Judge Recommends Scam Class Action Settlement Site Be Shut Down

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. and Christian J. Palacios

Duane Morris Takeaways:  U.S. Magistrate Judge Joseph Marutollo’s recent report and recommendation – a novel order in the context of class action settlements – in the proceeding captioned In Re Payment Card Interchange Fee and Merchant Discount Antitrust Litigation, Case No. 1:05-MD-01720, Doc. No. 9009 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2023), highlights the risks associated with class action claims websites and the potential for bad actors to create fraudulent web pages to mislead claimants. Corporate defendants should take care to monitor online activity following the creation of a court-authorized settlement website in order to protect any class-wide settlement and claimants against potential fraudsters. Indeed, in a world where scammers are becoming increasingly more sophisticated through the use of technology, class action settlement websites may be the next frontier in the battle against cybercrime.

Background

After 15 years of contentious litigation, Visa and MasterCard settled a putative class action for $5.6 billion to resolve allegations that the credit card companies violated federal and state antitrust laws resulting in over 12 million merchants allegedly paying excessive fees to Visa and MasterCard. As is typical in class actions of this size, a court-authorized settlement website was created to accept claim submissions and provide claimants with details regarding the settlement agreement.

On November 28, 2023, Magistrate Judge Marutollo recommended that the Court order the website “settlement2023.org” (and any affiliate website) be taken down, as the operators of the Settlement2023.org entity, who remain unknown, were attempting to deceive putative class members into using the site through various schemes, including using fake voicemails from rap artist Snoop Dogg to convince users of its validity.   According to Magistrate Judge Marutollo’s report, although the scam website ceased operation on November 21, 2023, it was unclear if other webpages remained open under different domain names that were also operated by the Settlement2023.org entity.

The Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation And Report

In addition to recommending the Court issue an order to take down of any and all remaining webpages that attempt to mimic the court-authorized settlement website, Magistrate Judge Marutollo also recommended that the owners and operators of the Settlement2023.org entity be required to identify themselves, and provide a list of all class members that signed up for its services, as well as give notice to would-be customers that any contract they entered into with the entity was now void.  Finally, the Magistrate Judge requested that the Court be notified of any newly-detected websites and recommended that the court-authorized website be updated to alert those who may have been deceived by the settlement2023.org website.

Implications

Cybercriminals continue to capitalize on advances in technology to launch misinformation campaigns, and large class action settlements are in the cross-hairs of this emerging threat. Therefore, it is imperative that plaintiff and defendant-side representatives alike remain vigilant to protect class members from deception and safeguard the integrity of the class action settlement process.

The Class Action Weekly Wire – Episode 40: Global Developments In Artificial Intelligence Regulations

U.S. And U.K. Cybersecurity Agencies Announce International Agreement Addressing AI Safety

Duane Morris Takeaway: This week’s episode of the Class Action Weekly Wire features Duane Morris partner Jerry Maatman and special counsel Brandon Spurlock with their discussion of the latest developments on the regulatory front of artificial intelligence.

Check out today’s episode and subscribe to our show from your preferred podcast platform: Spotify, Amazon Music, Apple Podcasts, Google Podcasts, the Samsung Podcasts app, Podcast Index, Tune In, Listen Notes, iHeartRadio, Deezer, YouTube or our RSS feed.

Episode Transcript

Jerry Maatman: Hello, loyal blog readers! Welcome to the Class Action Weekly Wire. Today our guest is my colleague, Brandon Spurlock.

Brandon Spurlock: Hey Jerry, it’s great to be here. Thanks.

Jerry: Today, we’re talking about the most recent developments on a global basis for regulatory endeavors insofar as artificial intelligence is concerned. I know that, Brandon, you’re a thought leader in that space, so wanted to get your feedback on what corporations should know about the global move towards regulation of artificial intelligence.

Brandon: Absolutely, Jerry. Well, this agreement was unveiled to the public just this past weekend – November 26 to be exact. It’s titled “Guidelines for Secure AI System Development.” This initiative was led by the U.K.’s National Cyber Security Centre, and it was developed in conjunction with the U.S.’ Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. These guidelines focus on how to keep artificial intelligence safe from rogue actors. The U.S., Britain, Germany, are among 18 countries that signed on to the new guidelines laid out in this 20-page document. Now, this is a non-binding agreement that lays out general recommendations, such as monitoring AI systems for abuse, elevating data protection and vetting software suppliers. One thing to note is that the framework does not address the challenging questions around data sources for AI models or appropriate use of AI tools.

Jerry: Well it certainly seems to be a milestone on the road to regulation of AI from a comparative standpoint. Where is the United States when it comes to regulation of artificial intelligence, as compared to other countries or major jurisdictions?

Brandon: Really  good question, Jerry. Many countries are putting their resources together, as well as independently positioning themselves to demonstrate leadership when it comes to embracing AI – while also cautioning its security, privacy, and market risk. So countries like France, Germany, Italy – they recently reached an agreement on how artificial intelligence regulations should be structured around “mandatory self-regulation through codes of conduct.” So what does this mean? It’s focused on how these AI systems are designed to produce a broad range of outputs. The European Commission, the European Parliament, and the EU Council are negotiating how the bloc should position itself on this particular topic.

Even last month, when we examined President Biden’s executive order on artificial intelligence, that publication from the White House further provides businesses with the in-depth roadmap of how the U.S. federal government’s regulatory goals regarding AI are developing.

Jerry: The evolution of artificial intelligence is certainly uppermost in the mind of most corporate counsel, and its impact on litigation – and in particular, the class action world – is real and palpable and with us. So thank you for your thoughts and analysis, Brandon, and we’ll see you next week on the Class Action Weekly Wire.

Brandon: Thanks, Jerry.

Report From Montreal: What A Comparative Analysis Of ESG Class Action Litigation May Teach USA-Based Companies

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Duane Morris Takeaways: USA-based companies are experiencing a deluge of class action litigation. Part of the increase is related to ESG-related claims (“Environmental, Social, and Governance”) involving environmental justice, product advertising, employment and DEI, corporate social responsibility, and investment practices. At the National Conference on Class Actions 2023 by BLG and the Quebec Bar Association in Montreal, Jerry Maatman of the Duane Morris Class Action Defense Group provided commentary on the state of U.S. class action litigation and how Asian, European, and U.S.-based corporations should be “looking around the corner” to ready themselves for new class action theories advancing ESG-related claims..

