Christian Palacios – Class Action Defense

November 2, 2026November 2, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

EEOC Rescinds Its Long-Standing Criminal History Guidance In 2-1 Vote

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Karla V. Mardueño, and Christian J. Palacios

Duane Morris Takeaways: On October 28, 2026, the Commissioners of the EEOC voted 2-1 to rescind its Enforcement Guidance on the Consideration of Arrest and Conviction Records in Employment Decisions Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (the “Guidance”), a document that has shaped how employers screen job applicants with criminal records for over a decade. The rescission, which the Commission announced on October 29, 2026, is effective immediately, and the Guidance has already been removed from the agency’s website.

The rescission is significant because it marks the latest step in the Commission’s retreat from disparate impact enforcement. Despite this rescission, Title VII’s disparate impact provisions remain on the books, and private plaintiffs remain free to bring such claims.

Background

On April 25, 2012, the Commission published the Guidance, which explained how an employer’s use of arrest and conviction records could violate Title VII under two theories. See U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, Enforcement Guidance on the Consideration of Arrest and Conviction Records in Employment Decisions Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (Apr. 25, 2012). Under a “disparate treatment theory,” an employer violates Title VII by treating applicants with comparable criminal records differently on the basis of race or national origin. Under a “disparate impact theory,” a facially neutral criminal history policy may still violate Title VII if it disproportionately excludes applicants of a particular race or national origin and is not “job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.” See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). The Guidance was premised, in large part, on concerns that broad criminal record exclusions could disproportionately screen out Black and Hispanic applicants, given disparities in arrest and incarceration rates.

To help employers satisfy the business necessity defense, the Guidance recommended that employers develop “targeted screens” that consider at least three factors: (1) the nature and gravity of the offense or conduct; (2) the time elapsed since the offense or completion of the sentence; and (3) the nature of the job held or sought. The Guidance also encouraged employers to provide applicants who are screened out with an “individualized assessment,” giving those individuals an opportunity to provide information (such as evidence of rehabilitation, references, or a successful post-conviction work history) that might change the hiring decision. The Guidance further distinguished between arrests and convictions, cautioning that an arrest, standing alone, does not establish that criminal conduct has occurred. Finally, the Guidance included numerous hypothetical scenarios illustrating lawful (and unlawful) uses of background checks, and it recommended that employers eliminate blanket policies that exclude applicants based on any criminal record.

The EEOC’s Rescission

On October 28, 2026, the Commission voted to rescind the Guidance. The rescission passed along party lines, with Chair Andrea R. Lucas and Commissioner Brittany Bull Panuccio, both Republican appointees, voting in favor, and Commissioner Kalpana Kotagal, the Commission’s sole Democratic appointee, voting against. In its announcement, the Commission emphasized that the rescission does not restore the policy statements that the Guidance superseded, nor does it require employers to abandon any lawful practices they may have adopted in response to the Guidance. See EEOC Press Release, EEOC Votes to Rescind Enforcement Guidance on Arrest and Conviction Records (Oct. 29, 2026). Chair Lucas stated that the vote “reaffirms the agency’s commitment to enforce Title VII consistent with the Constitution and the limits Congress placed on the EEOC’s authority.” Id. She further cautioned that “[r]escinding this guidance does not give employers license to engage in unlawful discrimination – Title VII continues to prohibit discrimination based on race or national origin, including employment requirements that are proxies for intentional discrimination. The EEOC will continue to vigorously enforce these protections in accordance with the law.” Id.

Although the Commission’s announcement framed the rescission in terms of constitutional and statutory limits, without expressly naming disparate impact liability, the decision fits within the current administration’s retreat from disparate impact enforcement. In April 2025, President Trump issued an executive order titled “Restoring Equality of Opportunity and Meritocracy,” which directed federal agencies to deprioritize disparate impact enforcement and to pursue the elimination of disparate impact liability to the extent possible. See Exec. Order No. 14281, Vol. 90, Fed. Reg. 17537, Apr. 28, 2025. In June 2026, the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) issued an opinion concluding that the EEOC’s interpretation of Title VII’s disparate impact provisions was unconstitutional, and that opinion expressly addressed background checks. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice OLC, Constitutionality of Disparate-Impact Liability Under Title VII (June 9, 2026).

Implications for Employers

Although the rescission marks a significant shift in the EEOC’s enforcement posture, Title VII’s disparate impact framework remains the law because it is codified in the statute itself. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k). An employer facing a disparate impact challenge must still demonstrate that its criminal history screen is “job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.” Id. As a practical matter, the EEOC will likely continue to pursue disparate treatment claims involving criminal background checks, while declining to pursue disparate impact charges and instead issuing right-to-sue letters. Private plaintiffs, however, remain free to bring both disparate treatment and disparate impact claims, and the plaintiffs’ bar may well step in to fill the enforcement vacuum left by the Commission.

Further, the rescission has no effect on the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), which imposes its own procedural requirements on employers that obtain background checks from third-party consumer reporting agencies. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681b(b)(2)-(3), 1681m(a). Nor does it affect the growing landscape of state and local fair chance and “ban-the-box” laws, many of which impose obligations that mirror, or exceed, the recommendations in the Guidance. In short, while the rescission signals a different federal enforcement approach, the legal risks associated with criminal history screening remain alive, and employers should continue to monitor state and local laws to ensure compliance.

September 11, 2026September 11, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Court Grants Conditional Certification Of Mortgage Underwriter’s Collective Action

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Gregory Tsonis and Christian J. Palacios

Duane Morris Takeaways: In Brown v. Equity Prime Mortgage, LLC, Case No. 1:25-CV-1832, ECF No. 38 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 27, 2026), U.S. District Judge Michael L. Brown of the Northern District of Georgia granted a plaintiff’s motion for conditional certification of an FLSA collective action on behalf of a group of mortgage underwriters, alleging misclassification and unpaid overtime violations. This decision is yet another reminder for employers of how lenient the evidentiary standard is in jurisdictions that apply the longstanding “two step” conditional certification analysis employed by many courts. This decision further highlights the potential risk associated with classifying broad categories of employees as “exempt” for overtime purposes, while relying exclusively on the FLSA’s administrative exemption (i.e. office workers that require the exercise of independent judgment on important matters).

