Author: Class Action Defense

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California Attorney General Utilizes Novel Nuisance Theory From Opioid Litigation Against Manufacturers Of “Forever” Chemicals In New Government Enforcement Action

By Sharon L. Caffrey and Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Duane Morris Synopsis—The Attorney General of California has filed a first of its kind lawsuit against several named manufacturers and “John Doe” manufacturers of per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (commonly known as PFAS and PFOA) based upon the same public nuisance theory used by several attorneys general and local governments against opioid manufacturers, distributors, and pharmacies in nationwide class action litigation.  Claiming that defendants knew PFAS, PFOA, and related chemicals were harmful but put the chemicals into the market and into the environment with insufficient testing, and claiming the PFAS can be found in the bloodstreams of virtually every Californian, the Attorney General is seeking both equitable and financial relief, including an injunction against further sales of products containing PFAS and PFOA, remediation, and monetary damages.  The lawsuit is a blockbuster of ambitious claims, and given the ubiquitous nature of PFAS and PFOA, this case is one of potential concern for any manufacturer whose products or processes may result in the ingestion or release of PFAS and PFOA.

Case Background

On behalf of the People of California, the California Attorney General is seeking remediation and damages of soil and groundwater allegedly contaminated with PFAS and PFOA.  PFAS and PFOA are sometimes referred to as “forever chemicals” because of their bio-durability in soil, groundwater, and in the human body.  In a nod to the playbook of successful class actions against another industry, the Attorney General’s action relies on the same public nuisance theory used in the opioid litigation, as well as traditional product liability failure to warn theories of liability.

PFAS and PFOA are found in a “wide array of products and industrial processes,” including products as common as food packaging, carpet and fabric coatings and cleaning products.  The claim centers on the release of PFAs and PFOA into drinking water sources, including bays, lakes and streams.  Claiming exposure to PFAS and PFOA contributes to certain cancers, adverse pregnancy outcomes, delayed puberty, and infertility, among other harms, the Attorney General’s suit notes that PFAS and PFOA are ingested orally and persist in the body because they are not readily broken down.

In support of his claims, the Attorney General relies primarily on toxicology studies and some in vitro studies, as well as very limited human epidemiologic evidence that PFAS and PFOA are associated with certain adverse health outcomes.  The complaint also notes that the California Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment (OEHHA) listed PFOA and PFOS as chemicals known to cause reproductive toxicity under the Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986, commonly known as “Prop 65.”  The Complaint further asserts that the EPA intends to issue enforceable National Primary Drinking Water Regulations (NPDWRs) for drinking water contaminants, to include PFAS and PFOA by the end of 2022.  Because PFAS and PFOA are not readily broken down in soil, water or the human body, they are found in over 97 percent of all Californians’ bloodstreams.  Finally, the Attorney General’s lawsuit claims that defendants put products containing PFAS and PFOA in the stream of commerce without adequate testing or warnings of the harms they could cause, or while being aware of the potential harms and not warning the public.

Implications For Manufacturers

At present California is the only state that has filed a claim against manufacturers who allegedly put PFAS and PFOA into groundwater and soil.  California’s unique Prop 65 is part of the basis for the Attorney General’s claim.  However, if the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency issues enforceable limits on PFAS and PFOA in drinking water, similar suits will inevitably arise in other jurisdictions.  Companies who believe they may be at risk for similar claims should consult with counsel about the best way to mitigate any exposure for such litigation.

Posted on by Class Action Defense

Just In Time For The Holidays: New York Federal Court Gifts The Denial Of Plaintiffs’ Rule 23 Class Certification Motion In FDNY Bias Lawsuit

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Katelynn Gray and Elizabeth M. Lacombe

Duane Morris Takeaways – In Local 3621 Of The EMS Officers Union, et al. v. City Of New York, Case No. 18 Civ. 4476, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 212218 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2022), the City successfully defeated a Rule 23 motion for class certification brought by a group of EMS officers and Unions who alleged that the promotional process to leadership positions resulted in disparate and discriminatory promotional practices in violation of federal, state, and local law. The ruling is a primer for employers on how to dismantle employment discrimination class claims.