The National Conference on Class Actions in Montreal  – with a robust two day agenda and roster of speakers from Canada, Europe, and Asia – examined diverse issues on cutting-edge class actions on a global basis. Subjects included the phenomenon of the “continuous evolution” of class action theories; securities fraud class action theories; collective, opt-in and opt-out representative actions in Canada and Europe; cross-jurisdictional class actions; and the dawn of ESG class actions filed by NGO’s, consumers, workers, and advocacy groups.

I had the privilege of speaking in Montreal on the current state of U.S. class action litigation, its impact on the global economy and litigation in non-U.S. jurisdictions, and the future of ESG-related class-wide litigation in America.

The plaintiffs’ class action bar in the United States is exceedingly innovative and in constant pursuit of “the next big then” insofar as potential liability is concerned for acts and omissions of Corporate America. Environmental, Social, and Governance issues – known as “ESG” – each of the verticals within ESG are topics on the mind of leading plaintiffs’ class action litigators. As ESG-related issues evolve and become increasingly more important to corporate stakeholders, class action litigation against companies is inevitable and has already begun to take shape. Factors driving these class actions include the new “social inflation” concepts coming out to the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as social movements coalescing around climate change, technological disruptions, and social justice.

The Class Action Context

In 2022, the plaintiffs’ class action bar filed, litigated, and settled class actions at a breathtaking pace. The aggregate totals of the top ten class action settlements – in areas as diverse as mass torts, consumer fraud, antitrust, civil rights, securities fraud, privacy, and employment-related claims – reached the highest historical totals in the history of American jurisprudence. Class actions and government enforcement litigation spiked to over $63 billion in settlement totals. As analyzed in our Duane Morris Class Action Review, the totals included $50.32 billion for products liability and mass tort, $8.5 billion for consumer fraud, $3.7 billion for antitrust, $3.25 billion for securities fraud, and $1.3 billion for civil rights. While the exact totals are not in yet for 2023, aggregate settlement numbers are nearly as high over the past 11 months.

As “success begets success’ in this litigation space, the plaintiffs’ bar is focused on areas of opportunity for litigation targets. ESG-related areas are a prime area of risk.

The ESG Context

Corporate ESG programs is in a state of constant evolution. Early iterations were heavily focused on corporate social responsibility (or “CSR”), with companies sponsoring initiatives that were intended to benefit their communities. They entailed things like employee volunteering, youth training, and charitable contributions as well as internal programs like recycling and employee affinity groups. These efforts were not particularly controversial.

In recent years, ESG programs have become more extensive and more deeply integrated with companies’ core business strategies, including strategies for avoiding risks, such as those presented by employment discrimination claims, the impacts of climate change, supply chain accountability, and cybersecurity and privacy. Companies and studies have increasingly framed ESG programs as contributing to shareholder value.

As ESG programs become larger and more integrated into a company’s business, so do the risks of attracting attention from regulators and private litigants.

Class Actions Are Coming From Multiple Quarters

While class action litigation can emanate from many sources, four areas in particular are of importance in the ESG space.

Shareholders: Lawsuits by shareholders regarding ESG matters are accelerating. Examples include claims that their stock holdings have lost value as a result of false disclosures about issues like sexual harassment allegations involving key executives, cybersecurity incidents, or environmental disasters. Even absent a stock drop, some shareholders have brought successful derivative suits focused on ESG issues. Of recent note, employees of corporations incorporated in Delaware who serve in officer roles may be sued for breach of the duty of oversight in the particular area over which they have responsibility, including oversight over workplace harassment policies. In its ruling in In Re McDonald’s Corp. Stockholder Derivative Litigation, No. 2021-CV-324 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 2023), the Delaware Court of Chancery determined that like directors, officers are subject to oversight claims. The ruling expands the scope of the rule established in the case of In Re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996), which recognized the duty of oversight for directors. The decision will likely result in a flurry of litigation activity by the plaintiffs’ bar, as new cases will be filed alleging that officers in corporations who were responsible for overseeing human resource functions can be held liable for failing to properly oversee investigations of workplace misconduct such as sexual harassment.

Vendors and Business Partners: As companies face increasing demands to address ESG issues in their operations and throughout their supply chains, ESG requirements in commercial contracts are increasing in prevalence. Requirements imposed on vendors, suppliers, and partners – to ensure their operations do not introduce ESG risks (e.g., by using forced or child labor or employing unsustainable environmental practices) are becoming regular staples in a commercial context. In addition, as more companies report greenhouse gas emissions – and may soon be required by the SEC to report on them – they increasingly require companies in their supply chain to provide information about their own emissions. Furthermore, if the SEC’s proposed cybersecurity disclosure rules are enacted, companies also may require increased reporting regarding cybersecurity from vendors and others. These actions – and disclosures – provide fodder for “greenwashing” claims, where consumers claim that company statements about environmental or social aspects of their products are false and misleading. The theories in these class actions are expanding by encompassing allegations involving product statements as well as a company’s general statements about its commitment to sustainability.

State Consumer Protection and Employment Laws: The patchwork quilt of state laws create myriad causes of action for alleged false product advertising and other misleading marketing statements. The plaintiffs’ bar also has invoked statutes like the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act to bring claims against companies for alleged failures to stop alleged human rights violations in their supply chains. These claims typically allege that the existence of company policies and programs aimed at helping end human rights violations are themselves a basis for liability. In making human capital management disclosures a part of ESG efforts (including whether to disclose numeric metrics or targets based on race or gender), companies may find themselves in a difficult place with respect to potential liability stemming from stated commitments to diversity and inclusion. On the one hand, companies that fail to achieve numeric targets they articulate (e.g., a certain percent or increase in diversity among management) may subject themselves to claims of having overpromised when discussing their future plans. Conversely, employers that achieve such targets may face “reverse discrimination” claims alleging that they abandoned race-based or gender-neutral employment practices to hit numbers set forth in their public statements.

