their litigation strategy and potential exposure.

April 2, 2026April 2, 2026 by Class Action Defense

The Class Action Weekly Wire – Episode 142: New York Federal Court Denies Certification Of An FLSA Collective Action

Duane Morris Takeaway: This week’s episode features Duane Morris partner Jerry Maatman and associates Olga Romadin and Elizabeth Underwood with their discussion of a key ruling in the Southern District of New York denying certification of an FLSA collective action.

Check out today’s episode and subscribe to our show from your preferred podcast platform: Spotify, Amazon Music, Apple Podcasts, Podcast Index, Tune In, Listen Notes, iHeartRadio, Deezer, and YouTube.

Episode Transcript

Jerry Maatman: Thank you, loyal blog listeners and readers, for joining us for the next episode of our weekly podcast series, The Class Action Weekly Wire. I’m Jerry Maatman, a partner at Duane Morris, and joining me today on the podcast are my colleagues Elizabeth Underwood and Olga Romadin. Thanks so much for being here.

Elizabeth Underwood: Great to be here, thank you for having me.

Olga Romadin: Thanks, Jerry. Always good to be on the podcast.

Jerry: Today, we’re going to unpack a major recent decision from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York that’s getting quite a bit of attention in the wage and hour area. It involves a failed attempt by a plaintiff’s counsel to conditionally certify an FLSA collective action against a medical school. Elizabeth, could you set the stage for our listeners on this case?

Elizabeth: Sure, Jerry. This case involves a study coordinator who sued a medical school and related entities, claiming they misclassified him and others as learned professionals, exempt from overtime compensation under the FLSA. He wanted to bring a collective action on behalf of similarly situated research and study coordinators who allegedly weren’t paid overtime.

Jerry: And as I understand it, the ruling at question involved not a preliminary preemptive motion to dismiss, but rather a motion for conditional certification of a collective action, to, in essence, certify this wage in our case.

Olga: Exactly. The case had already gone through some discovery, and that’s important because it affected the standard the court applied when evaluating whether to conditionally certify the collective.

Jerry: Let’s talk about the standard, Elizabeth. I know that that standard around the United States is in flux. What did the Southern District of New York opine on in terms of that standard?

Elizabeth: Sure, so typically at step one of the FLSA certification process, plaintiffs just need to make a modest factual showing that they, and others, are similarly situated. But here, because discovery had already taken place, the court applied a more demanding modest plus standard.

Jerry: That’s not quite, then, like, a Rule 56 summary judgment standard, but it’s certainly more than the usual kind of ‘breathe on a mirror’ standard, where plaintiffs have enjoyed, from the analytics we keep, about an 80% success factor.

Olga: Right. The court expected more developed evidence, not just general allegations or a couple of declarations.

Jerry: In this particular case, what did the plaintiffs offer in support of their motion to conditionally certify the collective action?

Elizabeth: They relied on two declarations and six job descriptions to argue that coordinators were uniformly misclassified and performed similar duties.

Jerry: That’s a little thin, doesn’t sound like much, given the scope that the plaintiff was aiming for in terms of the size of the case.

Olga: It wasn’t. He was trying to represent hundreds of employees across dozens of departments. The court found that his evidence just didn’t capture that breadth or demonstrate meaningful similarity in job duties.

Elizabeth: The defendants came in with much more robust evidence, including 49 job descriptions, showing a wide range of responsibilities. Some coordinators were doing basic data collection, while others were designing clinical studies, making medical recommendations, or interacting directly with patients.

Olga: And the court emphasized that those differences mattered. The roles varied in terms of intellectual rigor, autonomy, and educational requirements, and all this was relevant to whether the learned professional exemption applies.

Jerry: By my way of thinking, having done this for about 35 years, that’s a really key point, because often an employer will ascribe a label to a certain job and classify everyone under that label in the same way, and for the court to determine that simple matter of labeling doesn’t render everybody similarly situated, I think it’s a very key finding by the court.

Olga: Yeah, and it kind of backfired. The plaintiff relied on testimony from the employer’s vice president of human resources, but that testimony actually reinforced the idea that job duties varied widely across coordinators.