Background Of The Case

Plaintiffs Renae Mascol, Luis Rodriguez, Local 3621, EMS Officers Union, DC-37, AFSCME and AFL-CIO (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) brought a class action on behalf of its members and all other similarly-situated individuals against Defendants, the City of New York, the New York City Fire Department, and the Department of Citywide Administrative Services (collectively, the “City”), alleging Defendants’ subjective promotional policies and practices led to the denial of promotions to qualified applicants based on their race, sex, gender and/or disability and/or circumstances that led to the applicant taking a leave of absence.

Plaintiffs sought class certification pursuant to Rule 23(a) and (b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of three classes, including: (1) EMS officers who are non-white, female, have received a reasonable accommodation, or have taken a leave of absence due to a disability or pursuant to FDNY time and leave policies; (2) non-white and/or female EMS officers; and (3) EMS officers who have received a reasonable accommodation or taken a leave of absence because of a disability and/or have taken a leave of absence pursuant to FDNY time and leave policies.

In support of their motion, Plaintiffs submitted an expert report from a forensic labor economist who concluded there was “statistically significant evidence of discriminatory promotional disparities” and that the statistical evidence showed that the common promotional policy “resulted in disparities that commonly disadvantaged the class.”  Id. at *7. Plaintiffs also submitted anecdotal evidence in the form of declarations from EMS officers testifying to their experiences with the City’s promotional processes.

Defendants opposed these theories and submitted rebuttal evidence with their own expert report. They argued that Plaintiffs’ expert’s analysis was flawed, largely because it was based in part on data that was irrelevant to the analysis and in other instances because it failed to consider other, relevant data.  Moreover, Defendants’ expert concluded that the relevant data led to a determination that, when evaluating promotions over the same time period, white men were actually less likely to be promoted than similarly-situated non-white officers; men were less likely to be promoted than women; and whites were less likely to be promoted than non-whites.

The Court’s Ruling Denying Class Certification

In denying Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, Judge Lewis J. Liman of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York conducted an extensive review of the promotional process at issue, as well as the expert reports and anecdotal evidence offered by the parties. Ultimately, the Court concluded that Plaintiffs had failed to sufficiently demonstrate the element of commonality under Rule 23(a)(2).

With respect to Plaintiffs’ disparate impact claims, the Court explained that Plaintiffs cannot simply point to the promotional process generally as the basis for the disparate impact, but must identify the “specific” employment practices allegedly responsible for the at-issue disparities.  In this case, there were several distinct steps in the promotional process, which combined subjective criteria with standardized eligibility criteria.  Significantly, an applicant could fail to be promoted at any one of these steps. As such, the Court opined that in order to state a disparate impact claim based on a failure to promote, Plaintiffs were required to identify which specific employment practice was responsible for the statistical disparities.

The Court reasoned that Plaintiffs’ expert’s analysis did not help them win the day, where it merely showed a racial and gender disparity with respect to the individuals holding leadership positions but failed to identify what aspect of the promotional process, if any, resulted in those disparities.  Moreover, the Court found that Plaintiffs’ anecdotal evidence did more harm than good, underscoring the individualized nature of each alleged incident of discrimination where each declaration identified a different form of discrimination and a different course of conduct.  The Court ultimately determined that Plaintiffs had failed to show that Defendants had used any of the cited employment practices to discriminate against the proposed class or that such practices had a discriminatory impact, holding that “the question of which of these specific employment practices has a discriminatory impact on the applicant is largely an individualized inquiry.” Id. at *25.

Plaintiffs’ disparate treatment claim fared no better for similar reasons, as the Court again noted that the statistical evidence from Plaintiffs’ expert did not offer “significant proof of a pattern or practice of unlawful discrimination” and failed to account for non-discriminatory explanations for any disparities.  Plaintiffs’ primary evidence, that of anecdotal evidence from declarants, was similarly insufficient to salvage their claims because it raised “individual rather than common questions.” Id. at *26.

