Eden Anderson – Class Action Defense

July 23, 2024 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Ninth Circuit Broadly Applies The FAA’s Transportation Worker Exemption To Fueling Technicians To Green Light Their Class Action And Side-Step Arbitration

By Eden E. Anderson, Rebecca S. Bjork, and Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Duane Morris Takeaways: On July 19, 2024, in Lopez v. Aircraft Service International, Inc., Case No. 23-55015 (9th Cir. July 19, 2024), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the Federal Arbitration Act’s (FAA) transportation worker exemption applies to an airplane fueling technician. Even though the technician had no hands-on contacts with goods, the Ninth Circuit held that was not required because fuel is necessary to flying the plane that holds the goods. The decision is yet another from the Ninth Circuit broadly applying the FAA’s transportation worker exemption, in spite of multiple recent decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court directing narrow that loop hole to mandatory arbitration. The Lopez decision presents an obstacle for employers seeking to enforce arbitration agreements and class action waivers within the Ninth Circuit, thereby opening the door to arguments that workers who do not even handle goods in the stream of commerce are exempt from arbitration if their work somehow supports the mechanism by which the goods travel.

Case Background

Danny Lopez worked as a fueling technician at Los Angeles International Airport. He added fuel to airplanes. After Lopez filed a wage & hour class action against his employer, the employer moved to compel arbitration. The district court denied the motion, concluding that Lopez was an exempt transportation worker because he was directly involved in the flow of goods in interstate or foreign commerce. It reasoned that, although Lopez did not handle goods in commerce, he was directly involved in the maintenance of the means by which the goods were transported. The employer appealed on the grounds that the FAA’s transportation worker exemption is to be narrowly construed and that Lopez did not have any hands-on contact with goods and direct participation in their movement.

The Ninth Circuit’s Decision

The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by mentioning the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2022 decision in Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon, 596 U.S. 450 (2022). In Saxon, the U.S. Supreme Court instructed that the transportation worker exemption is to be narrowly construed and does not turn on the industry within which the work is performed. Saxon held that airline ramp agents are nonetheless transportation workers exempt from the FAA because, in loading and unloading cargo onto airplanes, ramp agents play a “direct and necessary role in the free flow of goods across borders” and are “actively engaged in the transportation of those goods across via the channels of foreign or interstate commerce.” Id. at 458. Perceiving that the transportation worker exemption continued to be misapplied by lower courts, the U.S. Supreme Court repeated this same guidance this year in Bissonnette v. Le Page Bakeries Park St., LLC, 601 U.S. 246 (2024), and cautioned that the exemption should not be applied broadly to all workers who load and unload goods as they pass through the stream of interstate commerce.

While mentioning this recent controlling authority, the Ninth Circuit harkened back to its 2020 analysis of the transportation worker exemption in Rittman v. Amazon.com, Inc., 971 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2004), deeming it consistent with Saxon and Bissonnette. In Rittman, the Ninth Circuit held that Amazon delivery drivers making local, last mile deliveries of products from Amazon warehouses to customers’ homes were exempt transportation workers engaged in interstate or foreign commerce. Applying “the analytical approach applied in Rittman,” the Ninth Circuit concluded that Lopez was an exempt transportation worker because his fueling of airplanes was a “vital component” of the plane’s ability to fly. Id. at 12.

Implications Of The Decision

The Lopez decision is yet another from the Ninth Circuit broadly applying the FAA’s transportation worker exemption, in spite of multiple recent decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court directing narrow interpretation. The Lopez decision opens the door to arguments that workers who do not even handle goods in the stream of commerce are exempt from arbitration if their work somehow supports the mechanism by which the goods travel.