Elizabeth: So instead of showing uniformity, it highlighted differences. And the court specifically noted that this undermined the plaintiffs’ argument for collective treatment.

Jerry: So, the bottom line with the court ruling is no conditional certification.

Olga: Correct. The court denied conditional certification, finding the plaintiff failed to meet even the modest plus standards.

Jerry: Let’s turn to the implications of this ruling and the broader meaning of it in terms of the wage and hour space. What should the employers take away from this particular decision?

Elizabeth: So, one big takeaway is the importance of detailed, accurate job descriptions. The employer’s ability to produce dozens of descriptions showing meaningful differences across roles was critical in this case.

Olga: And not just having them – maintaining and organizing them so they can be used effectively in litigation.

Jerry: What about the strategy on the defense side in terms of encountering and opposing these sorts of motions?

Elizabeth: This case highlights the value of pushing for pre-certification discovery. If you can develop a factual record early, you may be able to trigger that higher modest plus standard. And, once you’re there, submitting your own evidence, such as varied job descriptions or testimony, can be very effective in defeating certification. Plaintiffs need more than surface-level evidence to move forward collectively.

Olga: And for employers, this is a reminder that variability in roles, if properly documented, can be a strong defense against collective actions.

Jerry: Well, those are great insights and analysis, Elizabeth and Olga, so thanks so much for joining us on our podcast this week, and I urge all of our listeners to keep checking the Duane Morris Class Action Defense Blog for updates such as this ruling, and we’ll make sure to keep everyone on top of new developments in both the wage and hour space and across the board on class action rulings. So, thanks for being here, and thanks to our listeners for tuning in.

Elizabeth: Thanks for having me, and thanks to the listeners for being here.

Olga: Thanks, everyone. Great to be here.

April 1, 2026April 1, 2026 by Class Action Defense

Three Theories, One Trimmed Down Class: Court Certifies Class and Collective Action For Travel Time and Bonus Program Claims

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jennifer A. Riley, Anna Sheridan, and Elisabeth Bassani

Duane Morris Takeaways: On March 31, 2026, in Justin Lawrence, et al, v. Sun Energy Services LLC d/b/a/ Deep Well Services, 2:23-CV-02155 (W.D. Pa, March 31, 2026), Judge Christy Criswell Wiegand of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania certified, but narrowed, a Rule 23 class action and FLSA collective action after narrowing the case to two of the three asserted theories and adding additional temporal restrictions. In a decision that threads the needle between plaintiffs’ ambition and Rule 23 reality, this is a strong reminder that courts will certify only what can be proven with common evidence, and nothing more.

Case Background

Plaintiff Justin Lawrence (“Lawrence” or “Plaintiff”) brought a hybrid action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and the New Mexico Minimum Wage Act alleging that oilfield company Deep Well Services failed to properly compensate employees in three ways, including: (1) by failing to pay for pre-shift travel to out of town jobsites; (2) by failing to compensate time spent in mandatory pre-shift safety meetings; and (3) by excluding the bonuses paid to eligible employees when calculating employees’ rate of regular pay.

On October 15, 2024, the Court conditionally certified an FLSA collective action consisting of “current and former employees of Sun Energy Services LLC d/b/a Deep Well Services (“Deep Well”) who have worked in the United States as a Greenhat, Leadhand, Roughneck, or Snubbing Operator from [date certain three years prior to date of Notice] to the present and were not paid for out of town travel, were not paid for the time spent attending pre-shift safety meetings, or who did not have the amount of any quarterly bonus included in the calculation of their regular rate of pay in determining their overtime rate of pay.” Id. at *4. One hundred and fifty-five former or current employees opted in to the collective action.

The Court’s Decision

In a detailed 17-page opinion, Judge Weigand considered whether to certify the New Mexico claims as a class action (and/or to confirm final collective action certification under the FLSA) by analyzing the typicality, commonality, predominance, and superiority factors under each of the three theories put forth by Plaintiffs.

