George Schaller – Class Action Defense

November 26, 2025November 26, 2025 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

California Court Of Appeal Affirms Dismissal Of Standalone PAGA Action Because A Prior Global Settlement Precluded Overlapping Claims

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, and George J. Schaller

Duane Morris Takeaways: On November 19, 2025, in Brown v. Dave & Buster’s of Cal., Inc., Case No. B339729, 2025 Cal. App. LEXIS 750 (Cal. App. Nov. 19, 2025), the California Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District affirmed a trial court’s decision granting judgment on the pleadings that barred a standalone PAGA plaintiff’s claims for lack of standing and due to a prior global settlement with overlapping claims.

In an important decision for all employers in California, the Court of Appeal recognized a prior PAGA settlement fully encompassed and released the standalone plaintiff’s claims as to all defendant entities. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court order finding that the plaintiff did not have standing to sue and her claims were barred by claim preclusion.

Case Background

Lauren Brown worked for Dave & Buster’s of California, Inc. and Dave & Buster’s Inc. (collectively “Buster’s”) in its Westchester restaurant location from November 2016 to April 2018. Id. at *1-2.

In June 2019, Brown filed a standalone representative action under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”) against Buster’s and alleged Buster’s “failed to provide meal periods, rest periods, vacation pay, and wage statements . . . and routinely required employees to work off-the-clock.” Id. at *2.

Buster’s filed a demurrer to abate/stay, or in the alternative, a motion for discretionary stay, and argued that Brown’s action “was between the same parties on the same cause of action in at least two previously-filed actions” in Espinoza v. Dave & Buster’s Management Corporation, Inc., Los Angeles County Superior Court Case No. BC710345, and Lopez v. Dave & Buster’s of California, Inc., et al.,San Diego County Superior Court Case No. 37-2018-00054080-CU-OE-CTL. See Brown, 2025 Cal. App. LEXIS 750at *2. In October 2019, the trial court found Brown’s case was “‘substantially identical’ to the Espinoza action” and sustained Buster’s demurrer and stayed the case. Id.

Buster’s, in February 2020, filed a statement with the trial court concerning additional information on earlier-filed PAGA actions. Buster’s statement included “when each case was filed, when the other plaintiffs submitted their requisite notices to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (Agency), and which claims overlapped with Brown’s.” See id. at *3. Buster’s disclosed Rocha v. Dave & Buster’s Management Corporation, Inc., Santa Clara County Superior Court Case No. 19CV348961, and Andrade v. Dave & Buster’s Management Corporation, Inc., San Diego County Superior Court Case No. 37-2019-00019561-CU-OE-CTL (“Andrade”). See Brown, 2025 Cal. App. LEXIS 750at *3.

On April 1, 2022, the Andrade parties entered into a long-form settlement agreement with all three Buster’s entities, including those that Brown sued. Included in the released claims was “failure to pay accrued vacation pay at the end of employment, including but not limited to claims under the California Labor Code.” The released claims specifically cited § 227.3 of the California Labor Code regarding vacation pay. Id. at *4-5.

The plaintiff in Andrade moved for settlement approval, showing she notified the Agency of her motion and settlement agreement. The Agency accepted the settlement and did not oppose it. On November 4, 2022, the San Diego Superior Court granted approval of the Andrade settlement. Id.

In April 2023, the parties in Brown’s action notified the court that the Andrade action had settled. Brown alleged there “might not be complete overlap with Andrade as to her unpaid vacation claim, but she was still checking on this issue.” Id. at *4.

Thereafter, in June 2023, Buster’s moved for judgment on the pleadings and argued the Andrade settlement released all of Brown’s claims and that claim preclusion barred Brown’s lawsuit. Id. Buster’s supported its motion with various documents from the Andrade action, including the pre-filing notice to the Agency on May 13, 2019, the Andrade complaint filed on November 14, 2019 (which omitted a vacation pay violation), the amended notice letter to the Agency on February 3, 2022, and the corresponding amended complaint filed in Andrade on March 10, 2022. The amended notice to the Agency added a vacation pay claim, under § 227.3, and added the named defendants in Brown’s case. Id. at *4.

Brown opposed Buster’s motion and asserted she had standing to bring all claims in her PAGA letter because Buster’s violated her rights under the Labor Code. Citing LaCour v. Marshalls of Cal., LLC, 94 Cal. App. 5th 1172 (2023), Brown maintained because the Andrade plaintiff failed to exhaust her claims before the Agency, “she was therefore not deputized to pursue and settle the Labor Code violations in [Andrade’s] amended complaint.” See Brown, 2025 Cal. App. LEXIS 750at *5. Brown also noted the plaintiff in Andrade waited 35 days between sending her amended pre-filing notice and filing her complaint in court, and therefore, the Andrade settlement did not apply to Brown’s §227.3 vacation pay claims against the Buster’s entities Brown sued. Id.

The trial court granted Buster’s motion without written comment, dismissed Brown’s complaint with prejudice, and entered judgment in favor of Buster’s. Thereafter, Brown appealed. Id. at *5-6.

The California Court of Appeal’s Decision

The Court of Appealaffirmed the trial court’s decision, finding Brown lacked standing, claim preclusion barred Brown’s PAGA claims, and the Andrade plaintiff’s failure to wait 65 days to file her amended complaint was a “harmless defect” where the Agency had an opportunity to object to the Andrade global settlement and did not do so.

At the outset, the Court of Appealopined Brown identified no error from the trial court decision and determined Brown “effectively concede[d]” the Andrade settlement resulted in a final judgment on the merits and did not bar her non-vacation pay claims. Id. at *6. The Court of Appealsimilarly rejected Brown’s argument that she had standing to pursue Labor Code violations after November 4, 2022, the date after court approval of the Andrade settlement, because her employment with Buster’s ended in 2018. Id. at *6-7.

The Court of Appealconsidered the sole issue as — “did Andrade’s failure to adhere strictly to the 65-day waiting period for her amended claims defeat Buster’s claim preclusion argument?” Id. at *7. In determining this question, the Court of Appealexplained § 2699.3 of the Labor Code provides “if the Agency does not respond within 65 calendar days of an aggrieved employee providing it with written notice, ‘the aggrieved employee may commence a civil action.’” The crux of the Court of Appeal’sdecision centered on Andrade’s amended complaint which was filed “fewer than 65 days after her amended notice to the Agency.” Id.

The Court of Appealreasoned claim preclusion “bars a new lawsuit if the first case had (1) the same cause of action; (2) between the same parties, or parties in privity; and (3) a final judgment on the merits” and noted the doctrine “promotes judicial economy by requiring all claims based on the same cause of action that were or could have been raised to be decided in a single suit.” Id.

Brown argued LaCour, 94 Cal.App.5th 1172 (2023), controls and suggested the Court of Appealfind the Andrade settlement “does not bar her vacation pay or reach the Buster’s defendants in [Brown’s] case because [the] Andrade [plaintiff] filed her second amended complaint only 35 days after submitting her amended presuit notice to the agency.” See Brown, 2025 Cal. App. LEXIS 750at *7-9. The Court of Appeal interpreted Brown’s reliance on LaCour to suggest the plaintiff in Andrade “was never authorized to pursue the additional vacation pay claim and new defendants in her amended complaint” which would necessarily encompass Brown. Id. at *9.

Buster’s contended LaCour is “‘completely inapposite’ and factually distinguishable” given “Andrade’s initial notice letter, initial complaint, amended notice letter, and amended complaint ‘expressly include all of Brown’s alleged Labor Code violations such that they encompass Brown’s entire PAGA claim.’” Buster’s additionally contended “Andrade’s failure to abide by the 65-day waiting period is a technicality” and “not dispositive as to the issue of administrative exhaustion under PAGA.” Id.

The Court of Appealdetermined on the “administrative exhaustion issue, LaCour does not apply” and California’s Supreme Court has described “PAGA’s statutory pre-filing notice requirement as a ‘condition of suit.’” Similarly, the Court of Appealreasoned the purpose of PAGA’s pre-filing notice requirement is to afford “the Agency ‘the opportunity to decide whether to allocate scare resources to an investigation…’” Id. at *11. It explained “[n]othing in the statute’s language or any published case law suggests the 65-day waiting period also applies to amended notices and complaints.” Id. Accordingly, the Court of Appealfound “Andrade’s failure to wait 65 days was a harmless defect” and the “Agency accepted Andrade’s global settlement with Buster’s after it had an opportunity to object.” Id. at *12.

