Pennsylvania Superior Court Shoes In Consent Framework For State Wiretap Claims

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer Riley, and Olga A. Romadin

Duane Morris Takeaways:  On October 23, 2026, in Thompson v. C. & J. Clark America, Inc., No. 74 WDA 2026, 2026 Pa. Super. LEXIS 557 (Pa. Super. Ct. Oct. 23, 2026), the Pennsylvania Superior Court vacated a lower court’s grant of summary judgment to footwear retailer C. & J. Clark America, Inc. (“Clarks”) in a putative class action alleging that a third-party analytics vendor “wiretapped” visitors’ interactions with the retailer’s website in violation of Pennsylvania’s Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act (“WESCA”) and constituted common law invasion of privacy. The Superior Court rejected the trial court’s holding that communicating over the internet amounts to consent to interception, and adopted the framework articulated in Popa v. Harriet Carter Gifts, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 3d 592 (W.D. Pa. 2025), in its entirety, holding that a reasonably conspicuous privacy policy disclosing third-party tracking can establish implied consent under WESCA’s all-party consent exception. The decision underscores an emerging line of state court rulings scrutinizing online privacy policies more closely, with wider implications for litigation to be brought against companies with an online presence.

Background

On February 14, 2023, Plaintiff, a consumer, brought a putative class action against Clarks in the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County alleging that the shoe retailer, through third-party vendor Content Square, wiretapped the electronic communications of visitors to its website, including their “mouse movements, clicks, keystrokes … URLs of web pages visited, and/or other electronic communications,” in violation of WESCA and common law invasion of privacy.  Id. at *1-2. Plaintiff claimed that after visiting the Clarks website on her phone and browsing for sandals, she received unwanted, targeted ads for sandals, including for those sold by Clarks. Id. at *6-7. Plaintiff’s complaint stated that she had not entered her name, email address, or payment information, did not create an account on the website, and did not use the chat function. Id. Further, Plaintiff claimed that she never reviewed the website’s terms of use nor the cookie policy. Id. at *7.

The Court of Common Pleas dismissed her common law invasion of privacy claim on preliminary objections but allowed her to proceed on her WESCA claim. Id. at *2. On December 5, 2025, it granted summary judgment to Clarks. Id. at *8. In a 3-5 decision relying on Commonwealth v. Proetto, 2001 PA Super 95, 771 A.2d 823 (Pa. Super. 2001), Commonwealth v. Cruttenden, 619 Pa. 123, 58 A.3d 95 (Pa. 2012), Commonwealth v. Diego, 2015 PA Super 143, 119 A.3d 370 (Pa. Super. 2015), and Commonwealth v. Byrd, 661 Pa. 85, 235 A.3d 311 (Pa. 2020), the Court of Common Pleas held that a website visitor need not have known that she was being tracked or by whom, and that her “‘very act’ of sending an electronic communication over the Internet amounted to her express consent to recording.” Id. at *15-16. The Court of Common Pleas determined that “when [plaintiff] surfed the Internet for summer sandals and clicked on the Clarks America website, she should have known that Clarks America or another acting on its behalf was tracking her activity.” Id. at *16.

Plaintiff appealed, and the Superior Court vacated the summary judgment and remanded the matter back to the Court of Common Pleas.

The Superior Court’s Decision

On October 23, 2026, the Superior Court issued its decision after considering (1) whether the Court of Common Pleas erred in finding that a website visitor gives their express consent to being wiretapped through the act of sending an electronic communication over the internet; (2) whether the Court of Common Pleas erred in finding that Clarks’ third-party vendor was its agent and thus permitted to circumvent WESCA’s all-party consent requirement; and (3) whether the Court of Common Pleas erred in holding that Plaintiff had failed to make a prima facie showing sufficient to allow a trier of fact to find that her communications with Clarks’ website were unlawfully intercepted by the third party vendor. In an opinion written by Judge Mary P. Murray and joined by Judges Mary Jane Bowes and Judith F. Olson, the Superior Court found that the Court of Common Pleas had erred on the issue of consent, and found the last question moot, and thus vacated and remanded the decision.

