Derek Franklin – Class Action Defense

February 21, 2024 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Seventh Circuit Affirms Minors Are Not Parties Bound To Arbitrate Claims In GIPA Class Action

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Derek S. Franklin, and George J. Schaller

Duane Morris Takeaways: In Coatney, et al. v. Ancestry.com DNA, LLC, No. 22-2813, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 3584 (7th Cir. Feb. 15, 2024), the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Ancestry’s motion to compel arbitration on the grounds that minors were not parties to arbitration agreements entered by their guardians and the Defendant. Circuit Judge Michael B. Brennan wrote the opinion of the Seventh Circuit panel.

For companies facing class actions under the Illinois Genetic Information Privacy Act (“GIPA”) involving alleged disclosure of confidential genetic information, this ruling is instructive on dispute resolution provisions and how drafting those provisions can dictate who is bound to arbitrate claims.

Case Background

Defendant, Ancestry.com DNA, LLC (“Ancestry”) is a genealogy and consumer genomics company that allows users to create accounts to purchase DNA test kits, which Ancestry collects consumer saliva samples. Id. at 2. Ancestry takes these samples, analyzes the genetic information, and then returns genealogical and health information to the purchaser through its website. Id. In 2020, Blackstone, Inc. acquired Ancestry.

Only adults may purchase or activate a DNA test kit, and purchasers must agree to Ancestry’s terms and conditions before purchasing and activating a test kit. Id. However, minors thirteen to eighteen years old may still use Ancestry’s DNA service as long as a parent or legal guardian purchases and activates the test kit, and sends in the minor’s saliva sample using an account managed by the child’s parent or guardian. Id.

Between 2016 and 2019, guardians purchased and activated test kits on behalf of the Plaintiffs, who were all minors at the time. Id. at 2-3. Each guardian agreed to consent terms (“Terms”) concerning the use of each minor’s DNA test kit. Id. at 3. The terms contained a dispute resolution provision binding the parties to arbitration and waiving any class actions. Id. However, the Terms did not require Plaintiffs to read them. Plaintiffs alleged that they did not, and that they also did not create the Ancestry accounts. Id. at 4.

Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and a putative class of similar members, filed suit against Ancestry in Illinois federal court alleging violations of the Illinois GIPA. Id. Plaintiffs alleged that, as part of Blackstone’s 2020 acquisition of Ancestry, Ancestry disclosed genetic test results and personal identifying information to Blackstone without obtaining written authorization. Id.

Ancestry responded by moving to compel arbitration under the Terms dispute resolution provisions. Id. at 5. The district court denied Ancestry’s motion. First, the district court found that Plaintiffs did not assent to Ancestry’s Terms through their guardians’ accounts or their guardians’ execution of consent forms on Plaintiffs’ behalf. Id. Second, the district court determined equitable principles such as the theory of direct benefits estoppel did not bind Plaintiffs, as there were no allegations that Plaintiffs accessed their guardians’ Ancestry accounts or their DNA test results. Id.

As a result, Ancestry filed an interlocutory appeal with the Seventh Circuit for review of the district court’s decision. Id.

The Seventh Circuit’s Decision

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. On appeal, Ancestry urged the Seventh Circuit to reverse the district court’s denial of its motion to compel on three grounds, including: (1) Plaintiffs’ guardians assented to the Terms on their behalf; (2) Plaintiffs were “closely related” parties to their guardians (or even third-party beneficiaries), foreseeably bound by the Terms; or (3) as direct beneficiaries of the Terms, Plaintiffs were estopped from avoiding them. Id. at 6.

At the outset, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that it is a “bedrock principle” that “an arbitration agreement generally cannot bind a non-signatory.” Id. at 6-7. The Seventh Circuit also explained that “whether an arbitration agreement is enforceable against a non-party is a question governed by ‘traditional principles of state law.’” Id. at 7.

First, on Ancestry’s argument that Plaintiffs’ guardians assented to the Terms on Plaintiffs’ behalf, the Seventh Circuit determined that the Terms’ plain and ordinary meaning was unambiguous and found that the only parties to the agreement are the signatory and Ancestry. Id. Further, the Seventh Circuit noted that Terms stated they “are personal” to the signatory, who “may not … assign or transfer any … rights and obligations,” established by them. Id. The Seventh Circuit also found that the Terms contained no language that the guardians “agreed to them ‘on behalf of their children.” Id. at 9.