In sum, the Court of Appeal held “Andrade’s settlement fully encompassed and released Brown’s claims as to all Buster’s entities, thus satisfying all elements of claim preclusion” and affirmed the trial court’s decision.

Implications For Employers

Employers facing PAGA litigation can rely on Brown for support that prior settlements have a preclusive effect where, as here, the prior settlement and second lawsuit have overlapping claims.

Brown also supports the proposition that PAGA’s 65-day notice waiting period requirement for filing suit may not apply to amended PAGA notices. In another win for employers, the Court of Appeal found the plaintiff in Brown could not recover for periods after she left the company in 2018 – thereby limiting the scope of PAGA penalties further.

Given the myriad issues employers defend against in PAGA litigation, this decision signals an important strategic consideration in defending overlapping PAGA actions. Employers when faced with multiple PAGA actions must consider the sequencing of PAGA settlements and whether an already settled PAGA action can create a preclusive effect barring a separate PAGA action.

November 19, 2025November 19, 2025 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Duane Morris Class Action Review Cited In Three U.S. Supreme Court Briefs

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, Ryan T. Garippo, and George J. Schaller

Duane Morris Takeaways: On October 15, 2025, in Eli Lilly & Co., et. al. v. Richards, et al., No. 25-476 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2025), Eli Lilly & Co. filed a Petition For Writ Of Certiorari after a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit which created a four-way circuit split as to the proper interpretation of 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). This petition drew briefing from several amici curiae, including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the CHRO Association.

Similarly, when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decision widened that circuit split to include five different methodical approaches in Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. v. Andrew Harrington, et al., No. 25-559 (U.S. Nov. 5, 2025), Cracker Barrel also filed a Petition For A Writ of Certiorari.

Significant for readers of this blog, both petitioners and amici also cited the Duane Morris Class Action Review as the authoritative source on FLSA certification statistics and the widening circuit split regarding when it is appropriate to send notice to would-be plaintiffs, under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) in a Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) collective action.

In its review of our practice group’s resource, Employment Practices Liability Consultant Magazine (“EPLiC”) said, “The Duane Morris Class Action Review is ‘the Bible’ on class action litigation and an essential desk reference for business executives, corporate counsel, and human resources professionals.” EPLiC continued, “The review is a must-have resource for in-depth analysis of class actions in general and workplace litigation in particular.

With the submission of our analysis to the U.S. Supreme Court, we are humbled and proud to be cited as the authoritative source in the class action space.

The Briefing In Richards And Harrington

Both Cracker Barrel and Eli Lilly correctly argued in their petitions that “the circuits are split five ways in how to interpret” Section 216(b) and the case law in this area “is in total disarray.” Both petitions ask the U.S. Supreme Court to help organize this “disarray.” As such, a brief guide through these disjointed methodological approaches is included below.

First, there is the familiar and lenient two-step standard in Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 118 F.R.D. 351 (D.N.J. 1987), which was expressly adopted by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Scott v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 954 F.3d 502, 515 (2d Cir. 2020), and “acquiesced to . . . without express adoption” by the First, Third, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits. Kwoka v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Company of Boston, LLC, 141 F.4th 10, 22 (1st. Cir. 2025); Zavala v. Wal Mart Stores Inc., 691 F.3d 527, 534 (3d Cir. 2012); Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Cap. Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1105 (10th Cir. 2001); Hipp v. Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 252 F.3d 1208, 1219 (11th Cir. 2001)

Under the Lusardi approach, at step one, a plaintiff moves for conditional certification, relying solely on his or her allegations, and not competing evidence submitted by the employer. If the employee’s motion is granted, would-be plaintiffs receive notice of the lawsuit and then have the ability to opt-in as party plaintiffs to the case and participate in discovery. At the close of discovery, the employer can then move to decertify the conditionally certified collective action, and prove the employees are not similarly situated with the benefit of discovery and evidence.

Second, in Campbell v. City of Los Angeles, 903 F.3d 1090, 1114 (9th Cir. 2018),the Ninth Circuit adopted a variation of the Lusardi two-step approach but also required the plaintiff to show he or she is similarly situated to his or her fellow employees in “some material aspect of their litigation” and not just similar in some sort of irrelevant way, but the plaintiff may rely on mere allegations to make that showing.

Third, the Fifth Circuit in Swales v. KLLM Transp. Servs., LLC, 985 F.3d 430, 443 (5th Cir. 2021), rejected Lusardi’s two-step approach outright, and required its district courts to “rigorously enforce” the FLSA’s similarity requirement at the outset of the litigation in a one-step approach. “[T]he district court needs to consider all of the available evidence” at the time the motion is filed and decide whether the plaintiff has “met [his or her] burden of establishing similarity.” Id. at 442-43.

Fourth, the Sixth Circuit in Clark v. A&L Homecare & Training Ctr., LLC, 68 F.4th 1003 (6th Cir. 2023), adopted a comparable standard to Swales requiring the employee to show a “strong likelihood” that others are similarly situated to him or her before the district court can send notice, but leaving open the possibility of the employer filing a motion for decertification down the line. Clark, 68 F.4th at 1011.

Fifth, the Seventh Circuit in Richards, et al. v. Eli Lilly & Co, et al., 149 F.4th 901 (7th Cir. 2025), rejected the Lusardi framework but declined to go as far as Clark or Swales. Instead, the Seventh Circuit approach requires “a plaintiff must first make a threshold showing that there is a material factual dispute as to whether the proposed collective is similarly situated” to secure notice and an employer “must be permitted to submit rebuttal evidence” for the court to consider. Richards, 149 F.4th at 913. But, there is not a bright line rule as to whether the court should decide the similarly situated question in a one or two step approach as the analysis is not an “all-or-nothing determination.” Id. at 913-914.

Sixth, as correctly noted by counsel for Cracker Barrel, the U.S. Courts of Appeal for the D.C., Fourth, and Eighth Circuits have not yet opined on the proper interpretive method, leaving their district courts free to choose among the available options.

Duane Morris Class Action Review Citations

It should go without saying that these issues are complicated, and employers are looking to experienced practitioners to help them navigate this procedural morass. For that reason, both petitioners and the amici curiae turned to the Duane Morris Class Action Review, and its authors, as the authoritative source in support of their petitions.

The first citation is found in Eli Lilly’s petition for writ of certiorari, which cites Avalon Zoppo, Circuit Split Widens on Judicial Approach to Sending FLSA Collective Action Notices, Nat. L. J. (Aug. 11, 2025), regarding the proper interpretation of Richards, following the Seventh Circuit’s decision in that case. In that article, Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Chair of the Duane Morris Class Action Defense Group, stated “[t]he [Seventh Circuit’s] holding is going to reverberate and have a huge impact on wage and hour litigation throughout the United States.”

The second citation can be found in Cracker Barrel’s petition, following the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Harrington, which cites directly to the Duane Morris Class Action Review for varying conditional certification rates under this patchwork quilt of legal standards. Indeed, in the 2024 and 2025 editions of the Duane Morris Class Action Review, our analysis showed that: (1) the federal circuit courts that follow or acquiesce to Lusardi grant conditional certification at rates of 84%; (2) the Ninth Circuit grants conditional certification at rates of approximately 71% under the lenient-plus approach; and (3) the remaining Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits, with varied stricter standards, granted certification at rates approximating 67%. The petition further noted our finding that only approximately 10% of conditionally certified FLSA collective actions reach the decertification stage.

The third citation is found in the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the CHRO Association’s amicus brief which relies on the Duane Morris Class Action Review for the proposition that “motions for conditional certification . . . are granted in a large majority of [FLSA] cases.” Looking at the statistics, the amici highlight “[i]n 2024, district courts granted 80% of motions seeking court-ordered notice” with “Plaintiffs enjoy[ing] similar success in past years”

These U.S. Supreme Court practitioners and defense counsel are not alone as others refer to the Duane Morris Class Action Review as “the Bible” on class action litigation. It is also relied on by some of the world’s largest plaintiffs’ firms and federal judges, see, e.g., Laverenz v. Pioneer Metal Finishing, LLC, 746 F. Supp. 3d 602, 614 (E.D. Wis. 2024). The Duane Morris Class Action Review is the “one stop shop” and authoritative source on collective action certification rates, collective action trends and analysis, and the implications, pressures, and contours that parties face when engaged in FLSA collective action litigation.