Government Enforcement Litigation: Federal, state and local government regulators have taken multiple actions against companies based on their alleged participation in climate change, investments inconsistent with ESG goals, or alleged illegal activities. For instance, in 2019, the U.S. Department of Justice investigated auto companies for possible antitrust violations for agreeing with California to adopt emissions standards more restrictive than those established by federal law. While the investigation did not reveal wrongdoing, it underscores the creativity that proponents and opponents of ESG efforts can employ.

Implications For Corporate Decision-Makers

The creation, content, and implementation of ESG programs carries increasing litigation risks for corporations but it is unlikely that ESG programs will diminish is size or scale in the coming years given increased focus by Fortune 100s and 500s and increased regulation at the federal and state levels.

Sound planning, comprehensive legal compliance, and systematic auditing of ESG programs should be a key focus and process of all entities beginning or continuing their ESG journey.  As more and more companies adopt some level of corporative ESG strategy planning, compliance and auditing are some of the key imperatives in this new world of exposure to diminish and limit one’s exposure.

The Class Action Weekly Wire – Episode 39: PAGA Faces Potential Transformation In California Supreme Court Decision


Duane Morris Takeaway:
This week’s episode of the Class Action Weekly Wire features Duane Morris partner Jerry Maatman and special counsel Eden Anderson with their discussion of a PAGA case currently before the California Supreme Court weighing whether trial courts have inherent authority to ensure that PAGA claims will be manageable at trial, and to strike or narrow such claims if they cannot be managed appropriately.

Check out today’s episode and subscribe to our show from your preferred podcast platform: Spotify, Amazon Music, Apple Podcasts, Google Podcasts, the Samsung Podcasts app, Podcast Index, Tune In, Listen Notes, iHeartRadio, Deezer, YouTube or our RSS feed.

Episode Transcript

Jerry Maatman: Thank you for being here, loyal blog readers, in our next installment of the Class Action Weekly wire. I’m very excited to join my colleague, Eden Anderson, who is on the show today to talk about new California developments.

Eden Anderson: Thanks, Jerry. I’m very happy to be here.

Jerry: Great. A significant decision in the PAGA area was argued this past month in the California Supreme Court. And I know you’re following all things PAGA and all things arbitration on behalf of employers, and are very much in the forefront of thought leadership in this area. Could you tell our audience a bit about the case and what it means?

Eden: Yes, the Estrada, et al v. Royalty Carpet Mills case. There the plaintiff Jorge Estrada filed a putative class and PAGA action against his former employer asserting meal period violations under California law. The employer manufactured carpets and had employees working at a number of different locations and a number of different positions. The court initially certified two classes of workers from two different production facilities – 157 employees in total – and the claims were tried to the bench. The judge ultimately to decertified one of the two classes. The judge found there were too many individualized issues to support class treatment for that group, and as to the PAGA claim for that group, the judge deemed it not manageable, and dismissed it. Mr. Estrada appealed, and he argued that PAGA claims have no manageability requirement, and the Court of Appeal agreed with him; it reasoned that class action requirements don’t apply to PAGA actions, and therefore the manageability requirement that is rooted in class action procedure does not apply. And at the same time the Court of Appeal acknowledged that the difficulty that employers face, and trial courts as well with PAGA claims involving hundreds or thousands of employees, but it concluded that dismissal for lack of manageability just isn’t a tool that trial courts can utilize.

Jerry: I know there are a range of approaches that trial courts and appellate courts have undertaken when it comes to managing or adjudicating a PAGA action. Is there a split in authority that the California Supreme Court is going to be debating and looking at in terms of its ultimate ruling?

Eden: Yes, that’s correct. The holding in Estrada is contrary to the holding in Wesson v. Staples, where the trial court struck a PAGA claim as unmanageable, and the Court of Appeal affirmed. The claims at issue in Wesson involved the alleged misclassification of 345 store managers. The employer’s exemption affirmative defense turned on individualized issues as to each manager’s performance of exempt versus non-exempt tasks, which varied based on a number of factors including store size, sales volume, staffing levels, labor budgets, store hours, customer traffic, all of which varied across the stores.  The split in authority prompted the California Supreme Court to grant review in Estrada, but not Wesson. The Court of Appeal there determined that they had properly been dismissed for lack of manageability.

Jerry: I know the case was argued on November 8, and the stakes are quite high. It’s a vexing area for employers. It’s a challenging area for judges and lawyers. What were your takeaways from the oral argument, and what employers ought to know about the issues that were argued over that day before the California Supreme Court?

Eden: Overall, it was an uplifting oral argument for employers, which, as you know, can be a little bit unusual out here. On the downside, several justices, including justices Liu and Jenkins, express some skepticism about whether a trial court’s inherent powers allow it to outright strike or dismiss an entire PAGA action for lack of manageability. Justice Liu commented that permitting trial courts such wide-ranging power could shortchange the PAGA statute, unless there’s an overriding constitutional interest. On that point several justices acknowledged that an employer has a due process right to present evidence to support its affirmative defenses, and that in certain cases that evidence might require a series of mini trials over a period of years and wholly consume a trial court’s resources. Justice Kruger asked questions of Estrada’s counsel about the impracticability of requiring trial courts to consume years of time and resources in that manner. Justice Groban also expressed concern about a PAGA case, for example, where you have multiple labor code violations alleged, hundreds or even thousands of employees at issue, different work sites, different types of employees ranging from janitors to accountants, and he asked why, in such a case a trial court could not just limit the case to the accountants only, and other justices raised similar concerns. Chief Justice Guerrero asked Estrada’s counsel why the answer shouldn’t just be that trial courts have this broad discretion and that it’s just something that’s going to be subject to appellate review.

Jerry: It’s often said that California is the toughest venue in the United States to be an employer and litigate cases in courtrooms there. I suspect the answer is a little more nuanced, since every case is different. But given your expertise in this area and your thought leadership, do you have any prognostications for employers as to the outcome of the Estrada case and the California Supreme Court?