Second, the Seventh Circuit rejected Ancestry’s argument that Plaintiffs may be contractually bound to the Terms “either as closely related parties or third-party beneficiaries.” Id. at 11. The Seventh Circuit opined that “[t]he company mounts these arguments from shaky legal ground, as Illinois ‘recognize[s] a strong presumption against conferring contractual benefits on non-contracting third parties.’” Id. With respect to Ancestry’s argument that Plaintiffs were bound by the Terms as “closely related” parties to their guardians who signed them, the Seventh Circuit determined that a special relationship in fact and in law between the Plaintiffs and their guardians as that relationship “does not join their identities, as can be the case with parent and subsidiary corporations.” Id. at 12-14. The Seventh Circuit similarly concluded that the Terms did not cover Plaintiffs as third-party beneficiaries since the express provisions of Ancestry’s Terms excluded third-party beneficiaries. Id. at 12. While the Seventh Circuit found that the Terms that contemplated consent to Ancestry’s processing and analysis of a child’s DNA, no aspect of that consent established that the Terms were for “plaintiffs direct benefit.” Id. at 16. In addition, the Terms’ arbitration provision did “not contain language capturing the plaintiffs.” Id. at 17. Instead, the provisions’ language indicated that the “signatories intended to bind themselves, but not others to arbitration.” Id.

Finally, the Seventh Circuit rejected Ancestry’s argument that “[a]s direct beneficiaries of their guardians’ agreement to the Terms, Plaintiffs are estopped from avoid its arbitration provision.” Id. at 18. Noting the absence of legal authority supporting Ancestry’s argument, the Seventh Circuit concluded “that Illinois would not embrace direct benefits estoppel to bind plaintiffs here.” Id. at 19. The Seventh Circuit also based its conclusion on the absence of any record allegation that “plaintiffs have accessed or used the analyses completed by Ancestry as contemplated by the Terms” coupled with Illinois’ law “disfavoring the binding of non-signatories to arbitration.” Id. at 25.

Implications For Companies

Companies that are confronted with GIPA class action litigation involving dispute resolution provisions should note the Seventh Circuit’s emphasis in Coatney on the lack of allegations that Plaintiffs read the contractual terms at issue, along with the absence of contractual language capturing or identifying Plaintiffs.

Further, from a practical standpoint, companies should carefully evaluate the language expressed in terms and conditions agreements, including those drafted in dispute resolution provisions, as courts are not inclined to assume non-signatories are bound to agreements when not expressly included.

February 5, 2024February 5, 2024 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Federal Illinois Court Rejects Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion For Class Certification Seeking A ‘Second Bite At The Apple’

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, and Derek S. Franklin

Duane Morris Takeaways: On January 29, 2024, in Hossfeld v. Allstate Insurance Co., No. 1:20-CV-07091 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 29, 2024), Judge Joan B. Gottschall of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied a renewed motion for class certification brought by plaintiffs accusing Allstate of violating telemarketing laws by allowing an outside party to solicit ‘do-not-call’ listees on its behalf. After denying the plaintiff’s initial motion of class certification a year earlier, Judge Gottschall denied the plaintiff’s second motion for class certification because the plaintiff failed to show a material change of circumstances in the time since the first certification motion that warranted a different ruling. The decision is required reading for corporate defendants seeking to quell efforts by plaintiffs to take a second shot at obtaining class certification after a failed earlier attempt.

Case Background

Plaintiff Robert Hossfeld filed a lawsuit against Allstate Insurance Co. alleging that Allstate violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) by providing a telemarketer that Allstate contracted with a list of consumer leads identifying individuals such as Plaintiff who requested to be placed on Allstate’s internal ‘do-not-call’ list. Id. at 2.

In May 2022, Plaintiff filed a motion for class certification pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In March 2023, the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to show a large enough class to make joinder impractical. Id. at 2-3. In the order denying the motion, the Court did not include language stating that its denial of Plaintiff’s certification bid was “with prejudice.” Id. at 8.

Given the absence of that language, Plaintiff filed a renewed motion for class certification in May 2023 asking the Court to reconsider its earlier class certification ruling. Plaintiff asserted that he “reviewed the infirmities relied upon by the Court in its original opinion denying his first motion for class certification, and modified the class definitions and arguments to address them.” Id. at 5. Allstate moved to strike Plaintiff’s second motion for class certification, arguing that Plaintiff should not be given a “second bite at the apple.” Id. at 1.

The Court’s Rejection Of Second Motion For Class Certification

On January 29, 2024, the Court issued a 9-page decision granting Allstate’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s second class certification motion. Id. The Court’s decision analyzed Plaintiff’s second class certification motion under two applicable standards, including: (1) principles governing a pre-judgment motion for reconsideration under Rules 54(b) and 59(c); and (2) the Rule 23(c)(1) standard for revising an order granting or denying class certification. Id. at 4. The Court rejected Plaintiff’s arguments under both standards.

First, the Court determined that Plaintiff did not satisfy the reconsideration standards under Rules 54(b) and 59(e) because he failed to “present either newly discovered evidence or establish a manifest error of law or fact.” Id. at 5. The Court noted as part of this conclusion that, “although [Plaintiff] has submitted evidence not previously presented to the court, he [did] not contend that this evidence was unavailable to him when he filed his first class certification motion or that the court made a manifest error of fact or law when it denied his first class certification motion. Id. at 5-6.

