August 2023 – Page 2 – Class Action Defense

August 11, 2023August 11, 2023 by Class Action Defense

The Class Action Weekly Wire – Episode 25: Sanctions Issues In Class Actions

Duane Morris Takeaway: This week’s episode of the Class Action Weekly Wire features Duane Morris partner Jerry Maatman and special counsel Rebecca Bjork with their discussion and analysis of key sanctions issued in class action litigation throughout 2022.

Jerry Maatman: Hello everyone and thank you for being here in our weekly installment each Friday of the Class Action Weekly Wire. Joining me today is Rebecca Bjork of our Washington D.C. office who is a special counsel in our Workplace Class Action Group.

Rebecca Bjork: Thanks – great to be here, Jerry.

Jerry: Today we have a little bit of a different topic – an important one and one that tends to rear itself from time to time in class action litigation, and that’s the topic of sanctions – either sanctions against the plaintiffs’ lawyer who brought the case or sanctions against defense counsel involved in the class action litigation. One of the chapters of our Duane Morris Class Action Review details the largest sanctions awards and rulings throughout the United States each year. Rebecca, what are some of the reasons that you’ve seen in the case law about why courts would ever enter sanctions in a class action?

Rebecca: Well, by way of background, sanctions really are simply thought of as penalties – in civil cases, they are typically in the form of a monetary fine, usually issued in response to violating some sort of court procedures or abusing the judicial process. And of course the most extreme sanction imposed in civil cases is dismissal with prejudice of the filing party’s claim – or on the other hand, dismissal of the answer of the responding party – so then the case would have no further movement going forward and it would be over with judgment against the party that was being sanctioned.

This actually happened in one case last year, Gui Zhen Zhu, et al. v. Matsu Corp., where the judge struck the defendants’ answer and entered a default judgment against them – and this was in a wage and hour collective action – and the reason for the sanction under Rule 37(b) was that their counsel disobeyed a court order to provide a class list for the provision of notice of the collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act by the deadline that the court had set, and in addition the counsel had withdrawn his appearance without securing substitute counsel for the collective.

Jerry: It’s interesting – I’ve always thought that because sanctions are such an odious sort of end result of a lawsuit, that the losing party in the end of the sanctions are order often makes an appeal – and to me, one of the key decisions that I read in 2022 was the Tenth Circuit decision in the case of O’Rourke, et al. v. Dominion Voting Systems, Inc., which was a case where various citizens had sued saying that the presidential election was a fraud and that their votes weren’t counted. The defendants had to respond to the lawsuit, filed a motion to dismiss for lack of standing, judge granted it and found that in essence the lawsuit was frivolous, shouldn’t have been brought, that the arguments of the plaintiffs in terms of their standing were just entirely frivolous, and to the extent that even during oral argument they admitted as much and the district court judge entered sanctions of $187,000. The Tenth Circuit opinion affirming that decision in terms of the sanction order makes for very interesting reading – it’s almost a road map of what lawyers should not do, and a road map in terms of what lawsuits should not be brought because there’s no basis in law or fact for them to be brought – and you know kind of that notion of making a bad situation even worse where a district court sanction order is then broadcast nationwide in a court of appeals decision, which is exactly what happened, and it was picked up in the media and it’s become quite an important case. I think if you’re corporate counsel and you wanted to read one sanctions order – that Tenth Circuit decision would be kind of required reading in terms of the sanctions area.

Rebecca: That’s absolutely right, and if you’re a class action attorney you should probably be aware of the fact that sanctions can be awarded if settlement agreements are violated, and this happened last year in a case called Asset Acceptance, LLC, et al. v. Caszatt. The court granted a motion not only for sanctions but also for civil contempt and awarded the counterclaim defendant a payment of $387,314.04 in remedial damages to class members who were wrongly subject to collections. This was a debt collection class action, and the counterclaim plaintiffs’ counsel also had to pay the defendant’s attorneys’ fees, more than $1.1 million, and an additional monetary sanction of close to $1.2 million if they fail to pay within 30 days of the deadline set by the court.

Jerry: That’s a great point, Rebecca. In my experience another fertile ground where sanctions tend to be in the mix is with discovery and as we all know in class actions, discovery tends to be very laborious, very expensive – and if you’re a defendant it involves production of massive amounts of material, either written or electronically stored information. I read with interest the Hudgins, et al. v. Total Quality Logistics, LLC decision last year where there was a sanction order entered with respect to the manner and method by which the defendant had approached discovery, and the magistrate judge giving the defendant opportunity after opportunity and basically saying ‘I have no alternative but to sanction you and to impose monetary costs upon you because of the cavalier attitude and the positions you took in discovery.’ In my experience, magistrate judges lording over discovery – especially in federal court and especially in class actions – are getting very serious about that because of the potential costs and delays that are involved in games that are played with discovery.