As an initial matter, the Court found that typicality was met for each claim. For Plaintiffs’ Travel Time and Bonus Computation claim, the Court held that commonality, predominance, and superiority were also met. This was found over Deep Well’s objection that the policy regarding payment of out-of-town travel changed in January 2025 allowing for payment of time spent driving to and from jobs but not time spent flying, making it difficult to calculate the amount of each class member’s damages. The Court found however that “differences in the amount of each class member’s damages are insufficient to defeat a finding that common issues predominate.” Id. at *9. The Court similarly found that since each individual member’s expected recover “is likely too meager to incentivize filing an individual action,” “a class action is the superior method for adjudicating the travel time claim.” Id. at *9.

However, the Court was not convinced by Plaintiffs’ argument that “common evidence ‘binds together’ the putative class members’ claims regarding the pre-shift meetings.” Id. at *10. The Plaintiffs were unable to demonstrate a uniform policy of not paying employees for time spent in pre-shift safety meetings and relied only on deposition testimony that was contradicted elsewhere in the record. The Court also found that Plaintiffs would have to put forth individualized evidence to establish liability with respect to the safety meetings since Deep Well pays their employees an additional two hours of wages for every shift worked . The Court found that allowing the safety meeting claim to proceed as a class would result in countless mini-trials and found that Plaintiff failed to establish either superiority or predominance for the safety meeting claim.

Even after finding that two of the claims met all required elements to be certified, the Court found that the class definition was overly broad. The Court added a time constraint, narrowing the class definition to leave out the safety meeting claims, added language to narrow the class to “only those members whose claims are not barred by the applicable statute of limitations,” and distinguished normal commute time from out-of-town commuting time requiring an overnight stay. Id. at 14.

Mirroring the ruling for the Rule 23 class certification motion, the Court gave final certification for the collective action relative to the time travel claim and the bonus claim. The Court found that the members of the collective action were similarly situated. Id. at 15. Although the Plaintiffs worked in four different positions, the Court found that they all performed similar enough functions to be found “similarly situated.” Most importantly, however, the Court reasoned that the members of the collective action “challenge the same uniform employer practices” of failing to pay for job time and failure to include the bonus into the regular rate of pay. Id. at 16. Even with the “considerably less stringent” similarly situated requirements under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), the Court concluded that Plaintiff had failed to meet his burden under § 216(b) with respect to the safety meeting claim as there was no company-maintained general practice. As a result, the Court narrowed the collective action to the same class definition.

Implication for Companies

The Lawrence decision shows that courts are not passively evaluating certification – they are scrutinizing it based on the evidentiary record. The Court’s decision not to certify the class under the safety meeting theory shows that difference in how work is performed (across locations, supervisors, or time periods) can be powerful tools at certification, especially when it leads to individualized determinations.

For employers, the message is clear: attack overbreadth early and often. Even if certification is not defeated outright, narrowing the class can materially reduce exposure.

April 1, 2026April 1, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

New York Federal Court Recommends Denial Of Class Certification In Gender Pay Discrimination Suit Against Bloomberg

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Denis Yavorskiy, and Elizabeth Underwood

Duane Morris Takeaways: On March 24, 2026, in Ndugga v. Bloomberg L.P., No. 20 Civ. 7464, 2026 WL 828730 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2026), Magistrate Judge Gabriel W. Gorenstein in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York issued a Report and Recommendation recommending that class certification be denied in a gender-based pay discrimination case brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”) and the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 290-301 (“NYSHRL”). The Magistrate Judge determined that Plaintiff’s statistical evidence was not significant and flawed and that Plaintiff failed to show that any pay disparity was traceable to a particular senior executive at Bloomberg L.P. (“Bloomberg”).

For employers defending against pattern-or-practice pay discrimination class actions, this decision provides a roadmap for defeating commonality and is a reminder that statistical evidence must be both methodologically sound and causally connected to an identified employment practice.

Case Background

Naula Ndugga, a Black female news producer formerly employed at Bloomberg News, sued Bloomberg alleging gender-based pay discrimination. Ndugga began working as a paid intern at Bloomberg News in September 2017. Ndugga alleged that she was paid a starting salary of $65,000 while male producers hired out of the same internship program received $75,000 and that she was repeatedly overlooked for raises, promotions, and favorable assignments. Her operative complaint, filed in July 2024, sought certification a “U.S. Class” and a “New York Class,” each of which included female reporters, producers, and editors who “(1) were not Team Leaders or in other supervisory positions, and (2) were subjected to [Bloomberg’s] compensation systems.” Id. at *2-3. According to Bloomberg, members of the putative classes worked in nearly 30 cities, in more than 30 different business units, held more than 30 different job profiles, and were assigned to more than 40 different peer groups. Id. at *5.