Second, the Court found that Plaintiff’s did not make a necessary showing to reverse the Court’s earlier denial of class certification under Rule 23. Citing Seventh Circuit precedent in Chapman v. First Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 785 (7th Cir. 2015), which affirmed the denial of a second class certification motion where there was no showing of “a material change of circumstances to justify revisiting the first class certification ruling,” the Court in Hossfeld rejected Plaintiff’s argument for the same reason. Id. at 7. As the Court explained, Plaintiff did not dispute that the newly-included arguments and supporting evidence in his second class certification motion were available at the time of his first motion. Id. at 9. Thus, the Court concluded that Plaintiff did not show “a material change in circumstances needed to obtain a second bite at the proverbial apple.” Id.

Based on rejecting Plaintiff’s arguments under both applicable legal standards, the Court granted Allstate’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s second motion for class certification. Id.

Implications For Companies

This opinion represents a helpful roadmap for employers to fend off attempts by plaintiffs to revive a failed class certification bid. The decision is a strong source of persuasive authority supporting that a plaintiff cannot successfully move a second time for class certification absent either “a manifest error of law or fact” in the court’s first class certification ruling, or newly-discovered evidence unavailable at the time of the first class certification bid representing a “material change in circumstances.” Id. at 5, 9. For these reasons as well, the ruling underscores the importance of not saving potentially supportive arguments and evidence during an initial class certification battle in case of a “second bite at the apple” that may not come.

October 14, 2023 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

EEOC Issues New Guidance On Harassment In The Workplace

By Gerald J. Maatman, Jr., Alex W. Karasik, and Derek Franklin

Duane Morris Takeaways: On September 29, 2023, the EEOC issued a new Proposed Enforcement Guidance on Harassment in the Workplace (the “Guidance”). The Guidance provides insights into how employers can handle evolving workplace realities and developing trends with harassment claims. Notably, the Guidance addresses how digital technology and social media postings can contribute to a hostile work environment. It also addresses the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2020 landmark decision in Bostock v. Clayton County, where Supreme Court held that discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity constitutes sex-based discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”). The Guidance is open to public comment through November 1, 2023; if issued in final form, it will mark the first update to the EEOC’s official harassment guidance in nearly 25 years.

For employers, the Guidance is a “must read” in terms of preventing future workplace harassment claims.

Workplace Harassment In The Digital Landscape

The Guidance spotlights how social media postings and other online content can contribute to hostile work environments, even if it occurs outside of the workplace and is not work-related. For instance, the Guidance cites the following examples of conduct occurring in an employee’s “virtual work environment” that employers can be liable for: “[a] sexist comments made during a video meeting, [b] racist imagery that is visible in an employee’s workspace while the employee participates in a video meeting, or [c] sexual comments made during a video meeting about a bed being near an employee in the video image.”

In addition to discussing conduct occurring in a “virtual work environment,” the Guidance also clarifies that conduct occurring in non-work-related contexts can contribute to a hostile work environment if it impacts the workplace. This includes electronic communications through phones, computers, and social media. For example, the Guidance cautions that, if an employee’s private social media posting subjects a co-worker to racial epithets, and other co-workers discuss the posting at work, then that posting “can contribute to a racially hostile work environment.”

Harassment Based On Sexual Orientation And Gender Identity

Another notable aspect of the Guidance is that it incorporates the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2020 landmark decision in Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1747 (2020), which held that Title VII’s prohibition of sex-based discrimination encompasses discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity.

While Bostock concerned an allegedly discriminatory employment discharge and did not involve harassment, the EEOC states in the Guidance that the Supreme Court’s reasoning “logically extends to claims of harassment.” The Guidance therefore dictates that “sex-based harassment includes harassment on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity, including how that identity is expressed.”

The Guidance lists several examples of conduct that can constitute this type of harassment, including: “[a] epithets regarding sexual orientation or gender identity; [b] physical assault; [c] harassment because an individual does not present in a manner that would stereotypically be associated with that person’s gender; [d] intentional and repeated use of a name or pronoun inconsistent with the individual’s gender identity (misgendering); or [e] the denial of access to a bathroom or other sex-segregated facility consistent with the individual’s gender identity.”

The EEOC also includes a hypothetical fact pattern in the Guidance depicting harassment based on gender identity. In that hypothetical, supervisors and co-workers of a fast food employee who identifies as female commonly referred to the employee using her prior male name and pronouns, asked questions about her sexual orientation and anatomy, and asserted that she was not female. In addition, customers “intentionally misgendered” the employee and “made threatening statements to her,” which the employer only responded to by reassigning the employee to a workstation where customers could not see her. These facts, according to the EEOC, established harassment based on gender identity and, therefore, sex-based discrimination under Title VII.

Takeaways For Employers

The Guidance is a “must read” resource for employers to navigate potential harassment concerns. It provides employers with an opportunity to revise their policies and protocols to better reflect the current legal landscape and the evolution of digital technology. The Guidance also highlights the EEOC’s emphasis on enforcing Title VII’s prohibition of harassment based on sexual orientation and gender identity.