Implications For Employers

The ruling in Local 3621 Of The EMS Officers Union emphasizes the value of crafting and implementing detailed and thoughtful employment policies and procedures that utilize both objective and subjective measures in an effort to reduce or eliminate the influence of potential bias (implicit or otherwise) when evaluating employees for promotional opportunities.  Moreover, ensuring that those policies and procedures are reduced to writing, provided to those employees who might have occasion to evaluate others for promotional opportunities, and implemented appropriately will provide a strong defense to discrimination claims and may, as it did here, serve to dismantle a potential class claim based on generalized allegations of process-based discriminatory conduct.

Posted on by Class Action Defense

When Consistency Creates Commonality

By Jonathan A. Segal

Duane Morris Takeaways: Guest blogger Jonathan A. Segal – one of the deans of the employment bar in the United States – offers his ruminations on the challenges that employers face in class action litigation.

I recently attended an employment law webinar.  It got me thinking about employers and the challenge of dealing with workplace class action litigation.

At one point, when discussing how to minimize exposure to discrimination claims, a seminar speaker opined there are three words to keep in mind at all times:  “Consistency, Consistency and Consistency.”

When it comes to performance management, if employers treat employees consistently when the circumstances are the same or substantially similar, they can mitigate exposure to individual discrimination claims.  The consistency ensures that helpful comparators exist, which employers can use to defend an alleged employment discrimination claim. Of course, and as important, the consistency here is critical to a strong workplace culture.

However, consistency is not always desirable.  Huh? Stay with me.

Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23 provides:

  • Prerequisites. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all members only if:
    • the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable;
    • there are questions of law or fact common to the class;
    • the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and
    • the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.

As is evident, consistency may help satisfy the second requirement relative to common issues of fact or law. The U.S. Supreme Court decided that a decade ago in its seminal ruling in Wal-Mart Stores, In. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011).

Arguably – and we certainly see it in the courtroom in the manner of arguments by Plaintiff’s counsel – per se rules that are created to minimize any exposure to discrimination claims may increase the employer’s exposure to class claims because of the commonality they create.   But one example suffices — automatic termination of employees after they have been on leave for a specified period of time.

Ralph Waldo Emerson once said that “Foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds.”  Let me say this with a bit more civility. While consistency often is desirable, there are times when consistency hurts rather than helps.  The key is to know when consistency is desirable and when it is, well, anything but optimal.

Over the next year, I will blog about examples of employment practices/rules that create commonality that have been the basis for class action attacks.  In these blogs, I also will talk about alternative approaches that help mitigate exposure to both individual and class action claims.

Stay tuned!

Posted on by Class Action Defense

Consumer Fraud Class Actions On The Rise In The Cannabis Industry – With More To Come With Interstate Sales

By Seth Goldberg, Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., and Jennifer A. Riley

Duane Morris Takeaways: Cannabis products – such as vapes, pre-rolled joints, tinctures, gummies, and beverages – are consumer packaged goods that are required under state law to be marketed with packaging and labeling that demonstrates their safety to consumers. Although the U.S. state-licensed cannabis industry has been one of the fastest-growing industries in the U.S. over the past decade, consumer fraud lawsuits arising out of alleged packaging and labeling problems, which are a common risk for CPG manufacturers in other industries, have, until now, not been a major consideration for the cannabis supply chain.  However, that is changing. As three recent lawsuits suggest, consumer fraud class actions may be on the rise in the industry. Given the media attention cases like these attract, and the potential for damages for thousands or millions of potential consumers, the cannabis supply chain should take notice. As discussed below, this is going to be especially true once cannabis products are permitted to be sold interstate.