Implications For Employers

Although the petitioners are still briefing their petitions, it is clear that the myriad approaches adopted by the federal circuit courts are ripe for some clarity from the U.S. Supreme Court, which would hopefully provide a roadmap for district courts to assess collective actions uniformly.

Further, the framework for when and how to send notice under Section 216(b) are not the only issues presented by these petitions. Eli Lilly expressly invited the U.S. Supreme Court to overturn Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165 (1989) and plaintiff-appellee in Harrington would also have the high court decide whether Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., 582 U.S. 255 (2017) applies to collective actions, which we blogged about here.

Because these questions, and many others, remain in flux and unanswered, employers should monitor this blog for updates as it is a trusted source for companies, defense counsel, plaintiffs’ firms, federal judges, and U.S. Supreme Court practitioners alike. We will be following these petitions as they unfold.

September 30, 2025October 1, 2025 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Signaling A Slowdown? EEOC’s FY 2025 Lawsuit Filings Reflect A Narrowing Of Priorities After Change In Presidential Administration

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Alex W. Karasik, Jennifer A. Riley, Gregory Tsonis, and George J. Schaller

Duane Morris Takeaways: In FY 2025 (October 1, 2024 to September 30, 2025), the EEOC’s litigation enforcement activity stalled significantly compared to previous years. By the numbers, FY 2025 lawsuit filings ended on the lower end of the spectrum with 94 lawsuits filed compared to the height of filings in FY 2018 (217 lawsuits). The decline in enforcement activity suggests that during President Trump’s second term in office, employers should not expect the EEOC to be as aggressive as past regimes in terms of the volume of government enforcement lawsuits, particularly in terms of systemic litigation.

Though the overall filings totals are lower than previous years, certain geographic regions, types of claims, and key industries remain prime targets of the Commission’s lawsuits. Our analysis of these patterns is set forth below and is offered to arm employers with the EEOC’s FY 2025 litigation scorecard through an evaluation of district office enforcement activity, filings by statute and discrimination basis, and the most impacted industries.

In sum, there is still a bevy of EEOC lawsuits being filed against businesses, but in a more localized and targeted fashion. Employers should continue their legal compliance with all EEOC initiatives.

Lawsuit Filings Based On Month And Year

The EEOC’s fiscal year ends each year on September 30. The final deluge of filings for EEOC-initiated litigation maintained its year-end boost in 2025. This year, in September alone, 35 lawsuits were filed, down from September filings in FY 2024 (50 lawsuits filed) and September filings in FY 2023 (67 lawsuits filed) – but still a significant total, nonetheless. Of the 94 total filings this year, just over one-third of EEOC lawsuits were filed in September, down from FY 2024’s last-minute filing frenzy accounting for half of that year’s filings. The following chart shows the EEOC’s filing pattern over FY 2025:

We track the EEOC’s filing efforts across the entire fiscal year with its beginning in October through the anticipated filing spree in September. Unlike other fiscal years, the EEOC’s filing patterns were consistent in the first half of FY 2025, peaking with 14 lawsuits in January. Filings again slowed down until Summer, where there was a resurgence of another 14 lawsuits in June 2025. Thereafter, lawsuit filings dipped until the “eleventh hour” in September.

Comparing these filings in FY 2025 to previous years, the EEOC filed significantly less lawsuits than in FY 2024 (111) and FY 2023 (144 lawsuits), signaling a trend in decreased EEOC enforcement activity. Though EEOC litigation filings continuously decreased compared to pre-COVID era filing metrics, the EEOC’s presence as a litigation powerhouse persists. The following graph shows the EEOC’s year-over-year fiscal year filings beginning in FY 2017 through FY 2025:

Lawsuit Filings Based On EEOC District Offices

In addition to tracking the total number of filings, we closely monitor which of the EEOC’s 15 district offices are most actively filing new cases throughout the EEOC’s fiscal year. Some district offices tend to be more aggressive than others. Some focus on different case filing priorities. The following chart shows the number of lawsuit filings by each of the EEOC district offices.

In FY 2025, Philadelphia and Chicago led the pack in filing the most lawsuits at 11 each, followed by Indianapolis with 8 filings, then Atlanta, Birmingham, Houston, and Phoenix with 7 filings, and Charlotte, New York, and Miami each with 6 filings. St. Louis had 5 filings, Los Angeles and San Francisco had 4 filings, and Dallas had 3 filings. Memphis had the lowest amount with only 2 filings.

Like FY 2024, Philadelphia proved itself as a leader in EEOC enforcement filings. Chicago remained steady with 11 filings, same as FY 2024. St. Louis (2 filings in FY 2024) and Phoenix (4 filings in FY 2024) also experienced increases in filings compared to last year. Other offices comparatively lagged in enforcement activity, Atlanta (11 filings in FY 2024), Indianapolis (9 filings in FY 2024), and Houston (8 filings in FY 2024), showed slight decreases in enforcement activities. Across the board filings generally evened out for each district office compared to FY 2024, but overall, filings fell.

Although filing trends were down for all Districts, the total filings demonstrate the EEOC maintained its consistent litigation strength, across all district offices. Employers with operations in Philadelphia and Chicago should pay extra attention to EEOC charge activity given the aggressiveness of the Commission in those regions.

(Note: Three EEOC press releases from the Washington D.C. Field Office included their lawsuit filings as part of the Philadelphia District Office statistics)

Lawsuit Filings Based On Type Of Discrimination

We also analyze the types of lawsuits the EEOC filed in terms of the statutes and theories of discrimination alleged. This enables us to determine how the EEOC is shifting its strategic priorities.

When considered on a percentage basis, the distribution of cases filed by statute skewed significantly in favor of Title VII cases when comparing FY 2025 to previous fiscal years. Title VII cases once again made up the majority of cases filed, as they constituted 50% of all filings in FY 2025 (decreased from 58% of all filings in FY 2024, significantly down from 68% of all filings FY 2023 and 69% of filings in FY 2022, and decreased compared to 61% of all filings in FY 2021).

Overall, ADA cases also made up the next most significant percentage of the EEOC’s FY 2025 filings – totaling 31.5%. This is an overall decrease in previous years where ADA filings amounted to 42% in FY 2025, 34% in FY 2023, and 37% in FY 2021. Though these filings are marginally higher than FY 2022 where ADA filings on a percentage basis amounted to 29.7% of all filings.

There was also an uptick in ADEA filings, as 9 ADEA cases were filed in FY 2025, whereas 6 age discrimination cases were filed in FY 2024, after 12 age discrimination cases were filed in FY 2023 and 7 age discrimination cases were filed in FY 2022. Like FY 2024, this year the EEOC pursued Pregnant Worker’s Fairness Act cases with 6 filings compared to FY 2024’s 3 filings. In addition, FY 2025 had a slight increase in Pregnancy Discrimination Act cases where 5 cases were filed compared to FY 2024’s 4 filed cases. Notably absent from FY 2025’s filing balance are cases under the Equal Pay Act and Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act. The following graph shows the number of lawsuits filed according to the statute under which they were filed.

We also collect data on the allegations for which the EEOC bases its litigation filing.

The EEOC’s basis for suit remained the same among its core tenets, with Disability, Sex, and Retaliation claims leading the way. Collectively, these three bases were alleged in 59.4% of FY 2025 EEOC filings. In FY 2024, those same three core tenets also took the top three spots (collectively alleged in 67.6% of FY 2024 EEOC filings). Notably, in FY 2025, only 3 Race or National Origin based lawsuits were filed by the EEOC, or 2.3% of the total lawsuit filings. In FY 2024, 8.9% of all filings included Race claims. The following graph shows a comparison of the filings in FY 2025 to FY 2024 for the allegation basis in filings:

Lawsuits Filings Based On Industry

In monitoring the EEOC’s filings by industry, FY 2025 aligns with prior EEOC-initiated lawsuits in the top two industries compared to FY 2024, demonstrating the Commission’s focus on a few major industries.