March 27, 2024 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

California Court Of Appeal Deems Attorneys’ Fees And Costs Awards To Prevailing Plaintiffs Mandatory On Overtime And Minimum Wage Claims

By Eden E. Anderson and Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Duane Morris Takeaways: On March 25, 2024, the California Court of Appeal for the Second District held in Gramajo v. Joe’s Pizza on Sunset, Inc., Case Nos. B322992/B323024 (Cal. App. Mar. 25, 2024), that awards of attorneys’ fees and costs to prevailing plaintiffs in actions for unpaid minimum or overtime wages are mandatory. Consequently, a trial court lacks discretion to deny fees and costs recovery, even when a plaintiff engages in bad faith litigation tactics and recovers a negligible amount. On a bright note, mandatory fee and cost awards must still be reasonable, and a trial court retains discretion to reduce the amount sought if it is unreasonable.

Case Background

Elinton Gramajo worked as a pizza delivery driver. He sued his employer for failing to pay him minimum and overtime wages, failing to provide meal and rest breaks, failing to reimburse business expenses, and other related claims. He sought a total recovery of $26,159.23. Coincidentally, that amount was just above the $25,000 jurisdictional threshold for an unlimited civil proceeding. After four years of litigation, the case proceeded to trial. A jury found in Gramajo’s favor, but only on his claims for unpaid minimum and overtime wages. The jury awarded him just $7,659.63.

Gramajo then sought to recover a whopping $296,920 in attorneys’ fees, and $26,932.84 in costs. The trial court denied any recovery. It found that Gramajo acted in bad faith by artificially inflating his damages claim to justify filing the case as an unlimited civil proceeding. As evidence of bad faith, the trial court highlighted that, although Gramajo sought $10,822.16 in unreimbursed expenses, he submitted no evidence at trial to support that claim. He also alleged an equitable claim for injunctive relief, but then never pursued that claim. Additionally, the trial court found that the case had been “severely over litigated” with Gramajo noticing 14 depositions and serving 15 sets of written discovery requests, while ultimately using just 12 exhibits at trial. Id. at 4.

The trial court’s denial of Gramajo’s motion for fees and costs was premised upon § 1033(a) of the California Code of Civil Procedure, which vests discretion in a trial court to deny attorneys’ fees and costs recovery when a plaintiff recovers less than the $25,000 jurisdictional minimum for an unlimited civil case. Gramajo appealed.

The Court of Appeal’s Decision

On appeal, the California Court of Appeal for the Second District reversed.

It held that § 1194(a) of the California Labor Code applied, and not § 1033(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 1194(a) of the Labor Code provides than a plaintiff who prevails in an action for unpaid minimum or overtime wages “is entitled to recover in a civil action . . . reasonable attorneys’ fees, and costs of suit.” The Court of Appeal reasoned that § 1194(a) mandates a fee award to a prevailing plaintiff who alleges unpaid minimum and/or overtime wages, and that it was more specific than § 1033(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure, and more recently enacted.

On a bright note, the Court of Appeal cautioned that its reversal “should not be read as license for attorneys litigating minimum and overtime wages cases to over-file their cases or request unreasonable and excessive cost awards free of consequence” and that § 1194(a) mandates only the recovery of a “reasonable fee and cost award.” Id. at 15. While remanding that issue to the trial court, the Court of Appeal highlighted an example of a fee award it deemed reasonable. It noted that, in Harrington v. Payroll Entertainment Services, Inc., 160 Cal.App.4th 590 (2008), the plaintiff recovered just $10,500 in unpaid overtime wages and was awarded attorneys’ fees of just $500.

Implications Of The Decision

While it is an unfortunate outcome that attorneys’ fees and costs awards in overtime and minimum wage cases are mandatory to a prevailing plaintiff, and not entirely discretionary, the silver lining in Gramajo is that a trial court at least retains discretion to award only what is reasonable.