Rebecca: That’s absolutely right, and not only monetary sanctions in the context of discovery are important to keep your eyes on, but also barring the use of evidence in the trial of the case. That happened in a case last year, L.D., et al. v. United Behavior Health, a class action alleging not paying sufficiently for out-of-network claims for substance use disorder and mental health treatments for people who were insured by the defendant. What happened in that case was that plaintiffs filed a motion for sanctions after the defendant submitted tens of thousands of documents in discovery after the discovery deadline had elapsed, and the court granted the plaintiffs’ motion and barred the defendant from using documents, audio records, an Excel spreadsheet – all of the information that they had failed to produce before the close of discovery.

Jerry: That’s a great example because sanctions or threats of sanctions are also used as a weapon, often by the plaintiffs’ bar against the defendants since discovery tends to be more focused on the defendants because they have the information, the data. In terms of the array of case law rulings in 2022, by your way of thinking, were there any notable rulings where judges backed up what defendants did and denied plaintiffs’ motions for sanctions in a class action?

Rebecca: Sure, absolutely there are instances where sanctions are denied even when a rule or proper procedure is violated if the defendant can show the court that there was no bad faith or willfulness on their part. This happened in a case in the state of Pennsylvania where it was involving people who were wards of the state who had profound intellectual disabilities, and they filed a class action alleging their civil rights were being violated. The name of the case is Jennings, et al. v. Wolf, and they failed to disclose an expert but released the expert’s report one day after the deadline. Plaintiffs still had four months left to rebut the testimony and they did, so the testimony didn’t come as a surprise to them, so the court found that there was no evidence of bad faith in order to apply any sanctions in that instance.

In a similar case, it wasn’t necessarily an issue of lack of bad faith that the defendant was able to convince the judge that they were not obligated under law to do what the plaintiffs’ side was asking them to do in a class action, and in this case it was producing the list of all putative class members’ names and addresses prior to certification. This was Holland-Hewitt, et al. v. Allstate Life Insurance Co., and again that court found that sanctions were not warranted in that situation.

Jerry: Well those are great insights and analysis Rebecca, I know you’re a subject matter expert in this area and I’m sure we’ll see more in 2023 since by their very nature, class actions involve very significant issues and lots of discoveries, so I’m sure corporate counsel will see other threats of sanctions and sanctions rulings down the line. Thank you loyal blog readers for joining us for our Friday weekly podcast – signing off, thanks so much.

August 10, 2023August 17, 2023 by Class Action Defense

Fighters Win Class Certification In Their Antitrust Wage-Suppression Battle With The UFC

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. and Sean McConnell

Duane Morris Takeaways: On August 9, 2023, Judge Richard F. Boulware II of the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada granted Plaintiffs’ motion to certify a class of all persons who competed in one or more live professional UFC-promoted mixed-martial arts bouts taking place or broadcast in the United States from December 16, 2010 to June 30, 2017 in Le v. Zuffa, LLC, No. 2:15-CV-01045 (D. Nev. Aug. 9, 2023). The Court rejected defense arguments that class certification should be denied on the grounds that the statistical model of Plaintiffs’ expert was flawed because it failed to include everyone in the sport and failed to consider the ways promoters help fighters develop in to headliners. Instead, the Court found that these arguments were factual and merits-based, and therefore, were unavailing as a matter of law to defeat class certification. The Court also found defendants’ arguments unpersuasive relative to factual matters underlying the elements of Rule 23.

The ruling in Le v. Zuffa is required reading for any corporate counsel handling antitrust class action litigation involving wage-suppression issues.

Case Background

Plaintiffs are current or former UFC fighters. Defendant, Zuffa, LLC does business as UFC and is the preeminent MMA event promoter in the United States. Plaintiffs allege that UFC used exclusive contracts, market power, and a series of acquisitions to suppress wages paid to UFC fighters during the class period by up to $1.6 billion. Plaintiffs filed suit in December 2014 and defeated UFC’s motions for partial summary judgment in 2017. In February 2018, plaintiffs moved to certify two classes. The first consisted of all persons who competed in one or more live professional UFC-promoted MMA bouts taking place in the United States from December 16, 2010 to June 30, 2017. As discussed in more detail below, the Court certified this class. The second putative class consisted of all UFC fighters whose identity was expropriated or exploited by the UFC. Due to differences in identity rights allegedly at issue and a lack of connection between UFC’s anticompetitive scheme and any suppressed identity compensation, the Court did not certify the identity-based class.

Class Certification Granted

Plaintiffs’ expert advanced a statistical regression model to tie UFC’s alleged anticompetitive scheme to allegedly suppressed wages earned by UFC fighters. The model utilized a database that tracked any fighter that fought for an MMA promoter as well USA Today/MMA Junkie rankings to identify the top fifteen fighters in any of the ten major MMA weight classes.

Defendants opposed certification on grounds that these inputs were flawed because they were underinclusive and failed to account for all of the ways that promoters promote fighters. The Court rejected these arguments at the class certification stage on the grounds that they were factual and merits-based. The Court also found these arguments unpersuasive as to the facts in the record underlying the motion for class certification.

The Court concluded plaintiffs met the requirements of Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(3). In doing so, the Court recognized a relevant antitrust market for elite fighter services. The Court also found that UFC dominated that market because it controls, or controlled, in excess of 70% of it. The Court also opined that UFC used exclusionary provisions in fighter contracts, coercive tactics, and acquisitions of competing promoters as part of an anticompetitive scheme to frustrate fighters’ ability to fight for rivals and suppress wages.