Eden: Yeah, given the constellation of comments from the justices, the court may hold that trial courts have an inherent authority to protect an employer’s due process rights, and that such power necessarily encompasses the right to gauge the manageability of PAGA claims, and to narrow them down as to whether that authority includes outright dismissal of an entire PAGA case. Employers are going to have to wait and see – a decision has to issue within 90 days, so we will soon know the answer.

Jerry: Well, in following the dockets of filings in all the states as we do, I think the number one case being filed these days by the plaintiffs’ bar are PAGA representative actions. So this particular decision certainly has the potential to be a game changer in the landscape of legal liability, especially in California. Well, thank you so much, Eden, and thank you to our loyal blog listeners for another edition and participation in our Class Action Weekly Wire.

Eden: Thank you for having me, Jerry, and thank you listeners.

Illinois Appellate Court Denies Cell Phone Retailer’s Second Attempt To Arbitrate Class Action Privacy Claims

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. and Tyler Zmick

Duane Morris Takeaways:  In Ipina v. TCC Wireless, 2023 IL App (1st) 220547-U (Nov. 9, 2023), the First District of the Illinois Appellate Court held that T-Mobile retailer TCC Wireless was barred from enforcing an arbitration clause in the plaintiff’s employment agreement based on TCC’s actions in an earlier-filed privacy class action it settled.  The Court determined that TCC was collaterally estopped from compelling the plaintiff’s claims to arbitration because TCC had unsuccessfully moved to send nearly identical claims to arbitration in the earlier-filed case.  In doing so, the Illinois Appellate Court embraced a broad view of the circumstances in which “offensive” collateral estoppel is warranted in the class action context – that is, when a party may be prohibited from making an argument that was already raised and rejected in an earlier case.

Background

Plaintiff Stephanie Ipina alleged that while employed by Defendant TCC Wireless, she used a fingerprint-based timekeeping device to clock in and out of work.  According to Plaintiff, her use of the timekeeping device resulted in TCC collecting her biometric data.  Plaintiff claimed that TCC did not give her prior notice that it would be collecting her biometric data or obtain her prior written consent, and that TCC disclosed her data to TCC’s “payroll provider” without Plaintiff’s consent.  Based on these allegations, Plaintiff asserted that TCC violated §§ 15(b) and 15(d) of the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (the “BIPA”).

Plaintiff’s complaint also described a prior BIPA class action entitled Garcia v. TCC Wireless, which had been brought against TCC based on the same timekeeping device used by the Plaintiff in Ipina.  In Garcia, TCC responded to the complaint by moving to compel arbitration pursuant to the plaintiff’s employment agreement, which stated that “[a]ny dispute arising out of or relating in any [way] to Employee’s employment with [TCC] . . . shall be resolved by binding arbitration . . . . except for (i) the institution of a civil action seeking equitable relief, or (ii) the institution of a civil action of a summary nature where the relief sought is predicated on there being no dispute with respect to any fact.”  Id. ¶ 7.

The trial court in Garcia denied TCC’s motion to compel because TCC did not dispute that it collected employees’ biometric data without consent, and therefore the plaintiff’s claims were subject to the arbitration clause’s “carve-out” for claims “of a summary nature where no facts are in dispute.”  Id. ¶ 23.  The parties in Garcia later reached a class-wide settlement, after which TCC produced a list of 899 employees to include in the settlement class.  Due to TCC “compil[ing] the class incorrectly,” however, Plaintiff Stephanie Ipina and other TCC employees were omitted from the list of class members eligible to receive payments in connection with the Garcia settlement.

In response to the complaint filed in the Ipina case (on behalf of Plaintiff and other individuals who should not have been omitted from the settlement class in Garcia), TCC moved to compel Plaintiff’s BIPA claims to arbitration based on the same employment agreement provision at issue in Garcia.  In opposing the motion, Plaintiff argued that TCC was collaterally estopped from compelling arbitration based on TCC’s motion to compel arbitration having been denied in the Garcia action.  The trial court granted TCC’s motion, however, reasoning that collateral estoppel did not apply because unlike in Garcia, in the present case TCC denied the factual allegations set forth in the complaint.

The Illinois Appellate Court’s Decision

On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court reversed the trial court and held that TCC was collaterally estopped from enforcing the arbitration provision in Plaintiff’s employment agreement.

The Court noted that collateral estoppel is an equitable doctrine that “promotes fairness and judicial economy by preventing the relitigation of issues that have already been resolved in earlier actions.”  Id. ¶ 21 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  A party seeking to collaterally estop its opponent from raising a particular argument must show that (i)  the current issue is identical to one that was resolved in a prior action; (ii) the court in the previous matter entered a final judgment on the merits; and (iii) the party against whom estoppel is being asserted was a party, or in privity with a party, to the prior litigation.

The Appellate Court summarized TCC’s litigation conduct in Garcia by noting that in that case, TCC did not dispute that it collected employees’ biometric data without consent; in light of that fact, the court in Garcia denied TCC’s motion to compel arbitration because of the arbitration provision’s exception for claims of a summary nature where no facts are in dispute; the court also denied TCC’s motion to reconsider the order denying TCC’s motion to compel arbitration, which denial TCC did not appeal; and the parties subsequently settled the case on a class-wide basis.

Based on these facts, and contrary to the trial court’s order, the Appellate Court ruled that Plaintiff had shown that the collateral estoppel elements were established, and that the trial court erred in not applying the doctrine.

First, the Appellate Court rejected TCC’s attempt to distinguish the present case from Garcia on the basis that unlike Garcia, in this case TCC had denied the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint.  According to the Appellate Court, this argument was contradicted by the position TCC had taken throughout the litigation, which is that Plaintiff should have been included in the Garcia settlement because TCC collected her biometric data before she signed a consent form.  Because “TCC is bound by these admissions,” the Appellate Court ruled that the issue in the present case was identical to the issue resolved in Garcia because TCC had effectively conceded the plaintiffs’ factual allegations in both cases. Id. ¶ 25.