February 19, 2024 by Eden Anderson

Illinois Federal Court Orders Samsung To Defend 806 Individual BIPA Claims In Arbitration And Pay $311,000 In Arbitration Filing Fees

By Eden E. Anderson, Rebecca Bjork, and Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Duane Morris Takeaways: On February 15, 2024, the Judge Harry Leinenweber of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted a motion to compel arbitration in Hoeg et al. v. Samsung Electronics of America, Inc., Case No. 23-CV-1951 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 15, 2024), and sent 806 individual privacy claims to arbitration and ordered Samsung to pay $311,000 to cover its share of arbitration filing fees in those matters. The decision highlights the potential downsides of class action waivers in arbitration agreements, as well as the importance of coupling a class action waiver with a well-crafted mass arbitration provision designed to streamline arbitration proceedings and, hopefully, limit exposure and litigation costs.

Case Background

Samsung required customers to execute agreements to binding arbitration and those agreements waive the right to pursue class claims. The arbitration agreements provided that electronic acceptance, opening product packaging, product usage, or product retention amounted to acceptance of the arbitration agreement.

In 2022, 806 customers, all of whom alleged they had purchased and used Samsung products, filed individual arbitration actions against Samsung alleging violations of the Illinois Biometric Privacy Act (“BIPA”). After Samsung failed to pay $311,000 in arbitration filing fees due in the matters, AAA administratively closed the cases in January 2023. The plaintiffs then moved to compel arbitration.

The Court’s Decision

The Court granted the motion to compel arbitration and, in doing so, was highly critical of Samsung’s tactics in seeking to stall the prosecution of the claims. The Court found that the plaintiffs alleged they purchased and used Samsung products, and thereby assented to arbitration. While Samsung argued those allegations were conclusory and did not show the existence of agreements to arbitrate, the Court noted that Samsung’s approach “flips the evidentiary burden on its head” because, as the party opposing arbitration, it was Samsung’s burden to dispute the existence of an agreement to arbitrate. Id. at 9.

As to its failure to pay the arbitration filing fees, the Court expressed great displeasure with Samsung, noting that its “repeated failure to pay after multiple deadlines, without any showing of hardship, is a classic refusal to pay scheme in violation of Section 4” of the Federal Arbitration Act. Id. at 15. The Court also highlighted that Samsung’s tactics had delayed plaintiffs’ prosecution of their claims for two years. The Court further denied Samsung’s request that the matters be stayed so that it could pursue an appeal and ordered Samsung to pay the outstanding arbitration fees.

Implications Of The Decision

The Hoeg decision highlights the potential downsides of class action waivers, which have spurred the plaintiffs’ bar to pursue hundreds or even thousands of individual arbitrations all at once. The decision also underscores the importance of adding a mass arbitration provision to an arbitration agreement. Such a provision, if well-crafted, may serve to streamline those proceedings, facilitate resolution, and limit exposure. Some jurisdictions have enacted laws aimed at punishing a retailer’s or employer’s failure to pay arbitration fees. For example, in California, if arbitration fees are not timely paid, it results in a material breach of the arbitration agreement and could lead to the imposition of sanctions including “the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees and costs, incurred by the employee or consumer as a result of the material breach.” (Cal. Civil Code § 1281.99.)

February 15, 2024 by Eden Anderson

Ninth Circuit Holds That Federal Courts Must Apply Adolph In PAGA Cases, With A Concurring Opinion Addressing Whether Individual Arbitration Will Have Preclusive Effect

By Eden E. Anderson, Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., and Jennifer A. Riley

Duane Morris Takeaways: On February 12, 2024, the Ninth Circuit issued its opinion in Johnson v. Lowe’s Home Centers, LLC, No. 22-16486 (9th Cir. Feb. 12, 2024). It held that federal courts must follow the statutory standing analysis of the California Supreme Court in Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc., and not the U.S. Supreme Court’s different interpretation in Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana. Additionally, in his concurrence, Judge Kenneth Lee opined that issues decided in individual arbitration of a PAGA claim should not have preclusive effect on the bigger non-individual PAGA claim.