Employers should review their policies and practices to ensure they adequately protect against, and provide avenues to report, potential harassment that takes place virtually. Likewise, employers may wish to consider incorporating examples of harassment given by the EEOC when implementing harassment prevention measures.

October 4, 2023 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Alabama Federal Court Rejects ADA Lawsuit By The EEOC In Part Because Requiring Employees To Stop Taking Prescription Medications Is Not An Adverse Employment Action Under The ADA

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Derek Franklin, and Emilee N. Crowther

Duane Morris Takeaways: In EEOC v. Army Sustainment, LLC, No. 1:20-CV-234 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 26, 2023), Judge R. Austin Huffaker, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama granted in part and denied in part Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court dismissed the EEOC’s “failure-to-accommodate” and “screening-out” claims against Defendant, in addition to holding that only four of the EEOC’s seventeen claimants could support the EEOC’s disability bias claim. The Court also found that the Defendant employer’s policy barring employees from taking various prescribed medications was not, by itself, an adverse employment action. For employers facing EEOC-initiated lawsuits involving ADA claims alleging discrimination and failure-to-accommodate, this decision is instructive in terms of what evidence courts are apt to consider in determining whether an employee suffered an adverse employment action, as well as what is required to trigger an employer’s duty to provide a reasonable accommodation.

Case Background

Defendant Army Sustainment LLC a/k/a Army Fleet Support (“AFS”) is a helicopter maintenance contractor which, from 2003 to 2018, employed aircraft mechanicals, technicians, and other aviation specialists at Fort Novosel (previously known as Fort Rucker). Id. at 1. AFS implemented a drug testing policy (the “Policy”) in 2012 requiring employees in “safety-sensitive positions” to submit to drug testing for opioids, amphetamines, and benzodiazepines. Id. Individuals who were legally prescribed these medications were cleared to work so long as they agreed not to take their medication within 6-to-8 hours before their shift. Id. at 1-2.

In 2016, AFS eliminated the “6-to-8-hour rule,” and instead required employees to undergo a medical evaluation “to determine whether an employee’s prescription medication was appropriate for use during work hours.” Id. at 2. As part of the medical evaluation, the employee’s original prescribing doctor was asked “whether the employee was stable on their safety-sensitive medication or whether alternative medications were available that were as effective.” Id. If no alternative medications were available, and the employee was determined unable to safely work while taking the medication, the employee was deemed “disabled.” Id.

In 2016, two AFS employees affected by the Policy filed discrimination charges with the EEOC. The Commission found reasonable cause that AFS violated the ADA by “not allowing a class of individuals ‘to continue to work or return to work while taking their disability-related medications.’” Id. at 2-3. Further, the EEOC held that AFS’ Policy itself had “the effect of discrimination on the basis of disability” and violated the ADA. Id. at 3.

The EEOC filed suit against AFS on behalf of 17 AFS employees who suffered from different disabilities, but were legally prescribed medications and required to undergo medical evaluations to return to work. Id. The EEOC brought four claims against AFS, including: (1) Discrimination on the Basis of Disability; (2) Failure to Accommodate; (3) Impermissible Qualification Standard; and (4) Interference. Id.

The Court’s Decision

Timeliness Of The EEOC’s Enforcement Action

In Alabama, an employee bringing claims under Section 706 of Title VII “must file a charge with the EEOC within 180 days of the date of the alleged discrimination.” Id. at 4. Any claims filed with the EEOC after the 180-day period are time-barred. Id. AFS asserted that eight of the 17 claimants were time-barred, as their claims arose more than 180 days before the “representative charge” was filed with the EEOC. Id.

The Court found that Section 706(e)(1) precluded the EEOC “from pursuing claims that arose outside the charging period, even when those untimely claims are related to otherwise timely claims.” Id. at 5. While the parties disagreed as to what date the “representative charge” was filed with the EEOC, the Court held that any claims that arose prior to May 23, 2016 (180 days before one of the representative charges were filed), were time-barred. Id. at 6. As such, the Court dismissed seven of the claimants from the EEOC’s lawsuit. Id.

Whether Prohibiting Use Of A Medication Can Constitute An Adverse Employment Action

The Court’s first step in analyzing the EEOC’s disability discrimination claim was determining whether the claimants with timely claims experienced adverse employment actions. The Court rejected the EEOC’s argument that requiring the claimants to stop using their prescription medications was an adverse action, and held that merely being required to stop using certain prescription medications, without more, did not have a tangible adverse effect on employment of the claimants. Id. at 23. In making this determination, the Court explained that “[w]hether the employer’s conduct constitutes an actionable adverse employment action under the ADA is determined by whether a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position would view the employment action in question as adverse.” Id. at 23.