Second, the Appellate Court found that the trial court in Garcia entered a “final judgment on the merits” when it issued an order granting final settlement approval and dismissing the case with prejudice.  Acknowledging the split in authority as to whether a settlement agreement qualifies as a “final order on the merits,” the Appellate Court sided with those decisions reflecting the proposition that “policy reasons counsel in favor of applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel to interlocutory judgments after settlement and dismissal with prejudice.”  Id. ¶ 28 (citation omitted).  As stated by the Appellate Court, “[c]ollateral estoppel exists to prevent litigants from doing exactly what TCC attempts.  The doctrine’s purpose is to prevent a party from losing an issue on the merits, but then relitigating it before a different judge to procure the desired result.”  Id. ¶ 29.  Thus, the Appellate Court found that Plaintiff satisfied the second element.

Third, the Appellate Court held that the last collateral estoppel element was satisfied because TCC was the defendant in Garcia and was the same party against whom estoppel was being asserted in the present case.  See id. ¶ 30 (“TCC was a party in Garcia, where it had the same incentive to fully litigate the enforcement of the arbitration clause (and in fact did so).”).  However, the Appellate Court also noted that while both parties argued on appeal the issue of Plaintiff’s privity, that was is “irrelevant” because “the privity requirement only applies to the party against whom estoppel is asserted.”  Id.

Implications For Corporations

Ipina is an important reminder that a litigation decision made in one case can have potentially significant consequences for that party in an entirely separate action.  As illustrated in the Ipina case, a party’s position in one matter (e.g., a defendant conceding the truth of certain factual allegations in a complaint) can be used to limit (or entirely foreclose) that party’s ability to raise a defense in another matter – regardless of how strong the defense might be on the merits.

Thus, corporate defendants should always think about the “big picture” when deciding on a course of action to take in defending a lawsuit.  They should consider not only how a defense position may impact that particular litigation, but also how the position could affect separate and seemingly unrelated actions involving the same (or a related) party, whether in cases that are currently pending or that may be filed in the future.

New York Federal Court Denies Class Certification Due To Rule 23(a)(4) Adequacy Requirement Based On Employer’s Strong Defense To Plaintiff’s Individual Claims

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Katelynn Gray, and Gregory S. Slotnick 

Duane Morris TakeawaysLack of adequacy of the named plaintiff in a class action can result in the denial of Rule 23 class certification in appropriate circumstances.  In Cheng, et al. v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 20-CV-01551, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161453 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2023), the plaintiff filed a class action against the defendant alleging breach of contract and violation of § 349 of the New York General Business Law.  The plaintiff filed a motion for class certification pursuant to Rule 23, and the court denied the motion on the basis of the bank’s strong defense to the plaintiff’s individual claims, which was was likely to impede the claims of other class members – even though the class members were not subject to the same defense.  Employers in New York defending Rule 23 class actions should carefully consider the court’s reasoning and finding that plaintiff was an inadequate representative of his sought-after class.  As shown in Cheng, potential defenses to a named plaintiff’s individual claims may be sufficient to defeat class certification.  

Case Background

In Cheng, the plaintiff asserted that defendant HSBC Bank USA, N.A. (“HSBC” or “the bank”) failed to apply interest to plaintiff’s bank savings account deposits in a timely manner.  After the plaintiff made a deposit with the bank on May 31, 2019, he alleged HSBC did not apply any interest on the account until June 4, 2019, four days after the deposit.  Plaintiff claimed the bank also delayed applying interest on another deposit made on November 26, 2019 until November 29, 2019.  In November and December 2019, the plaintiff made phone calls to HSBC to address the alleged delays in crediting interest to his deposits.  Id. at *2.  The bank responded that its policy was to not credit interest on account deposits until 3 to 5 business days after they were made.  In the 2019 phone calls, the plaintiff indicated that he understood interest could not accrue until the bank had his “money on hand,” and that his concern was that the bank was failing to post the funds and initiate interest accrual upon receipt of those funds, despite the fact that it already had the “money on hand.”  Id. at *3.  In one of the 2019 phone calls, when a bank representative explained that plaintiff should have received an email indicating his deposit needed to pass through a clearing process before HSBC could post it to his account (and presumably, begin interest accrual), plaintiff responded, “I don’t care about the email…I look at when is my money withdraw[n] from other bank, when is the money posted to my HSBC account, okay?  Don’t tell me HSBC takes five days to post the money after you receive it.”  Id. at *4.

In plaintiff’s lawsuit, brought on behalf of himself and a prospective class of customers, plaintiff claimed HSBC was obligated to credit interest to his account on the day he initiated the deposit or transfer, rather than when the bank actually received the money.  Plaintiff contended the class consisted of at least 100 members and the amount in controversy exceeded $5 million.  Id. at *5.  At his deposition, plaintiff attempted to contextualize the 2019 phone calls, but admitted that he had read HSBC’s Terms and Charges Disclosures (“Disclosures”) when opening his account.  The Disclosures stated that “[i]nterest begins to accrue on the Business Day you deposit noncash items.”  Noncash items are instruments like checks and wire transfers.  Id. at *1-2.

Although the court previously had denied the bank’s motion for summary judgment on the claims by drawing all reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor, it expressed in that decision its view that the 2019 phone calls “strongly suggested” plaintiff shared HSBC’s understanding that the “you deposit” language in the Disclosures meant interest would begin to accrue once HSBC had cleared funds on hand, not when he initiated the deposit.  Id. at *6.  The court also opined that in the calls, plaintiff appeared to recognize HSBC could not apply interest until it was in receipt of his funds, and plaintiff told the bank multiple times that if the delay in accruing interest was due to a delay in receiving the funds, “that’s perfect” and “that’s fine.”  Id.

The Court’s Opinion Denying Class Certification

In its decision denying class certification under Rule 23, the court set forth Rule 23’s threshold requirements for class certification – numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy – and confirmed plaintiff bears the burden of establishing each element.  Id. at *8.  The court pointed specifically to the adequacy requirement of Rule 23(a)(4), which focuses on the fitness of purported class representative to competently litigate the case on behalf of absent class members, and reiterated that the interests of the named plaintiff cannot be antagonistic to those of the rest of the class.  Id.