Implications for Employers

Le v. Zuffa is yet another example of a federal court class certification decision turning on the existence of common, injury-producing conduct. The Court credited evidence establishing UFC has anticompetitive power on the buyer-side market of purchasing fighter services and that it used this power to harm all UFC fighters.

August 9, 2023 by Class Action Defense

Georgia Federal Court Declines To Dismiss ERISA Prohibited Transaction Claims And Certifies Class Despite Differences In Class-wide Investment Choices

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Brian W. Sullivan, and Jesse S. Stavis

Duane Morris Takeaways: On August 2, 2023, Judge Clay Land of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Georgia granted a motion to certify a class of participants in an ERISA class action involving an employer-sponsored defined contribution plan in Goodman v. Columbus Regional Healthcare System, Inc., No. 21-CV-15, 2023 WL 4935004 (M.D. Ga. Aug. 2, 2023). The Court rejected defense arguments to deny certification of one large class in favor of smaller sub-classes based on differences in the investment choices and resulting injuries of putative class members. Instead, the Court concluded that allegations that the asserted injuries were caused by Defendant’s common conduct warranted class certification without regard to such differences. For these reasons, the Goodman decision is instructive for ERISA plans and fiduciaries defending putative class claims under the ERISA.

Case Background

Plaintiffs were participants in a defined contribution plan (the “Plan”) sponsored by their employer, Defendant Columbus Regional Healthcare System, Inc. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant violated its fiduciary duties under the ERISA by failing to prudently monitor and control the Plan’s investments and expenses and because it caused the Plan to engage in prohibited transactions with the Plan’s record-keeper and investment advisor (together, the “Service Providers”). Goodman, 2023 WL 4935004, at *1-2. Plaintiffs moved to certify a class under Rule 23(b)(1) consisting of all plan participants or beneficiaries of the plan with an account balance on or after February 2, 2015 through the termination of the Plan. Id.

Class Certification Granted

Plaintiffs sought to certify a class with respect to their three ERISA claims that Defendant violated its duty to prudently monitor investments and expenses and had engaged in prohibited transactions. Id. at *3. Defendant opposed certification on the grounds that “the class proposed by Plaintiffs is so broad that Plaintiffs did not meet their burden to establish standing, commonality, and typicality” as required by Rule 23. Id. at *4.

Addressing Defendant’s standing challenge first, the Court acknowledged that, to have standing, Plaintiffs and other Plan participants “must have suffered a decrease in value of their defined contribution accounts due to a breach of fiduciary duty.” Id. The Court rejected Defendant’s argument that “it is possible that some members of the putative class as presently defined did not suffer any loss due to the alleged breaches of fiduciary duties.” The Court reasoned that “this is not a standing problem but a liability issue.” Id. It explained that “[t]he possibility that some putative class members may not ultimately make a recovery does not eliminate standing for class certification purposes,” particularly where evidence of specific losses “should be readily ascertainable.” Id.

The Court likewise rejected Defendant’s arguments that Plaintiffs failed to establish the commonality or typicality requirements of Rule 23(a). The Court explained that commonality requires a showing that class members have suffered “the same injury” and that their claims depend on “common questions or law or fact” with common answers. Id. at *5. Typicality, the Court explained, requires evidence of “a sufficient nexus” between the claims of the Plaintiffs and those of the putative class as shown by claims or defenses arising “from the same event or pattern or practice” and “based on the same legal theory.” Id. Together, the Court opined that commonality and typicality require Plaintiffs and the class members to have the same interest and suffer the same injury, even though the Plaintiffs need not have suffered injury “at the same place and on the same day as the class members.” Id.

Applying these principles, the Court rejected Defendant’s suggestions “that there must be a separate sub-class for each allegedly imprudent investment and that the named Plaintiffs cannot establish typicality for allegedly imprudent investments options in which they did not invest.” Id. Instead, the Court held that this “level of granularity” was not “required at the class certification stage” where Plaintiffs had alleged that Defendant employed “flawed selection and monitoring practices” that were the same for class members across all investment options. Id. The same was true of “the excessive fee and prohibited transaction claims,” which were based on Defendant’s “alleged failure to insist” that the Service Providers charge “no more than reasonable fees, which resulted in harm to Plan participants” invested in relevant funds.

As such, the Court concluded that “the alleged cause of the injury remains the same across all funds.” Id. On these allegations, the Court found that there were common questions capable of class-wide resolution and for which Plaintiffs’ claims were typical of the class – whether Defendant breached its fiduciary duties by offering imprudent investments and by allowing the Service Providers to collect unreasonable fees. The Court determined that more granular issues concerning the specific investments and injuries of particular class members “relate to the degree of injury and level of recovery” such that the Court did “not see the benefit of dividing the proposed class into sub-classes by investment option.” Id. at 5-6. For these reasons, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion to certify the class.