Background

Plaintiff Shameen Brown worked for Defendant Equity Prime Mortgage, LLC (“EPM”), a national mortgage lender, as an underwriter between March 2023 and May 2024. Order at 2. On April 7, 2025, she filed a class and collective action complaint against her EPM alleging misclassification and unpaid overtime violations, specifically that she typically worked 60 or more hours per week but received no overtime compensation because EPM misclassified her and others as exempt under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Id.

On September 12, 2025, Brown moved to conditionally certify a collective action, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) of the FLSA, of “[a]ll current and former employees of [EPM] working as Underwriters throughout the United States during the time period from three years prior to the filing of this Complaint until final resolution of [the] action.” Id. at 2. Brown submitted a proposed notice and requested permission to send it to potential collective members via mail, e-mail, and text message. She also requested access to the last four digits of collective members’ social security numbers and permission to send a reminder notice halfway through the notice period. Order at 2-3. EPM opposed the motion. Id.

The Court’s Ruling

On August 27, 2026, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for conditional certification. At the outset of its decision, the Court observed that the Eleventh Circuit “sanctioned a two-stage procedure for district courts to effectively manage FLSA collective actions in the pretrial phase.” Order at 3.

At the first stage, or the “notice” stage, the Court observed that it need only determine whether there existed other “similarly situated” employees who should be notified of their ability to join the litigation, describing the applicable standard as “not particularly stringent” and “fairly lenient.” Id. at 4. Only at the second stage, typically after close of discovery, would Plaintiff be required to satisfy a higher evidentiary burden to prove that the collective action is similarly situated and could proceed. Id. at 4-5.

In support of conditional certification, Plaintiff submitted affidavits from other former underwriters describing their duties, alleging each underwriter was required to adhere to the same “predetermined underwriting guidelines” without “any authority to deviate” from those guidelines. Id. at 6. EPM argued that its underwriters were not similarly situated because underwriters worked on different loans, such as retail and wholesale, and were “likely exercising more judgment than an underwriter working primarily on loans to individuals with steady W-2 income and low debt.” Id. at 7.

The Court agreed with Plaintiff that a collective should be conditionally certified, reasoning that Defendant’s position that underwriters were “likely exercising more judgment” did not contradict the “simplicity” of Plaintiff’s claim that EPM’s underwriters were required to “strictly adhere” to the same “predetermined guidelines” when reviewing loans, and that they were required to apply these guidelines without discretion. Id. The Court also rejected Defendant’s argument that different underwriters had different job descriptions, holding that the postings contained only “minute differences” and involved “similar duties.” Id. at 7. Finally, the Court rejected Defendant’s argument that opt-in plaintiffs were not similarly situated because they used different job descriptions in their LinkedIn postings, quipping that “[o]ne man’s Trash Collector is another man’s Sanitation Expert.” Id. at 8.

As a result, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for conditional certification and further approved the form of the proposed notice, authorizing it to be sent via mail, email, and text message. Id. at 9. However, the court denied Plaintiff’s request to send a reminder notice halfway through the notice period, concluding that such notices “would be redundant and ‘could be interpreted as encouragement by the Court to join the lawsuit.”’ Id at 10. It also denied Plaintiff’s request that Defendant be required to provide the last 4 digits of the collective members’ social security numbers, citing privacy concerns. Id. at 11.

Takeaway for Employers

As this case illustrates, employers will continue to face uphill battles at the “conditional certification” stage in jurisdictions that apply the lenient “two step” FLSA certification analysis. Although the Fifth, Sixth, and, most recently, the Seventh Circuit have rejected the majority rule in favor of more rigorous tests, most federal circuits, including the Eleventh Circuit, continue to utilize this plaintiff-friendly analysis. Additionally, employers in all sectors, and in the mortgage industry specifically, should be mindful that classifying employees as exempt carries legal risk, particularly where the employer cannot easily demonstrate that the employees maintain meaningful discretion and exercise independent judgment on important matters as part of their job duties to satisfy the FLSA’s administrative exemption.

September 11, 2025September 11, 2025 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Illinois Federal Court Allows FLSA Collective Action To Proceed In Misclassification Case

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Gregory Tsonis, and Christian J. Palacios

Duane Morris Takeaways: On August 22, 2025, U.S. District Judge Matthew Kennelley for the Northern District of Illinois ruled that a group of supermarket meat, bakery, and deli managers could maintain their collective action against the grocery chain, Mariano’s, despite the differences in job responsibilities and store locations of collective action members. In the same order, Judge Kennelley denied Plaintiffs’ motion to certify a proposed class pursuant to Rule 23, highlighting the more demanding requirements for class certification. The case, captioned Depyper, et al. v. Roundy’s Supermarkets, Inc. et al., Case No. 20-C-2317 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 22, 2025) and available here, is significant because it is one of the first times a court considers a defendant’s “decertification” motion following the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Richards, et al. v. Eli Lilly & Co., Case No. 24-2574, 2025 WL 221850 (7th Cir. Aug. 5, 2025), (“Eli Lilly”), which addressed the standard applicable for conditionally certifying an FLSA collective action. As this decision illustrates, although plaintiffs may face a higher legal bar for sending notice to a purported collective post-Eli Lilly, maintaining the collective after it has been “conditionally certified” is still subject to a much less demanding analysis than under Rule 23.

Background

Mariano’s and its banner store, Roundy’s Supermarkets, Inc. (“Defendant”), a well-known grocery store chain in the state of Illinois, was sued on April 14, 2020, by a former meat manager and bakery manager, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and the Illinois Minimum Wage Law (“IMWL”), seeking unpaid overtime wages and alleging they were misclassified as exempt under both laws. Two years later, on April 21, 2022, a former deli manager filed a similar lawsuit alleging similar violations on behalf of her and other similarly situated deli managers. Id. The first lawsuit was “conditionally certified” on November 9, 2020, and Defendant stipulated to conditional certification in the second action on June 14, 2022.

Following the close of the lawsuits’ respective notice periods, the first collective action (comprised of meat managers and bakery managers) numbered twenty-eight (28) plaintiffs, while the second collective action (comprised of deli managers and hot foods managers) contained seventy-six (76) plaintiffs. Id. The parties consolidated the actions shortly thereafter to streamline discovery. Id.