In FY 2025, two industries remained in the EEOC’s targets: Hospitality and Healthcare: On a percentage basis, Hospitality (Restaurants / Hotels / Entertainment) comprised 25% of filings, and Healthcare had 21.3% of filings. A key difference in FY 2025 compared to FY 2024 is Manufacturing (15% of FY 2025 filings; 12.1% of FY 2024 filings) overtaking Retail (11.3% of FY 2025 filings; 23.1% of FY 2024 filings) as the next most targeted industry. The staggering drop in enforcement actions against Retailers poses a distinct drop in enforcement actions in this industry. Only one other industry, Transportation & Logistics, entered double digit enforcement activity (with 10%).The remaining industries in FY 2025 did not enter double-digit percentages though Staffing and Construction each experienced EEOC initiated litigation in FY 2025 (8.8%, and 8.8% of filings respectively per industry).

Unlike FY 2024, FY 2025 did not have any actions which involved Property Management industries. Overall, the FY 2025 industry spread aligns with FY 2024, where Hospitality and Healthcare are the most heavily targeted industries. Though Manufacturing and Retail swapped positions in enforcement priority, both still placed in the third and fourth impacted industries. Like FY 2024, the EEOC’s FY 2025 fiscal year again did not advance any industry-based filings in the Automotive, Security, and/or Technology industries.

Like FY 2024, Hospitality and Healthcare employers should continue to monitor their compliance with federal anti-discrimination laws. These industries are regular hotbeds for charges and ultimately lawsuits. No matter the industry, every employer should recognize they are vulnerable to EEOC-initiated litigation as detailed by the below graph.

Looking Ahead To Fiscal Year 2026

Moving into FY 2026, the EEOC’s budget justification includes a $19.618 million decrease from FY 2025. President Trump’s Administration prioritizes a return to the “agency’s true mission.” The reinvigorated EEOC aims to “return to its founding principles and restore evenhanded enforcement of employment civil rights laws on behalf of all Americans.” The EEOC’s mission is guided by the President’s pledge to “restore dignity to the American worker” and is bolstered by the President’s series of executive orders.

The FY 2026 EEOC budget justification signals a transition to “attacking all forms of race discrimination, including rooting out unlawful race discrimination arising from DEI programs, policies, and practices; protecting American workers from unlawful national origin discrimination involving preferences for foreign workers; defending women’s sex-based rights at work; and supporting religious liberty by protecting workers from religious bias and harassment and protecting their rights to religious accommodations at work.” The Commission also intends to continue its efforts in incorporating technological advances, streamlining and improving operational processes, and refining its organizational structure to ensure efficiency and effective EEOC enforcement.

The EEOC also shifted its goals in FY 2025. The EEOC now prioritizes three strategic goals. First, the EEOC will combat and prevent employment discrimination through the strategic application of the EEOC’s law enforcement authorities. In achieving this goal, the EEOC will employ broad remedial measures and exercise its enforcement authority fairly, efficiently, and based on the circumstances of the charge or complaint. Second, the EEOC will prevent employment discrimination and advance equal employment opportunities through education and outreach. Namely, the EEOC will increase public awareness of employment discrimination laws, and knowledge of specific rights and responsibilities under these laws, while also using its agencies to advance and resolve EEO issues. Third, the EEOC will strive for organizational excellence through its people, practices, and technology. In so doing, the EEOC intends to achieve a culture of accountability, inclusivity, and accessibility balanced against intake, outreach, education, enforcement, and service to the public to protect and advance civil rights in the workplace.

Key Employer Takeaways

In several respects, FY 2025 represented a change in enforcement targets and continued efforts in key discriminatory areas. While total filings decreased, the new administration foreshadows a targeted approach in upcoming EEOC enforcement. This is considerably true where the requested budget decrease reflects a narrower window of enforcement priorities but maintains the EEOC’s hallmark tradition of defending public civil liberties.

Given the President’s second term is just beginning, the EEOC’s FY 2025 data should be taken with a grain of salt. After all, it was a year of transition for the Commission. The Commission’s FY 2025 filings suggest discrimination always stays within the purview of the EEOC’s priorities, but what constitutes “actionable” or “litigation-worthy” discrimination is wavering. We anticipate these figures will grow by next year’s report. Finally, given the volatility of the EEOC’s priorities, it is more crucial than ever for employers to stay abreast of EEOC developments and comply with anti-discrimination laws.

***This article is published in advance of EEOC’s FY 2025, with the data current as of 5:00 p.m. CST. Duane Morris will post the final numbers and statistics through FY 2025, by 5:00 p.m. CST on October 1, 2025.

***For more on the EEOC’s FY 2025, we invite you to attend Duane Morris’ Year-End EEOC Review Webinar on October 22, 2025. To register for the webinar access the link here.

September 26, 2025 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Florida Court Finds No Standing For “Disappointed” Consumers In Class Action Lawsuit Concerning Halloween-Themed Candies

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., George J. Schaller, and Andrew P. Quay

Duane Morris Takeaways: On September 19, 2025, in Vidal, et al. v. The Hershey Co., No. 24-CV-60831, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184308 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 19, 2025), Judge Melissa Damian of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed a class action complaint alleging violations of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act for deceptive candy packing. The Court held the plaintiff-consumers failed to plausibly allege an economic injury, and therefore, lacked Article III standing. Plaintiffs’ allegations that they were “disappointed” with the lack of carved designs on Halloween-themed candy and blanket assertions that they “paid a premium” was not enough to sustain an economic injury.

The decision illustrates that conclusory statements, without an economic injury, are not enough to confer Article III standing. Though the ruling demonstrates “spooky” claims for deceptive labeling and deceptive advertising can support a potential class action, the Plaintiffs here could not show they sustained an economic injury.

Case Background

Plaintiffs Nathan Vidal and Eduardo Granados, on behalf of themselves and a putative class of consumers, filed a class action complaint against The Hershey Company (“Hershey”). Plaintiffs alleged they purchased certain decorative Reese’s products in Florida and that these products “misled” them in violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act. Id. at *4

Plaintiffs asserted they would not have purchased Reese’s Peanut Butter Pumpkins and Reese’s White Pumpkins had they known that the products did not contain detailed carvings of eyes and a mouth as pictured on the packaging. Id. at *3-4. Plaintiffs maintained “Hershey [] deceived reasonable consumers … into believing the [p]roducts were something that they were not.” Id. at *5. In true Halloween horror story fashion, Plaintiffs claimed that without the carvings and designs the products were “worthless” and that they would not have purchased them. Id. at *14.

Hershey moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or, in the alternative, for failure to state a claim, Hersey also moved to strike Plaintiffs’ class action allegations. Id. at *4.

Hershey primarily argued Plaintiffs lacked standing because “they suffered no injury-in-fact.” Id. at *6. Hershey maintained Plaintiffs lacked standing because they only alleged an economic injury. Hershey however contended Plaintiffs did not suffer an economic injury because they still received “delicious Reese’s candy.” Id. Even still, Hershey countered that most of the at-issue products, contained “DECORATING SUGGESTION” disclaimers and both carved and uncarved images. Id. at * 7. Hershey similarly highlighted that Plaintiffs did not allege the products were defective, inedible, did not meet taste/flavor expectations, or that they lost any economic value without the decorative carvings. Id. at *14.

While Hershey’s motion was pending, Plaintiffs moved for class certification arguing they satisfied all the requirements under Rule 23 to certify a class of consumers who purchased any of the at-issue Reese’s products “based on a false and deceptive representation of an artistic carving” on the products packaging. Id. at *5.

The Court’s Decision

The Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint because they did not allege a concrete economic injury and therefore lacked standing to pursue their personal claims and class claims.

In dismissing Plaintiffs’ complaint, the Court reasoned the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis of standing emphasizes that “[e]conomic injuries are the ‘epitome’ of concrete injuries,” and that such an economic injury can be the “result of a deceptive or unfair practice” where an individual is “deprived of the benefit of her bargain.” Id. at *15. In analyzing the benefit of the bargain a plaintiff’s damages are calculated based on “the difference in the market value of the product or service in the condition in which it was delivered and its market value in the condition in which it should have been delivered according to the contract of the parties.” Debernardis v. IQ Formulations, LLC, 942 F.3d 1076, 1084 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing Carriuolo v. Gen. Motors Co., 823 F.3d 977, 986-87 (11th Cir. 2016)).