Key Cases

In Centeno et al. v. DreamFields Brands Inc., and Med for America, Inc., a consumer class action filed on October 20, 2022, in the Superior Court of California for Los Angeles County, two putative class representatives filed a putative class action against the manufacturers of Jeeter-branded pre-roll joints on behalf of “all persons who, while in the State of California and within the applicable statute of limitations period, purchased or more Jeeter Products.”  The complaint alleges that the putative class representatives purchased a variety of Jeeter-branded pre-rolled joints based on the high THC potencies stated on the labeling of such products, but those products were actually lower in THC than stated on the labeling. Given that products with greater THC potency are priced higher than products with lower THC, the putative class representatives claim they paid a premium they would not have paid had they known the true THC potency of the Jeeter products they purchased, and thus they suffered an economic loss for which they should be made whole. Their complaint alleges that “millions of other consumers” bought Jeeter pre-rolled joints and suffered the same economic loss. As the Complaint asserts:

If Defendants told the truth — that is, that its products’ THC content is substantially lower than represented on the label — the price of its Products would fall dramatically. If  consumers knew the truth — that the Products contain substantially less THC than the label says —  Defendants could not sell their Products for its current prices. Indeed, as explained above, cannabis products with lower declared amounts of THC content sell for substantially less than ones with higher declared amounts of THC content. Accordingly, if Defendants told the truth about the THC content of their products, they would have had to lower the price, and Plaintiffs and class members would have paid less.

In addition to seeking for themselves and the class of “millions of consumers” damages for the amounts overpaid for the Jeeter-branded pre-rolls, the putative class representatives also seek punitive damages, attorneys’ fees, and injunctive relief to stop the allegedly fraudulent labeling under California’s unfair competition and false advertising statutes, as well as various common law claims.

We previously wrote about a number of separate actions filed against Curaleaf, the largest U.S. cannabis product manufacturer in 2021, arising out of allegations that Curaleaf mislabeled tinctures containing THC that were marketed as containing CBD. One of those cases, Williamson v. Curaleaf, Inc., a consumer class action filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon on May 30, 2022, was reported last week to have settled for payments of $150 to $200 for as many as 500 class members who are alleged to have consumed the mislabeled Curaleaf tinctures. Like the class action complaint filed in Centeno arising out of the mislabled Jeeter pre-rolls, Williamson’s class action complaint sought statutory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees under Oregon’s consumer fraud statute known as the unfair Trade Practices Act.

In addition to Centeno and Williamson, we previously wrote about Plumlee v. Steep Hill Inc., a putative class action filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas against cannabis testing lab and cannabis cultivators NSMC-OPCO LLC, Bold Team LLC and Osage Creek Cultivation LLC, which, like Centeno, arose out of allegations that the operators falsified the amount of THC in their cannabis products. As in Centeno, Plumlee seeks class-wide damages for economic loss, i.e., amounts overpaid for mislabeled cannabis products, and as in Centeno and Williamson, Plumlee seeks punitive damages and attorneys’ fees for the alleged fraudulent conduct. Interestingly, although the claims in Plumlee are sound in consumer fraud, Plumlee asserts that the defendants acted together to form an enterprise in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. As we previously wrote, these claims could just as easily been asserted as consumer fraud.

Future Litigation Prospects

There are a few reasons cannabis consumer fraud class actions may not have been attractive to the plaintiffs’ class action bar in recent years. First, given that cannabis products may only be manufactured and sold in the same state, the size of a class and the amount of damages are limited to consumers in a single state, as opposed to the type of nationwide class action one see with other CPGs. Indeed, Centeno, Williamson, and Plumlee, assert claims on behalf of a single state-wide class.

Second, most state cannabis markets have only recently – in the past few years – begun to grow into markets of hundreds of thousands or millions of consumers, and thus a single state class a few years ago would likely have been too small to warrant the investment in an expensive litigation by plaintiffs’ counsel.

Third, and similarly, defendants’ pockets are deeper today as a result of the increased sales over time than they were just a few years ago. For these reasons, the continued growth of state cannabis markets is likely to result in more cannabis consumer fraud class actions.

However, the interstate sale of cannabis products is really going to change the risk spectrum from consumer fraud class actions.