After the close of discovery, Plaintiffs moved for “final certification” of the FLSA collective and concurrently moved to certify a IMWL class under Rule 23 comprised of all Mariano’s deli, hot foods, bakery, and/or meat department managers which were paid a weekly salary and classified as exempt, within the statutory period. Id. at 5. In response, Defendant moved to “decertify” both collectives. Id.

The Court’s Ruling

In a lengthy, 39-page opinion, the Court denied Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification under Rule 23 while simultaneously granting Plaintiffs’ motion for collective action certification (thus denying Defendant’s decertification motion).

The Court considered Plaintiffs’ class certification motion first, holding that while Plaintiffs established a common question (i.e. whether Defendant maintained an unofficial policy of misclassifying department managers), they did not establish that common issues predominated over individual issues. Id. at 10-11. As Defendant maintained that it properly classified Plaintiffs as exempt from the FLSA under the Administrative or Executive exemptions, the Court determined that individualized inquiries would be required to establish whether exempt work was the primary duty of an employee. Id. at 14. Thus, even though proving an unofficial policy “will move the plaintiffs’ claims forward,” the factfinder would still have to determine whether that policy resulted in a department manager having non-exempt primary duties. Id. Notably, the Court also credited various declarations provided by Defendant from department managers that indicated a wide range of “supervisory responsibility,” thus requiring further individualized inquiries regarding satisfaction of the discretion and independent judgment necessary to establish the Administrative exemption, further precluding predominance. Id. at 15-16. Finally, the Court also denied Plaintiffs’ fallback argument for “issue-class certification” under Rule 23(c)(4), similarly reasoning that even isolating the alleged misclassification policy as a common issue would not materially advance the litigation, given liability still turned on an individualized analysis of plaintiffs’ primary duties. Id. at 19.

With respect to Plaintiffs’ motion for FLSA collective action certification, the Court’s analysis and conclusion differed markedly. The Court first noted that FLSA collective actions do not have the same requirements as Rule 23 class actions and, unlike Rule 23, nothing in the FLSA required “adequate representation,” establishing predominance, or proving the superiority of proceeding as a collective. Id. at 21. Notably, the Court first analyzed and considered the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ recent decision in Eli Lilly, which revised the standard for granting conditional certification of an FLSA collective, and its consequence on the instant action. As the Court noted, although Eli Lilly provided some guidance on the “notice” stage of an FLSA collective action, once opt-in discovery concluded, Plaintiffs bore the burden of establishing that they were similarity situated at the final certification stage by a preponderance of evidence. Id. at 23. The Court also noted that Eli Lilly was silent on the standard that district courts should apply to determine whether the collective contains “similarly situated” employees. Id. at 23.

Given the lack of guidance from the Seventh Circuit, the Court applied a three-factor test adopted by district courts in Illinois and elsewhere, which considers: “(1) whether the plaintiffs share similar or disparate factual and employment settings; (2) whether the various affirmative defenses available to the defendant would have to be individually applied to each plaintiff; and (3) fairness and procedural concerns.” Id. at 23.

Applying these factors, the Court determined that plaintiffs met their burden and could maintain both collectives. Specifically, the Court found that the collective members uniformly testified that they were classified as exempt, constrained by upper-level management hierarchy, expected to work 50 hours per week, and often performed the same tasks as hourly employees. Id. at 28. Though Defendant attempted to point to dissimilarities between Plaintiffs’ testimony and the department manager job descriptions, the Court noted that this argument “does not show a difference among the plaintiffs,” concluding that “[t]he fact that the plaintiffs uniformly testified that their job descriptions did not accurately reflect their actual work is a similarity among them, not a difference.” Id. The Court further rejected Defendant’s argument that managers’ job responsibilities varied across locations, noting that the fact that Mariano’s had forty-four (44) locations was not dispositive. Id. at 27. Defendant did not demonstrate how each store was different from the others, the Court opined, further noting that Defendant itself thought store location was “immaterial” when classifying department managers as exempt. Id. at 27-28. Accordingly, the Court certified the twenty-eight (28) collective action of meat and bakery managers and the seventy-six (76) collective action of deli and hot foods managers.

Takeaway for Employers

This decision highlights the relatively lenient standard applicable to FLSA collective actions, as opposed to Rule 23 class actions. Significant variation among job duties, titles, and responsibilities may not be enough to defeat collective action certification, and Employers should formulate an aggressive strategy for obtaining record evidence of substantial dissimilarities to prevail at the decertification stage. The Depyper decision also demonstrates that, while the Seventh Circuit has weighed in on the notice requirement for conditional certification, district courts retain substantial discretion in deciding what standard to apply at the “decertification” stage in assessing whether FLSA collective action members are “similarly situated.” Ultimately, even where employers prevail against Rule 23 class claims, they can still face costly and broad FLSA collective action litigation on wage and hour claims.

August 26, 2025 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Illinois Federal Court Dismisses Data Breach Class Action Lawsuit For Lack Of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Christian Palacios, and Brett Bohan

Duane Morris Takeaways: On August 20, 2025, in Phelps v. Ill. Bone & Joint Inst., LLC, No. 24-CV-08555, 2025 WL 2410341 (N.D Ill. Aug. 20, 2025), Judge Martha Pacold of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted Defendant Illinois Bone & Joint Institute, LLC’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court held Plaintiff failed to adequately plead Defendant’s citizenship, given its status as a limited liability company; therefore, the Court could not determine whether complete diversity existed between the parties. This ruling illustrates the differences between the general diversity statute under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), and the more lenient “minimal diversity” requirement under the Class Action Fairness Act, as well as the consequences of failing to sufficiently plead a limited liability company’s citizenship.

Case Background

On August 30, 2024, Defendant Illinois Bone & Joint Institute, LLC (“Defendant”) sent a data breach notification letter to its patients, including Plaintiff Alexandra Phelps (“Plaintiff”). Id. at *1. Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of a putative class, filed a lawsuit shortly after receiving the letter alleging negligence, negligence per se, breach of implied contract, and violation of the Illinois Personal Information Protection Act. Id.

Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. In the motion, Defendant raised two arguments, including: (i) that Plaintiff lacked Article III standing, and (ii) that Plaintiff could not establish diversity jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”). Id. Although Plaintiff had invoked jurisdiction under the CAFA in her Complaint, she did not respond to Defendant’s CAFA arguments. Id. at 2. Instead, Plaintiff argued that she could “invoke jurisdiction under the general diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).” Id.

The Court’s Order

The Court determined that the Complaint failed to allege sufficient facts to support diversity jurisdiction.

First, the Court reasoned that Plaintiff’s decision not to respond to Defendant’s CAFA arguments amounted to a concession that Plaintiff could not meet the standards for subject-matter jurisdiction under the statute. Id. However, although Plaintiff had not invoked general diversity jurisdiction in her Complaint, the Court permitted her to raise these arguments because “a complaint’s imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting jurisdiction does not itself defeat jurisdiction.” Id.

Second, the Court observed that, to satisfy general diversity jurisdiction, Plaintiff must be able to show that Plaintiff is a citizen of a different state than Defendant and “the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs.” Id. Under the CAFA, an LLC, like Defendant, is “a citizen of the State where it has its principal place of business and the State under whose laws it is organized.” Id. Under the general diversity statute, on the other hand, an LLC is a citizen “of every state of which any member is a citizen.” Id. The Court concluded that the Complaint did not include any allegations of Defendant’s “member’s identity or citizenship.” Id. As such, the Court could not determine whether “any member is a citizen of the same state as Phelps.” Id. Because the Complaint did not allege facts sufficient for the Court to conclude that “complete diversity between the parties” existed, the Court dismissed the case without prejudice. Id.

In sum, the Court concluded that, to establish diversity jurisdiction, a Complaint must adequately allege the citizenship of all parties. Id. Plaintiff’s failure to plead the citizenship of all Defendant’s members was, therefore, fatal to her claims. Id. at 3

Implications For Employers

The Court’s ruling in Phelps serves as a reminder of the distinctions between the the CAFA’s minimal diversity jurisdiction requirement and general diversity jurisdiction. While Plaintiff’s Complaint may have included sufficient facts to establish Defendant’s citizenship under the CAFA, the Complaint could not support the more demanding “complete” diversity jurisdiction requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).

This case highlights an important procedural defense available to employers, particularly if the named corporate entity in the litigation is a limited liability company (rather than a traditional corporation, who’s citizenship is tied to its state of incorporation and principal place of business). Employers should take note of a plaintiff’s burden to sufficiently establish federal subject matter jurisdiction at the outset of the litigation, and the accompanying procedural defenses they might avail themselves of when a plaintiff fails to sufficiently plead the jurisdictional prerequisite.

August 7, 2025August 7, 2025 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

New York Federal Court Rules EEOC Early Right to Sue Regulation Is Incompatible With Title VII In Post-Loper Bright Decision

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. and Christian J. Palacios

Duane Morris Takeaways: On July 30, 2025, Judge Eric Komitee of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed a plaintiff’s ADA discrimination lawsuit against her employer after finding that the plaintiff failed to satisfy the statutory 180-day waiting period before receiving a right-to-sue (“RTS”) letter from the EEOC. The case, Prichard v. Long Island University, Case No. 23-CV-09269 (E.D.N.Y. July 30, 2025), is significant because it represents one of the first applications of Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 401 (2024) (“Loper Bright”), where a court has held that an EEOC regulation is incompatible with the text of an employment discrimination statute. This ruling is a critical development for employers seeking to control the timing of when a plaintiff can bring a discrimination claim and marks the first of many challenges to the longstanding deference the Commission has enjoyed when interpreting employment discrimination statutes in a post-Loper Bright world.

Background and The EEOC’s Early RTS Regulation

Cecilia Prichard, a financial aid counselor at Long Island University (“LIU”), was terminated in 2022 after exhausting her FMLA leave following a kidney transplant. Id. at 1. Prichard filed a charge with the EEOC on July 24, 2023, alleging disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). At her request, the EEOC issued an early RTS letter only 57 days later — well before the 180-day statutory waiting period elapsed.

With her early RTS letter in-hand, Prichard commenced her suit in New York federal court against her employer, alleging it violated the ADA, as well as other state-specific human rights laws. Id. at 3. LIU moved to dismiss, arguing that the early RTS letter was invalid and thus, Prichard had not satisfied the precondition to filing suit under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)

By way of context, the EEOC regularly issues “early” RTS letters upon a charging party’s request prior to the expiration of Title VII’s 180-day statutory waiting period if the Commission determines that it is probable it will “be unable to complete its administrative processing of the charge within 180 days from the filing of the charge.” See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a)(2). This regulation, as well as other regulations promulgated by the Commission, have previously enjoyed longstanding “Chevron deference,” which required judicial deference for agency interpretations of vague laws. In the Supreme Court’s 2024 ruling in Loper-Bright, it eliminated “Chevron deference,” holding it was the courts, not agencies, that determined statutory meaning. Loper Bright at 401.

There is currently a circuit split regarding the Commission’s “early RTS” regulation, and it has been upheld as lawful by the Ninth, Eleventh, and Tenth Circuits (prior to Loper-Bright). See Saulsbury v. Wismer & Becker, Inc., 644 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1980); Sims v. Trus Joist MacMillan, 22 F.3d 1059 (11th Cir. 1994); Walker v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 240 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 2001). In contrast, the D.C. Circuit has invalidated the regulation while the Third Circuit has opined, in dicta, that early RTS letters should be discouraged as contrary to congressional intent. See Martini v. Federal Nat. Mortg. Ass’n, 178 F.3d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Moteles v. Univ. of Penn., 730 F.2d 913, 917 (3d Cir. 1984). The Second Circuit has not addressed this question, however as Judge Komitee observed in his ruling, district courts have decided this issue both ways. Prichard Order, at 5.