Case Background

The plaintiff in Johnson alleged PAGA claims against her former employer based on the employer’s alleged violations of the California Labor Code. Applying all aspects of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, the district court compelled Johnson’s individual PAGA claims to arbitration and dismissed her non-individual PAGA claims for lack of statutory standing. While the case was on appeal, the California Supreme Court issued its decision in Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc., which held that a PAGA plaintiff retains standing to maintain non-individual PAGA claims even after their individual PAGA claims are compelled to arbitration.

At issue on appeal in Johnson v. Lowe’s Home Centers, LLC was whether the non-individual PAGA claims should have been dismissed.

The Ninth Circuit’s Decision

The Ninth Circuit held that federal courts must follow the statutory standing analysis of the California Supreme Court in Adolph, and not the U.S. Supreme Court’s different interpretation in Viking River. It thus vacated the ruling dismissing the non-individual PAGA claims and remanded the case to the district court to apply Adolph.

The Johnson decision is of further interest because of the concurring opinion of Judge Kenneth Lee. His concurrence addressed the next big question in PAGA cases, i.e., the extent to which issues decided by the arbitrator in resolving individual PAGA claims will be binding in court in the litigation of the non-individual PAGA claims. Judge Lee noted that individual arbitration is often “low-stakes” for companies, who sometimes even send non-lawyers, such as paralegals, to arbitration proceedings because the amount at issue is not worth a lawyer’s higher hourly rates. However, as Judge Lee noted, if legal conclusions or factual findings in individual arbitration are binding, then companies would have little choice but to bring in the “legal cavalry” and devote substantial resources in individual arbitration, which would undermineg the efficiency of those proceedings, which is the whole “point” of enforcing arbitration agreements according to their terms. Judge Lee reasoned that there is thus a “lurking tension” between the FAA and the suggestion in Adolph that issue preclusion can apply to the outcome of arbitration of an individual PAGA action. Judge Lee expressed his view that application of issue preclusion in this context would contravene the FAA.

Implications For Employers

Whether in state or federal court in a PAGA action, the Ninth Circuit made clear that Adolph must be applied. The concurring opinion in Johnson provides employers facing adverse rulings in individual arbitration with good arguments against the application of issue preclusion in the non-individual PAGA claim proceedings.

January 18, 2024 by Eden Anderson

California Supreme Court Rules That Lack Of Manageability Is An Improper Basis Upon Which To Strike A PAGA Claim, But Leaves Open Due Process Challenges

By Eden E. Anderson, Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., and Jennifer A. Riley

Duane Morris Takeaways: On January 18, 2024, the California Supreme Court issued its opinion in Estrada v. Royalty Carpet Mills, No. S274340 (Cal. Jan. 18, 2024). It is a game changer for employers operating in California. The Supreme Court held, in a unanimous decision, that trial courts lack inherent authority to dismiss claims under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 – the “PAGA”- with prejudice due to lack of manageability. The Supreme Court declined to address whether, and under what circumstances, a defendant’s right to due process might ever support striking a PAGA claim. As such, the decision in Estrada is a required read for employers and their decision-makers.

Case Background

Jorge Estrada filed a putative class and PAGA action against his former employer asserting, as relevant here, meal period violations. After two classes comprised of 157 individuals were certified, the case was tried to the bench. The trial court ultimately decertified the classes, finding there were too many individualized issues to support class-wide treatment. Although the trial court awarded relief to four individual plaintiffs, it dismissed the non-individual PAGA claim on the grounds that it was not manageable.

On appeal, Estrada argued that PAGA claims have no manageability requirement, and the Court of Appeal agreed in Estrada v. Royalty Carpet Mills, Inc., 76 Cal.App.5th 685 (2022). The Court of Appeal reasoned that class action requirements do not apply in PAGA actions and, therefore, the manageability requirement rooted in class action procedure was inapplicable. Further, the Court of Appeal reasoned that “[a]llowing courts to dismiss PAGA claims based on manageability would interfere with PAGA’s express design as a law enforcement mechanism.” Id. at 712. The Court of Appeal acknowledged the difficulty that employers and trial courts face with PAGA claims involving thousands of allegedly aggrieved employees, each with unique factual circumstances, but concluded that dismissal for lack of manageability was not an available tool for a trial court to utilize.