Once interstate sales of cannabis products are permitted, the mass marketing and distribution of cannabis products to consumers in multiple states in a region, if not nationally, will open the door to claims asserted on a nationwide basis that a cannabis consumer product was mislabeled. While such claims would be asserted under state-specific consumer fraud laws, they may be asserted on behalf of consumers around the country, resulting in significant exposure to the cannabis supply chain, i.e., growers, processors, labs, and dispensaries, for economic loss and punitive damages, as well as attorneys’ fees. These types of claims are routinely filed by the plaintiffs’ class action bar on behalf of nationwide classes arising out of the alleged mislabeling of other CPGs, and that bar will no doubt have cannabis products in their sights when interstate sales cannabis begin.

Posted on by Class Action Defense

Massachusetts District Court Denies Class Certification and Grants Summary Judgment Because Franchisees Not Employees

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Brandon Spurlock, and Shaina Wolfe

Duane Morris Takeaways – In Patel, et al. v. 7-Eleven, Inc., et al., 2022 WL 4540981, No. 17-11414 (D. Mass. Sept. 28, 2022), Judge Nathaniel Gorton of the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted summary judgment in favor of 7-Eleven, as a franchisor, and denied Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification because franchisees were not employees under Massachusetts state law.  In analyzing the state independent contractor statute, the Court determined that the obligations the franchisees undertook pursuant to the franchise agreement did not amount to “services” for purposes of the statute and Plaintiffs, therefore, were not employees.  This ruling is important because it provides guidance for companies operating under a franchisor/franchisee business model on how to combat arguments that franchisee agreements create an employee/employer relationship and obligate franchisors to cover a myriad of legal costs for their franchisees.

Background Of The Case

Plaintiffs, a group of franchisee store owners and operators, brought a putative class action against 7-Eleven alleging that Defendant misclassified them as independent contractors in violation of the Massachusetts Independent Contractor Law. Id. at 1.  Two of the named Plaintiffs entered into franchise agreements directly with 7-Eleven and three as corporate entities.  Id.  The franchise agreements outlined the obligations of the franchisees and included language that the franchisee agreed to hold itself out to the public as an independent contractor.  Id.  Under the agreement, the franchisee also agreed to pay several types of fees to 7-Eleven, including a franchise fee, gasoline fee, and down payment fee.  Id. at 2.  Plaintiffs filed a class action in Massachusetts state court and Defendant removed it on diversity grounds.  Id.  Both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and Plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification.  Id. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of 7-Eleven, and Plaintiffs appealed to the First Circuit where the case was remanded to allow the District Court to first weigh on the issue, which the First Circuit certified as “[w]hether the three-prong test for independent contractor status … applies to the relationship between a franchisor and its franchisee…” Id.

On remand, the District Court analyzed the elements for the independent contractor test under Massachusetts law, including: (1) freedom from control and direction; (2) service is performed outside the usual course of business; and (3) the individual is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession, or business of the same nature as that involved in the service.  Id. at 3.  Defendant argued that franchisees do not perform services for 7-Eleven, and in fact, 7-Eleven actually provides services to the franchisee in exchange for payment; and that 7-Eleven was not a direct employer where the franchise agreement was entered into by corporate entities.  Id. at 4.

The District Court based its ruling on the threshold inquiry of determining whether the individual performs any service for the alleged employer.  Id.  Plaintiffs argued that because the franchise agreement required them to work full time in the store, operate the store 24 hours a day, record inventory sales, wear approved uniforms and use 7-Eleven payroll system, in addition to submitting cash reports and depositing receipts, they should be deemed employees, not independent contractors.  Id. at 5.  The District Court, however, was not convinced that the contractual obligations outlined in the franchise agreement, alone, constituted services under Massachusetts law regarding independent contractors. Id.  Moreover, the District Court opined that although the parties do have mutual economic interests, even though both profit from the franchise stores’ revenue, that mutual interest was not enough to establish that plaintiffs provide services to support an employee relationship. Id.

In short, the District Court reasoned that where a franchisee is merely fulfilling its contractual obligations under a franchise agreement, that by itself does not refute the independent contractor status.  Id.  The District Court therefore granted 7-Eleven’s motion for summary judgment and denied Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification.  Id. at 6.

