Anna Sheridan – Class Action Defense

June 17, 2025 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Nothing Common or Predominant About Emotional Distress Damages

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Shannon Noelle, and Anna Sheridan

Duane Morris Takeaways: In an opinion issued on May 29, 2025, Judge Christy Wiegand of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania denied class certification of two proposed classes under the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act (“FDCPA”) (one in the alternative in the event of failure of the first) finding that the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) was not met where putative class members’ standing would depend on individualized inquiries “highly specific” to each member or was based solely on the fact that the member was a consumer that received a debt collection letter (whether it was read or not). The ruling is a defense blueprint for defending FDCPA cases.

Case Background

Named Plaintiff Jeffrey Lezark brought a putative class action under the FDCPA against I.C. System, Inc. (“ICS”), a debt collector, that allegedly sent Lezark and putative class members debt collection letters (“540 Letters”) to collect on a medical debt. The 540 Letter stated in relevant part that “[i]f you fail to contact us to discuss payment of this account, our client has authorized us to pursue additional remedies to recover the balance due, including referring the account to any attorney.” (ECF 91 ¶ 17). Lezark alleged that, in sending the 540 Letter, ICS violated the FDCPA by implying that legal action was possible to collect the debt when it was not. The Court authorized distribution of a Claim Form Questionnaire to putative class members to enable Lezark to collect information regarding their standing. The Questionnaire asked respondents for their individual experience upon reading the 540 Letter. Putative class members were instructed not to fill out the questionnaire if they did not read the 540 Letter. The questionnaire asked if putative class members: (1) felt anxious, overwhelmed, or stressed because they believed they could be subject to legal action or have debt referred to an attorney; (2) contacted an attorney or some other person because they believed they could be subject to legal action or debt could be referred to an attorney; (3) contacted ICS because they believed that they could be subject to legal action or that their debt could be referred to an attorney; (4) made a payment on their account because they believed they could be subject to legal action or their debt could be referred to an attorney; or (5) experienced some other event or engaged in some other conduct after reading the 540 Letter.

Lezark proposed one class definition consisting of “all individuals in the state of Pennsylvania who within the applicable statute of limitations, received a letter from Defendant in which Defendant claimed it was authorized to refer a medical debt to an attorney, incurred said debt from a medical provider that entered into a contract with Defendant in which the provider elected [NLAR] and/or litigation referral and incurred such debt for personal, family, and/or household purposes.” (ECF 130, at 4). There were over 15,000 putative class members of this first proposed class. Lezark also sought certification of an alternative class definition if the Court determined the first class definition could not be certified consisting of “[a]ll individuals who: signed, dated, and returned the Claim Form Questionnaire; checked the first, second, third, fourth, and/or fifth box on the Claim Form Questionnaire; and did not indicate that they failed to receive or read the 540 Letter.” Id. There were over 700 putative class members of this alternative proposed class.

ICS focused its opposition on challenging both proposed class definitions adherence to Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement. ICS specifically cited to and relied on TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413 (2021), where the U.S. Supreme Court held that federal courts must “affirmatively determine that each putative class member has Article III standing before awarding that class member damages,” arguing that both proposed class definitions would require individualized factual inquiries into the injuries sustained by each putative class member. See ECF No. 142 (citing ICS’ opposition brief, ECF No. 136 at 14). As to the first class definition, Lezark argued that there was standing under Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982) as each class member suffered an injury “in precisely the form [that the FDCPA] was intended to guard against.” Havens, 455 U.S. at 364.As it regards the alternative proposed class definition, Lezark argued that Huber v. Simon’s Agency, Inc., 84 F.4th 132, 150 (3d Cir. 2023), confers standing as, in that case, the Third Circuit held that the named plaintiff that received a debt collection letter had standing as the plaintiff identified “an allegedly deceptive communication and specific harmful action and inaction she took as a result of the communication.” Huber, 84 F.4th at 150. The District Court rejected both proposed class definitions and Plaintiff’s argument that case law precedent supported certification in this context.