Central to Ndugga’s theory was that compensation at Bloomberg News was controlled by a “single decisionmaker:” Reto Gregori, Bloomberg News’ deputy editor and a member of its Editorial and Research Management Committee. Id. at *4. Ndugga maintained that Gregori “micromanaged, at both systemic and individual levels, every stage of [Bloomberg News’] multipart evaluation and compensation systems,” resulting in lower pay for women. Id. at *5. Bloomberg countered that performance ratings and compensation decisions were made by hundreds of different managers across the organization. Id.

Ndugga retained labor economist Dr. David Neumark, who performed a regression analysis comparing compensation between female and male employees while controlling for variables such as race, experience, education, job profile, performance ratings, business unit, and an accounting category referred to as “Cost Center.” Id. at *19. For the proposed U.S. Class, Neumark found that female employees’ total compensation was 3.1% below that of similarly situated male employees, which was a difference of 1.64 standard deviations. Id. at *20. For the proposed New York Class, Neumark found a 4.4% disparity, amounting to a difference of 2.29 standard deviations. Id.

The Court’s Analysis

Magistrate Judge Gorenstein’s recommended denying class certification on the grounds that Ndugga failed to put forward sufficient evidence of discrimination to satisfy the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2).

First, the Magistrate Judge determined that Neumark’s 1.64 standard deviation result as to the proposed U.S. Class was, by Neumark’s own admission, not statistically significant. Citing Ottaviani v. State Univ. of New York at New Paltz, 875 F.2d 365, 371 (2d Cir. 1989), the court explained that “[a] finding of two standard deviations corresponds approximately to a one in twenty, or five percent, chance that a disparity is merely a random deviation from the norm.” Id. at *15. While some courts have relaxed this threshold for small samples sizes, the Magistrate Judge found no basis for disregarding this rule because Neumark’s analysis was based on a large dataset of 750 compensation records. Id. at *31.

Second, for both proposed classes, the Magistrate Judge found that Neumark’s inclusion of “Cost Center” as a control variable in his regression analysis was improper. Cost Center is an organizational accounting category to which costs are charged, and Neumark even acknowledged that it “does not play a role in compensation guidelines.” Id. at *35. Bloomberg’s expert, Dr. Denise Neumann Martin, demonstrated that when Cost Center was excluded from the analysis, any observed pay differences between men and women were no longer statistically significant at either the 5% or 10% levels. Id. at *38. Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge found that the inclusion of this variable “obfuscate[d] the principal explanatory variable” and created a mere “appearance of difference.” Id.

Finally, the Magistrate Judge agreed with Bloomberg that Ndugga did not provide adequate evidence to show that any disparity in pay was traceable to Gregori. Id. Specifically, the court noted that even if Gregori may have been involved in all aspects of compensation, this does not in itself establish that he was responsible for any pay disparity. Id. at *39.

Implications For Employers

This Report and Recommendation in the Ndugga case is a win for employers defending against pattern-or-practice gender pay discrimination class actions and provides guidance on how to defeat a showing of commonality. Employers should scrutinize a plaintiff expert’s findings and assumptions, including whether they fall below the two-standard-deviation threshold, the size of the data set considered, and whether certain control variables are irrelevant like the Cost Center variable was here.

The court’s analysis also illustrates that where lower-level managers exercise substantial discretion over performance ratings and compensation, the involvement of a senior executive in a final review capacity does not automatically transform the process into a class-wide common policy. Even if a plaintiff can show a common mode of exercising discretion through a decisionmaker’s influence, she still must establish a causal relationship between this practice and the pay discrimination alleged.