Implications for Employers and Plan Administrators

Goodman is typical of federal court decisions in the last several years addressing motions to certify classes in cases asserting breach of fiduciary duty claims under the ERISA. The ruling underscores that the focus for class certification of such claims remains on the existence of common, injury-producing conduct rather than the similarity of the resulting injuries. Courts generally will not decline to certify a class based on differences in the investment options chosen or injuries suffered by class members so long as those investments or injuries are linked by a defendant’s common conduct, at even high levels.

August 8, 2023 by Class Action Defense

Seventh Circuit Saves EEOC’s Disability Discrimination Lawsuit

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Alex W. Karasik, and Zev Grumet-Morris

Duane Morris Takeaways: In EEOC v. Charter Communications, LLC, Case No 22-1231, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 19528 (7th Cir. July 28, 2023), the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded a district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer in an EEOC enforcement lawsuit, holding that an employee was possibly entitled to a modified work schedule as an accommodation to make his commute safer.

This is a significant ruling in the context of EEOC-initiated ADA litigation, as employers may potentially see an increase in litigation related to denials of commute-related accommodation requests.

Case Background

The Charging Party, James Kimmons (“Kimmons’”), alleged that his employer, Charter Communications (“Defendant”) violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) by refusing to accommodate his request for a temporary modified work schedule. Kimmons, who suffers from cataracts, sought a temporary schedule modification allowing him to begin and end his workday two-hours earlier in order to avoid nighttime driving. While originally granting the 30-day request, Defendant ultimately declined to extend this accommodation for an additional 30-days while Kimmons sought closer living arrangements.

Kimmons filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. After conciliation efforts failed, the EEOC filed a lawsuit on Kimmons’ behalf. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendant, repeating the oft-cited understanding that employees are responsible for their own commute to and from the workplace. The district court further held that Kimmons’ disability did not affect his ability to perform the essential functions of his job. Id. at *6.

The EEOC thereafter appealed to the Seventh Circuit.

The Seventh Circuit’s Decision

The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. In reaching this conclusion, the Seventh Circuit opined that the main question was whether the employee was entitled to a modified work schedule as an accommodation to make his commute safer. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the answer is “maybe.” Id. at *6.

As a threshold question, the Seventh Circuit examined the threshold question of whether an employee’s work-schedule was inherently outside the scope of the ADA. Relying on decisions within its jurisdiction and those of its sister courts, the Seventh Circuit declined to offer a bright line rule. Instead, it concluded that the inquiry was fact-intensive and necessarily unbefitting for summary judgment resolution. Specifically, while acknowledging that “getting to and from work is in most cases the responsibility of an employee, not the employer,” the Seventh Circuit reasoned that an employee’s disability could interfere with that commute, thereby entitling him to a work-schedule accommodation “if commuting to work is a prerequisite to an essential job function, such as attendance in the workplace, and if the accommodation is reasonable. Id. at *3.

Further, the Seventh Circuit determined that a trier of fact could find Kimmons’ travel to his workplace a prerequisite essential to his job duties, which demanded regular attendance. Moreover, whether or not Kimmons’ cataracts constituted a disability was a question of fact, it was not unreasonable to believe it negatively impacted his evening commutes. And because Defendant failed to establish how Kimmons’ schedule modification imposed an undue burden on its operations, the accommodation was not inherently unreasonable sufficient to warrant dismissal of the litigation. While businesses are not compelled to exhaust every avenue to improve trivial comforts of its disabled workforce, the Seventh Circuit emphasized that it will consider the precise accommodation at issue when evaluating these efforts. Id. at *21

Finally, the Seventh Circuit opined that it, “do[es] not intend to endorse an interpretation of the ADA where ‘no good deed goes unpunished.’” Id. at *23. The Seventh Circuit additionally clarified that the employer need not provide the exact accommodation the employee requests. However, the Seventh Circuit held that a qualified individual’s disability substantially interferes with his ability to get to work and attendance at work is an essential function, an employer may sometimes be required to provide a commute-related accommodation, if reasonable under the circumstance. Id. at *26. Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and remanded to the district court.

Implications For Employers

This is a novel ruling in that it opens the possibility for employers to be held liable for accommodations related work scheduled based on commuting concerns. While the Seventh Circuit made abundantly clear that it did not want to establish a bright-line rule, this decision demonstrates that in some situations, employers could potentially be responsible for granting accommodation requests related to work schedules and commutes. Employers should thus continue to closely consider all accommodation requests, even those that may seem outside of the scope of day-to-day job duties.

August 6, 2023August 6, 2023 by Class Action Defense

Louisiana Federal Court Grants Defendants’ Motion To Decertify Collective Action And Evidences A New Fifth Circuit Regime Post-Swales

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. and Emilee N. Crowther

Duane Morris Takeaways: In Moore v. MW Servicing, LLC, No. 20-CV-217 (E.D. La. Aug. 2, 2023), Judge Greg Guidry of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana granted Defendants Motion to Decertify Plaintiffs’ Collective Action, holding that, pursuant to Swales v. KLLM Transportation Services, L.L.C., 985 F.3d 430 (5th Cir. 2021), Plaintiffs had not met their burden of establishing they were “similarly situated” to the opt-ins during the decertification stage. The decision in Moore evidences the new Fifth Circuit regime in certifying/decertifying collective actions post-Swales, in that it properly places the “similarly situated” burden in Plaintiff’s court at all relevant times. The ruling should be required reading for all businesses defending wage & hour litigation in the states comprising the Fifth Circuit.