The Court of Appeal in Estrada recognized its holding was contrary to the holding in Wesson v. Staples the Office Superstore, LLC, 68 Cal.App.5th 746 (2021), and created a split in authority. In Wesson, the trial court struck a PAGA claim as unmanageable, and the Court of Appeal affirmed. The claims at issue in Wesson involved the alleged misclassification of 345 store managers. The employer’s exemption affirmative defense turned on individualized issues as to each manager’s performance of exempt versus non-exempt tasks which varied based on a number of factors including store size, sales volume, staffing levels, labor budgets, store hours, customer traffic, all of which varied across the stores. The split in authority prompted the California Supreme Court to grant review in Estrada.

The California Supreme Court’s Decision

At the outset, the California Supreme Court noted that the issue before it was whether trial courts possess inherent authority to “strike” PAGA claims for lack of manageability, defining the word “strike” to mean a dismissal with prejudice. Jan. 18 Opinion at 7. The Supreme Court then addressed, and rejected, the employer’s argument that trial courts possess inherent authority to, for judicial economy purposes, strike any claim a plaintiff asserts. The Supreme Court explained that the power to dismiss a claim with prejudice is limited to cases involving a failure to prosecute, frivolous claims, or egregious misconduct, and that judicial economy does not warrant the dismissal of any claim.

The Supreme Court rejected the employer’s argument that the manageability requirement for class actions should be imported into PAGA actions. It reasoned that there are three structural differences between class actions and PAGA representative actions that warrant treating these claims differently, as well as differences in jurisprudential history. The three structural differences cited by the Supreme Court were: (1) that plaintiffs in PAGA actions are not required to establish superiority or predominance of common issues; (2) PAGA’s purpose is to maximize enforcement of labor laws; and (3) that the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA) can impose civil penalties for Labor Code violations without considering manageability.

As to jurisprudential history differences, the Supreme Court noted that, unlike class actions which were an “invention of equity,” PAGA actions are not “creatures of equity.” Id. at 30. Thus, while class action jurisprudence developed to create various common law requirements for class actions that are not set forth in California’s class action statute, the PAGA statute provides detailed statutory requirements for maintaining a PAGA claim, thereby constraining trial courts from using “extra-statutory inherent authority to strike PAGA claims that the Legislature has authorized.” Id. at 31. Because PAGA’s express wording permits a plaintiff who has suffered one labor code violation to seek civil penalties on behalf of other employees for “violations that vary widely in nature,” imposing a manageability requirement would “defeat the purpose of statute.” Id. at 32.

The Supreme Court declined to address whether, and under what circumstances, a defendant’s right to due process might ever support striking a PAGA claim other than to note that any such authority would be “narrow authority of last resort.” Id. at 41. Although the employer argued its due process rights would be violated if the PAGA claims against it were re-tried, the Supreme Court noted that the employer had only offered the testimony of two employees in the original trial and, thus, the due process issue was “hypothetical.” Id. at 40. The Supreme Court, however, agreed that employers have a due process right to present an affirmative defense, but emphasized that an employer has no due process right to present the testimony of an “unlimited number of individual employees” or “each allegedly aggrieved employee.” Id. at 40.

The Supreme Court concluded by noting that trial courts have “numerous tools” to manage complex cases, and suggested that the “extent of liability” in a PAGA case can be determined by surveys or statistical methods that estimate the number of aggrieved employees. Id. at 41. The Supreme Court emphasized that the burden of proof in a PAGA case remains with plaintiffs who should endeavor to be “prudent in their approach to PAGA claims” and that, if “a plaintiff alleges widespread violations of the Labor Code . . . but cannot prove them in an efficient manner, it does not seem unreasonable for the punishment assessed to be minimal.” Id. at 44.