Implications For Employers

For those companies with franchisee operations, this ruling supports the position that obligations under a franchise agreement requiring the franchisee to perform certain tasks does not establish an employment relationship.  And the fact that the franchisor provides services to the franchisee for payment actually cuts against the employee designation.  Further, the simple fact of mutual benefit from business revenues does not help establish employee status under these circumstances.  Although an appeal from Plaintiffs is anticipated, the District Court’s analysis offers solid guidance for franchisors who are operating under similar franchise agreements.

Posted on by Class Action Defense

Alabama Federal Court Affirms $13 Million Default Judgement Against Employer In A Wage & Hour Collective Action For Discovery Failures

By: Gerald L. Maatman Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, and Aaron A. Bauer

Duane Morris Takeaways – In Hornady v. Outokumpu Stainless USA, No. 1:18-CV-317 (S.D. Ala. Oct. 4, 2022), the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Alabama upheld its sanction of a default judgement against the defendant on all of the Fair Labor Standards Act claims brought by a collective action of current and former employees. In affirming a default judgment of approximately $13 million, the Court cited the employer’s repeated failure to produce pay records, time records and incentive plan data during discovery.  Such a catastrophic outcome demonstrates the importance of reliable and honest client communication and responsible and reasonable conduct at all stages of discovery in complex employment-related litigation.

Background Of The Case

In 2018, Plaintiff William Hornady filed a collective action against his former employer Outokumpu Stainless (“OTK”) alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) for overtime and timekeeping record violations.  The case proceeded to discovery, and on November 18, 2021, things quickly unraveled for OTK when the Court found that the company had “acted in pervasive bad faith throughout the discovery process of this entire case…”  Id. at 3.  As a result, the Court sanctioned OTK by entering non-final default judgement against the company, thereby holding it liable for all of plaintiffs’ FLSA claims.  Id. at 6-7.  Earlier this year, OTK challenged this ruling by filing a motion to reconsider the order granting default judgement.

The Court’s Ruling Denying Reconsideration Of The Default Judgement

In seeking reconsideration of the decision to grant default judgement, OTK urged the Court to apply the “good cause” standard of review, under Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows courts to evaluate many different factors such as willfulness, prejudice, and whether the defaulting party might have a meritorious defense for purposes of determining whether to reconsider an order of a default judgement.  Id. at 7.  However, the Court declined to apply this “good cause” standard. Instead, it to use the stricter standard of Rule 54, which allows courts to reconsider interlocutory decisions if there is “evidence of an intervening change in the controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct clear error or manifest injustice.”  Id. at 12.

Given OTK’s failure to introduce newly available evidence disputing the Court’s previous finding that defense counsel had failed to meet its “discovery obligations,” the Court rejected OTK’s argument that the Court had abused its discretion by improperly imposing “death penalty” sanctions in the form of default judgement.  Id. at 14.  Specifically, the Court noted that it had ordered OTK to produce pay, time, and incentive plan records on “twelve (12) separate occasions spanning almost three years.”  Id. at 17-18.  When OTK finally did produce pay records, they were incomplete, and did not even include rate of pay data.  Id.  The Court also noted that the Magistrate Judge assigned to the case had originally recommended lesser sanctions against OTK.  However, while a ruling on this lesser sanction was pending, the Court opined that OTK “engaged in additional sanction-worthy behavior” during discovery.  Id. at 15.

OTK attempted to shift the blame for these discovery shortcomings to its payroll software provider and former outside counsel for the case.  OTK argued that it could not have produced the formula used to calculate the regular rate of pay (“RROP”) for its employees, as the Court had ordered, because this formula came from the proprietary software of ADP, which OTK would have had to obtain through a subpoena.  Id. at 23-24.  In reality, the Court observed that it had previously ordered OTK to subpoena ADP for this data in 2020, a year before the entry of default judgement.  Id. at 24.  For this reason, OTK could no longer argue that the requirement to subpoena ADP was newly available evidence that might allow the Court to reconsider its sanctions order.  Moreover, the Court noted that OTK’s failure to produce the RROP data had not been its “primary failing” because OTK also failed to produce hourly pay rates.  Id. at 25.