The court found that plaintiff faced “serious obstacles to recovery on his individual claims,” and that plaintiff’s statements made in the 2019 phone calls were compelling evidence he understood that he would not begin accruing interest until the bank had his cash on hand.  Id. at *10.  The court reasoned that in his class certification motion, plaintiff now alleged that the bank misled him to believe that interest would begin accruing as soon as he initiated a deposit, which was contradicted by the statements made by plaintiff in the 2019 phone calls.  The court determined that the 2019 phone calls, plaintiff’s conflicting allegations about whether he read the Disclosures, and his prior relevant litigation and banking history were all likely to weaken his claims, and that there was a strong argument that plaintiff “knew precisely what he was doing and that he and HSBC shared the same understanding about what the key term ‘you deposit’ meant.”  Id. at *11.

As a result, the court determined that the plaintiff could not be an adequate representative of the class he sought to represent because he acknowledged in the 2019 phone calls that he understood the key terms of the bank’s policies.  The court opined there was a strong argument that the plaintiff understood the defendant’s terms, but was attempting to represent a class based on the bank’s alleged misconduct.  Id. at *10-11.  The court ruled that it was “not comfortable” making plaintiff the representative of all other class members’ claims and allowing him to bind hundreds of absent class members to plaintiff’s story, conditioning their recovery on how well plaintiff’s story held up.  Id. at *12.  For these reasons, the court denied plaintiff’s motion for class certification under Rule 23(a)(4).

Implications For Employers

The court’s decision denying class certification based on its finding that plaintiff failed to meet Rule 23’s adequacy threshold requirement is a potentially helpful roadmap for employers facing class action claims.  The court’s analysis centered on an individualized determination of plaintiff’s particular factual background in ultimately holding it was uncomfortable the plaintiff could adequately represent hundreds of absent class members based on his own contradictory and inconsistent testimony and evidence.  Businesses defending class actions should consider each named plaintiff’s individual circumstances and factual background for issues that could preclude their ability to adequately represent class members.  The decision confirms that in the appropriate circumstances, courts will not hesitate to deny class certification to named plaintiffs on such grounds.

California Supreme Court Expresses Concern At Estrada Oral Argument About Manageability Of PAGA Claims

By Eden E. Anderson, Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., and Jennifer A. Riley 

Duane Morris Takeaways: In a case with significant consequences for employers, the California Supreme Court heard oral argument in Estrada v. Royalty Carpet Mills, No. S274340, on November 8, 2023.  In Estrada, the Supreme Court will decide whether trial courts have inherent authority to ensure that PAGA claims will be manageable at trial, and to strike or narrow such claims if they cannot be managed appropriately.  The Supreme Court signaled during oral argument its concerns with unwieldy PAGA claims that, if tried, would require a series of mini-trials over the course of years.  The Supreme Court further expressed concern with ensuring that employers’ due process rights to present affirmative defenses are protected, potentially signaling the issuance of an employer-friendly decision. A decision is expected in the next three months, and has the potential to transform the prosecution and defense of PAGA litigation.

Case Background

Jorge Estrada filed a putative class action and PAGA action against his former employer asserting meal period violations.  After two classes comprised of 157 individuals were certified, the parties tried the claims before a judge in a bench trial.  The trial court ultimately decertified the classes, finding there were too many individualized issues to support class treatment.  Although the trial court awarded relief to four individual plaintiffs, it dismissed the non-individual PAGA claim, concluding it was not manageable.

On appeal, Estrada argued that PAGA claims have no manageability requirement, and the Court of Appeal agreed in Estrada v. Royalty Carpet Mills, Inc., 76 Cal.App.5th 685 (2022).  The Court of Appeal reasoned that class action requirements do not apply in PAGA actions and, therefore, the manageability requirement rooted in class action procedure was inapplicable.  Further, the Court of Appeal opined that “[a]llowing courts to dismiss PAGA claims based on manageability would interfere with PAGA’s express design as a law enforcement mechanism.”  Id. at 712.  The Court of Appeal acknowledged the difficulty that employers and trial courts face with PAGA claims involving thousands of allegedly aggrieved employees, each with unique factual circumstances, but concluded that dismissal for lack of manageability was not an available tool for a trial court to utilize.

Estrada is contrary to the holding in Wesson v. Staples the Office Superstore, LLC, 68 Cal.App.5th 746 (2021), and created a split in authority.  In Wesson, the trial court struck a PAGA claim as unmanageable, and the Court of Appeal affirmed.  The claims at issue in Wesson involved the alleged misclassification of 345 store managers.  The employer’s exemption affirmative defense turned on individualized issues as to each manager’s performance of exempt versus non-exempt tasks, which varied based on a number of factors including store size, sales volume, staffing levels, labor budgets, store hours, customer traffic, all of which varied across the stores.  The split in authority prompted the California Supreme Court to grant review in Estrada, but not Wesson.

Oral Argument At The California Supreme Court

During oral argument on November 8, 2023, several Justices, most prominently Justices Liu and Jenkins, expressed skepticism that a trial court’s inherent powers include the ability to outright strike or dismiss an entire PAGA action for lack of manageability.  As Justice Liu commented, permitting trial courts such wide ranging power would shortchange the PAGA statute unless there is an overriding constitutional interest.

Several Justices also acknowledged that an employer has a due process right to present evidence to support its affirmative defenses and that, in certain cases, such evidence presentation might require a series of mini-trials over a period of years and wholly consume a trial court’s resources.  Justice Kruger asked questions of Estrada’s counsel that suggested the illogical nature of these issues telling trial courts as to what to do in terms of mini-trials, and how unwieldy such PAGA-related problems would evolve under such a set of principles.

Justice Groban also expressed concern about a PAGA case where multiple Labor Code violations are alleged, hundreds or thousands of employees are at issue, and different work sites and different types of employees ranging from janitors to accountants are implicated.  Justice Groban asked why, in that case, a trial court could not just limit the case to the accountants only.  Other justices raised similar concerns, with Chief Justice Guerrero asking Estrada’s counsel why the answer is that this is all subject to appellate review.