As to the Havens standing argument for the first proposed class definition, the Court found that the Havens decisions was a distinguishable and narrow holding applicable to the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) and not a proposed FDCPA class definition. The Court explained that “the plaintiff in Havens was not just given false information but suffered a concrete injury in the form of racial discrimination prohibited by the FHA.” See ECF No. 142, at 13 (citing Havens, 373-74). The Court found that Lezark’s argument — that any consumer that is the object of a misrepresentation made unlawful under the FDCPA has de facto suffered an injury in the precise form prohibited by the FDCPA — was in direct tension with the TransUnion decision. The Supreme Court in TransUnion rejected the proposition that “a plaintiff automatically satisfied the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate that right.” 594 U.S. at 426. The Court, therefore, declined to extend the logic in Havens to “the 15,000-plus Proposed Class members” that “simply . . . receive the 540 Letter” with no “evidence that they read it, let alone suffered any downstream harm as a result.” See ECF No. 142 at 14.

As to the alternative proposed class definition that Plaintiff argued had viability under Huber, the Court pointed out that Huber only found standing as to the named plaintiff and had been remanded to the district court to make a predominance determination. The Court highlighted that Huber guided the district court on remand to evaluate whether each putative class member “undertook the kind of determinant action or inaction required for standing” and could show the same with a “plausible straight forward method” suitable for class adjudication. Huber, 84 F.4th at 157-58. Applying this directive, the District Court found that Lezark himself had demonstrated standing, having shown evidence of emotional distress and the decision to file for bankruptcy based on the 540 Letter, but the putative class members did not. Plaintiff had to show that putative class members could “likely” demonstrate standing through summary judgment and trial but the Court found that given that standing was “premised on suffering emotional distress and/or taking particular actions in response to the 540 Letter” this “necessarily” would require “individualized and highly” specific inquiries as to each member requiring deposition testimony, cross and direct examination, and medical records. See ECF No. 142 at 10-11.

Implications For Employers and Debt Collectors

This decision reinforces that plaintiffs’ burden at the certification stage of demonstrating concrete, particularized injury is not a mere formality. To the contrary, plaintiffs must come forward with evidence showing that putative class members can likely demonstrate standing through summary judgment and trial using a method that is common amongst all class members and unlikely to produce individualized mini trials on the issue of damages. The Lezark decision also further underscores that this burden is particularly high in cases asserting standing on the basis of emotional distress or intangible injuries.

May 20, 2025May 20, 2025 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

When Removing Diversity Cases Defendants Cannot “Embiggen” The Amount-In-Controversy Through Attorneys’ Fee Estimates

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Shannon Noelle, and Anna Sheridan

Duane Morris Takeaways: In an order issued on May 13, 2025, Judge Joshua Wolson of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania ruled that a case removed to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction had to be remanded back to state court given that the amount-in-controversy (AIC) alleged was based on an attorneys’ fee award that exceeded the plaintiff’s damages award by “at least seven times.”

Case Background

On January 9, 2025, Plaintiff Frank Wise sued his former employer Kimberly-Clark, a manufacturer of paper-based consumer products, in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas on behalf of himself and a putative class, accusing his former employer of violating the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act (“PMWA”) by failing to pay overtime for the time spent walking to and from job assignments in the Defendant’s manufacturing facility. As part of its remedial regime, the PMWA permits a prevailing party to recover “reasonable” attorneys’ fees. Plaintiff Wise estimated that his damages totaled $9,350.30, but on his cover sheet he indicated that the amount in controversy totaled “[m]ore than $50,000.00” for the amalgamated claims of the class. (ECF No. 1-3, p. 2).

On February 26, 2025, Defendant Kimberly-Clark removed the action to federal court, asserting that the amount in controversy was over $75,000 because Plaintiff Wise “may try to recover at least $78,375.00 in attorney’s fees.” (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 24, 29). Plaintiff Wise moved to remand by including with that motion a declaration from his attorneys that if the lawsuit proceeded on an individual, rather than a class wide basis, the Plaintiff and his attorneys would waive the right to recover attorneys’ fees that would cause the amount in controversy to cross $75,000.