The Court’s Ruling

In a short, seven-page order, Judge Eric Komitee sided with LIU, concluding that the EEOC exceeded its statutory authority by issuing an RTS letter before the 180-day period had expired. As the Court observed, “Prichard’s assertion that deference is due the EEOC’s interpretation of the statute effectively urges this court to operate in a parallel universe in which Loper Bright had been decided the other way. No case that Prichard cites (or that the Court has identified) sided with the EEOC on textual grounds without according deference: they either deferred to the agency pre-Loper Bright, or relied primarily on policy considerations.” Id. at p. 7. The Court then “directed” the EEOC to reopen Prichard’s charge and granted Prichard leave to re-file once: (1) the Commission dismissed her claim; or (2) investigated for 123 more days and neither filed a lawsuit or entered into a conciliation agreement. Id.

Takeaway for Employers

The Prichard ruling illustrates the consequential impact of Loper Bright on employment discrimination litigation, specifically with respect to the Commission’s ability to interpret the employment discrimination statutes it is meant to enforce. Although the issue decided in Prichard is comparatively low stakes (given plaintiff’s lawsuit was ultimately dismissed without prejudice and she was granted leave to re-file), this ruling may be one of many where courts challenge other, more consequential EEOC regulations, in the absence of Chevron deference.

From a strategy perspective, employers may now be able to better control the timing of when plaintiffs bring their employment discrimination claims (ensuring they first exhaust the 180-day waiting period). Such a strategy carries with it, its own risks, however, and many employers welcome early RTS letters. In the event an employment discrimination charge is heavily investigated by the Commission, and the employer receives a request for information (“RFI”) from the EEOC, the employer may be forced to provide the complaining employee with wide-ranging “free discovery” that it would ordinarily be able to contest in court. Employers should evaluate such early RTS letters on a case-by-case basis and determine, as a matter of strategy, whether it makes sense to contest the lawsuit-permission letter, or simply litigate the matter in court.

June 18, 2025June 18, 2025 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Transgender Worker Can Intervene In Bias Suit After EEOC Moves To Dismiss Action With Prejudice

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Christian J. Palacios, and George J. Schaller

Duane Morris Takeaways: On June 05, 2025, in EEOC et al., v. Sis-Bro, Inc., Case No. 3:24-CV-00968 (S.D. Ill. June 5, 2025), Judge J. Phil Gilbert of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois granted a transgender worker’s petition to intervene in an EEOC discrimination case against her former employer, after the Commission moved to permanently dismiss the lawsuit to comply with a January 2025 Executive Order issued by President Trump. The Court opined that while it “recognize[d] that it may not dictate what cases the EEOC pursues” given that this was “the exclusive purview of the Executive Branch,” the worker also deserved a fair opportunity to litigate her claims. Id. at 3. This decision is noteworthy for its unique procedural posture. During the first few months of the Trump Administration, the EEOC has realigned its enforcement priorities consistent with a flurry of executive orders, but, as this decision illustrates, the Commission’s pending enforcement actions may not be so easily dismissed to the extent a private litigant’s rights are implicated by the dismissal.

Case Background

In March 2024, the EEOC brought an employment discrimination case on behalf of charging party Rafael Figueroa a/k/a Natasha Figueroa, alleging her employer, Sis-Bro Inc., a pig farm, discriminated against her by creating a hostile work environment and constructively discharged her based on her sex and transgender status in violation of Title VII. Id. at 1. After surviving a motion to dismiss, the Court allowed Figueroa to intervene and assert state law tort and discrimination claims, all of which were either voluntarily dismissed, or dismissed by the Court without prejudice, shortly thereafter. While discovery was ongoing, Sis-Bro filed a partial motion for summary judgment on the issue of back pay, front pay, and reinstatement, asserting Figueroa was not entitled to such relief given she was not legally eligible to work in the U.S. Id. at 2.

While the partial motion for summary judgement was pending, the executive administration changed, and on January 20, 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order 14168, “Defending Women From Gender Ideology Extremism and Restoring Biological Truth to the Federal Government.” After the Executive Order was issued, the EEOC moved to dismiss the action with prejudice, on the basis that continuing to litigate the matter would violate the Trump administration’s new Executive Order. Id.

As the EEOC’s motion to dismiss was pending, Figueroa sought to intervene a second time, filing yet another intervenor complaint asserting violations of Title VII (similar claims to that of the Commission), in addition to §1981 claims based on race, color, ethnicity, and national origin. Id. at 7. Figueroa did not request back pay, front pay, or reinstatement in her second intervenor complaint, but instead sought non-pecuniary and punitive damages, as well as attorneys’ fees. Id. at 3. In response, Sis-Bro moved to dismiss Figueroa’s motion to intervene, amongst other related motions, to dispose of the action entirely.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court began its ruling by observing, in dicta, that Figueroa had an interest in her claims that Sis-Bro violated the law, and while her claims may fail for other reasons, “the EEOC’s change of heart will not be one of those reasons.” Id. at 4. The Court then granted the EEOC’s motion to dismiss without prejudice, to ensure Figueroa’s rights were not impaired. Id. at 4-5.

The Court next addressed Sis-Bro’s arguments and rejected the contention that Figueroa’s motion to intervene was untimely, given Sis-Bro was unable to demonstrate her second intervenor action would have any prejudicial effect. Id. at 6. Although the Court did not allow Figueroa to re-plead her §1981 claims (because they were dismissed in the previous intervenor action), Figueroa was allowed to plead a new Title VII claim, given it was like the one that the EEOC abandoned, despite surviving a motion to dismiss. Id. at 7-8. The Court reasoned that although Figueroa did not assert these claims in her original intervenor complaint, “she placed her confidence in the good faith of the EEOC to pursue her rights along with its other statutory claims” and she sought to timely intervene once it became clear that the EEOC “changed its mind.” Id. at 9. Accordingly, the Court found Sis-Bro should be ready to litigate the matter.

Implications For Employers

As the above case illustrates, despite the fact that there has been a “changing of the guard” and the EEOC under President Trump has drastically different enforcement priorities than the Biden Administration, the Commission’s pending enforcement actions will not be so easily dismissed by courts, to the extent pending enforcement actions conflict with newly promulgated executive orders, provided that the allegedly aggrieved private litigant is ready and able to pursue the action without the assistance of the Commission.

Given that the EEOC under President Trump has indicated it will be withdrawing from many areas championed during the Biden Administration (e.g., disparate impact cases and abortion-related Pregnant Workers Fairness Act accommodation actions), private enforcement actions may increase within the coming months to fill in the enforcement vacuum left open by the Commission.