Implications For Employers

The constellation of the comments from the justices seemingly signals that the California Court may hold that trial courts possess inherent authority to ensure an employer’s right to due process is safeguarded, which necessarily encompasses the right to gauge the manageability of PAGA claims and to narrow them as appropriate.  As to whether such authority could include outright dismissal of an entire PAGA case, employers will have to wait and see.

Implementation Of Equal Pay And Benefits Requirement Of The Illinois Day & Temporary Labor Services Act Likely Postponed Until April 2024

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. and Gregory Tsonis

Duane Morris TakeawaysIn a significant development impacting both staffing agencies and their customers, recent legislative changes in Illinois propose to delay implementation of the equal pay provision of the Illinois Day and Temporary Labor Services Act (IDTLSA) until April 1, 2024.  Further, recent guidance from the Illinois Department of Labor clarifies that the 90-day period which triggers the equal pay and benefit provision requires a temporary laborer to actually work 90 days for a client employer.  A comprehensive breakdown of the 2023 amendments to the IDTLSA and the law’s significant new requirements can be found here.

Proposed Amendment And Recent Clarification To Equal Pay And Benefit Provision

On November 9, 2023, both houses of the Illinois General Assembly passed legislation that further amends Section 42 of the IDTLSA.  The original IDTLSA amendments, passed on August 4, 2023, required staffing firms to provide day and temporary laborers with equal pay and benefits as workers employed directly by the client employer after 90 days of work. The new bill passed by the Illinois legislature, HB 3641, proposes to delay the start of the 90-day calculation period.  Specifically, the approved bill adds language to the IDTLSA stating that “[t]he calculation of the 90 calendar days may not begin until April 1, 2024.”  This proposed delay would provide employers and staffing agencies with additional time to ensure compliance with the IDTLSA’s equal pay requirements.

It is important to note that this amendment, if signed into law by Governor J. B. Pritzker, extends the timeline for compliance with the IDTLSA’s equal pay and benefits provision only.  It does not, however, exempt employers and staffing agencies from adhering to other mandates of the IDTLSA, which took effect on August 4, 2023.  These mandates include but are not limited to placement fee restrictions, required safety training, labor issue disclosures, and stringent recordkeeping requirements.

Further clarifying the scope of these requirements, the Illinois Department of Labor published a list of frequently asked questions following the amendments’ passage on August 4, 2023.  One frequent question raised by employers and staffing agencies alike is whether the 90 days which entitle a temporary employee to equal pay and benefits is 90 days assigned at a client or 90 days actually worked.  The IDOL’s recently published Day and Temporary Labor Service Agency FAQ (which can be found here) clarifies that the 90-day count “includes only days worked by a day or temporary laborer for the third-party client within a 12-month period, not simply the total duration of the contract or assignment.”  Notably, even a minimal amount of time worked on any given day will count towards the 90-day total.

Implications for Employers and Staffing Agencies

This legislative update and further guidance from the Illinois Department of Labor underscore the dynamic nature of labor laws and the importance of staying informed.  Given the IDTLSA’s extensive requirements and private right of action as an enforcement mechanism, employers and staffing agencies must remain vigilant in understanding and complying with the law’s evolving requirements to avoid potential legal complications.

The Class Action Weekly Wire – Episode 38: White House Speaks Out On Artificial Intelligence: Development, Enforcement, And Innovation

Executive Order Targets Safety & Security, Consumer Privacy, And Algorithmic Discrimination

Duane Morris Takeaway: This week’s episode of the Class Action Weekly Wire features Duane Morris partners Jerry Maatman and Alex Karasik and associate George Schaller with their discussion of the landmark Executive Order published by the White House last week regarding artificial intelligence. The EO provides a good roadmap for employers of the federal government’s regulatory goals as artificial intelligence begins to take firm root throughout all sectors of the American economy.

Check out today’s episode and subscribe to our show from your preferred podcast platform: Spotify, Amazon Music, Apple Podcasts, Google Podcasts, the Samsung Podcasts app, Podcast Index, Tune In, Listen Notes, iHeartRadio, Deezer, YouTube or our RSS feed.

Episode Transcript

Jerry Maatman: Hello loyal blog readers, welcome to this week’s installment of our Class Action Weekly Wire series. I’m joined today by my colleagues Alex Karasik and George Schaller for an interesting discussion on artificial intelligence. Welcome Alex and George.

Alex Karasik: Thank you Jerry, always a pleasure.

George Schaller: Great to be here, Jerry.

Jerry: Today we’re talking about an important issue that has been in the news over the last week, and that is the White House initiative on artificial intelligence. Alex, can you give provide some overviews of what employers and corporations need to know about this particular event?

Alex: Absolutely, Jerry – like many federal, state, and local regulatory bodies, the White House is also paying attention to AI in terms of what its impact might be on a broad range on constituents. The Executive Order endeavors to cover eight key areas: consumer protection, workers’ protection, safety and security, privacy, innovation and competition, global leadership, and the government’s own use of AI. And in setting the tone on the regulatory front, this marks the White House’s commitment to these areas. The broad range means that essentially every sector of the American business economy could be potentially underneath the umbrella of AI and impacted by this new development.

Jerry: I found it fascinating that the White House and President Biden would focus on and get involved in potential regulation and policy statements in artificial intelligence. George, what does the Executive Order say and contemplate with respect to issues involving safety and security?

George: That’s a great question, Jerry. The EO directs the creation of new safety and security standards in requiring safety testing and reporting, standard safety tests, biological synthesis screening, determining best practices for detecting AI-generated content, establishing a cybersecurity program, and ordering the development of a national security memorandum. There are many AI-enabled problems like “deep fakes” and disinformation campaigns, and these are key targets in this area. Right now the processes and technologies for labeling the origins of text, audio, and visual content is further behind than the advancement of AI tools – a reliable way to identify machine-generated content does not yet exist.

On the privacy viewpoint, the EO includes evaluating how government agencies collect and use commercially available information, as well as enhancing privacy guidance for federal agencies.

Jerry: The phone calls I’ve gotten over the last ten days from general counsel of companies with whom we work focused on their responsibilities, obligations, and duties as employers. Alex, in pivoting to anti-discrimination issues and how artificial intelligence may impact workplace litigation issues – are there particular topics, areas, and issues that employers should focus on in the wake of the Executive Order?