The Court noted that while AFS required the claimants to sign a document acknowledging that their medications were “inappropriate for use in a safety sensitive work environment” and could result in discipline for employees if caught taking the medications, the Court held that “neither signing a form nor fear of termination are sufficient to constitute an adverse employment action.” Id. at 24.

The Court’s Rejection Of Unpaid Leave As A Reasonable Accommodation

The Court also considered whether AFS, as a means of providing a disability accommodation, could place employees on unpaid leave until they either received medical clearance to return to work or agreed to stop taking their medications. Id. at 25.

The Court rejected the notion that temporary leave is an accommodation rather than an adverse action. It reasoned that AFS “unilaterally forced the claimants on unpaid leave and did so without an accommodation request by the claimants or without any showing that the claimants could not actually perform their job duties either with or without their prescription medications.” Id. at 27. Thus, the Court denied summary judgment as to the claims of four AFS employees who alleged they suffered an adverse employment action after being placed on unpaid leave, and granted summary judgment in favor of AFS as to the remaining employees on this claim. Id. at 28.

Summary Judgment Universally Granted On Claims of Failure-To-Accommodate And Screening Out Employees Under The ADA

The Court further held that AFS was entitled to summary judgment against all claimants based on their failure to establish a prima facie case for the EEOC’s failure-to-accommodate claim. Id. at 37. For example, the Court found the EEOC did not show that two of the claimants made accommodation requests to AFS or how any such requests would accommodate the limitations presented by their disabilities. Id. at 36.

The Court’s penultimate holding concerned the EEOC’s claim that AFS’s drug policy constituted an impermissible qualification standard in violation of Sections 12112(b)(3) and 12112(b)(6) of the ADA by screening out qualified individuals with a disability. Id. 41-42. The Court granted summary judgment as to all claimants on the screening-out claim based on the EEOC’s failure to support its claim with statistical evidence or by showing that any of the claimants were actually terminated and “screened out” from their jobs. Id.

Finally, the Court refused to consider or grant summary judgment on the EEOC’s interference claim because AFS failed to acknowledge it as a standalone cause of action and thus did not formally move for summary judgment on that claim. Id. at 44-45.

Implications For Employers

Employers confronted with EEOC-initiated litigation involving restrictions on employee conduct outside the workplace should take note that the Court relied heavily on its assessment of whether “a reasonable person” in the claimants’ position would view the restriction in question as adverse. Further, from a practical standpoint, the Court’s refusal to grant summary judgment on the EEOC’s failure-to-accommodate claims illustrates the potential risk of trying to use unpaid leave as an attempted means of reasonably accommodating an employee’s disability.

September 22, 2023 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Conditional Certification Denied To Illinois Jail Guards Who Were Not Paid For Time Outside Work Engaging In COVID-19 Protocols

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, and Derek Franklin

Duane Morris Takeaways: In Evans III, et al v. Dart, et al., No. 1:20-CV-02453 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 15, 2023), Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District Of Illinois denied Plaintiffs’ motion for conditional certification of a collective action of Cook County Jail Guards who were not compensated for time spent off-the-clock decontaminating their work gear to prevent the spread of COVID-19. In rejecting the jail correctional officers’ bid for conditional certification under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), the Court ruled the Plaintiffs could not establish that they were victims of a common policy or plan that violated the law, as there was no evidence that the jail even had an off-the-clock decontamination policy. Thus, the Court concluded that Plaintiffs failed to establish that their cleaning efforts outside of work resulted from any requirement imposed by their employer. The ruling is a blueprint for corporate counsel in terms of a solid approach for opposing employment-related conditional certification motions.

Case Background

The factual origins of the case stem from a COVID-19 outbreak at the Cook County Department of Corrections (“Cook County Jail”) in April 2020. Plaintiffs allege that, amid the outbreak, the Cook County Jail required correctional officers to “engag[e] in decontamination/sanitation activities” before and/or after their shifts within the CCDOC, “including washing and sanitizing their uniforms, sanitizing their persons, sanitizing and maintaining personal protective equipment (‘PPE’), and showering.” Id. at 2.

According to Plaintiffs, they would spend approximately 20 to 30 minutes before and after shifts completing these protocols but were not paid for that time. As the Court noted, “each Plaintiff described slightly different activities that took slightly different amounts of time,” which formed “a consistent narrative of enhanced decontamination activities, significantly exceeding what they did prior to COVID.” Id. at 4.

In the same month that the April 2020 outbreak began, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on behalf of themselves and a proposed group of all persons who worked at the Cook County Jail between January 27, 2020 and June 11, 2021 who engaged in the purported COVID-19 decontamination protocols, but who were not paid for time spent on those activities. Id. at 3.

The Court’s Decision

The Court declined to certify the proposed collective action based on finding that Plaintiffs fell short in identifying a common policy requiring workers in the proposed collective action to engage in those [decontamination] activities as a condition of their employment.” Id. at 1. Importantly, the Court noted that the Plaintiffs themselves acknowledged that there was no express written policy requiring correctional officers to decontaminate outside of work, and that the only instructions that they received from supervisors about decontamination was during roll call meetings, when supervisors would merely “read and disseminate general advice from the CDC” and instruct guards to not bring items home from the jail. Id. at 4-5.