The Court’s Order

Judge Wolson found that Defendant Kimberly-Clark did not carry its burden to demonstrate that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000, which the Defendant primarily based on its attorneys’ fees estimate. Although attorneys’ fees can be factored into the amount in controversy threshold, the attorneys’ fees sought must be reasonable. To pinpoint the legal standard under Pennsylvania law for determining when an award of attorneys’ fees is reasonable, Judge Wolson surveyed case law interpreting statutes similar to the PMWA, such as the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, where Pennsylvania courts determined that the “term reasonable” incorporates the concept of proportionality between the damages award and attorneys’ fees award. Though Pennsylvania law contains no “hard-and-fast rule for the acceptable ratio,” courts consider “the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite properly to conduct the case, the customary charges of the members of the bar for similar services, the amount involved in the controversy and benefits resulting to the clients from the services, and the contingency or certainty of the compensation.” (internal citations and quotations omitted). Applying this framework, Judge Wolson found that a 7:1 ratio for attorneys’ fees as compared to damages was unreasonable and could not be used to reach the jurisdictional threshold.

Judge Wolson further opined that this conclusion also was consistent with protecting the judicial economy of federal courts as litigants and attorneys should not be able to use exorbitant attorneys’ fees estimates to circumvent the amount in controversy requirement to invoke diversity jurisdiction. In the case at hand, the parties agreed for purposes of the motion that Plaintiff Wise could recover $9,350.30 in monetary damages and that the legal issues at hand involved straight-forward unpaid overtime claims. Notably, Judge Wolson also found the Plaintiff’s attorneys’ declaration, waiving the right to collect attorneys’ fees, to be unavailing as it arguably amended the complaint.

Implications For Employers

The Court’s holding in Wise emphasizes the importance of providing concrete evidence regarding damages sought and reasonable attorneys’ fee estimates when seeking to remove based on diversity jurisdiction. Ultimately, the damages and attorneys’ fees alleged in the complaint take precedence, but proportionality must be considered even in the context of fee shifting statutes. If a party’s jurisdictional math does not add up, they may be sent back to where the matter started: state court.

May 8, 2025May 8, 2025 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Class Action Issues In 2025 – Report From The 9th Annual Class Action Conference In New York City

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, Shannon Noelle, and Anna Sheridan

Duane Morris Takeaways: On May 8, 2025, the Beard Group sponsored the Class Action Money & Ethics Conference in New York City. During the conference, over 200 attendees discussed key issues impacting class action litigation in 2025. We were privileged to chair the Conference and present the keynote address on class action litigation trends for the past year and what 2025 has in store for Corporate America. The discussion at the program underscores the cutting-edge issues facing companies in this area of law.

Key Trends For The Past Year

In our keynote address, we discussed the top ten developments in the class action litigation space. The leading trends center on the new era of heightened risks and elevated exposures that pivot on record-breaking settlement numbers, the high conversion numbers for class certification motions into certified classes, and the rise in privacy and data breach class actions.

On the settlement front, 2022 saw $66 billion in total proceeds when measured by the top ten settlements in all areas of law. In 2023, that figure totaled $51 billion, for a combined total of $117 billion over the past 24 months. And in 2024, those numbers came in at $42 billion, which pushed the settlement numbers to $159 billion for the past 36 months.

In terms of class certification motions, the Plaintiffs bar successfully secured certification in 63% of cases over the past year. Those figures ranged from nearly 83% in WARN lawsuits to 37% in RICO cases. That said, the plaintiffs’ bar has proven its track record to convert class action lawsuit filings in to certified classes at a high rate.

In the privacy and data breach space, such claims became ubiquitous in 2024, with a virtual explosion in those types of lawsuits. While certification rates were quite low in data breach situations, the plaintiffs’ bar secured certification in privacy class actions at a higher rate.

We also discussed how class actions over environmental. social, and governance issues went mainstream in the past year. We predicted that ESG class actions will continue to increase, especially as the plaintiffs’ bar refines their theories of recovery and begin to monetize their claims. In particular, securities fraud class actions over DEI commitments are increasing as a result of the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Students For Fair Admissions, Inc., et al. v. President And Fellows Of Harvard College, 600 U.S. 181 (2023). Both plaintiffs’ lawyers and defense counsel anticipate more litigation in this space.