Alex: Thank you, Jerry, that’s a great question. If we had to boil this down to three topics that are most impacted by the Executive Order in terms of anti-discrimination laws, it would be equity, workers’ protection, and civil rights. And what’s the common thread that ties all these topics together? Algorithmic fairness and algorithmic discrimination is a common theme. For example, the EO mentions making sure that federal contractor programs are being monitored for not having any type of discriminatory impact on those that are being hired. We’ve also seen something similar in New York City, where in July of 2023, there was an algorithmic fairness law that came out about the use of artificial intelligence in hiring processes. And we anticipate that the Executive Order is starting the conversation on the federal level. Whether or not and how the Executive Order will be enforced remains to be seen, but nonetheless I think this signifies that the federal government is aware what state and local governments are doing around the country and they’re now starting that conversation from a broader, bigger level.

George: Additionally, the EO highlights the importance of responsible and effective government use of AI by issuing guidance, acquiring products, and hiring professionals for government agencies. The EEOC has artificial intelligence in its strategic sights as well – both on the enforcement level and as an agency resource. It will be important to watch how different government agencies will be involved with carrying out the eight priorities set forth in the EO and considering the short timelines outlined, and further down the road, seeing what the extent of the enforcement strategy will be.

Alex: The Executive Order also aims to identify the benefits of AI and see how this technology could be used for good purposes. In addition, the Executive Order calls for monitoring of the labor markets to see what is the actual impact of this technology in terms of how it’s being used – is it having a good impact, are there potential harms that are arising from its use? Essentially, the Executive Order wants more data to make the most informed decisions.

Jerry: It struck me that this 100-page Executive Order is, in essence, the first ten feet in a race that is probably as long as a marathon, and this is that starting salvo in terms of the government getting involved in AI regulation. More importantly, the plaintiffs’ bar is nothing if not innovative, and certainly the use of artificial intelligence, applications of it, and challenges to its use are going to be things that I believe are going to find their way into privacy-related class action litigation and employment-related class action litigation, at least at the start.

George and Alex, thank you for your comments and thought leadership in this area, and loyal blog readers, we’ll see you next week on our future installment of the Class Action Weekly Wire.

Athletes Secure Class Certification On Monetary Relief Claims In NIL Battle In California Federal Court With The NCAA And Power 5 Conferences

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. and Sean P. McConnell

Duane Morris Takeaways: On November 3, 2023, Judge Claudia Wilken of the U.S. District Court for the District of Northern California granted a motion by Plaintiffs – a group of former, current and future student athletes – for certification of three proposed damages classes under Rule 23(b)(3) in the litigation entitled In Re College Athlete NIL Litigation, No. 4:20-CV-03919 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2023). Judge Wilken certified three classes seeking to recover compensation for the commercial use of their names, images, and likenesses (“NIL”). This class certification order follows a September 22, 2023 order in the same case certifying a proposed injunctive relief class under Rule 23(b)(2). While defendants did not dispute certification of the proposed injunctive relief class, they argued that the damages classes should not have been certified because the NIL market is inherently too distinct for the thousands of impacted student-athletes to claim the same kind of harm from lost compensation. In certifying the three proposed damages classes, the order sets the stage for a possible class-wide trial for hundreds of millions or even billions in back pay for student athletes.

Case Background

Plaintiffs are student athletes who either have competed or will compete on a Division I team since June 15, 2020. Defendants are the National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) and the “Power Five” Conferences – the Pac-12 Conference, Big Ten Conference, Big 12 Conference, Southeastern Conference, and Athletic Coast Conference. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants set and enforced a set of rules to restrict the compensation that student-athletes can receive in exchange for the commercial use of student-athletes’ NIL and prohibit NCAA member conferences and schools form sharing with student athletes the revenue they receive from third parties for the commercial use of student-athletes’ NIL. Even though Defendants had suspended enforcement of some of these rules, they have not suspended enforcement of rules that prohibit NIL compensation contingent upon athletic participation or performances or enrollment at a particular school, including, most notably, compensation for lucrative broadcast deals that pay conferences hundreds of millions of dollars. Plaintiffs’ complaint includes claims for Sherman Act Section 1 violations for conspiracy to fix prices and group boycott or refusal to deal as well as a claim for unjust enrichment.

Plaintiffs moved for class certification of their claims under § 1 of the Sherman Act only.

The Court’s Certification Order

The decision at issue deals only with Plaintiffs’ motion for certification of three proposed damages classes under Rule 23(b)(3). The proposed classes are (i) current and former Division I men’s basketball players and FBS football players; (ii) current and former Division I women’s basketball players; and (iii) current and former Division 1 athletes that did not play Division I basketball or FBS football. Plaintiffs’ alleged damages fall into three different buckets, including: (1) broadcast TV NIL damages, which arise out of student-athletes having been deprived of compensation they would have received from conferences for use of their NIL in broadcasts of FBS football or Division I basketball games in the absence of the challenged restrictions; (2) video game damages, which arise out of student-athletes having been deprived of compensation they would have received from video game publishers for use of their NIL; and (3) third-party NIL damages suffered between 2016 and July 1, 2021 when the NCAA started to allow some NIL compensation for student athletes.

Defendants argued that the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) was not met because common proof cannot establish antitrust damages on a class-wide basis due to intra-class conflicts that exist among class members in each class as a result of Plaintiffs’ methodology for calculating damages. The Court disagreed. Relying largely on the opinions of Plaintiffs’ experts, the Court concluded that every class member suffered injury as a result of the NCAA’s rules, and that every class member will be entitled to receive a piece of the damages pie.

Implications For Organizations

The Court’s ruling is important to the ongoing debate over student athletes’ compensation. Thus far, NCAA-member schools cannot directly compensate their athletes for NIL. By certifying the damages classes proposed by Plaintiffs, the Court’s decision is likely to advance the ball on this issue.

© 2009- Duane Morris LLP. Duane Morris is a registered service mark of Duane Morris LLP.

The opinions expressed on this blog are those of the author and are not to be construed as legal advice.

Proudly powered by WordPress