Another key finding by the Court was that Plaintiffs “did not report their off-duty decontamination activities to their supervisors, nor were they asked about those efforts or disciplined for failing to decontaminate proper.” Id. at 5. Further, the Court made important note of how “no named Plaintiff reported monitoring the time consumed by their daily decontamination activities, submitting any decontamination overtime, or asking their supervisors about decontamination overtime, although many testified that there was no clear way to submit an overtime claim for these activities in the CCDOC “Workforce” record system.” Id.

In reaching its determination, the Court also rejected the relevance of a Communicable Diseases Policy that Cook County had in place requiring workers to “use good judgment and follow training and procedures related to mitigating the risks associated with communicable disease,” and if exposed to one, to “begin decontamination procedures immediately, obtain medical attention if needed, and “notify a supervisor as soon as practical.” Id. at 7. According to the Court, because this policy specified that its aim was to “provide a safe work environment,” the Court found it “hard to imagine how a pre-shift shower or laundering one’s uniform after a drive home is consistent with that language” and concluded, in turn, that the policy did not require the Plaintiffs to engage in COVID-19 protocols at issue outside of work at the jail. Id. at 11.

Finally, the Court discussed how, even if the Communicable Diseases Policy applied to activities outside of work, an “insurmountable” problem for Plaintiffs was that “none of them seemed to know about the policy at the time they were undertaking those activities.” Id. at 12. As a result, the Court found that there was no evidence showing that the Defendants had actual or constructive knowledge of any de facto policy requiring the Plaintiffs to engage in decontamination activities away from the jail. Id. at 15.

For these reasons, the Court concluded that the Plaintiffs fell short of satisfying the requirements for conditional certification of their proposed collective action.

Implications For Employers

The Evans ruling underscores the importance of maintaining and utilizing well-organized clearly-delineated employee conduct policies for activities at and away from the workplace, in anticipation of arguing the absence of uniform policies and procedures in collective actions under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). In dismissing all of Plaintiffs’ arguments after finding an absence of policy or plan for all proposed collective action members that violated the law, the Court signaled its steady reliance on the well-established standards for these types of claims, providing a valuable reaffirmation to employers’ reliable defense strategies.

September 15, 2023 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Colorado Supreme Court Applies Litigation Privilege To Attorney’s Allegedly Defamatory Statements About Class Action Defendant

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, and Derek Franklin

Duane Morris Takeaways: In Killmer, Lane & Newman, LLP v. BKP, Inc., No. 21-SC-930, (Col. Sept. 11, 2023), the Colorado Supreme Court ruled that an attorney’s allegedly defamatory statements about a company’s wage-and-hour practices during a press conference to announce filing a class action against that same company were protected by the litigation privilege. The Supreme Court’s unanimous en banc opinion held that the Colorado Court of Appeals erred in concluding that there was an exception to the applicability of the litigation privilege where the size and contours of the proposed class were easily ascertainable from the employer’s records and undermined the need to identify and alert potential class members through the press. In reversing the appellate panel’s ruling, the Colorado Supreme Court determined that the attorney’s statements were shielded from defamation claims by the litigation privilege since the statements merely repeated wage-and-hour allegations made in the complaint and advanced the goals of the lawsuit. The decision in BKP serves as a reminder to companies of the potential pitfalls of bringing defamation claims against attorneys who disseminate information to the public about a party that they are suing in a class action.

Case Background

In 2018, two law firms, Killmer, Lane & Newman, LLP and Towards Justice (collectively, along with attorney Mari Newman of Killmer, Lane & Newman, “the Attorneys”), filed a federal class action lawsuit claiming that Ella Bliss Beauty Bar (“Ella Bliss”), an operator of beauty salons in the Denver metropolitan area, failed to properly pay its nail technicians for required custodial work under federal and Colorado state law. Id. at 5.

On the same day the federal lawsuit was filed, one the Attorneys, Mari Newman, held a press conference in which she stated that Ella Bliss nail technicians had to clean the businesses “for no pay whatsoever,” that the salons “only pay [employees] for the hours they feel like paying,” and that Ella Bliss “is simply too cheap to pay its workers the money they deserve.” Id. at 43. The Attorneys collectively also issued a press release that day asserting that “Ella Bliss Beauty Bar forced its service technicians to perform janitorial work without pay, refused to pay overtime, withheld tips, and shorted commissions.” Id. at 44.

Exactly one year later, Ella Bliss’ parent company, BKP, Inc. (“BKP”) filed a defamation lawsuit against the Attorneys in Colorado state court pertaining to five allegedly defamatory statements that the Attorneys made during their 2018 press remarks, including the ones quoted above. Id. at 13. The district court dismissed the defamation suit and found that the Attorneys’ statements were protected by the litigation privilege, which shields from defamation claims statements by an attorney that have “some reference to the subject matter of . . . proposed or pending litigation.” Id. at 22.