Case Background

Defendants MW Servicing, LLC, WBH Servicing, LLC, Bruno, Inc., and Joshua Bruno (“Defendants”) own and operate various properties in Louisiana. Plaintiffs Brittany Moore, Dmitry Feller, Jada Eugene, Christopher Willridge, and five opt-in Plaintiffs (“Plaintiffs”) worked for Defendants as property managers, leasing agents, leasing consultants, accounting managers, executive assistants, janitorial/maintenance workers, and babysitters.

Plaintiffs filed their a collective action (the “Complaint”) against Defendants on January 20, 2020, asserting Defendants failed to pay minimum wage under the Federal Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), and failed to pay, or untimely paid, Plaintiffs their final checks under the Louisiana Wage Payment Act (“LWPA”).

The Lusardi v. Xerox Corporation Standard

At the time Plaintiffs filed their Complaint, the standard practice in federal courts to certify a collective action and send notice to potential opt-in plaintiffs followed the two-step process outlined in Lusardi v. Xerox Corporation, 116 F.R.D. 351 (D.N.J. 1987).

The first Lusardi step, also known as the “notice stage,” required courts to determine whether the named plaintiffs and potential opt-in plaintiffs were “similarly situated” solely on the basis of the pleadings and affidavits submitted by the parties. Id. at 360-61. Once the named plaintiffs met this lenient threshold, courts often granted conditional certification and notice was sent to the potential opt-ins. Id.

The second Lusardi step, also known as the “decertification stage,” permitted defendants to move to decertify the conditional certification, but shifted the burden of establishing that plaintiffs are not “similarly situated” to defendants. Id.

In Moore, Plaintiffs filed their motion for conditional certification on May 5, 2020. Almost a year later, on March 15, 2021, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ Motion for Conditional Certification.

The Fifth Circuit’s Departure From Lusardi “Notice Stage” In Swales

In Swales v. KLLM Transport Services, L.L.C., 985 F.3d 430, 441 (5th Cir. 2021), the Fifth Circuit rejected Lusardi’s “notice stage” approach. The Fifth Circuit held that the text of the FLSA did not require a certification phase, and courts should instead determine at the outset of the case “what facts and legal considerations are material to determining whether Plaintiff and the proposed class are similarly situated.” (emphasis added).

Importantly, in rejecting Lusardi’s “notice stage” approach, the Fifth Circuit held that the burden of establishing that the plaintiffs and opt-ins are “similarly situated” rests with plaintiffs at all relevant times. Id. at 443, n. 65 (“a plaintiff should not be able to simply dump information on the district court and expect the court to sift through it and make a determination as to similarity”).

On January 5, 2022, Defendants in Moore filed a motion to decertify the collective action. They asserted that Plaintiffs were not “similarly situated,” and the collective action should be decertified.

The Court’s Decision

On August 2, 2023, Judge Guidry granted Defendants motion to decertify on the grounds that Plaintiffs had not met their burden to establish they were “similarly situated” to the opt-ins. Moore, No. 20-217, at 7.

In reaching its decision, the Court acknowledged that while Swales rejected the traditional Lusardi “notice stage,” the Fifth Circuit clarified that the factors considered by courts in Lusardi’s “decertification stage” could “help inform or guide” courts “similarly situated analysis.” Id. at 3 (citing Loy v. Rehab Synergies, L.L.C., 71 F 4th 329, 336-37 (5th Cir. 2023)). Thus, even though Lusardi’s “notice stage” had been employed in this case, the Court elected to impose Swales for the decertification stage and required Plaintiffs to establish that they had met the “similarly situated” requirement of the FLSA. Id.

The court considered three factors, including: “(1) the disparate factual and employment settings of the individual plaintiffs; (2) the various defenses available to defendant which appear to be individual to each plaintiff; [and] (3) fairness and procedural considerations.” Id. at 3 (quoting Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1103 (10th Cir. 2001)).

As to the first factor, the Court noted substantial differences existed between the plaintiffs and opt-ins’ method of payment (salary versus hourly), employer (all worked for different entities), job titles, and the asserted wrongful acts of Defendants. Id. at 5-6. As to the second factor, the Court found that too many individualized claims remained in the matter (such as joint employment, good faith and willfulness, common policies, and salary status), which would necessarily require individualized defenses. Id. at 6. As to the final factor, while the Court acknowledged that the plaintiffs and opt-ins did have some overlapping common issues, “other methods of managing [the] litigation to the benefit of judicial efficiency” existed. Id.

Ultimately, the Court found that a single trial of all plaintiffs’ claims would “result in confusion both for the jury and management of the trial itself,” and granted Defendants’ motion to decertify the collective action. Id. at 7.