The Court relied on two analogous cases in considering Plaintiffs’ economic injury assertions. The first case concerned “honey-lemon cough drops” that “soothe[] sore throats” and based on those representations the “plaintiff believed that the cough drops contained lemon ingredients and were capable of soothing bronchial passages.” Id. at *17-18 (citing Valiente v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91089 (S.D. Fla. May 24, 2023)). The Court in Valiente held plaintiff failed to allege an economic injury because the plaintiff did not allege the cough drops were defective, did not work as advertised, or were otherwise so flawed to render them worthless. Id. at *18.

The second case concerned plaintiffs who alleged they “paid a premium price” for “protein-infused brownies” that contained less than the advertised protein content. Id. at *18 (citing Melancon v. Alpha Prime Supps, LLC, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21114 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 13, 2025). The Court in Melancon held plaintiffs failed to allege they suffered an economic injury for the same reasons as Valiente and also failed to identify any competing products for the Court to plausibly conclude that plaintiffs suffered a concrete injury in fact. Id.

Based on these cases, the Court agreed that “Plaintiffs here fail to allege Reese’s Products they purchased were defective or worthless.” Id. The Court explained “[p]ut simply, Plaintiffs do not allege that the products were unfit for consumption, did not taste as Plaintiffs expected, or otherwise were so flawed as to render them worthless.” Id. a

The Court reasoned Plaintiffs’ disappointment and conclusory allegations as to why they were deprived of the benefit of their bargain merely reflected their subjective, personal expectations of how the candies would or should have looked when unpackaged. Id. The Court held Plaintiffs’ failure to tie the value of the candies to their purported misrepresentation theory did not plausibly allege a concrete economic injury for purposes of Article III standing. Id. at *19. Further, the Court reasoned Plaintiffs made no allegations that would allow any measurement of “the difference between the value of the Reese’s Products with or without the decorative carvings.” Id.

The Court also determined Plaintiffs’ “[c]omplaint contain[ed] nothing more than allegations of Plaintiff’s subjective belief that they paid a price premium” and these blanket allegations were not enough to allege a concrete injury. Id. at *19-20.

Accordingly, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint finding “Plaintiffs lack Article III standing to assert a claim for relief” individually or on behalf of a purported class. Id. at *20. The Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint without prejudice preserving Plaintiffs’ ability to move for leave to amend within 15 days from the date of the Court’s Order. Id. at *23.

Implications For Companies

Companies faced with consumer fraud class action lawsuits alleging theories of false advertising and deceptive practices related to their products must consider standing at the outset of any litigation.

Vidal illustrates the importance of analyzing Article III standing issues in every lawsuit. The Vidal Plaintiffs did not allege a sufficient economic injury based on their personal expectations of how Halloween-themed candies should have looked and did not allege the candies were defective, flawed, or reduced the actual value of the product. Accordingly, the Court subjected their claims to dismissal.

Companies should not treat defective or false advertising product class action claims lightly, and if faced with such a lawsuit, Companies must consider all available defenses.

September 23, 2025September 23, 2025 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

California Adopts New Rules Expanding The FEHA’s Reach To AI Tool Developers

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Justin Donoho, and George J. Schaller

Duane Morris Takeaways: On October 1, 2025, California’s “Employment Regulations Regarding Automated-Decision Systems” will take effect. These new AI employment regulations can be accessed here. The regulations add an “agency” theory under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and formalize this theory’s applicability to AI tool developers and companies employing AI tools that facilitate human decision making for recruitment, hiring, and promotion of job applicants and employees. With California’s inclusion of a private right of action under the FEHA, these new AI employment regulations may augur an uptick in AI employment tool class actions brought under the FEHA. This blog post identifies key provisions of this new law and steps employers and AI tool developers can take to mitigate FEHA class action risk.

Background

In the widely-watched class action captioned Mobley v. Workday, No. 23-CV-770 (N.D. Cal.), the plaintiff alleges that an AI tool developer’s algorithm-based screening tools discriminated against job applicants on the basis of race, age, and disability in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADA”), and California’s FEHA. Last year the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California denied dismissal of the Title VII, ADEA, and ADA disparate impact claims on the theory that the developer of the algorithm was plausibly alleged to be the employer’s agent, and dismissed the FEHA claim which was brought only under the then-available theory of intentional aiding and abetting (as we previously blogged about here).

In recent years, discrimination stemming from AI employment tools has been addressed by other state and local statutes, including Colorado’s AI Act (CAIA) setting forth developers’ and deployers’ “duty to avoid algorithmic discrimination,” New York City’s law regarding the use of automated employment decision tools, the Illinois AI Video Interview Act, and the 2024 amendment to the Illinois Human Rights Act (IHRA) to regulate the use of AI, with only the last of these laws providing for a private right of action (once it becomes effective January 1, 2026).

Key Provisions Of California’s AI Employment Regulations

California’s AI employment regulations amend and clarify how the FEHA applies to AI employment tools, thus constituting a new development in case theories available to class action plaintiffs regarding alleged harms stemming from AI systems and algorithmic discrimination.

Employers and AI employment tool developers should take note of key provisions codified by California’s new AI employment regulations, as follows:

Agency theory. An “agency” theory is added under the FEHA like the one that allowed the plaintiff in Mobley v. Workday to proceed past a motion to dismiss on his federal claims, whereby an AI tool developer may face litigation risk for developing algorithms that result in a disparate impact when the tool is used by an employer. While Mobley v. Workday continues to proceed in the trial court, no appellate authority has yet had occasion to address the “agency” theories being litigated in that case under federal antidiscrimination statutes. However, with the California AI employment regulations taking effect October 1, 2025, that theory is now expressly codified under the FEHA. 2 Cal. Code Regs § 11008(a).
Proxies for discrimination. The regulations clarify that it is unlawful to use an employment tool algorithm that discriminates by using a “proxy,” which the regulations define as a “characteristic or category closely correlated with a basis protected by the Act.” Id. §§ 11008(a), 11009(f). While the regulations do not explicitly identify any proxies, proxies that have been identified in literature by the EEOC’s former Chief Analyst include zip code (this proxy is also codified in the IHRA), first name, alma mater, credit history, and participation in hobbies or extracurricular activities.
Anti-bias testing. The regulations state that relevant to a claim of employment discrimination or an available defense are “anti-bias testing or similar proactive efforts to avoid unlawful discrimination, including the quality, efficacy, recency, and scope of such efforts, the results of such testing or other effort, and the response to the results.” Id. § 11020(b). Thus, for example, adoption of the NIST’s AI risk management framework, itself codified as a defense under the CAIA, could be a factor to consider as a defense under the FEHA. Many other factors are pertinent with respect to anti-bias testing, including auditing, tuning, and the use of various interpretability methods and fairness metrics, discussed in our prior blog entry and article on this subject (here).
Data retention. The regulations provide that employers, employment agencies, labor organizations, and apprenticeship training programs must maintain employment records, including automated-decision data, for a minimum of four years. Id. § 11013(c).

Implications For Employers

California’s AI employment regulations increase employers’ and AI tool developers’ risks of facing class action lawsuits similar to Mobley v Workday and/or alleging discrimination under the FEHA. However, developers and employers have several tools at their disposal to mitigate AI employment tool class action risk. One is to ensure that AI employment tools comply with the FEHA provisions discussed above and with other antidiscrimination statutes. Others include adding or updating arbitration agreements to mitigate the risks of mass arbitration; collaborating with IT, cybersecurity, and risk/compliance departments and outside advisors to identify and manage AI risks; and updating notices to third parties and vendor agreements.

August 6, 2025August 6, 2025 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

The Seventh Circuit Raises The Bar For Conditional Certification Under The FLSA And The ADEA

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Ryan T. Garippo, and George J. Schaller

Duane Morris Takeaways: On August 5, 2025, in Richards, et al. v. Eli Lilly & Co., et al., No. 24-2574, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 19667 (7th Cir. Aug. 5, 2025), the Seventh Circuit issued an opinion that vacated and remanded a district court’s decision to conditionally certify a group of potential opt-in plaintiffs in an Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) collective action. The opinion breaks new ground on the contours of 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b), and as a result, also applies to conditional certification of wage & hour collective actions under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). The opinion elucidates the standards for notice in FLSA collective actions. While the opinion is undoubtedly a win for employers, only time will tell the scope of the win, as this opinion ultimately may create more questions than it answers.