The Court also rejected OTK’s contention that its failures during the discovery process should be attributed to its former outside counsel in the case.  Id. at 27-28.  In support of this position, OTK submitted emails of its former counsel that purported to show that it had been “kept in the dark… as to what was actually occurring” in discovery.  Id.  However, the Court found that these emails could only “provide insight into a fraction of the circumstances” leading to the default judgement.  Id. at 29.  Regardless of whether these emails provided a legitimate excuse for all of OTK’s failures during the discovery process, the Court determined that the emails did not constitute newly available evidence, as OTK had failed to submit them to the Court when it was first facing default judgement sanctions.  Id. at 30.  Given this record, the Court placed the blame squarely on OTK for failing to “produce accurate and complete time and pay records.”

Implications for Employers

The $13 million sanction of a default judgment in the case is an eye-opener for any litigant. The Hornady decision demonstrates that employers who fail to actively engage and communicate with their outside counsel on a regular basis do so at their own peril.  To avoid such a disastrous outcome, clients should always expect and demand regular and truthful case status updates, especially in class and collective actions where the stakes can be so high.

Posted on by Class Action Defense

$228 Million Judgment Entered In First Ever BIPA Class Action Trial Before A Chicago Jury

By: Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, and Alex W. Karasik

Duane Morris Synopsis:  In Rogers v. BNSF Railway Co., Case No. 19-CV-03083 (N.D. Ill.), the first federal court jury trial in a case brought under the novel Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”), the plaintiffs secured a verdict in favor of the class of 45,000 workers against Defendant BNSF. After a week-long trial in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in Chicago, the jury found that BNSF recklessly or intentionally violated the law 45,600 times, based on the defense expert’s estimated number of drivers who had their fingerprints collected.  The Court thereafter entered a judgment against BNSF for $228 million.

This landmark verdict showcases the potentially devastating impact of the BIPA statute on unwary businesses across the state of Illinois that collect, use, or store biometric information.

Case Background

Plaintiff, a truck driver, filed a class action lawsuit alleging that BNSF unlawfully required drivers entering the Company’s facilities to provide their biometric information through a fingerprint scanner.  He claimed that BNSF collected the drivers’ fingerprints without first obtaining informed written consent or providing a written policy that complied with the BIPA and therefore violated sections 15(a) and (b) of the BIPA.  BNSF argued that it did not operate the biometric equipment and instead sought to shift blame to a third-party vendor who operated the biometric equipment that collected drivers’ fingerprints.

The case proceeded before a jury in federal court in Chicago. The proceeding was closely watched, as it represented the very first time any class action had gone to a full trial with claims under the BIPA

The trial lasted five days. However, the jurors deliberated for just over an hour.  The jurors were asked to: (1) indicate on the verdict form whether they sided with Plaintiff, and (2) if so, indicate how many times BNSF violated the BIPA negligently or how many times the company violated the statute recklessly or intentionally.

The BIPA provides for damages of $1,000 for every negligent violation, and up to $5,000 in liquidated damages for every willful or reckless violation. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found that BNSF recklessly or intentionally violated the law 45,600 times.  Accordingly, the Court entered a judgment against BNSF in the amount of $5,000 per violation, for a total amount of $228 million.

Implications For Employers

This verdict undoubtedly will embolden the plaintiffs’ class action bar and equally serve as an eye opener for businesses in Illinois.  In the short term, companies can expect an uptick in the number of BIPA class actions filed by the plaintiffs’ bar. While it is almost certain that the verdict will be challenged in post-trial motions and in an appeal, companies can expect that plaintiffs’ lawyers will increase their settlement demands in other BIPA class actions.

The BIPA vastly increases the importance of adopting a strategic compliance plan for businesses that operate in Illinois.  It is more important than ever for companies to implement proper mechanisms and consent forms to comply with the BIPA.