February 25, 2025February 25, 2025 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

EEOC’s First Publicized Settlement During The Trump Administration Puts Employers On Notice Of “Anti-American Bias”

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., and Christian J. Palacios

Duane Morris Takeaways: On February 18, 2025, in EEOC v. LeoPalace, Case No.: 1:25-CV-00004 (D. Guam), the EEOC settled a lawsuit and entered into a three-year consent decree with LeoPalace Resort, a large hotel in Guam. Under the terms of the agreement, LeoPalace agreed to pay over $1.4 million and hire an external equal employment monitor to settle allegations that it provided employees of non-Japanese national origin with less favorable wages, benefits, and other terms of employment than their Japanese counterparts. This lawsuit is significant because it is the first seven figure settlement that the Commission has procured since President Trump took office in January 2025 and it is accompanied by a statement from the new Acting Chair Andrea Lucas announcing the Commission’s new enforcement agenda and its intent to protect all workers from national origin discrimination and “Anti-American” bias.

The LeoPalace Settlement And Anti-American Bias Enforcement

On February 14, 2025 the EEOC filed suit against LeoPalace in the U.S. District Court for the District of Guam, on behalf of non-Japanese employees Christopher Adams, Thomas Lee and Donald Gueniot Jr., alleging that the hotel subjected these workers to less favorable wages and benefits, and other terms and conditions of employment compared to equivalent or subordinate Japanese employees on the basis of their national origin (non-Japanese), in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Id. at 1. The Commission settled with LeoPlace shortly thereafter, resulting in the hotel chain agreeing to pay $1,412,500.00 and further agreeing to a three-year external equal opportunity monitor to oversee compliance and training, as well as reinstate former employees interested in going back to work for LeoPalace. Id. at 9.

In the accompanying press release, Acting Chair Andrea Lucas announced, ““Federal anti-discrimination laws ensure equal employment opportunity for jobs performed by all workers regardless of national origin. The President’s Executive Order on Ending Illegal Discrimination and Restoring Merit-Based Opportunity recognizes that the longstanding federal civil rights laws serve as a bedrock to support equality of opportunity for all Americans. This case is an important reminder that unlawful national origin discrimination includes discrimination against American workers in favor of foreign workers.” See EEOC Newsroom, LeoPalace Resort to Pay Over $1.4 Million in EEOC National Origin Discrimination Lawsuit (Feb. 18, 2025). This is the Commission’s first publicized settlement since Lucas was appointed Acting Chair of the EEOC on January 21, 2025.

One day after the settlement was announced, the EEOC published a second press release on its Newsroom “putting employers and other covered entities on notice” that the Commission was committed to protecting all workers from unlawful national origin discrimination, including American workers. See EEOC Newsroom, EEOC Acting Chair Vows to Protect American Workers from Anti-American Bias (Feb. 19, 2025). The Commission further explained that, although Title VII’s national origin nondiscrimination requirement generally meant that employers could not prefer American workers, it also meant that employers could not prefer non-American workers, or otherwise disfavor Americans. Id. It concluded its press release by stating that while employers may have “many excuses” for preferring non-American workers (including lower labor cost, client preference, or a biased perception that foreign workers have a better work ethic than Americans), none of these were legally permissible reasons to violate Title VII. Id.

Takeaway for Employers

Every new presidential administration brings with it an array of objectives focused on different policy priorities. Since President Trump took office, he has taken unique steps to reshape the Commission by firing its Chair, two Commissioners, and its general counsel, all within the course of a few weeks. The Commission has already indicated it is committed to carrying out President Trump’s policy agenda, consistent with his executive orders related to “unlawful DEI-motivated race and sex discrimination,” “defending the biological and binary reality of sex and related rights,” “protecting workers from religious bias and harassment, including antisemitism” and, as the above settlement illustrates, “anti-American national origin discrimination.” See EEOC Newsroom, President Appoints Andrea R. Lucas EEOC Acting Chair (Jan. 21, 2025).

Employers should take note of the EEOC’s new policy priorities and can likely expect increased enforcement activity in each of these areas for the next four years.

April 8, 2024 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

BIPA Plaintiffs Ring The Bell In Class Certification Victory Over Amazon

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Tyler Zmick, and Christian J. Palacios

Duane Morris Takeaways: In Svoboda v. Amazon, Case No. 21-C-5336, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58867 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2024), Judge Jorge L. Alonso of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted class certification to a class of plaintiffs who alleged that Amazon’s “virtual try-on” (“VTO”) technology violated the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”). In doing so, Judge Alonso dealt Amazon a significant blow in its efforts to block the certification of a purported class of claimants that might number in the millions (with pre-certification discovery already establishing that there were over 160,000 persons who used Amazon’s VTO technology during the relevant class period). This decision is the most recent success by the plaintiffs’ bar in a string of victories for class action privacy lawsuits across Illinois and illustrates that even the largest and most sophisticated companies in the world face legal exposure in connection with their biometric retention and application practices.

Background

Amazon sells products to consumers on its mobile website and shopping application. Its “virtual try-on” technology allows users to virtually try on makeup and eyewear, and is exclusively available on mobile devices. VTOs are software programs that use augmented reality to overlay makeup and eyewear products on an image or video of a face, which allows shoppers to see what the product might look like prior to deciding whether to purchase it. During the relevant class period, there were two VTOs at issue, one of which was developed by a third party (ModiFace), and another which was developed in-house by Amazon that later replaced ModiFace. Id. at 4. Amazon’s VTOs come in two forms, including: (1) VTO technology available for lip products, and; (2) VTOs available for glasses. The ModiFace VTO is available for lip liner, eye shadow, eye liner, and hair color. Amazon licenses, rather than owns ModiFace VTO. Id. at 5.

Both Amazon and ModiFace VTOs essentially works the same for every user. In order to access Amazon’s virtual try-on technology, the user first begins by clicking a “try on” button on an Amazon product page (the use of this try-on feature is entirely optional and does not serve as a barrier to the customer actually purchasing the product). The first time the customer uses Amazon VTO, she is shown a pop-up screen that states, “Amazon uses your camera to virtually place products such as sunglasses and lipstick on your face using Augmented Reality. All information remains on your device and is not otherwise stored, processed or shared by Amazon.” Only after granting permission can the customer use the VTO technology to virtually try on the product. Users may select “live mode” or “photo upload mode” to superimpose the try-on product on an image of their own face. For both modes, the VTOs use software to detect users’ facial features and use that facial data in order to determine where to overlay the virtual products. Id. at 5.