Implications for Employers

In the Fifth Circuit pre-Swales, plaintiffs’ counsel could readily establish that plaintiffs and opt-ins were “similarly situated” during the notice stage by presenting minimal evidence. After plaintiffs’ counsel met this low threshold and conditional certification was granted, employers were left with two options: (1) expend significant resources to conduct extensive discovery in pursuit of establishing that plaintiffs and opt-ins were not “similarly situated”; or (2) settle. Thus, until Swales, Plaintiffs’ counsel were able to utilize employers’ looming financial burden to unfairly obtain settlements on the basis of threadbare evidence.

Post-Swales, however, district courts in the Fifth Circuit are required to “rigorously scrutinize the realm of ‘similarly situated’ workers, [at] the outset of the case, not after a lenient, step-one ‘conditional certification.’” Swales, 985 F.3d at 434. By placing the FLSA’s “similarly situated” burden on Plaintiffs, this ensures that collective action complaints can no longer be used as fishing expeditions, and reduces the likelihood that frivolous lawsuits are filed.

Since Swales, the Sixth Circuit in Clark v. A&L Homecare and Training Center, LLC, 68 F.4th 1003, 1009 (6th Cir. 2023), similarly rejected Lusardi’s two-step certification approach, but elected not to adopt Swales “rigorous scrutiny” standard. Instead, the Sixth Circuit held that notice must only be sent to potential plaintiffs if they show “a ‘strong likelihood’ that those employees are similarly situated to the plaintiffs themselves.” Id. at 1011.

While at present only the Fifth and Sixth Circuits have departed from the longstanding Lusardi standard, other circuits may follow suit, and depending on how many circuits “jump ship” from Lusardi, the issue may soon be ripe for judicial review with the U.S. Supreme Court.

August 4, 2023 by Class Action Defense

The Class Action Weekly Wire – Episode 24: WARN Act Class Actions

Duane Morris Takeaway: This week’s episode of the Class Action Weekly Wire features Duane Morris partner Jennifer Riley and associate Tyler Zmick with their discussion of recent developments in WARN class action litigation spurred by the COVID-19 pandemic and its impact on the global workforce.

Episode Transcript

Jennifer Riley: Thank you for being here again, for the next episode of our Friday weekly podcast, the Class Action Weekly Wire. I’m Jen Riley, partner at Duane Morris, and joining me today is Tyler Zmick. Thank you for being on the podcast, Tyler.

Tyler Zmick: Thank you, Jen. Great to be here, thanks for having me.

Jen: So today we wanted to discuss trends and important developments in Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, or WARN Act class action litigation. So class actions brought under the WARN Act remain an area of key focus for skilled class action litigators in the plaintiffs’ bar. In recent years, dozens of COVID-19-related lawsuits have been filed under the WARN Act, as well as under state counterparts to the WARN Act, and new class actions are being filed almost daily. The mass layoffs that arose in the aftermath of the pandemic and related to quarantines and those spawned countless WARN Act class actions, resulting in courts having issued several significant decisions in that area – in COVID-19-related WARN Act cases, including rulings that can shape the contours of future WARN Act class action litigation beyond the pandemic and for years to come.

Tyler, can you explain to our listeners some of the requirements for employers under the WARN Act?

Tyler: Absolutely. So, the WARN Act requires employers to give written notice to affected employees at least 60 days before conducting a plant closing or mass layoff at a single site of employment. Now as you’d expect, the statute has very specific definitions of each of those teams. A “plant closing” is the permanent or temporary shutdown of a single site of employment or one or more facilities or operating units within that site of employment where the shutdown results in an “employment loss” during any 30-day period for at least 50 full-time employees. A “mass layoff” is a reduction in force – sometimes called a “RIF” – that is not a plant closing and results in an employment loss at a single site of employment during any 30-day period for either A) at least 50 full-time employees who comprise at least 33 percent of the employee population, or B) 500 or more full-time employees. The WARN Act regulations require aggregation of employment losses at a single site of employment during a rolling 90-day period, which in essence extends the statute’s 30-day period to 90 days. And the statue has teeth in the sense that covered employers that do not satisfy the statute’s requirements, or qualify for an exemption, can be liable to affected employees for back pay and benefits.

Jen: Thanks so much Tyler for that great overview. In terms of class action litigation relating to the WARN Act, how often do courts or are courts certifying these types of cases?

Tyler: In short – very, very often. In the year 2022, plaintiffs’ lawyers actually won every single motion for class certification that was filed in a WARN Act case pending in federal court. And the jurisdictions where those rulings were issued were clustered in the Third, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits.

Jen: Wow, pretty good success rate! Can you tell our listener about some of the most significant rulings in the WARN class action space?