The Superior Court, finding a dearth of Pennsylvania case law applying WESCA to the circumstances at issue,  based its decision on what it referred to as a “highly instructive” 2025 ruling in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania entitled Popa v. Harriet Carter Gifts, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 3d 592 (W.D. Pa. 2025) (“Popa II”), which followed a reversal of summary judgment granted in Popa v. Harriet Carter Gifts, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 3d 535 (W.D. Pa. 2021) (“Popa I”), to a defendant in a putative class action alleging similar claims, reversed by the Third Circuit in Popa v. Harriet Carter Gifts, Inc., 52 F.4th 121 (3d Cir. 2022) (“Popa III”). Id. at *28.  In Popa II, the Third Circuit held that “there is no sweeping direct-party exception to civil liability under WESCA,” reasoning that the General Assembly’s 2012 amendment codifying a narrow intended-recipient carve-out for law enforcement limited Proetto and Cruttenden to their facts. Id. at *31. On remand, the District Court in Popa III had held that the plaintiff constructively consented to third-party tracking because the defendant retailer’s privacy statement adequately disclosed third-party data collection and was reasonably conspicuous in the website’s footer. Id. at *33-44.

The Superior Court found that the record raised a genuine issue of fact as to whether Content Square tracked Plaintiff’s communications, and that such tracking would constitute an interception under WESCA. Id. at *47. The Superior Court agreed with the Court of Common Pleas that under WESCA § 5704(4), consent turns on an objective, “reasonable user” standard: “whether a reasonable Internet user in [plaintiff’s] position knew or should have known that the contents of her communications with the Clarks website would be acquired by a third party,” and that actual knowledge is not required. Id. at *47-48. But the Superior Court held that the Court of Common Pleas erred with its application of the statute. Id. at *48.  It found that the lower court’s conclusion that a sender’s ignorance of the recipient’s identity is irrelevant was in error because of the reliance on Proetto and Cruttenden, which had involved two-party communications with police officers posing as the intended recipient, and a 2012 amendment to WESCA licensed only police officers to do so. Id. at *48-50. As the Superior Court observed, “misrepresenting one’s identity in order to receive communications appears to be a prerogative belonging to police officers.” Id. at *49.

The Superior Court found that the Court of Common Pleas had removed Proetto’s language on the “very act of sending a communication over the Internet” being consent from its context, which, in Proetto was a chat room message received in recorded form by its intended recipient. Id. at *51-53. The Superior Court explained that “Proetto and its progeny do not support the blanket ruling, which implies that any person sending any form of communication over the Internet inherently consents to the acquisition of that communication’s contents by anyone who happens to be listening/recording.” Id. at *52. The Superior Court found that the Court of Common Pleas erred by failing to apply the reasonable person standard to the particular form of communication at issue, here, a shopper’s interaction with a retail website, and by failing to consider whether a reasonable person would be aware that someone other than the intended recipient might acquire the communication. Id. at *52-53.

The Superior Court agreed with Clark’s reasoning, relying on Popa III, that “a reasonably prudent person has a lower expectation of privacy on the Internet, particularly with respect to the kind of non-sensitive data involved here.” Id. at *55. While acknowledging that WESCA is content-neutral and that a violation does not require sensitive information, the Superior Court held that the “innocuous nature” of the data is relevant to the reasonable person standard. Id. at *55.

The Superior Court then held that a website privacy policy may convey implied consent to an interception if it “disclose[s] the nature of the interception to a reasonable reader” and is “reasonably conspicuous” on the webpage. Id. at *57. It found Clarks’ privacy policy to have satisfied the first prong because it disclosed that Clarks and its “third party partners” used cookies, pixel tags, and web beacons to “track the actions of users,” and that third parties “may place cookies on your browsers for purposes of tracking consumer behavior.” Id. at *57-61. The Superior Court found the policy “rife with references to the involvement of third parties,” and concluded that “reasonable readers of the Privacy Policy would know that the content of their communications with the Clarks website would be intercepted by third parties.” Id. at *61-62. The Superior Court rejected the opinions of Plaintiff’s expert that the policy did not cover Content Square because it applied only to data collected by “www.clarksusa.com” because the Superior Court found that such a technical distinction “would not be appreciable by an average Internet user,” and it agreed with Popa III that WESCA does not require a privacy policy to “reveal granular details about the identity of the ‘third parties’ or the specific type of cookies used.” Id. at *62.