Data Breach Panel

An interesting panel discussion – consisting primarily of plaintiffs’ lawyers – ensued after the keynote address on wiretapping class claims under the Video Privacy Protection Act and data privacy class action litigation. They reflected on the patchwork quilt of rulings in these areas over the past year and the low certification rates due to problems in surmounting standing issues based on lack of injury-in-fact showings.

The panelists predicted a subtle shift in privacy and data breach lawsuits to effectuate a “work around” to these impediments. Multiple plaintiffs’ counsel predicted more reliance on state law claims and litigation of class-wide claims in state court.

Panel On Class Notice Strategies

The next panel focused on trends for class notice in 2025 and how artificial intelligence is now mainstream in terms of its use to facilitate the notice send to class members. The panelists expressed how these practices are quite innovative and rapidly evolving. Notice through social media and/or texts or email also is considerable cheaper than U.S. Mail, which is driving down settlement administration costs.

The challenge, however, is to prevent fraudulent claims from individuals seeking a share of the settlement pot. As to take rates, social media advertising is driving the rates upward, but the rates in data breach cases remain low at 1% to 5% (as compared to other types of settlements).- Class member demographics also impact the take rate, as older individuals are apt to view social media notice as “junk mail” or a scam. Conversely, staying ahead of fraudsters has created an imperative for settlement administrators (e.g., where settlement shares are claimed by an IP address of a bot).

Panel On Fraud In The Class Action Process

Another panel discussed the rise of fraudsters in the class action space. Some involve “deep fakes” of persons who seek to assert false claims as named plaintiffs or class members. Others involve cyber-criminals who infiltrate the settlement administration process through artificial intelligence software and seek class settlement shares on a false basis.

Judicial responses have run the gamut from shutting down the settlement administration process and rebooting it with enhanced security measures to referrals to law enforcement personnel to combat fraud. Panelists predicted that judges are apt to ratchet up the scrutiny of final settlement approval of class actions, and possibly promote direct mail notice over digital communications.

Implications For Companies

Class action litigation is a fact of life for corporations operating in the United States. Today’s conference underscored that change is inevitable, and class actions litigation is no exception.

April 25, 2025April 25, 2025 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Consent Decree Gets Dumped: Court Refuses To Approve Vague Settlement In EEOC v. Waste Pro

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Anna Sheridan, and Brett Bohan

Duane Morris Takeaways: On April 22, 2025, in EEOC v. Waste Pro Fla., Inc., No. 23-CV-1132, (M.D. Fla. Apr. 22, 2025), Judge Wendy Berger of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida denied a joint motion for approval of a consent decree between the EEOC and Waste Pro of Florida, Inc. The Court determined that the parties failed to comply with the Middle District of Florida’s local rules and to provide specificities necessary for approval of the consent decree. For those who think that EEOC consent decrees simply get rubber-stamped, this order demonstrates that that this is not the case. This ruling illustrates the importance of litigants closely adhering to a courts’ local rules and always providing a legal and factual basis for the court to grant their motions, even when those motions are unopposed.

Case Background

On September 26, 2023, the EEOC, on behalf of charging party Fednol Pierre, filed a lawsuit against his former employer, Waste Pro of Florida, Inc. (“Waste Pro”) regarding allegations systemic racial harassment and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. (ECF 1.) The EEOC alleged that Waste Pro perpetuated a work environment that subjected Mr. Pierre to racial slurs and derogatory racial comments and retaliated against Mr. Pierre when he complained of harassment. Id. ¶¶ 36, 57.

On October 15, 2024, the parties jointly moved for approval of a consent decree. (ECF 65.) The motion spans two pages and includes details about the procedural background of the case, the claims made in the complaint, the settlement process, the decree’s compliance with the federal rules, and the decree’s public benefit. Id. Among other provisions, the agreement provided for a $1.4 million cash award to Mr. Pierre and other Black and Haitian employees and required Waste Pro to employ an officer to ensure compliance with civil rights laws. (ECF 65-1 ¶¶ 17–44.).