Background

In 2022, Monica Richards (“Richards” or “Plaintiff”) sued Eli Lilly & Co and Lilly USA, LLC (collectively, “Eli Lilly”), the international pharmaceutical manufacturers and her one-time employer, alleging discrimination under the ADEA. The ADEA incorporates the FLSA’s “enforcement provision, permitting employees to band together in collective actions when suing an employer for age discrimination.” Id. at *3. Richards, as a result, alleged that Eli Lilly promoted younger employees in violation of the ADEA.

Shortly after she filed her lawsuit, Richards “moved to conditionally certify a collective action, asserting that the unfavorable treatment she experienced was part of a broader pattern of age discrimination against Eli Lilly’s older employees.” Id. at *9. “Conditional certification” of such claims has traditionally been thought of in two steps. At the first step, an employee moves for conditional certification, i.e., to send notice of the lawsuit, to all individuals that he or she contends are similarly situated to him or her. Drawing on a District Court of New Jersey opinion from 1987, Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 118 F.R.D. 351 (D.N.J. 1987), many courts hold that the employee has a light burden at this stage, and thus rely solely on the plaintiff’s allegations, and do not consider competing evidence submitted by the employer.

If the employee’s motion is granted, as they are with exceedingly high rates, those individuals covered by the collective action definition receive notice of the lawsuit and then have the ability to opt-in as party plaintiffs to the case and participate in discovery. At the close of discovery, if the case has not settled, the employer can then move to decertify the conditionally certified collective action, and prove the employees are not similarly situated, which results in the opt-in plaintiffs’ claims being dismissed without prejudice if successful.

In this case, the fight over the applicability of Lusardi took center stage as it has in many other collective actions. In recent years, the Fifth and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeal, have found that Lusardi’s two step approach is inconsistent with the text of the FLSA. Swales v. KLLM Transp. Servs., LLC, 985 F.3d 430 (5th Cir. 2021); Clark v. A&L Homecare & Training Ctr., LLC, 68 F.4th 1003 (6th Cir. 2023). In Swales, 985 F.3d at 443, the Fifth Circuit rejected Lusardi’s two-step approach outright, and required its district courts to “rigorously enforce” the FLSA’s similarity requirement at the outset of the litigation in a one-step approach. Similarly, in Clark, 68 F.4th at 1011, the Sixth Circuit adopted a comparable, but slightly more lenient standard, requiring the employee to show a “strong likelihood” that others are similarly situated to him or her before the district court can send notice.

In contrast, the Second, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits continue to either follow or allow the district court to adopt the two-step framework outlined in Lusardi. Harrington v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., 142 F.4th 678 (9th Cir. 2025); Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Cap. Corp., 267 F.3d 1095 (10th Cir. 2001); Myers v. Hertz Corp., 624 F.3d 537 (2d Cir. 2010); Hipp v. Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 252 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2001). This brewing circuit split gave rise to the dispute in Richards.

Against this backdrop, the district court in Richards ultimately followed Lusardi, and decided to send notice to the employees whom Richards contended were similarly situated to her. But Eli Lilly filed a motion for interlocutory appeal, which was subsequently granted, and the Seventh Circuit set out to opine on the circuit split for itself.

The Seventh Circuit’s Opinion

The Seventh Circuit, in an opinion written by Judge Thomas Kirsch, rejected the Lusardi framework but declined to go as far as Clark or Swales. The Seventh Circuit observed that the notice process should be facilitated by three guiding principles: (1) the timing and accuracy of notice; (2) judicial neutrality; and (3) the prevention of abuses of joinder. Richards, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 19667 at *14. It reasoned that the Lusardi standard threatened the latter two principles by “incentivizing defendants to settle early rather than attempt to ‘decertify’ at step two . . . transforming what should be a neutral case management tool into a vehicle for strongarming settlements and soliciting claims.” Id. at * 17. Thus, the Seventh Circuit rejected Lusardi, but what to do in the alternative was a more difficult question.

The Seventh Circuit decided that rather than endorse the rigid standards of Clark or Swales, its approach would be guided by “flexibility” and an analysis that is not an “all-or-nothing determination.” Id. at *19. Indeed, a plaintiff must now “make a threshold showing that there is a material factual dispute as to whether the proposed collective is similarly situated.” Id. at *21. Or, in other words, a plaintiff must “produce some evidence suggesting that they and the members of the proposed collective are victims of a common unlawful employment practice or policy.” Id, at *21-22. To counter a plaintiff’s evidence, an employer “must be permitted to submit rebuttal evidence and, in assessing whether a material dispute exists, courts must consider the extent to which plaintiffs engage with opposing evidence.” Id., at *22.It is not clear, however, the burden a plaintiff must satisfy to refute the defendant’s evidence to move forward.

In considering that threshold determination, the district court has the discretion to send notice or not.It also has the discretion to resolve some of the disputed issues, and narrow the scope of notice, or not. It also may authorize limited and expedited discovery to make the determination, or not. Id., at *24.It also has the discretion to allow a plaintiff to come forward with more evidence, or not. In essence, “[t]he watchword here is flexibility.” Id. And, with those principles in mind, the Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

Implications For Employers

The Seventh Circuit’s opinion is undoubtedly a win for employers, but the opinion introduces ambiguity into the equation with its focus on “flexibility.” See id. Plaintiffs in Illinois, Wisconsin, and Indiana can no longer rely on mere allegations to send notice and must wrestle with an employer’s evidence contradicting claims of a common unlawful policy or practice. This result is most certainly a win.

It is what comes next that is the problem. What is the level of scrutiny a district court must apply when deciding whether a plaintiff engaged with an employer’s evidence? Should a district court apply a one-step approach or two-step approach? Should it allow limited and expedited discovery? What is the standard to obtain such discovery? When should a court allow a plaintiff to come forward with more evidence? When should it not? All these questions go unanswered.

These unanswered questions continue to contribute to the procedural morass that employers must navigate in wage-and-hour collective actions under the FLSA. In addition to these questions, employers are also now navigating the 4-way circuit split on whether Lusardi applies at all and a separate circuit split, also discussed on our blog, regarding the applicability of Bristol Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 582 U.S. 255 (2017) to collective actions. With both issues ripe for consideration by the U.S. Supreme Court, corporate counsel facing a collective action should consider hiring experienced outside counsel to help navigate these complicated procedural issues and monitor this blog for further developments.

July 11, 2025July 11, 2025 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

North Carolina Federal Court Dismisses Data Breach Class Action In Finding Bare Assertions Are Insufficient To Confer Standing

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., George J. Schaller, and Bernadette M. Coyle

Duane Morris Takeaways:

On June 30, 2025, in Panighetti, et al. v. Intelligent Business Solutions, Inc., No. 1:23-CV-209, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123406 (M.D.N.C. June 30, 2025), Judge Loretta C. Biggs of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina granted Intelligent Business Solution’s (“IBS”) motion to dismiss a data breach class action and found that Plaintiff did not have standing under Article III because he failed to plead a concrete injury. Plaintiff alleged on behalf of himself, and over 11,000 other individuals, that IBS invaded his privacy and negligently failed to protect his personal informal following a data breach in 2022.

The decision in Panighetti shows a growing trend among federal courts finding claims based on future and/or speculative harm in data breach class actions are insufficient – without any concrete instance of personal information being stolen or misused –to establish Article III standing.

Case Background

IBS, a health information company, collects and maintains personal identifiable information and protected health information for healthcare entities. Plaintiff, a hospital patient that IBS provided services for, alleged that his personal information was part of a 2022 data breach. Id. at 1. Plaintiff further alleged the data breach exposed the names, Social Security numbers, medical treatment information, and health insurance information of an estimated 11,595 individuals. Id. at 2.

After IBS became aware of the data breach, it notified impacted individuals. Plaintiff maintained that by issuing this notification, IBS “created a present, continuing, and significant risk of suffering identity theft.” Id. On March 7, 2023, Plaintiff filed suit against IBS, alleging seven causes of action including negligence, invasion of privacy, unjust enrichment, and violation of the North Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act. Id.