March 31, 2026March 31, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

AbbVie Defeats Genetic Privacy Class Action Because Request For Plaintiff’s Family Medical History Was Not A “Condition Of Employment”

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Tyler Zmick, and Hayley Ryan

Duane Morris Takeaways: In Henry v. AbbVie, Inc., No. 23-CV-16830 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 2026), Judge Manish S. Shah of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed a claim brought under the Illinois Genetic Information Privacy Act (“GIPA”). In his ruling, Judge Shah determined that the alleged request for plaintiff’s family medical history (which history Plaintiff did not provide) during his pre-employment medical screening was not a “condition of employment.” The decision is welcome news for employers that ask employees to undergo medical exams. The ruling indicates that an employer does not necessarily request genetic information “as a condition of employment” by requiring an employee to undergo a medical exam (even if an employee is asked to disclose genetic information during the exam).

Background

Plaintiff Daniel Henry was assigned to work for Defendant AbbVie, Inc., a biopharmaceutical company. During the onboarding process, Plaintiff was required to undergo a “medical surveillance,” which included “questionnaires, blood work, and a brief physical exam.” Henry v. AbbVie, Inc., 2026 WL 788630, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 2026).

AbbVie used Premise Health, a third-party healthcare provider, to conduct Plaintiff’s medical screening. During the screening, Premise Health nurses asked Plaintiff to complete a written questionnaire and to undergo a physical examination. “Section U” of the questionnaire asked for Plaintiff’s genetic information (specifically, his family medical history), though Plaintiff did not complete that part of the form. Plaintiff claimed that nurses also verbally asked for his family medical history during the physical exam. After the exam, Plaintiff worked at an AbbVie facility in Illinois for four months.

Plaintiff subsequently sued AbbVie under the GIPA, alleging that the company violated Section 25(c)(1) of the statute by “solicit[ing], request[ing], [or] requir[ing] . . . genetic information of a person or a family member of the person . . . as a condition of employment [or] preemployment application.” 410 ILCS 513/25(c)(1).

AbbVie first responded to Plaintiff’s Complaint by moving to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Judge Shah denied AbbVie’s motion to dismiss after determining that the family medical history information sought during the medical screening constituted “genetic information” under the GIPA. See Henry v. AbbVie, Inc., 2024 WL 4278070, at *5-6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 24, 2024).

AbbVie later moved for summary judgment, arguing that: (1) AbbVie did not request Plaintiff’s genetic information because third-party Premise Health (not AbbVie) conducted the screening; (2) even if AbbVie requested Plaintiff’s genetic information, the request was inadvertent because the medical questionnaire instructed Plaintiff to not disclose genetic information; and (3) AbbVie did not condition Plaintiff’s work status or assignment on any request for his genetic information.

The Court’s Decision

The Court granted AbbVie’s motion for summary judgment. While the Court was not persuaded by AbbVie’s first two arguments, it concluded that AbbVie’s third argument warranted dismissal of Plaintiff’s GIPA claim.

Request for Genetic Information

The Court first considered whether AbbVie can be characterized as having requested Plaintiff’s family medical history despite third-party Premise Health having conducted the medical screening. In answering in the affirmative, the Court relied on the GIPA’s incorporation of certain protections found in the federal Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (“GINA”). See 410 ILCS 513/25(a) (“An employer … shall treat genetic testing and genetic information in such a manner that is consistent with the requirements of federal law, including but not limited to [GINA].”). The Court cited a regulation promulgated under GINA providing that an employer that requires employees or applicants to undergo medical examinations “must tell health care providers not to collect genetic information, including family medical history, as part of a medical examination intended to determine the ability to perform a job.” 29 C.F.R. § 1635.8(d). Based on this federal regulation, the Court concluded that AbbVie “[n]ot telling Premise Health to elicit genetic information is not enough; the [GIPA] requires an affirmative instruction not to elicit it.” Henry, 2026 WL 788630, at *5.

Inadvertent Disclosure

AbbVie’s second argument turned on the GIPA’s “inadvertent exception,” which states that “inadvertently requesting family medical history by an employer … does not violate this Act.” 410 ILCS 513/25(g). The Court observed that AbbVie’s health questionnaire advised Plaintiff to “not provide any genetic information, including family medical history.” Henry, 2026 WL 788630, at *6 (citation omitted). Thus, the Court held that the inadvertent exception barred Plaintiff’s claim to the extent it was premised on the written questionnaire. See id. (“The disclaimer on AbbVie’s form was enough to make any disclosure on the form inadvertent.”). But the Court determined that the exception did not necessarily bar Plaintiff’s claim to the extent it was premised on nurses orally asking for his family medical history. See id. (“[T]he written disclaimer in the form does not necessarily mean that [Plaintiff] knew that he should not disclose genetic information in response to verbal questions during his physical exam.”) (emphasis added).