The Superior Court adopted Popa III’s rejection of Plaintiff’s argument that tracking begins before a user can reach the privacy policy. Id. at *63. It further refused to import the heightened, “unambiguous manifestation of assent” standard that the Superior Court had applied to online arbitration agreements in Duffy v. Tatum, 354 A.3d 14 (Pa. Super. 2026), explaining that Plaintiff waived no constitutional right and that the alleged infringement “is of such low stakes” that the Third Circuit had found it insufficient to confer Article III standing. Id. at *63-65. The Superior Court thus held that “a website’s browsewrap privacy policy, if reasonably conspicuous, may be sufficient to demonstrate that a reasonable user should know about the data-collection practices disclosed in the policy, thereby conferring implied consent under WESCA section 5704(4).” Id. at *66.

Ultimately, however, the Superior Court rejected Clark’s contention that a link to its privacy policy was conspicuously located at the center of the bottom of its website because it was not supported by evidence in the record. Id. at *68. Thus, viewing the record in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Superior Court could not conclude that Clarks had met its burden for consent. Id. The Superior Court therefore vacated without prejudice and remanded, authorizing the parties to supplement the record. Id. at *70.

Implications For Companies

With the decision in Thompson, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania has laid out the governing framework for WESCA class actions in Pennsylvania courts via Popa. Courts in the state are instructed to more closely scrutinize whether website users have been reasonably apprised of a site’s privacy policy, and whether such policies inform users of any tracking they are subject to. A simple click or scroll is, under this ruling, may no longer be argued as consent to be tracked. The key takeaway for companies operating websites utilizing tracking software or third party vendors include the importance of preparing a conspicuous and clear privacy policy that discloses use of such technology and/or vendors, and that a visible and accessible privacy policy may be the centerpiece of a defense of consent in wiretapping litigation.

Ohio Supreme Court Holds Trial Courts May Address Every Class Certification Requirement Even After Finding One Unmet

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Kathryn Brown, and Brett Bohan

Duane Morris Takeaways: On October 22, 2026, in Hilton v. City of Lorain, Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-4114 (Ohio Oct. 22, 2026), the Supreme Court of Ohio unanimously reversed an intermediate appellate decision that had faulted a trial court for denying class certification in a “confusing and seemingly contradictory” opinion. Id. ¶ 7. The trial court had found two of the seven certification prerequisites under Ohio Civil Rule 23 lacking but went on to find the other five were satisfied. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that addressing every requirement, rather than stopping after finding one requirement is not met, is consistent with the “rigorous analysis” that class certification demands. Id. ¶ 1.

For defendants facing class claims under Ohio law, the decision clarifies that a well-reasoned denial of certification will not be undone on appeal because the trial court addressed every requirement for class certification.

Case Background

Appellees brought a putative class action against the City of Lorain and related entities in Ohio state court. Id. ¶ 2. They claimed that the city had charged unlawful rates and fees for water and wastewater services. Id. Appellees moved to certify a class of “[a]ll ratepayers who were charged water and sanitary sewer rates, fees and charges by the City of Lorain since May 7, 2012.” Id.

Under Ohio Civil Rule 23, a class may be certified only if seven prerequisites are met: (1) an identifiable class with an unambiguous definition; (2) named representatives who belong to the class; (3) numerosity; (4) common questions of law or fact; (5) typicality; (6) adequate representation; and (7) satisfaction of one of the Rule 23(B) categories. Id. ¶ 3. Appellees relied on Rule 23(B)(3), which requires common questions to predominate and a class action to be the superior method of resolving the disputes. Id. ¶ 5.