The Court’s Order

The Court denied the parties’ joint motion to approve the consent decree and found the motion failed on two independent grounds, including: (1) the motion did not provide a basis for approval and (2) the motion did not comply with Middle District of Florida Local Rule 3.01(a). (ECF 70 at 1.)

First, the Court determined that “the filing fails to provide this Court with any legal or factual basis” for granting the motion. Id. Courts do not rubber stamp consent decrees. See In Re Blue Cross Blue Shield Antitrust Litig. MDL 2406, 85 F.4th 1070, 1094 (11th Cir. 2023). Instead, courts must independently determine whether the agreements are “fair, adequate, and reasonable” by considering various factors. Bennett v. Behring Corp., 737 F.3d 982, 987 (11th Cir. 1984). In this case, the Court concluded that the parties had not provided it with sufficient information to undertake this analysis, so the Court could not approve the consent decree. (ECF 70 at 1.) As the parties here learned, courts generally will decline to enforce a consent decree that simply restates existing legal obligations without measurable terms.

Second, the Court held that “the filing fails to comply with Local Rule 3.01(a).” Id. The rule requires joint motions to include the word “unopposed” in the title. L.R. 3.01(a). It also requires a motion to include “a concise statement of the precise relief requested, a statement of the basis for the request, and a legal memorandum supporting the request.” Id. The parties titled the motion “Joint Motion for Approval of Consent Decree” and did not include a supporting legal memorandum; therefore, the Court determined that they failed to adhere to the requirements of the rule.

In sum, the Court concluded that it could not grant the parties’ motion without a firm factual or legal basis and that it would not excuse the parties’ violation of the local rules. (ECF 1 at 1.) Instead, it denied the motion and gave the EEOC one week to show cause why the lawsuit should not be dismissed with prejudice. Id.

Implications For Employers

The Court’s ruling in Waste Pro should serve as a stark warning to all litigants that they should always review a court’s local rules and be in the habit of giving the court a reason to rule in their favor, even when the relief they seek is unopposed.

This case demonstrates the serious consequences that can result from a lack of attention to detail. Here, the Court rejected the parties’ attempt to circumvent the Court’s independent duty to determine the fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness of the agreement.

When settling with the EEOC or any regulatory body, vague promises to “do better” will not suffice. If employers want their settlements approved, they cannot just recycle boilerplate language.

March 28, 2025 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

No Shot at Class Certification – Pennsylvania Federal Court Rules that Company Review of COVID-19 Vaccine Exemption Requests Requires Individualized Inquiries Not Suitable For Class Treatment

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Shannon Noelle, and Anna Sheridan

Duane Morris Takeaways: In Meinert et al. v. Port Authority of Allegheny County, Case No. 2:22-CV-01736 (W.D. Pa. 2025), Judge Robert J. Colville of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania denied class certification for a class of former transit company employees that were allegedly denied medical and religious exemptions to an employer-mandated COVID-19 vaccination policy. In so doing, the Court highlighted opportunities for defendants to defeat class certification by offering proof that the proposed class is amenable to ordinary joinder and that individualized inquiries predominate over common ones in terms of the qualified disabilities, sincerely held religious beliefs, and undue hardship. The ruling is a required read for corporate counsel facing workplace-related class actions.

Background

Former bus drivers and maintenance workers of Pittsburgh Regional Transit filed a class action complaint against the transit company in December 2022 alleging that a company policy issued in early 2022 requiring COVID-19 vaccinations for employees resulted in class members being denied a medical or religious exemption in violation of federal and state law prohibiting discrimination based on a disability or sincerely held religious belief. In total, the transit company received 350 accommodation requests related to its COVID-19 vaccination policy — 54 of which were for medical exemptions and 296 of which were for religious exemptions. The Company formed an Accommodation Review Committee that ultimately granted 13 medical exemption and 30 religious exemption requests to its vaccination policy.

The plaintiffs argued that the exemption review process was a “sham.” As it regards the medical exemption review process, the plaintiffs argued all proposed class members (the “medical exemption class”) were denied a medical exemption because their pre-existing conditions or disabilities did not show a contraindication to the CDC guidelines and the Company did not factor whether the conditions were a recognized disability under the ADA. As it regards its religious exemption review process, the plaintiffs maintained that the Company did not engage in any individualized analysis to determine undue hardship (the “religious exemption class”).