When the Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal to a three-judge panel of the Colorado Court of Appeals, the appellate panel partially reversed the district court’s decision and found that some of the statements at issue were not shielded by the litigation privilege. Id. at 49. While the Attorneys argued that the goals of the media statements were to promote their class action and publicize it to potential additional class members, the appellate panel rejected that notion since the Attorneys were set to receive employment records and payroll documents in discovery that could have easily identified the class members without needing to resort to harmful press statements. Id. at 14.

Following the appellate decision, the Colorado Supreme Court granted the petitioner’s writ for certiorari and analyzed on the question of “whether the common law litigation privilege for party-generated publicity in pending class action litigation excludes situations in which the identities of class members are ascertainable through discovery.” Id. at 1.

The Colorado Supreme Court’s Decision

On further appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed the appellate panel’s ruling and determined that the litigation privilege applied to the allegedly defamatory attorney statements at issue. Id. at 49. The Supreme Court reasoned that the statements “merely repeated, summarized, or paraphrased allegations in the class action complaint” and, therefore, “served to notify the public, absent class members, and witnesses about, and therefore furthered the objective of, the litigation.” Id. at 42.

The Supreme Court also held that the appellate panel erred by basing its litigation privilege analysis on whether the identities of class members were easily ascertainable through discovery. Id. at 2. According to the Supreme Court, two reasons led to that conclusion: “(1) ascertainability is generally a requirement in class action litigation, and imposing such a condition would unduly limit the privilege in this kind of case;” and (2) “the eventual identification of class members by way of documents obtained during discovery is not a substitute for reaching absent class members and witnesses in the beginning stages of litigation.” Id.

Implications For Employers

The Colorado Supreme Court’s decision in BKP, Inc. is notable in that it may serve to embolden the inclination of some class action plaintiffs’ attorneys to use strategic communication techniques to air their clients’ claims in the ‘court of public opinion’ in an attempt to gain leverage, as well as using mass communication tools to grow the reach of their lawsuit to more potential class members. While employers understandably may want to fight back against weaponized misinformation by asserting defamation claims, employers should exercise caution and pick their battles when it comes to such claims, given the high potential for variance in judicial outcomes in states where the case law on this issue remains unsettled and the jurisdictional variables also at play. Ultimately, corporate counsel should carefully consider the potential risks of pursuing a defamation claim against an attorney based on statements that a court may find shielded by privilege regardless of their truthfulness.

September 14, 2023 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Illinois Federal Court Orders Defendant To Pay Over $4 Million In Arbitration Fees In Mass Arbitration Alleging Violation Of The BIPA

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Rebecca S. Bjork and Derek Franklin

Duane Morris Takeaways: Mass arbitration continues to be a formidable tool for plaintiffs’ attorneys seeking to deal with class action waivers in arbitration agreements. This trend is aptly demonstrated by a new ruling in Wallrich, et al. v. Samsung, Case No. 22-CV-5506 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 2023), where Judge Harry D. Leinenweber of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois ordered the defendants – who had been served with just shy of 50,000 arbitration demands – to pay the arbitration fees and submit to arbitrating consumers’ claims that the defendants had committed violations of the Illinois privacy laws. Those fees had been waived by the arbitration authority, as allowed by a provision in its’ supplemental rules, but the Court sided with the plaintiffs, who had moved to compel arbitration after the fees were waived, and seeking also to require the defendants to pay them.

Case Background

The Named Plaintiffs filed 49,986 arbitration claims with the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) on September 7, 2022 on behalf of consumers who are users of Samsung mobile devices. Id. at 2, 5. They alleged that the defendants had unlawfully collected their biometric information in violation of the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act. The user agreement required all disputes be resolved in final, binding arbitration and it prohibited class actions. Id. at 3.

The agreement also required use of the services of the AAA and explicitly invoked the AAA’s rules, including its supplemental rules relating to arbitration fees. Id. On September 27, 2022, Samsung refused to pay its portion of the initial arbitration fees to the AAA because it believed the claimants included deceased individuals and others who did not reside in Illinois. Id. at 6. Plaintiffs responded by moving to compel arbitration on October 7, 2022. Id. at 7.

The Court’s Decision

Judge Leinenweber compelled arbitration of the claims of living, Illinois resident petitioners and ordered the respondents to pay the AAA arbitration fees. He first concluded that the arbitration agreements are valid between Samsung and those who actually are its consumers. Id. at 21-22. Second, he noted that as to the petitioners that respondents suspected were either deceased or not Illinois residents, he explained that petitioners’ counsel used Samsung’s own customer list to remove ineligible petitioners. Id. Third, he determined that the arbitration agreement left questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator, thereby declining to rule on respondents’ argument that the collective action waiver in the agreement applies to mass arbitrations, which would bar petitioners’ claims with the AAA. Id. at 25. Finally he ruled that he had the authority to construe and enforce the AAA’s rules about arbitration fees, and determined that respondents are required to pay approximately $4.13 million in fees. Id. at 30, 33-34.