The Lorain County Court of Common Pleas denied certification on two grounds. Id. ¶ 4. First, the court concluded that the proposed class was neither identifiable nor clearly defined. Id. Specifically, it was unclear whether the class covered everyone who had been charged fees or only those who paid them, and appellees had offered no means of identifying class members “going back from over a decade earlier.” Id. (emphasis in original). Second, the court found predominance and superiority lacking, since the court would have to determine, member by member, whether each person paid an unlawful charge and in what amount. Id. ¶¶ 5-6. The trial court nonetheless addressed the remaining five requirements for class certification and found that they had all been satisfied. Id. ¶ 7.

The Ninth District Court of Appeals reversed. Id. The court reasoned that the trial court could not logically find the class undefined while simultaneously finding that appellees belonged to it, that it was numerous, and that common, typical claims existed among members. Id. The court held that these “seemingly contradictory findings” amounted to an abuse of discretion and remanded to the trial court. Id. The city appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio. Id. ¶ 8.

The Ohio Supreme Court’s Opinion

The Supreme Court of Ohio unanimously reversed the appellate court’s ruling. Id. ¶ 19. The court reaffirmed that a trial court must conduct a “rigorous analysis” of a class certification motion, that a plaintiff’s failure on any single requirement defeats certification, and that a trial court’s certification ruling stands unless the court abused its discretion. Id. ¶¶ 10-11. The court also stressed that appellate courts should be especially cautious before overturning a trial court decision that denied class certification. Id. ¶ 11.

The city argued that the trial court’s decision was not contradictory and that the court had simply assumed, for the sake of argument when addressing the remaining requirements, that the class had been defined properly. Id. ¶ 12. The city warned that requiring the trial court to end its analysis once it found one element unsatisfied could lead to piecemeal litigation. Id. The trial court “would have to determine, one at a time, whether each of the other six requirements had been met; this process could result in six appeals and six remands.” Id. Appellees countered that an analysis that is confusing and internally inconsistent cannot be “rigorous” for purposes of satisfying Ohio law. Id. ¶ 13.

The Supreme Court of Ohio sided with the city. Id. ¶ 14. Although the trial court’s decision could have been clearer, it included sufficient language to show that the trial court had addressed the remaining five requirements of the class certification analysis as if the two unsatisfied requirements had been satisfied. Id. ¶ 15. The Supreme Court further explained that judicial economy favors resolving all seven requirements in a single ruling whenever possible. Id. ¶ 16. It cautioned, however, that there may be cases in which the failure of one requirement prevents a court from meaningfully evaluating the other six requirements. Id.

The Supreme Court of Ohio remanded the case to the Ninth District Court of Appeals to address the appellees’ remaining assignments of error in the trial court’s ruling.

Implications For Companies

The Hilton decision is required reading for businesses defending class actions under Ohio law. The Supreme Court of Ohio’s unanimous ruling establishes that a trial court does not jeopardize a denial of class certification by analyzing every Rule 23 prerequisite, even after it concludes that one requirement has not been satisfied. Because of the deference owed to trial courts that decline to certify a class, class action defendants should build a thorough record on each Rule 23 requirement so that the trial court may issue a complete, well-supported decision that gives appellate courts multiple independent grounds on which to affirm.

Additionally, although not the focus of the opinion, the Hilton decision illustrates how, in cases involving long look-back periods and individualized damages questions, class-definition and predominance challenges can defeat certification. Where determining class membership or liability would require account-by-account review, those issues can be decisive.

California Supreme Court Rules That A Smash-And-Grab Hardware Theft, With No Access To Sensitive Records, Does Not Automatically Result In Multi-Million Or Billion Dollar Liability Under California Privacy Laws

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, Ryan T. Garippo, and Jamar D. Davis

Duane Morris Takeaways: On May 14, 2026, in J.M. v. Illuminate Education, Inc., No. S286699, 2026 Cal. LEXIS 2657 (May 14, 2026), the California Supreme Court held that the California Court of Appeal decision to deny a demurrer was improper for an incorrect application of privacy laws.  This decision emphasizes why defendants should confirm whether a plaintiff sufficiently pled a cause of action that aligns with the remedies that he or she seeks to recover.  Further, the opinion clarifies that injury under the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 56, et seq. (“CMIA”) depends on whether the company subjects medical information to a substantial risk of unauthorized use or access, not whether the unauthorized user actually views sensitive data.