Request as a Condition of Employment

Finally, the Court turned to AbbVie’s argument that Plaintiff’s claim failed because any request for his family medical history was not a condition of his employment. See 410 ILCS 513/25(c)(1) (an employer may not “solicit, request, [or] require … genetic information of a person or a family member of the person … as a condition of employment [or] preemployment application”) (emphasis added). The Court agreed with AbbVie and granted the company’s motion for summary judgment on this basis, holding that no genuine issue of material fact existed regarding AbbVie’s request for Plaintiff’s family medical history not having been a condition of his employment. The Court further noted that “the request for genetic information on the written questionnaire was not a condition of [Plaintiff’s] employment, for the simple fact that [Plaintiff] did not fill out that section and it did not affect his employment with AbbVie.” Henry, 2026 WL 788630, at *6.

Moreover, the Court concluded that even if Plaintiff was required to undergo a medical exam to be eligible to work at AbbVie, that did not mean that the verbal request for his family medical history (made during the exam) was a condition of his employment. See id. at *7. The Court thus recognized an important distinction between (i) AbbVie requiring Plaintiff to undergo a medical screening as a condition of employment and (ii) AbbVie specifically requesting Plaintiff’s family medical history as a condition of employment. See id. (“[T]hat [Plaintiff] could not decline to complete his medical surveillance does not create a genuine dispute over whether the verbal request during his exam was a condition of his employment. The undisputed evidence is that a contractor could decline parts of the surveillance and still have the surveillance considered completed.”). Accordingly, because AbbVie did not condition Plaintiff’s employment on a request for his genetic information, the Court granted summary judgment in the company’s favor.

Takeaways For Companies

As noted in a prior blog post, recent decisions suggest that courts may be hesitant to dismiss GIPA claims (especially at the pleading stage). Given the GIPA statute’s strict penalty provision – under which statutory damages can quickly become significant ($2,500 per negligent violation and $15,000 per intentional or reckless violation, see 410 ILCS 513/40(a)(1)-(2)) – we have advised employers to ensure they comply with the statute regarding any health screenings they ask applicants or employees to complete (including by explicitly advising applicants and employees not to disclose their family medical histories during the screenings).

In this plaintiff-friendly litigation landscape, the Henry decision comes as welcome news for GIPA defendants and companies that have employees undergo medical screenings. Importantly, Henry suggests that an employer does not necessarily violate the GIPA by requesting an employee’s genetic information “as a condition of employment” by merely directing her to undergo a medical exam (during which the employee may or may not be asked to provide her family medical history).

March 31, 2026March 31, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Announcing The Launch Of The Duane Morris California, New York, And Illinois Class Action Reviews – 2026

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. and Jennifer A. Riley

We’re excited to officially announce the release of the all-new California, New York, and Illinois Class Action Reviews, which are comprehensive new desk reference resources designed to help legal professionals and businesses better understand the evolving landscape of class action law in three of the most influential jurisdictions in the United States. California, Illinois, and New York are class action epicenters where a significant number of class actions are filed each year.

Class action litigation continues to play a critical role in shaping consumer protection statutes, employment law obligations, and corporate accountability duties. With each state bringing its own nuances, staying informed and ahead of these risks can be a challenge. The Duane Morris Class Action Team created this new collection of desk references to simplify that process, and offering clear, practical insights into the rules, trends, and key considerations that define class action practice in California, New York, and Illinois.

Each volume in the series dives deep into state-specific procedures, recent case developments, and strategic considerations. Whether you’re navigating complex litigation, advising clients, or simply seeking to expand your legal knowledge, these resources provide accessible, up-to-date guidance you can rely on. We’re proud to offer a resource that supports better decision-making and deeper understanding in an increasingly complex legal environment.