IBS moved to dismiss and asserted Plaintiff lacked Article III standing to bring his claims. IBS argued Plaintiff was “not able to plead facts that show there was actual misuse of data that resulted in identity theft, fraud, or another concrete injury-in-fact.” Id. at 4. Plaintiff countered that he had standing to sue “because the data breach harmed him, will harm him again, and requires him to expend resources mitigating that harm” and that these harms “confer standing” based on Fourth Circuit precedent. Id.

The Court’s Order

The Court granted IBS’s motion to dismiss. The Court held Plaintiff failed to establish standing. The Court reasoned that to proceed with a lawsuit, Article III requires a plaintiff to “demonstrate (1) an injury in fact; (2) causation; and (3) redressability.” Id. at 5 (citing David v. Alphin, 704 F.3d 327, 333 (4th Cir. 2013)).

On the first element, the Court explained that Plaintiff must show he “suffered an invasion of a legally protected interest which is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent.” Id. Plaintiff argued that he was injured because the breach: “(1) exposed his medical records, thus invading his privacy; (2) exposed information criminals can use to commit fraud and steal his identity; (3) required him to spend resources to mitigate the risk; and (4) caused him to suffer from anxiety, sleep disruption, stress, fear, and frustration.” Id. Relying on Fourth Circuit precedent, the Court rejected Plaintiff’s argument that he was injured because of the data breach because nowhere in the pleadings did Plaintiff claim that he was a victim of identity theft or fraud, that risk of future theft was “certainly impending,” or provide instances of his personal information being exploited. Further, spending resources to mitigate the increased risk caused by the breach, where there was no misuse of data, was too speculative to confer standing.

Turning to Plaintiff’s claims of emotional harm, the Court opined that although the Supreme Court took no position on whether emotional harm confers standing in TransUnion v. Ramirez, Fourth Circuit precedent, in Beck, rejected a Plaintiff’s claims that “emotional upset” and “fear of future identity theft and financial fraud” was sufficient to confer standing. Id. at 8 (quoting Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d. 262 (4th Cir. 2017). Accordingly, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims of emotional harm as “bare assertions of possible or potential harm.” Id.

Implications For Companies

Standing remains an effective defense for companies to challenge putative class actions at the responsive pleading stage especially, whereas here, Plaintiff failed to assert facts demonstrating harm stemming from a data breach.

Panighetti shows that data breach plaintiffs cannot rely on speculative injuries based on future harm to satisfy Article III standing requirements. However, companies asserting an Article III standing defense must consider the possibility of a class action plaintiff refiling in state court when determining whether to challenge standing in federal court.

June 18, 2025June 18, 2025 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Transgender Worker Can Intervene In Bias Suit After EEOC Moves To Dismiss Action With Prejudice

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Christian J. Palacios, and George J. Schaller

Duane Morris Takeaways: On June 05, 2025, in EEOC et al., v. Sis-Bro, Inc., Case No. 3:24-CV-00968 (S.D. Ill. June 5, 2025), Judge J. Phil Gilbert of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois granted a transgender worker’s petition to intervene in an EEOC discrimination case against her former employer, after the Commission moved to permanently dismiss the lawsuit to comply with a January 2025 Executive Order issued by President Trump. The Court opined that while it “recognize[d] that it may not dictate what cases the EEOC pursues” given that this was “the exclusive purview of the Executive Branch,” the worker also deserved a fair opportunity to litigate her claims. Id. at 3. This decision is noteworthy for its unique procedural posture. During the first few months of the Trump Administration, the EEOC has realigned its enforcement priorities consistent with a flurry of executive orders, but, as this decision illustrates, the Commission’s pending enforcement actions may not be so easily dismissed to the extent a private litigant’s rights are implicated by the dismissal.

Case Background

In March 2024, the EEOC brought an employment discrimination case on behalf of charging party Rafael Figueroa a/k/a Natasha Figueroa, alleging her employer, Sis-Bro Inc., a pig farm, discriminated against her by creating a hostile work environment and constructively discharged her based on her sex and transgender status in violation of Title VII. Id. at 1. After surviving a motion to dismiss, the Court allowed Figueroa to intervene and assert state law tort and discrimination claims, all of which were either voluntarily dismissed, or dismissed by the Court without prejudice, shortly thereafter. While discovery was ongoing, Sis-Bro filed a partial motion for summary judgment on the issue of back pay, front pay, and reinstatement, asserting Figueroa was not entitled to such relief given she was not legally eligible to work in the U.S. Id. at 2.

While the partial motion for summary judgement was pending, the executive administration changed, and on January 20, 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order 14168, “Defending Women From Gender Ideology Extremism and Restoring Biological Truth to the Federal Government.” After the Executive Order was issued, the EEOC moved to dismiss the action with prejudice, on the basis that continuing to litigate the matter would violate the Trump administration’s new Executive Order. Id.

As the EEOC’s motion to dismiss was pending, Figueroa sought to intervene a second time, filing yet another intervenor complaint asserting violations of Title VII (similar claims to that of the Commission), in addition to §1981 claims based on race, color, ethnicity, and national origin. Id. at 7. Figueroa did not request back pay, front pay, or reinstatement in her second intervenor complaint, but instead sought non-pecuniary and punitive damages, as well as attorneys’ fees. Id. at 3. In response, Sis-Bro moved to dismiss Figueroa’s motion to intervene, amongst other related motions, to dispose of the action entirely.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court began its ruling by observing, in dicta, that Figueroa had an interest in her claims that Sis-Bro violated the law, and while her claims may fail for other reasons, “the EEOC’s change of heart will not be one of those reasons.” Id. at 4. The Court then granted the EEOC’s motion to dismiss without prejudice, to ensure Figueroa’s rights were not impaired. Id. at 4-5.

The Court next addressed Sis-Bro’s arguments and rejected the contention that Figueroa’s motion to intervene was untimely, given Sis-Bro was unable to demonstrate her second intervenor action would have any prejudicial effect. Id. at 6. Although the Court did not allow Figueroa to re-plead her §1981 claims (because they were dismissed in the previous intervenor action), Figueroa was allowed to plead a new Title VII claim, given it was like the one that the EEOC abandoned, despite surviving a motion to dismiss. Id. at 7-8. The Court reasoned that although Figueroa did not assert these claims in her original intervenor complaint, “she placed her confidence in the good faith of the EEOC to pursue her rights along with its other statutory claims” and she sought to timely intervene once it became clear that the EEOC “changed its mind.” Id. at 9. Accordingly, the Court found Sis-Bro should be ready to litigate the matter.

Implications For Employers

As the above case illustrates, despite the fact that there has been a “changing of the guard” and the EEOC under President Trump has drastically different enforcement priorities than the Biden Administration, the Commission’s pending enforcement actions will not be so easily dismissed by courts, to the extent pending enforcement actions conflict with newly promulgated executive orders, provided that the allegedly aggrieved private litigant is ready and able to pursue the action without the assistance of the Commission.

Given that the EEOC under President Trump has indicated it will be withdrawing from many areas championed during the Biden Administration (e.g., disparate impact cases and abortion-related Pregnant Workers Fairness Act accommodation actions), private enforcement actions may increase within the coming months to fill in the enforcement vacuum left open by the Commission.

June 12, 2025June 12, 2025 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Illinois Federal Court Certifies Interlocutory Appeal To Seventh Circuit On The Retroactivity Of The Amended BIPA

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., George J. Schaller, and Ryan T. Garippo

Duane Morris Takeaways: On June 10, 2025,inClay v. Union Pac. R.R. Co, No. 24-CV-4194, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108672 (N.D. Ill. June 10, 2025), Judge Georgia N. Alexakis of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois certified for interlocutory appeal her decision denying Union Pacific’s motion for partial summary judgment after concluding the 2024 amendment to the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (the “BIPA”) was not retroactive. In 10 days from entry of Judge Alexakis’ Order, Union Pacific may request the Seventh Circuit’s review of the certified question of whether the 2024 amendment to the BIPA applies retroactively. This would be a key issue of significant importance to all companies facing BIPA class actions.