Implications For Employers

As corporations who employ large numbers of individuals in their workforces know, agreements to arbitrate claims related to employment-related disputes are common. They serve the important strategic function of minimizing class action litigation risks. But corporate counsel also are aware that increasingly, plaintiffs’ attorneys have come to understand that arbitration agreements can be used to create leverage points for their clients. Mass arbitrations seek to put pressure on respondents to settle claims on behalf of large numbers of people, even though not via the procedural vehicle of filing a class or collective action lawsuit. As a result, corporate counsel should carefully review arbitration agreement language with an eye towards mitigating the risks of mass arbitrations as well as class actions.

August 28, 2023August 28, 2023 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Michigan Federal Court Declines To Compel Arbitration Of ERISA Claims Due To An Unenforceable Class Action Waiver

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. and Derek Franklin

Duane Morris Takeaways: In Parker, et al. v. Tenneco Inc., et al., Case No. 2:23-CV-10816 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 21, 2023), Judge George Steeh of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan denieda motion to compel arbitration based on finding an ERISA class action waiver in an arbitration agreement unenforceable. The Court determined that Plaintiffs’ breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim under the ERISA “seeks relief for the [Benefits] plan as a whole,” and that “the harm (and the recovery) is to the Plan, rather than to plaintiffs specifically.” Id. at 14-15. In turn, the Court concluded that compelling arbitration and enforcing the class action waiver would prevent plan participants from seeking plan-wide remedies conferred by the ERISA statute. For these reasons, the Parker decision is instructive for employers seeking to implement an enforceable class action wavier and configure arbitration agreements that are best suited to account for the possibility of a class action waiver being nullified.

Case Background

The group of Plaintiffs in the Parker lawsuit were led by Tanika Parker, a current employee of DRiV Automotive Inc. (“DRiV”), and Andrew Farrier, a former worker for Tenneco Inc. (“Tenneco”). DRiV and Tenneco were two of several affiliated entities named as Defendants in the case. Parker and Farrier, participants in ERISA-covered 401(k) plans (the “Plans”) sponsored by their respective employers, alleged that Defendants breached their fiduciary duties under the ERISA by failing to prudently monitor and control the Plans’ investments and expenses. Defendants moved to compel arbitration of Plaintiffs’ claims on an individual basis, pursuant to an Arbitration Procedure adopted by the Plans containing language barring participants from bringing ERISA claims as a group or class. The Arbitration Procedure also provided that, if the class action waiver was found unenforceable or invalid by a court, the entire arbitration procedures would become null and void.

Eastern District of Michigan Opinion

In denying Plaintiffs’ motion to compel arbitration, Judge Steeth ruled that the class action waiver within the Arbitration Procedure was unenforceable because it “limits a participant’s substantive right under ERISA by prohibiting plan participants from bringing suit.” Id. at 15.

The Court’s reasoning cited an April 2022 Sixth Circuit decision in Hawkins v. Cintas Corp., 32 F.4th 625, 630 (6th Cir. 2022), which held that breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims under the ERISA are “brought in a representative capacity on behalf of the plan as a whole.” Id. at 10. The Court also quoted the explanation in the Hawkins decision that, although an ERISA breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim is typically brought by individual plaintiffs, “it is the plan that takes legal claim to the recovery, suggesting that the claim really ‘belongs’ to the Plan,” and that “an arbitration agreement that binds only individual participants cannot bring such claims into arbitration.” Id. at 12.

Consistent with that rationale, the Court in Parker held that the ERISA class action waiver in the Arbitration Procedure at issue was unenforceable because it would preclude Plan participants from pursuing “plan-wide remedies” provided for under the ERISA statute that cannot be waived by an agreement. Id. at 15. According to the Court, this would occur by the class action waiver “(1) prohibiting participants from bringing suit in a representative capacity on behalf of the plan, and (2) limiting relief to losses attributable to individual participant accounts, as opposed to plan-wide remedies.” Id.

Given that the Arbitration Procedure provided that it “shall be rendered null and void in all respects” if the class action waiver were to be “found unenforceable or invalid by the court,” the Court declared the entire Arbitration Procedure null and void and denied Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration. Id. at 15-16.

Implications for Class Action Defendants

As federal courts continue to issue decisions limiting the application of class action waivers relative to claims under the ERISA, it remains critical for businesses and employers to regularly review their arbitration agreements and class action waiver language to ensure legal compliance. Any business trying to implement an enforceable class action waiver should carefully consider the potential risks of extending that language to cover plan mismanagement claims under the ERISA. Businesses should also review their arbitration procedures to ensure they are best positioned to function independently of a potentially unenforceable class action waiver.