Based on these facts, plaintiffs brought a class action lawsuit against Amazon, which alleged that the online retailer violated the BIPA’s requirements by collecting, capturing, storing or otherwise obtaining the facial geometry and associated personal identifying information of thousands (if not millions) of Illinois residents who used Amazon’s VTO applications from computers and other devices without first providing notice and the required information, obtaining informed written consent, or creating written publicly-available data retention and destruction guidelines. Id. Plaintiffs sought to certify a class of all individuals who used a virtual try-on feature on Amazon’s mobile website or app while in Illinois on or after September 7, 2016. Significantly, pre-certification discovery established that at least 163,738 people used virtual try-on technology on Amazon’s platforms while in Illinois during the class period. Id. at 6.

The Court’s Ruling

In ruling in favor of the plaintiffs, Judge Alonso systematically rejected each of Amazon’s arguments as to why plaintiffs failed to satisfy Rule 23’s requirements for class certification. Given the size of the purported class, Amazon did not attempt to contest the numerosity requirement. With respect to the adequacy requirement, Amazon argued that the named plaintiffs were inadequate and atypical because they alleged they used VTO for lipstick, and not eyewear or eye makeup (while the majority of the proposed class was comprised of individuals who used VTO for eyewear). Amazon further argued that the named plaintiffs had a conflicting interest with the class members who used VTO for eyewear, because the BIPA’s healthcare exception bars claims arising from the virtual try-on of eyewear. Id. at 12. The Court rejected this argument. It found that there was no evidence that the named plaintiffs’ interests were antagonistic, or directly conflicted with those members who used VTO to try on eyewear, and Amazon’s concern that plaintiffs lacked an incentive to vigorously contest the healthcare exception defense was merely speculative. Id. The Court was also satisfied that the plaintiffs’ claims arose from the same course of conduct that gave rise to other class members’ claims (such as Amazon’s purported collection, capture, possession, and use of facial templates via its VTOs) and thus the typicality requirement was satisfied. Id. at 15.

Similarly, the Court reasoned that common questions of law or fact predominated over any questions affecting individual members, and a class action was superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. Id. at 17. Amazon asserted that there was no reliable way to identify class members who used VTO in Illinois during the class period, and thus, individualized inquiries predominated rendering the case unmanageable. Id. at 21. The Court rejected this argument. It agreed with the plaintiffs that Illinois billing addresses, IP addresses from which VTO was used, and geo-location data all served as a way of identifying class members. Amazon raised other arguments about the difficulty of identifying potential class members, but Judge Alonzo rejected all of these arguments, observing that plaintiffs did not need to identify every member of the class at the certification stage. Id. at 23.

Finally, the Court dispatched with Amazon’s various affirmative defenses. In particular, Amazon argued that it had unique defenses for every member of the putative class, since damages were discretionary under the BIPA. The Court disagreed. It noted that the Illinois Supreme Court had determined that a trial court could fashion a damages award in a BIPA lawsuit that fairly compensated class members while deterring future violations, without destroying a defendant’s business. Id. at 25.

Implications for Employers

Employers should be well aware of the dangers associated with collecting or retaining individuals’ biometric information without BIPA-compliant policies in place. This case serves as a reminder that the larger the company, the larger the potential class size of a class or collective action. Although it remains to be seen the actual size of Svoboda v. Amazon, the class will likely number in the hundreds of thousands and this case should serve as a wake-up call for companies, regardless of scale, of the dangers of running afoul of the Prairie State’s privacy laws.

March 29, 2024 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

EEOC Scores Summary Judgement Victory Against Indiana RV Maker In Disability Suit

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Alex W. Karasik, and Christian J. Palacios

Duane Morris Takeaways: In EEOC v. Keystone RV Company, Case No. 3:22-CV-831 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 27, 2024), Judge Damon R. Leichty of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana held that an employer was liable under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) for failing to accommodate a former employee after the company terminated the worker for attendance issues stemming from his novel medical condition. This rare summary judgement victory in favor of the Commission illustrates the importance of employers engaging in an interactive process with their employees to provide them with reasonable accommodations under federal anti-discrimination laws, and the legal liability associated with non-compliance.

Background

The Charging party, Brandon Meeks, was diagnosed with cystinuria at the age of 19, a rare chronic illness that caused kidney stones to develop with irregular frequency. Roughly once every two years, he developed a large kidney stone that required surgical removal. In 2019 Meeks was hired as a painter at Keystone’s Wakarusa, Indiana plant, where he painted the base coat on RV wheels. Keystone had an attendance policy whereby it would terminate an employee who accrued seven “attendance points” (absences) within a year, and allowed an employee to miss up to three consecutive days from one doctor’s note and accrue just one attendance point without applying for an ADA accommodation. Id. at 2. According to the record, Mr. Meeks was a “diligent and hard worker,” but he accrued several attendance points for absences related to his medical condition, including a visit to his urologist, and treatment for kidney stone pain. Id.

On November 13, 2019, Meeks collapsed in a restroom due to excruciating pain. He was promptly rushed to the hospital and informed by a doctor that he had a “golf-ball-sized kidney stone” in his left kidney that would need to be surgically removed. Id. at 3. Meeks informed Keystone that he would require two weeks off of work to schedule and recover from surgery, which his employer agreed to given that Keystone’s Wakarusa plant closed down for several weeks from December to January and Meeks would only need a single day off of work. Prior to this request, Meeks had accrued 6 attendance points. Id. at 4. When Meeks returned to work on January 13, 2020, he informed Keystone he would need time off for another surgery scheduled on January 24, 2020. Meeks’ manager forecasted to him that he would be terminated if he missed work, and could reapply for employed 60 days later, per company policy. Id. According to the manager, Meeks did not provide a return to work date in connection with his second surgery request. According to Meeks, he knew he could likely return to work on January 27, 2020, but he never communicated this timeline to Keystone because his employer “never asked.” Id. After Meeks underwent his second surgery, on January 24, 2020, his mother drove him to the plant to pick up his paycheck, upon which he was sent to the corporate office and informed he was terminated due to his attendance points. Meeks subsequently filed a Charge with the EEOC. After its investigation, the EEOC brought suit on his behalf. On March 27, 2024, Judge Leichty granted summary judgement in favor of the Commission.