Case Background

Plaintiff Reginald Clay is a truck driver that visited Union Pacific’s facilities. He alleges Union Pacific required him to register his fingerprint information and scan his fingerprints upon entering and exiting those facilities. Id. at *2-3. Clay also alleges Union Pacific did not “disclose what was done with his [fingerprint] information or how it would be stored.” Id. at *3. On April 16, 2024, Clay sued Union Pacific under the BIPA.

In August 2024, the Illinois legislature amended the BIPA to “clarify that when an entity subject to the [BIPA] ‘in more than one instance, collects, captures, purchases, receives through trade, or otherwise obtains the same biometric identifier or biometric information from the same person using the same method of collection,’ in violation of the [BIPA], the entity ‘has committed a single violation … for which the aggrieved person is entitled to, at most, one recovery.’” Id. (quoting 740 ILCS 14/20(b), (c), as amended by SB 2979, Public Act 103-0769.)

On November 4, 2024, Union Pacific moved for partial summary judgment and argued “under the 2024 BIPA amendment Clay was now entitled to recover for at most a single BIPA violation rather than the ‘per-scan’” violation under Cothron v. White Castle Sys., Inc., 2023 IL 128004, ¶ 24. Id. at *3-4. On April 10, 2025, the Court concluded that “the BIPA amendment was substantive rather than procedural” and therefore the BIPA amendment “was not retroactive under Illinois law, and thus did not apply to Clay’s claim.” Id. at *4.

Union Pacific requested certification of the Court’s order for interlocutory appeal. Clay opposed the request.

The Court’s Order

On June 10, 2025, the Court certified Union Pacific’s request for an interlocutory appeal of the order denying Union Pacific’s partial motion for summary judgment. Id. at *7.

The Court determined Union Pacific satisfied the four statutory criteria under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (b)that: “there must be a question of law, it must be controlling, it must be contestable, and its resolution must promise to speed up the litigation.” Id. at *1-2. In addition, the Court found Union Pacific satisfied the Seventh Circuit’s fifth “non-statutory requirement: [that] the petition must be filed in the district court within a reasonable time after the order sought to be appealed.” Id. at *2.

The Court reasoned whether the 2024 amendment to the BIPA is retroactive is “undoubtedly ‘a question of the meaning of a statutory or constitutional provision,” the Amended BIPA “presents ‘an abstract issue of law . . . suitable for determination by an appellate court without a trial record,” and that the question of BIPA retroactivity “is quite likely to affect the further course of litigation.” Id. at *4. As Union Pacific argued, and as the District Court agreed, if the “Seventh Circuit were to conclude that Clay was entitled to only one recovery… [that] certainty about the retroactivity of the 2024 amendment would ‘materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” Id. at *5.

The Court reasoned Union Pacific’s motion was timely because the Court “did not consider 28 days to be unreasonable in preparing a motion to certify for interlocutory appeal a novel question of state law, especially when Clay points to no prejudice he suffers as a result.” Id. at *6.

The Court also opined that while “the Court shares Clay’s view that its April 10 order was ‘correctly reasoned,’[], its confidence does not mean that BIPA retroactivity is not ‘contestable’ within the meaning of § 1292.” Id. In addition, the Court relied on the overwhelming decisions of judges within the Northern District of Illinois and Illinois state court finding the “BIPA amendment does not apply retroactively to pending cases, [], so no current dispute exists among the courts.” Id. at *6-7. But that the consensus of these decisions “does not mean there is ‘no substantial ground for difference of opinion’ about retroactivity.” Id. at *7.

The Court concluded that though its “confidence in its earlier decision” in Schwartz v. Supply, Inc., 23-CV-14319, (N.D. Ill. Nov. 22, 2024) (finding 2024 BIPA amendment not retroactive to pending cases) is not changed that it acknowledges “the novelty and complexity of the legal issue” of retroactivity. Accordingly, the Court found Union Pacific meet all four statutory requirements and the Seventh Circuits’ timeliness requirement and certified Union Pacific’s interlocutory appeal.

Implications For Companies

The ruling in Clay sparks newfound hope on the hotly contested issue of retroactivity of the 2024 amendment to the BIPA. Judge Alexakis’ well-reasoned decision allows Union Pacific 10 days from the Court’s order to request the Seventh Circuit’s interlocutory review of the certified question.

Should the Seventh Circuit grant Union Pacific’s pending request, then the BIPA’s “per-scan” damages for pre-amendment BIPA litigation will receive further consideration. However, even if the Seventh Circuit grants the request, there is always a possibility the Seventh Circuit certifies the question to the Illinois Supreme Court.

Until then, the deluge of decisions referenced in Clay denying retroactivity remain in effect. Companies met with BIPA litigation must monitor Clay as it progresses through interlocutory review.

May 12, 2025May 12, 2025 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

California Court Sua Sponte Dismisses CIPA Class Action For Lack Of Standing

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Tyler Z. Zmick, and George J. Schaller

Duane Morris Takeaways: On April 4, 2025,inRodriguez v. Autotrader.com, Inc., No. 24-CV-08735, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70074 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2025), Judge R. Gary Klausner of the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California dismissed with prejudice a class action complaint which asserted violations of the California Invasion of Privacy Act (“CIPA”) for lack of standing. Plaintiff admitted she was a “tester” and knew that defendant Autotrader’s website contained tracking devices before accessing it, leading the Court to rule that Plaintiff failed to allege an unlawful use of pen registers and trace devices under the CIPA.

This ruling is welcome news for businesses sued by so-called “tester” plaintiffs, who actively seek out websites to “test” for potential CIPA violations.

Case Background

Plaintiff Rebeka Rodriguez filed a class action complaint against Autotrader.com, asserting claims under (i) CIPA § 631 for violating California’s wiretapping and eavesdropping statute and (ii) CIPA § 638.51 for violating California’s statute prohibiting the use of pen registers and trace devices.

Plaintiff claimed that Autotrader’s website immediately installs third-party tracking software that collects various types of information to deliver targeted advertising. She alleged that she ran a search containing “confidential” and “private” information using a search bar on Autotrader’s website, and that such information was then shared with third parties without her consent. Plaintiff also claimed that when she visited the website, tracking software was installed on her browser which “captured and sent identifying information to third parties.” Plaintiff admitted that she was actively seeking out privacy violations when she visited Autotrader’s website.

On March 14, 2025, the District Court granted Autotrader’s request that Plaintiff’s CIPA § 631 claim be dismissed with prejudice for lack of standing. See Rodriguez v. Autotrader.com, Inc., No. 24-CV-08735, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47308, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2025). The Court’s March 14 order also directed the parties to show cause in writing “whether Plaintiff has standing to bring her § 638.51 claim.” Id.

The Court’s Order

On April 4, 2025, the Court sua sponte dismissed Plaintiff’s remaining pen register claim under CIPA § 638.51 for lack of standing. The Court relied on the same analysis used in dismissing Plaintiff’s § 631 claim – specifically, Plaintiff was “a tester that actively [sought] out privacy violations,” she “had no expectation of privacy’ when she visited [Autotrader’s] website, and therefore, lacked an injury sufficient to establish standing.” Rodriguez v. Autotrader.com, Inc.,No. 24-CV-08735, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47308, *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2025). In its ruling, the Court determined that neither party disputed that Plaintiff’s § 638.51 claim “requires the same disclosure of sensitive information and reasonable expectation of privacy as her § 631 claim.” Id.

The Court was not persuaded by Plaintiff’s argument that her status as a tester did not preclude “standing even though she expected or sought out an injury,”finding her supporting authority distinguishable because the cases she relied on involved “First Amendment and ADA claims for which the plaintiffs were injured regardless of their expectations or intentions.” Id. at *3. Accordingly, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s § 638.51 claim with prejudice.

Implications For Companies

While the ruling in Rodriguez is a positive development for businesses, the scope of the decision was limited in that Plaintiff lacked standing only because her claim required a violation of her “reasonable expectation of privacy.” “Tester” plaintiffs in other class action lawsuits frequently assert claims against website hosts and website service providers and can proceed past the motion-to-dismiss stage.

While companies cannot prevent “tester” plaintiffs from filing similar lawsuits, companies can protect themselves from liability under the CIPA by employing safeguards on their websites in the form of data-tracking disclosures and obtaining consent from users.