Implications For Employers

The Estrada opinion strikes a blow to employers facing PAGA claims by removing lack of manageability as a ground for dismissal. While the California Supreme Court encouraged PAGA plaintiffs to be prudent to their approach to their PAGA theories, in practice, such prudence is uncommon. On the bright side, the decision leaves open an employer’s ability to seek dismissal on due process grounds.

January 4, 2024 by Eden Anderson

Permanent Injunction Issued Precluding Enforcement Of California’s Ban On Mandatory Arbitration Agreements

By Eden Anderson, Rebecca Bjork, and Gerald Maatman, Jr.

Duane Morris Takeaways: Last year, the Ninth Circuit held in Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Bonta, 62 F.4th 473 (9th Cir. 2023), that California Assembly Bill (AB) 51 — a statute that attempted to criminalize employers’ use of mandatory arbitration agreements — was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act. In Bonta, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a preliminary injunction prohibiting the State of California from enforcing AB 51. On January 1, 2024, following remand in the case, the district court entered a permanent injunction that enjoins the State from enforcing the Labor and Government Code sections enacted as part of AB 51, and awarding the plaintiffs, as prevailing parties, $822,496. The district court’s order brings finality, judgment, and ultimate success to a strong coalition of employer interests who banded together to challenge California’s attempt to criminalize the use of mandatory arbitration agreements.

Case Background

AB 51, effective January 1, 2020, added Section 432.6 to the California Labor Code and Section 12953 to the California Government Code. Labor Code Section 432.6 makes it a misdemeanor for employers to require employees or applicants to waive “any right, forum, or procedure for violation of any provision of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act” or the California Labor Code. Government Code Section 12953 makes it an unlawful employment practice to violate Labor Code Section 432.6.

In December 2019, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, California Chamber of Commerce, National Retail Federation, California Retailers Association, National Association of Security Companies, Home Care Association of America, and the California Association for Health Services at Home (“Plaintiffs”) filed a complaint against the State of California challenging AB 51 as preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).

The district court granted the Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits. California appealed, and challenged only the district court’s holding that AB 51 was likely to be preempted by the FAA. A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit initially reversed the district court in a September 2021 opinion but, after a rehearing petition was filed, the Ninth Circuit withdrew its opinion and issued a new opinion, which affirmed the district court’s preliminary injunction order and held that the FAA preempts AB 51.

The District Court’s Issuance Of A Permanent Injunction

After the decision, the case was remanded to the district court and, on January 1, 2024, the district court issued an order permanently enjoining the State of California from enforcing Labor Code Section 432.6 and Government Code Section 12953. Additionally, the district court awarded the Plaintiffs, as prevailing parties, $822,496 in attorneys’ fees. The order was obtained via stipulation of the parties whereby they agreed that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Bonta was dispositive of the legal issues in the case and further agreed to the amount of attorneys’ fees to be paid by the State.

Implications For Employers

The district court’s order brings finality, judgment, and ultimate success to a strong coalition of employer interests who banded together to challenge AB 51. Employers in California may permissibly use mandatory arbitration agreements. However, the use of mandatory arbitration agreements potentially can be problematic when it comes to enforcing the agreement. When an applicant or employee must sign an arbitration agreement as a condition of employment, the agreement is a contract of adhesion that will likely be found to be procedurally unconscionable. Thus, a court may refuse to enforce a mandatory arbitration agreement if there are also terms in the agreement that are substantively unconscionable and non-severable.