The District Court’s Ruling

Judge Leichty began his 19-page ruling by observing that this case illustrated one reason “why the ADA existed.” Id. at 1. Judge Leichty observed that “[n]o one can reasonably dispute that Mr. Meeks was a qualified individual with a disability. Keystone knew of the disability. And Keystone failed to accommodate the disability reasonably. A reasonable jury could not find otherwise on this record.” Id. at 7.

As the record reflected, the Court reasoned that Keystone clearly could have accommodated providing Meeks with two weeks leave, and yet it had not done so. The Court was unpersuaded by Keystone’s arguments that Meeks did not effectively communicate with his employer, and prior to his January surgery, he did not provide Keystone with an estimated return date. Rather, the Court determined that Keystone had an affirmative obligation to initiate an interactive process with its employees, and had historical knowledge of Meeks’ disability; because of this, the fault was theirs alone. Thus, “[a] reasonable jury could not lay the fault at Mr. Meeks’ feet,” and the Court granted summary judgement in the EEOC’s favor on ADA liability. Id. at 10-11.

Judge Leichty scheduled a trial at a later date to assess the question of damages, as factual disputes remained regarding Meeks’ reasonable diligence at finding comparable employment.

Implications For Employers

As the ruling in EEOC v. Keystone RV Company illustrates, it is imperative that employers engage in an interactive process with employees with respect to disability accommodations, provided the employer has reason to know of the employee’s disability. Significantly, a formal ADA request is not necessary on the part of the employee for a court to find an employer at fault for a breakdown of the interactive process. Because of this, employers should have robust policies in place to proactively provide their employees with reasonable accommodations for their disabilities. To do otherwise risks receiving a pre-liability judgement in favor of a federal, state, or municipal regulatory agency tasked with enforcing anti-discrimination legislation.

March 12, 2024 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

The EEOC’s 2023 Annual Performance Report Touts A Record $665 Million In Worker Recoveries

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Alex W. Karasik, and Christian J. Palacios

Duane Morris Takeaways: On March 11, 2024, the EEOC published its Fiscal Year 2023 Annual Performance Report (FY 2023 APR), highlighting the Commission’s accomplishments for the previous year, including a record-breaking recovery of $665 million in monetary relief for over 22,000 workers, a near 30% increase for workers over Fiscal Year 2022.

Employers should take note of the Commission’s annual report, as it provides invaluable insight into the EEOC’s regulatory priorities, and highlights the significant degree of financial risk that companies face for failing to comply with federal anti-discrimination laws. It is a must read for corporate counsel, HR professional, and business leaders.

FY 2023 Statistical Highlights

The EEOC’s recovery of $665 million in monetary relief over the past fiscal year represents an increase of 29.5% compared to Fiscal Year 2022. Specifically, the Commission secured approximately $440.5 million for 15,143 workers in the private sector and state and local governments and another $204 million for 5,943 federal employees and applicants.

Furthermore, the Commission reported having one of the most litigious years in recent memory, with 142 new lawsuits filed, marking a 50% increase from Fiscal Year 2022. Among these new lawsuits, 86 were filed on behalf of individuals, 32 were non-systemic suits involving multiple victims, and 25 were systemic suits addressing discriminatory policies or affecting multiple victims. These numbers show an agency flexing its litigation muscles.

The EEOC’s drastic increase in filings was accompanied by a corresponding increase in complaint activity, with 81,055 new discrimination charges received, 233,704 inquiries handled in field offices, and over 522,000 calls from the public, thereby demonstrating the efficacy of the Commission’s outreach and public education efforts.

Other performance highlights from the report included obtaining more than $22.6 million for 968 individuals in litigation, while resolving 98 lawsuits and achieving favorable results in 91% of all federal district court resolutions. The Commission further reduced its private and federal sector inventories by record levels.

Strategic Developments / Systemic Litigation

The Commission also reported significant progress in its “priority areas” for 2023, which included combatting systemic discrimination, preventing workplace harassment, advancing racial justice, remedying retaliation, advancing pay equity, promoting diversity, equity, inclusion and accessibility (“DEIA”) in the workplace, and, significantly, embracing the use of technology, including artificial intelligence, machine learning, and other automated systems in employment decisions.

In 2023, the EEOC resolved over 370 systemic investigations on the merits, resulting in over $29 million in monetary benefits for victims of discrimination. The Commission also reported that its litigation program achieved a 100% success rate in its systemic case resolutions, obtaining over $11 million for 806 systemic discrimination victims, as well as substantial equitable relief. Further, the Commission made outreach and education programs a priority in 2023, and specifically sought to reach vulnerable workers and underserved communities, including immigrant and farmworker communities, hosting over 680 events for these groups and partnering with over 1,120 organizations, reaching over 107,000 attendees.

Other Notable Developments

Beyond touting its monetary successes, and litigation accomplishments, the FY 2023 APR also highlights the newly enacted Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (“PWFA”), which provides workers with limitations related to pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions the ability to obtain reasonable accommodations, absent undue hardship to the employer.

The Commission began accepting PWFA charges on June 27, 2023 (the law’s effective date) and has conducted broad public outreach relating to employers’ compliance obligations under the new law.

Takeaways For Employers

The EEOC’s Report is akin to a litigation scorecard. By all accounts, 2023 was a record-breaking year for the EEOC. As demonstrated in the report, the Commission has pursued an increasingly aggressive and ambitious litigation strategy to achieve its regulatory goals, and had a great deal of success in obtaining financially significant monetary awards. Employers should take note of these trends and be proactive in implementing risk-mitigation strategies and EEOC-compliant policies.

We anticipate that the EEOC will continue to aggressively pursue its strategic priority areas in 2024, which could shape out to be another precedent-setting year. We will continue to track EEOC litigation activity, and look forward to providing our blog readers with up-to-date analysis on the latest developments.