The California, New York, and Illinois Class Action Reviews – 2026 are now available. We invite you to explore the series and discover how it can support your work and enhance your perspective on class action law. You can find the California Class Action Review here, the New York Class Action Review here, and the Illinois Class Action Review here.

Stay tuned to the Class Action Weekly Wire for more information on these new additions to the Duane Morris Class Action Review series.

March 30, 2026March 30, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Overtime Case Loses Pulse: New York Federal Court Finds Medical School Researchers Are Learned Professionals Exempt From FLSA And Denies Bid For Collective Action Certification

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Elizabeth Underwood, and Olga A. Romadin

Duane Morris Takeaways: On March 26, 2026, Judge Paul Engelmayer of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York issued an order denying certification of a Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) collective action brought by a study coordinator alleging that his employer, a medical school, misclassified him and a group of similarly-situated individuals in Castillo, et al. v. Albert Einstein College of Medicine, Inc. et al., No. 24 Civ. 00984, 2026 WL 834712 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2026). Following discovery, the Court found that a higher standard for the first step of the conditional certification process was warranted, and on review of evidence submitted by the defendants as well as the plaintiff, it declined to certify the collective action, concluding that the differences in coordinators’ duties precluded a collective action.

Case Background

Plaintiff, a researcher in the Cognitive Neurophysiology Laboratory of the Albert Einstein College of Medicine, a medical school based in New York, brought a collective action against the College and three related entities, including a teaching college and the schools’ parent corporations, alleging that they had misclassified study and research coordinators as “learned professionals” exempt from overtime under the FLSA. Id. at *3.

The College filed a motion to dismiss Castillo’s amended complaint in July 2024, arguing that it was not an “employer” under the FLSA and NYLL, but the Court found this unavailing and denied the motion, and the parties proceeded to discovery. Id. at *1. Castillo then moved for conditional certification under the FLSA, seeking to encompass a collective of current and former employees working as research and study coordinators for the College of Medicine and its related entities who he alleged were not compensated for overtime work. Id. Castillo also sought to toll the FLSA statute of limitations period and asked the Court to authorize notice to individuals employed by the defendants as far back as three years. Id.

The District Court’s Decision

The Court found that, in light of the substantial discovery between the parties, the plaintiff faced a higher threshold requirement of making a “modest plus” factual showing in step one of the Second Circuit’s two-step process to certify a collective action under the FLSA, which it ruled Castillo had failed to meet because evidence submitted by both parties was not convincing that a collective of similarly-situated individuals existed. Id. at *5.

In its analysis, the Court noted that classifying a category of employees as learned professionals exempt under the FLSA is not, on its own, enough for a finding of a “common policy, plan, or practice” to find them to be “similarly situated.” Id. at 6. Plaintiffs have to show a uniform misclassification by identifying individuals with similar duties and responsibilities, and Castillo had failed to do so here because his reliance on two declarations and six job descriptions lacked the weight and detail necessary to account for the work of hundreds of individuals in dozens of departments and programs across the institutions. Id. at *7-8.

The Court was further swayed by the defendants’ evidence of substantial job descriptions showing a variety of duties and responsibilities both demonstrating variation and fitting into the learned professional exemption. Id. at *8-9. Defendants produced 49 job descriptions demonstrating that coordinators’ duties ran the gamut—while some were primarily tasked with data collection, others were responsible for developing clinical studies, making medical recommendations, or engaging with patients—and had “differing levels of intellectual rigor” and educational requirements. Id.

Finally, the Court found that Castillo’s reliance on the deposition testimony of the College’s vice president of human resources actually bolstered the defendants’ position that the duties and responsibilities of coordinators vary widely from one position to the next, undermining his argument that they are similarly situated and thus eligible for conditional certification. Id. at *10-11.

Implications For Employers

This decision offers several practical takeaways for employers in fields where workers may fall under an FLSA exemption. Employers are well-served by maintaining and cataloging detailed job descriptions that accurately reflect the duties and educational requirements of each position.

The Court’s decision also highlights the strategic value of the “modest plus” standard for defendants facing FLSA conditional certification motions. Where pre-certification discovery has already taken place, defendants in many circuits may involve this heightened standard and submit their own evidence to demonstrate that putative class members are not similarly situated with respect to their job duties and requirements.