Tyler: Sure. So, one case from 2022 involving Rule 23 in the context of a WARN Act class action is Jones, et al. v. Scribe Opco, Inc. The plaintiff filed a class action alleging that the defendant, his former employer, violated the WARN Act when he and other employees were furloughed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The plaintiff claimed that while the employer gave notice of the initial furlough, the defendant employer failed to provide a follow-up notice once it became reasonably foreseeable that the furlough/layoff would exceed six months. The court granted the plaintiff’s motion for class certification, finding that all the requirements for Rule 23 were satisfied. The court determined that the putative class of 344 people met the numerosity requirement. The court further ruled that although the determination of each class member’s damages would be individualized based on their rate of pay and the benefits to which they were entitled, all of the class members’ claims involved the same legal questions. Specifically, the court ruled that common questions underlying the elements of the WARN Act claim and the defendant’s affirmative defenses were common and predominated over any individual issues. Finally, the court concluded that the plaintiff met the superiority requirement of Rule 23 because of the small individual values of the respective claims for class members, and the fact that it would be difficult to have potentially dozens of individual WARN actions filed by affected employees.

Jen: Thanks, Tyler. So one question that intrigues me in terms of WARN Act litigation is this question of what is this “single site of employment” and how does that bear when employees are working from home. So as the pandemic has spurred this trend and great rise of remote work, how does that “single site of employment” test apply? Do you have any rulings that address that question?

Tyler: Yes, absolutely. A case that got a lot of attention in the legal media is Piron, et al. v. General Dynamics Information Technology Inc., which was issued in 2022. In this case the court analyzed what constitutes a “single site of employment” under the WARN Act for employees who remotely, and the court analyzed that statutory term in the context of a motion for class certification under Rule 23(b)(3). So in the Piron case, the proposed class consisted of remote employees who had worked under the employer’s Flexible Work Location policy. Under that policy, employees could work from a company-provided setting (e.g., an office) or from an alternative setting like their home. Employees frequently moved from location to location to conduct their work duties depending on their schedules and where they preferred to be that day. When the defendant laid off the employees, many of whom who fell into that group who were subjected to the policy, the employees filed a class action against the defendant under the WARN Act, asserting they were not given the 60 days’ notice required for “mass layoffs” occurring at a “single site of employment.” In opposing class certification, the defendant argued that the putative class could not show that questions of law and fact for the class “predominate” over the same questions for the individual plaintiffs. Specifically, the defendant argued that the plaintiffs did not work at a “single site of employment” and thus could not trigger the WARN Act’s notice requirements for mass layoffs. Instead, the court would have to look at each class member’s individual situation to determine his or her place of employment. For example, for each class member you’d have to look at how often they work in the office versus at home or some other location. The court rejected the defendant’s predominance argument, and ruled that the class could be certified under Rule 23(b)(3). So in its ruling, the court emphasized that the remote-work policy applied to all employees, and this policy would guide its determination of what constituted the site of employment for each employee. Meaning the critical inquiry – the application of the remote work policy and its application to the work arrangements of the employees – would be common to all potential class members, even if some class members utilized that policy a little bit differently. This case illustrates one potential pitfall that can arise with the shift from an office workforce to a remote or hybrid workforce – and that pitfall is the possibility of layoffs to a remote or hybrid work force triggering WARN Act liability. It also highlights how the use of a common remote work policy for remote workers can potentially render a class of workers sufficiently similar for purposes of Rule 23 class actions.

Jen: Very interesting ruling. How about any issues or rulings on exemptions provided to employers under the WARN Act?

Tyler: Sure – so this is the last case I’ll go over for today’s video blog, and it’s a significant one issues by the Fifth Circuit where the court provided guidance regarding the “Natural Disaster” Exception to the WARN Act. The case was Easom, et al. v. US Well Services, Inc., in which the Fifth Circuit held that COVID-19 does not qualify as a natural disaster under the WARN Act’s natural disaster exception. So as background, in that case the plaintiffs filed a WARN Act class action claiming that the defendant terminated their employment without the 60-day noticed required by the WARN Act. The defendant, US Well, argued that the termination was caused by COVID-19, and therefore notice of the layoff with 60-day notice was not required due to the WARN Act’s natural-disaster exception. Both the plaintiff and defendant in the trial court moved for summary judgment on that issue regarding the exception. The district court denied both motions. In doing so, the trial court concluded that COVID-19 was a natural disaster because people did not start or consciously spread it and it was a disaster based on how many people were killed or infected. The trial court nonetheless denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment because the exception in the WARN Act uses a but-for causation standard and the court found that the record did not show that COVID-19 was the but four cause of the layoffs – meaning other factors could have been in play as for what led to the layoffs. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit basically disagreed with the trial court’s entire order. The Fifth Circuit held that COVID-19 does not qualify as a natural disaster and in doing so the appellate court narrowly construed the statutory language which limits examples of natural disasters to “flood, earthquake, or drought” and other hydrological, geological, and meteorological events. The Fifth Circuit also examined whether the phrase “due to” in the natural disaster exception requires but-for or proximate causation and unlike the trial court, the Fifth Circuit determined that the natural disaster exception incorporates proximate causation not but-for causation.

Jen: Great insights and analysis Tyler, thank you so much. I know that these are only some of the cases that had very interesting rulings in WARN Act class actions over the past year. The remainder of 2023 is sure to give us some more insights and more examples of the way that class actions are continuing to evolve in this space. That brings us to our conclusion, thanks to our listeners for joining us today – we’ll see you on the next edition of the Class Action Weekly Wire.