Case Background

Illuminate Education, Inc. (“Illuminate”) is a technology company that helps educators determine the academic progression of an individual student, as well as their areas of potential improvement.  The company uses data from individual students, including medical data, to make these determinations.  Illuminate provided its services to the Ventura County Office of Education, under which Plaintiff (a minor) was a student.  Plaintiff provided his medical information to the Ventura County Office of Education, which then provided Plaintiff’s health data to Illuminate.

In 2022, Illuminate became aware of suspicious activity related to its systems.  Illuminate promptly initiated an investigation.  The investigation confirmed an unauthorized user gained access to Illuminate’s records, including students’ medical information.  Illuminate sent a notice to the guardians of the affected students, including Plaintiff, informing them of the scope of the potential disclosure.  The notice made it clear that Illuminate found no evidence that the unauthorized user (or users) was successful in actual or attempted misuse of the data.

After the breach, Plaintiff alleges that he received several mail solicitations at an address provided to only the Ventura County Office of Education.  As a result, Plaintiff filed a class action lawsuit alleging that Illuminate, as health care provider, negligently managed the students’ medical records under the CMIA and failed to expediently disclose the data breach to those affected under the Customer Records Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.80, et seq. (“CRA”). 

The trial court sustained Illuminate’s demurrer, without leave to amend, after Plaintiff twice failed to cure deficiencies in his pleadings. The Court of Appeal reversed that decision, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by sustaining the demurrer, because Plaintiff may have been able to cure the defects in his complaint if a different legal analysis was applied.

Following that decision, the California Supreme Court set out to resolve the disagreement.

The California Supreme Court’s Decision

The California Supreme Court’s analysis hinges on its statutory interpretation, involving the plain reading of the statutes and their legislative histories.  Generally, this analysis fell into three distinct categories.

First, Justice Goodwin Liu, writing for the California Supreme Court, reasoned that Plaintiff failed to establish a valid claim under CMIA because he could not allege that Illuminate was a “provider of health care” under California Civil Code section 56.06.  Relying on the text of section 56.06, the Supreme Court explained there are two ways for a business to qualify as a “provider of health care”: (1) a covered business maintains medical records to make the information available to either an individual or a health care provider upon request of the individual or provider; or (2) a covered business makes medical information available for an individual or a health care provider upon request to allow an individual to manage their information, or to help diagnose or treat the individual.

The Supreme Court also confirmed this interpretation by relying on the legislative history of the statutes.  The Supreme Court observed that the legislative history confirmed that the legislature was concerned with  situations where diabetics used a data platform to record glucose levels, or where people with hypertension used platforms to track their blood pressure.  Relying on the legislative history, the Supreme Court observed that Plaintiff never alleged that Illuminate created a repository of student records that allowed the students to create their own records, or to access and share those records at their discretion.  Instead, Plaintiff asserted that Illuminate stored medical information to help educators monitor, evaluate, and address student needs.  As a result, Illuminate was not a “provider of health care,” because it did not make medical records available upon request of the individual or provider.

The Supreme Court also quickly addressed Plaintiff’s inability to satisfy the alternative method for determining whether Illuminate is a “provider of health care” because Plaintiff never alleged that Illuminate “provides medical information to health care providers or individuals for diagnosis and treatment of an individual.”  Illuminate Education, 2026 Cal. LEXIS 2657, at *12.  As a result, and after quickly dispensing with a few other arguments, the Supreme Court concluded that Illuminate was not a “provider of health care” under the CMIA.

Second, in addition to analyzing whether Illuminate was a “provider of health care,” the Supreme Court also determined whether Plaintiff had alleged sufficient injury to state a claim under the CMIA.  The Supreme Court disagreed with Illuminate’s argument that injury requires an unauthorized person to view medical data, and ruled that a plaintiff alleges injury by claiming that the medical information was exposed to “a significant risk of unauthorized access or use.”  Id. at *29.