Posted on by Class Action Defense

Montana Federal Court Denies Class Certification In Gender Discrimination Litigation

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, and Michael DeMarino

Duane Morris Takeaways – In Cole, et al. v. Montana University System, at al., 21-CV-88 (D. Mont. Oct. 3, 2022), the U.S. District Court for the District of Montana recently denied certification of a Title IX class action alleging discrimination and harassment on the basis of sex.  The decision in Cole is an important one for employers, as it is a reminder that Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011), is still a major obstacle to class certification of broad discrimination claims.  Companies and their corporate counsel are well-served to heed the lessons of Cole and center their class certification defense strategy around the commonality requirement articulated in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

Background Of The Case

Plaintiffs were a group of women suing Defendants for alleged violations of Title IX and sought to certify a class of approximately 76 women who allegedly experienced harassment, retaliation, and/or discrimination on the basis of their sex.  Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants either forced them to resign, terminated their positions, or limited their options for professional growth. Id. at 3-5.

Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants fostered a “good ol’ boys club” culture, favoring male athletes and employees, while excluding Plaintiffs from participating in activities and benefits regularly afforded to their male counterparts. Id. at 3-9.

Against this backdrop, Plaintiffs alleged that a “retaliatory culture blossomed” and that all Plaintiffs experienced direct retaliation or the fear of retaliation for speaking out against Defendants’ alleged discriminatory conduct. Id. at 8-9.

The Court’s Class Certification Ruling

After the parties filed competing motion papers in support of class certification, and to deny class certification, the Court issued a lengthy and thorough order, which ruled that Plaintiffs failed to satisfy the requirements for class certification. At the heart of the Court’s analysis was Rule 23(a)’s commonality requirement, which ultimately drove the Court’s decision to deny class certification.

Analyzing the evidence and the parties’ submissions, the Court noted that Plaintiffs’ claims appeared to be too disparate to be resolved in one stroke, which is key to satisfying Rule 23(a)’s commonality requirement. In reaching that conclusion, the Court relied extensively on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011). Specifically, the Court found that Plaintiffs failed to identify an employment practice that ties together the putative class members to satisfy the U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

Plaintiffs, for their part, argued that the Ninth Circuit had adopted a “permissive view of commonality” in employment discrimination claims and that the existence of shared legal issues with divergent factual predicates was sufficient to satisfy commonality. The Court, however, rejected this argument. It opined that its analysis was “constrained” by Wal-Mart Store, Inc. Id. at 17.

The Court reasoned that, according to Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., commonality requires both a shared legal theory and shared facts such that determination of one claim can answer all others. Citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the Court noted that there are only two mechanisms to bring a class claim alleging broad discrimination, including: (1) show that the employer used a biased testing procedure to evaluate potential employees; or (2) provide significant proof that the employer operated under a general policy of discrimination.

Based on its analysis, the Court held that Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that Defendants acted under a general policy of discrimination and the injuries alleged required distinct inquiries into each Plaintiff’s circumstances, qualifications, and the alleged discrimination.

For similar reasons, the Court also concluded that Plaintiffs could not satisfy Rule 23(b)’s predominance requirement because individualized issues were more prevalent than common ones and Defendants’ liability was not subject to common proof.

As a result, the Court denied Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification without prejudice.

Implications For Employers

The ruling in Cole underscores the importance that Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes plays in employment discrimination cases. At times, the Court was sympathetic to Plaintiffs, and recognized the inherent evidentiary problems in broad employment discrimination cases. The Court even lamented the “harsh nature of the standard as imposed on a discrimination case.” Id.  Nevertheless, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. proved to be too much of an obstacle to Plaintiffs’ class certification theories.

The lesson from this decision is that employers should center their class certification defense strategy on the key holdings in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., particularly the fact that commonality requires both a shared legal theory and shared facts.  Cole teaches that because it is somewhat easier for plaintiffs to assert shared legal theories, employers should focus on divergent facts.

 

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The opinions expressed on this blog are those of the author and are not to be construed as legal advice.

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