August 1, 2023 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

West Virginia Federal Court Finds Lack Of Involvement By Defendant In Alleged Class Action Solicitation Does Not Preclude Personal Jurisdiction Or Article III Standing

Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, and Nick Baltaxe

Duane Morris Takeaways: On July 18, 2023, in Mey v. Levin, Papantonio, Rafferty, Proctor, Buchanan, O’Brien, Barr & Mougey, P.A., et al., Case No. 5:23-CV-46 (N.D. W. Va. July 18, 2023), the Court denied a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for alleged violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (the “TCPA”). In doing so, the Court held that, despite the fact that Levin Law did not direct and was not involved in the alleged calls, the Court had personal jurisdiction over Levin Law, and Plaintiff had Article III standing to pursue the TCPA claims. In doing so, the Court found allegations concerning the law firm’s alleged agency relationship with a co-defendant sufficient to confer broad authority to adjudicate Plaintiff’s claims against Levin Law under the TCPA. Additionally, the Court concluded that Plaintiff had alleged sufficient facts to support a do-not-call claim under the TCPA by alleging that her cell phone was a residential phone on the National Do-Not-Call Registry.

Case Background

Plaintiff Diana Mey, a resident of West Virginia, initiated this lawsuit against two law firms, Levin Law and Principal Law Group, LLC, alleging that those defendants violated the TCPA by soliciting clients for a mass tort litigation related to toxic water exposure at Camp Lejeune. Mey, Doc. 33 at 1-2. Defendant Levin Law filed a motion to dismiss on numerous grounds, including that the Court lacked personal jurisdiction, that Plaintiff lacked Article III standing, that Plaintiff failed to plead direct or vicarious liability, and that Plaintiff failed to plead a violation of the TCPA. Id. The Court denied the motion. Id. Specifically, Levin Law argued that it was not directly involved in any of the phone calls, which were made by co-defendant MCM Services Group, LLC (“MCM”), and therefore could not be sued for violation of the TCPA. Id. at 8.

Initially, Levin Law, a Florida professional corporation with a principal place of business in Pensacola, Florida, argued that it did not have sufficient minimum contacts with West Virginia because it did not purposely direct the alleged tortious activity toward the state. Id. While the Court acknowledged that Levin Law was not directly involved in the telephone calls placed to Plaintiff, it held that Plaintiff had provided sufficient facts to find that the calls were made by an agent under Levin Law’s control. Id. at 12. Specifically, the Court noted that Plaintiff allegedly received a representation agreement from Principal Law, under which Levin Law would provide legal services to Plaintiff, and Principal Law would serve as Levin Law’s associate counsel. Id. The Court found that these allegations were sufficient to plausibly connect Levin Law to the alleged calls. In a final point regarding personal jurisdiction, the Court did not address whether it had personal jurisdiction over out-of-state class members noting that, to proceed with the case, it needed to find personal jurisdiction only over the named Plaintiff and Defendants. Id. at 13.

The Court then addressed Levin Law’s argument that Plaintiff did not have Article III standing. Specifically, Levin Law argued that the calls, which were initiated by MCM, were not traceable to any conduct by Levin Law, which was a necessary prong in establishing Article III standing. Id. The Court, however, noted that because the representation agreement identified Principal Law as Levin’s Law associate counsel, and Plaintiff received the agreement from Principal Law, the Court reasonably could infer that the calls were made by someone under Levin Law’s control. Id. at 14. As such, the Court found that Plaintiff had pled sufficient facts to trace the challenged conduct to the defendant and, as such, had asserted Article III standing.

The Court addressed Levin Law’s final arguments that Plaintiff failed to plead a theory of liability against it and, further, failed to state a do-not-call claim under the TCPA. First, the Court held that Plaintiff asserted sufficient factual allegations to show vicarious liability and to survive a Motion to Dismiss. Id. at 15. Second, the Court found no case law supporting dismissal of a TCPA claim on the basis that the defendant allegedly placed a call to a cell phone instead of a residential phone. Id. at 17. Specifically, the Court noted that Plaintiff had alleged that her cell phone was used for residential purposes and was placed on the National Do-Not-Call Registry, making the claim actionable under the TCPA. Id.

Key Takeaways

In this ruling, the Court made interesting findings that will extend to plaintiffs outside the TCPA context to survive attacks at the pleading stage of litigation. Specifically, the Court found both personal jurisdiction and Article III standing despite the fact that Levin Law did not purposefully direct the activity at issue. By doing so, the Court agreed with arguments that the conduct of an alleged agent was enough to establish both personal jurisdiction and Article III standing. Going forward, plaintiffs will have yet another way to support personal jurisdiction and Article III standing at the outset of the case even against defendants who they do not contend were directly involved in the conduct about which they complain. Additionally, while there is a split in authority as to whether the TCPA extends to wireless telephone numbers, the Court in this litigation had no issue finding that a cell phone could be a residential phone for purposes of the TCPA, potentially extending its reach and keeping it relevant as a potential source of claims against corporate defendants.