The CMIA requires covered entities to “preserve[] the confidentiality” of medical information.  Cal. Civ. Code § 56.101(a).  The Supreme Court stated that “confidentiality” requires “keeping information private or secret” and clarified that this obligation applies regardless of whether an unauthorized party actually views the data. Illuminate Education, 2026 Cal. LEXIS 2657, at *26. (“[W]e reject the rule that no breach of confidentiality has occurred until medical information is actually viewed by an unauthorized person.”).  Instead, the determination of whether a covered entity failed to preserve the confidentiality of data depends on a factor-based analysis that considers the “form, duration, and extent of the data breach, as well as any mitigation efforts by the covered entity.” Id. at *30. Thus, a plaintiff need not allege that his or her data was “actually viewed” by a third party, because that person is “unlikely to know what an unauthorized party has done with their data unless they suffer actual damage” and instead “[a]ll relevant circumstances must be considered” when determining whether confidentiality was breached.  Id.

Third, for the CRA claim, the Supreme Court ruled that Plaintiff did not state a cause of action against Illuminate because Plaintiff was not a customer within the meaning of the statute.  To bring suit under the CRA, a plaintiff must establish that he or she is a “customer” within the meaning of the statute.  Boorstein v. CBS Interactive, Inc., 222 Cal. App. 4th 456, 467 (2013).  A customer is “an individual who provides personal information to a business for the purpose of purchasing or leasing a product or obtaining a service from the business.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.80(c).  Here, the Supreme Court found that Plaintiff never alleged that he provided any personal information to Illuminate to purchase or lease a product, or obtain a service from Illuminate.  The Supreme Court observed that the Ventura County Office of Education purchased Illuminate’s services and provided the student information, not Plaintiff. Moreover, the Supreme Court disregarded Plaintiff’s argument that he was the “ultimate” customer of Illuminate because the CRA “does not authorize suit by all consumers or beneficiaries; it authorizes a civil action for an injured ’customer.’” Id. at *32.

In the end, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remanded the matter for further proceedings.

Implications For Companies

This decision emphasizes the importance of ensuring that a plaintiff has sufficiently pled all causes of action asserted.  When the CMIA or CRA are involved, companies must consider whether they are, in fact, a covered entity in order to determine whether they are subject to the statutes’ reach.

Further,  to assert injury under the CMIA for a data breach claim, the analysis hinges on the risk of unauthorized use, not what an unauthorized user is able to do with the data.  Thus, it is imperative that companies take all reasonable steps to retain the confidentiality of sensitive records, making an extra effort to ensure that hardware is secure.

For CRA claims, companies need to pay special attention to which entities solicit or contract for their services as attention to these details can potentially thwart a potential CRA claim.

In short, organizations that use such medical data, and operate in California, should take note of this decision because it impacts their defenses both positively and negatively going forward.

Announcing The Launch Of The Duane Morris California, New York, And Illinois Class Action Reviews – 2026

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. and Jennifer A. Riley

We’re excited to officially announce the release of the all-new California, New York, and Illinois Class Action Reviews, which are comprehensive new desk reference resources designed to help legal professionals and businesses better understand the evolving landscape of class action law in three of the most influential jurisdictions in the United States. California, Illinois, and New York are class action epicenters where a significant number of class actions are filed each year.

Class action litigation continues to play a critical role in shaping consumer protection statutes, employment law obligations, and corporate accountability duties. With each state bringing its own nuances, staying informed and ahead of these risks can be a challenge. The Duane Morris Class Action Team created this new collection of desk references to simplify that process, and offering clear, practical insights into the rules, trends, and key considerations that define class action practice in California, New York, and Illinois.

Each volume in the series dives deep into state-specific procedures, recent case developments, and strategic considerations. Whether you’re navigating complex litigation, advising clients, or simply seeking to expand your legal knowledge, these resources provide accessible, up-to-date guidance you can rely on. We’re proud to offer a resource that supports better decision-making and deeper understanding in an increasingly complex legal environment.

The California, New York, and Illinois Class Action Reviews – 2026 are now available. We invite you to explore the series and discover how it can support your work and enhance your perspective on class action law. You can find the California Class Action Review here, the New York Class Action Review here, and the Illinois Class Action Review here.

Stay tuned to the Class Action Weekly Wire for more information on these new additions to the Duane Morris Class Action Review series.

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The opinions expressed on this blog are those of the author and are not to be construed as legal advice.

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