November 12, 2023November 12, 2023 by Eden Anderson

California Supreme Court Expresses Concern At Estrada Oral Argument About Manageability Of PAGA Claims

By Eden E. Anderson, Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., and Jennifer A. Riley

Duane Morris Takeaways: In a case with significant consequences for employers, the California Supreme Court heard oral argument in Estrada v. Royalty Carpet Mills, No. S274340, on November 8, 2023. In Estrada, the Supreme Court will decide whether trial courts have inherent authority to ensure that PAGA claims will be manageable at trial, and to strike or narrow such claims if they cannot be managed appropriately. The Supreme Court signaled during oral argument its concerns with unwieldy PAGA claims that, if tried, would require a series of mini-trials over the course of years. The Supreme Court further expressed concern with ensuring that employers’ due process rights to present affirmative defenses are protected, potentially signaling the issuance of an employer-friendly decision. A decision is expected in the next three months, and has the potential to transform the prosecution and defense of PAGA litigation.

Case Background

Jorge Estrada filed a putative class action and PAGA action against his former employer asserting meal period violations. After two classes comprised of 157 individuals were certified, the parties tried the claims before a judge in a bench trial. The trial court ultimately decertified the classes, finding there were too many individualized issues to support class treatment. Although the trial court awarded relief to four individual plaintiffs, it dismissed the non-individual PAGA claim, concluding it was not manageable.

On appeal, Estrada argued that PAGA claims have no manageability requirement, and the Court of Appeal agreed in Estrada v. Royalty Carpet Mills, Inc., 76 Cal.App.5th 685 (2022). The Court of Appeal reasoned that class action requirements do not apply in PAGA actions and, therefore, the manageability requirement rooted in class action procedure was inapplicable. Further, the Court of Appeal opined that “[a]llowing courts to dismiss PAGA claims based on manageability would interfere with PAGA’s express design as a law enforcement mechanism.” Id. at 712. The Court of Appeal acknowledged the difficulty that employers and trial courts face with PAGA claims involving thousands of allegedly aggrieved employees, each with unique factual circumstances, but concluded that dismissal for lack of manageability was not an available tool for a trial court to utilize.

Estrada is contrary to the holding in Wesson v. Staples the Office Superstore, LLC, 68 Cal.App.5th 746 (2021), and created a split in authority. In Wesson, the trial court struck a PAGA claim as unmanageable, and the Court of Appeal affirmed. The claims at issue in Wesson involved the alleged misclassification of 345 store managers. The employer’s exemption affirmative defense turned on individualized issues as to each manager’s performance of exempt versus non-exempt tasks, which varied based on a number of factors including store size, sales volume, staffing levels, labor budgets, store hours, customer traffic, all of which varied across the stores. The split in authority prompted the California Supreme Court to grant review in Estrada, but not Wesson.

Oral Argument At The California Supreme Court

During oral argument on November 8, 2023, several Justices, most prominently Justices Liu and Jenkins, expressed skepticism that a trial court’s inherent powers include the ability to outright strike or dismiss an entire PAGA action for lack of manageability. As Justice Liu commented, permitting trial courts such wide ranging power would shortchange the PAGA statute unless there is an overriding constitutional interest.

Several Justices also acknowledged that an employer has a due process right to present evidence to support its affirmative defenses and that, in certain cases, such evidence presentation might require a series of mini-trials over a period of years and wholly consume a trial court’s resources. Justice Kruger asked questions of Estrada’s counsel that suggested the illogical nature of these issues telling trial courts as to what to do in terms of mini-trials, and how unwieldy such PAGA-related problems would evolve under such a set of principles.

Justice Groban also expressed concern about a PAGA case where multiple Labor Code violations are alleged, hundreds or thousands of employees are at issue, and different work sites and different types of employees ranging from janitors to accountants are implicated. Justice Groban asked why, in that case, a trial court could not just limit the case to the accountants only. Other justices raised similar concerns, with Chief Justice Guerrero asking Estrada’s counsel why the answer is that this is all subject to appellate review.

Implications For Employers

The constellation of the comments from the justices seemingly signals that the California Court may hold that trial courts possess inherent authority to ensure an employer’s right to due process is safeguarded, which necessarily encompasses the right to gauge the manageability of PAGA claims and to narrow them as appropriate. As to whether such authority could include outright dismissal of an entire PAGA case, employers will have to wait and see.