The Court’s Decision

In its Rule 23 analysis, the Court ruled that the medical exemption class failed to meet the numerosity and commonality prerequisites and that the religious exemption class failed to satisfy the commonality and predominance requirements for class certification. The Court found that as the plaintiffs presented no evidence to contradict the Company’s proof that only 12 individuals fell into the proposed medical exemption class, the Court opined that the plaintiffs failed to establish numerosity and demonstrate that joinder of all members was impracticable, particularly given that all class members were employees of the Company in Pittsburgh.

The Court also rejected plaintiffs’ generic arguments that class certification would promote consistent results and judicial economy. The Court further addressed the lack of commonality of the medical exemption class in dicta (as the lack of numerosity was sufficient to dismiss the proposed class) but nevertheless found that determining whether each member of the class had a cognizable disability would be an individualized inquiry that could not be considered on a class wide basis.

With respect to the religious exemption class, the Court found a lack of commonality given that the sincerity of a class member’s religious beliefs and the undue hardship to the Company are both individualized inquiries not suitable for class treatment. The Court rejected plaintiffs’ contention that the Company did not engage in any individual analysis to determine undue hardship, crediting an affidavit submitted by the Company detailing the Accommodation Review Committee’s process and attaching denial letters, which it reasoned illustrated that the Company considered undue hardship on an individual-by-individual basis. For the same reasons, the Court also reasoned that predominance was lacking as to the religious exemption class given that the sincerity of class members’ religious beliefs and undue hardship to the Company would both turn on individualized proof rather than evidence common to all class members.

Implications of the Decision

The Court’s decision underscores the opportunity for defendants to defeat certification by submitting evidence that proposed members of the class are limited and could be easily joined through ordinary joinder procedures and that the proposed class-wide proceeding is not apt to generate common answers as to whether class members are entitled to relief, as opposed to common questions.

Employers implementing similar review processes for exemption requests to company policies are well-advised to document and evidence an individualized process in evaluating and responding to such requests to defend against class action exposure.

February 26, 2025February 26, 2025 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

EEOC Male Bias Suit Against Sports Bar Restaurant Group Survives Dismissal

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Anna Sheridan, George J. Schaller

Duane Morris Takeaways: In EEOC v. Battleground Restaurants, Inc. et al., 1:24-CV-792, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32071 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 24, 2025), the Court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss an EEOC lawsuit alleging discriminatory hiring practices against men at a chain of sports bars. The EEOC’s complaint asserts sex discrimination in hiring for server, bartender, and host positions, and for failures to preserve employment records in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

This case signals a new wave of anti-discrimination enforcement actions against companies that prioritize hiring practices that may exclude male applicants. The Commission’s litigation efforts are in full swing, and companies must review their hiring practices to ensure all applicants are weighed neutrally during the application process.

Complaint Allegations

The EEOC’s complaint alleges that between December 1, 2019, and February 18, 2022, Kickback Jack’s restaurants located throughout North Carolina, Virginia, and Tennessee discriminated against males by failing to hire men for front of house, non-managerial positions. Id. at *1. Kickback Jack’s is owned and operated by Battleground Restaurants, Inc. and Battleground Restaurant Group, Inc. (“BRGI”) (collectively “Defendants”). Id.

Kickback Jack’s employs “servers, hosts, and bartenders in non-managerial front-of-house positions,” all of which require no “special skills or qualifications.” Id. at *2. Kickback Jack’s advertisements state that applicants need only “[b]ring [their] great attitude to work and [Kickback Jack’s] will train you.” Id. at *2.

The underlying charge was filed on July 31, 2020, when a female server, Melody Roe, filed an EEOC charge of discrimination against Kickback Jack’s. Id. Included in Roe’s charge of discrimination was statements that Kickback Jack’s “has a policy and/or practice of only hiring females for front of house positions and not into management.” Id. at *3. The EEOC’s investigation into Roe’s charge of discrimination found that Battleground Restaurants, Inc. “maintained a policy or practice . . . of failing or refusing to hire males for non-managerial front of house positions because of their sex.” Id.

The Commission’s investigation further revealed that of the 2,100 non-managerial front-of-house employees employed between December 1, 2019, and February 18, 2022, “approximately 3% were male” and some Kickback Jack’s locations “did not employ male servers at all.” Id. at *4.

As a result of these newly uncovered hiring practices, the EEOC filed a complaint asserting that “a predominantly female front-of-house workforce cannot be justified by any legitimate business purposes” and that Defendants’ hiring practices “were and are intentional and willful.” Id. The Complaint also alleged that Defendants failed to make and preserve records relevant to their employment practices, and specifically failed to retain applications for employment. Id. at *5.

Defendants moved to dismiss the EEOC’s complaint, dismiss or strike BRGI, and requested the Court certify the case for interlocutory appeal. Id. at *1.

District Court’s Ruling

The Court denied the Defendants’ motion in all aspects on the basis that the EEOC complied with procedural and administrative requirements, plausibly alleged a pattern or practice of disparate sex discrimination, and that the EEOC could properly include BRGI as a defendant. Id.

Defendants argued the EEOC failed to provide them with adequate notice of its claims on “behalf of male applicants and the Title VII records violations.” Id. at *5. Defendants did not dispute that it received notice of Roe’s charge of discrimination within 10 days (as required by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)). Rather, the Defendants argued the charge of discrimination did not “give them notice of an EEOC investigation into discrimination against males in hiring.” Id. at *7.

The EEOC countered that the investigation into discrimination against males was implicit in Roe’s allegations that the restaurant had “a policy and/or practice of only hiring females” for front of house positions. Id.The Court agreed that the “alleged discrimination against males for front of house positions appears on the face of the charge of discrimination,” Defendants did not allege that they were not on notice of the charge of discrimination, and therefore, the EEOC complied with its administrative and procedural requirements under the statute. Id. at *8

The Court also denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss the EEOC’s preservation of records claim because no 10-day notice requirement exists under the statutory provisions. Id. at *8-9. The Court further disagreed with Defendants that the EEOC’s claims should be limited to 180 days before Defendants received notice of the charge of discrimination because “the complaint [did] not contain the facts necessary to assess whether the EEOC’s claims exceed Title VII’s statute of limitations period.” Id. at *10-11.

On Defendants’ argument to dismiss or strike BRGI, the Court opined that the Commission plausibly alleged BRGI is “essentially, Kickback Jack’s operator.” Id. at *12. The Court held the EEOC can sue BRGI “despite not naming [BRGI] directly as a party in the charge of discrimination or communicating with it based on both the joint enterprise test and substantial identity exception.” Id. at *15.

On the EEOC’s allegations of Title VII sex discrimination in hiring, the Court denied the Defendants’ motion to dismiss because the EEOC “plausibly alleged a pattern or practice of discrimination by using statistics” which demonstrated of the 2,100 non-managerial front-of-house employees approximately only 3% were male. Id. at *18. And in some instances, locations “did not employ any male servers at all.” Id. The EEOC also satisfied its pleading requirements under Title VII as it alleged Defendants discriminated “against male applicants –– a protected class — ” and alleged that “male applicants qualified” for the front-of-house roles.” Id. *17-18. Based on these findings, the Court reasoned “this type of ‘gross disparity’ plausibly demonstrates an inference of discrimination against males who applied to work as servers.” Id. at *18. Therefore, the Court found that the EEOC has met its burden of plausibly alleging the elements of its claim sufficiently to survive a motion to dismiss.

The Court also denied Defendants’ request for certification stating it did “not find any esoteric issues meriting an interlocutory appeal.” Id. at *2.

Implications For Employers

Employers’ hiring practices remain a target for EEOC initiated litigation. This case is but one example of the EEOC bringing a lawsuit after identifying a pattern of potentially discriminatory practices first alleged in a charge. While uncommon, the EEOC does regularly bring these “pattern-or-practice” lawsuits under Section 706 or Section 707 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when it has a case that draws significant public interest or could make an industry-wide impact.

This is far from the first case of male gender discrimination in the restaurant industry. The popular restaurant chain Hooters has settled several similar lawsuits, one in 1997 for $3.75 million, and one in 2009 for an undisclosed sum. See Latuga v. Hooters, Inc., 1:93-CV-7709 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 25, 1997); see also Grushevski v. Texas Wings, Inc., No. 09-CV-00002 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 16, 2009). Lawry’s restaurants were also hit with an EEOC pattern or practice lawsuit in 2006 alleging that Lawry’s practice of only hiring females for its server positions constituted gender discrimination. See EEOC v. Lawry’s Restaurants, Inc., No. CV 06-01963 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2006).

The recent case against Battleground shows that the EEOC continues to closely scrutinize hiring practices which select individuals based on a protected characteristic, including gender. Employers must also monitor and audit their hiring practice outcomes to ensure statistical models don’t demonstrate discrimination otherwise an EEOC action may be on the horizon.

February 11, 2025February 11, 2025 by Rebecca S. Bjork

Kansas Federal Court Declines To Revisit Motion for Summary Judgment Order In EEOC Lawsuit And Rejects Interlocutory Appeal Request By Employer

By Rebecca S. Bjork, Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., and Anna Sheridan

Duane Morris Takeaways: A Federal Judge in Kansas recently refused a request for reconsideration of summary judgment and a request for interlocutory appeal on the correct legal standard for hostile work environment claims post-Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, Mo. In EEOC v. Chipotle Services, LLC, Case No. 23-CV-2439 (D. Kan. Feb. 10, 2025) (linked here), Judge Kathryn H. Vratil of the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas found that appellate review of the Muldrow standard used at summary judgment likely would not affect the case substantially, but rather lead to delay before the case would proceed in the same manner regardless of a decision by the Tenth Circuit. The opinion also rejected the employer’s motion for reconsideration to rehash arguments it should have made on summary judgment – in the Court’s view, an inappropriate use of a motion for reconsideration. This decision not only highlights the importance of timely arguments made at the appropriate stage of litigation, but also counsels employers to analyze and balance the potential outcomes of motions with the time and costs associated with non-dispositive or only partially dispositive motions.

Case Background

Areej Saifan, a Muslim woman, and former Chipotle crew member, alleged in a Charge of Discrimination that she experienced religious harassment from a co-worker during her employment. Saifan alleges that a co-worker repeatedly asked to see Saifan’s hair, which was covered by hijab, and on at least one occasion, the co-worker physically pulled on the hijab, partially uncovering Saifan’s hair. Saifan resigned the next day. After investigating the Charge, the EEOC filed suit on behalf of Ms. Saifan against Chipotle alleging that Chipotle (1) subjected Saifan to unlawful religious harassment, (2) constructively discharged her, and (3) retaliated against her for reporting religious harassment.

Chipotle filed a motion for summary judgment on all three of the EEOC’s Title VII claims but was unsuccessful on all counts.

On December 17, 2024, defendant filed two motions, asking the Court to (1) reconsider its order on defendant’s summary judgment motion, and (2) certify an interlocutory appeal.

The Court’s Ruling

Judge Vratil dismissed defendant’s motion for reconsideration as “simply a rehash of arguments that it made or could have made on summary judgment.” Slip Op. at 5. The Court rejected each of Defendant’s positions as an argument that “it [Defendant] could have raised in summary judgment briefing and chose not to.” Id. at 8. The Court found that Chipotle had not met its burden of showing an intervening change in the controlling law, availability of new evidence, or the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice as is required by the local Kansas rules.

Judicial economy also took center stage in this ruling when the Court denied the motion to certify its Memorandum and Order for immediate appeal, finding that an interlocutory appeal would not materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. While the question of whether Muldrow changed the legal standard for hostile work environment is a controlling question of law, the Court determined that Chipotle failed to establish that the Tenth Circuit would likely dispose or affect the EEOC’s claims for trial. As such, an interlocutory appeal would only delay, rather than expedite or eliminate trial.

Implications For Employers

Employers often may want to fight a non-dispositive decision that feels unfair. However, this decision counsels employers to consider the implications of motions practice before proceeding if the requested outcome would not materially change the future of the case.