California Court of Appeal Affirms Trial Court Judgment Defeating Malicious Prosecution Action Where Sister-in-Law Served As Class Representative In Underlying Lawsuit

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Daniel D. Spencer, and George J. Schaller

Duane Morris Takeaways: On June 10, 2026, in Citizens of Humanity, LLC v. John Donboli et al., No. D085849, 2026 Cal. App. LEXIS 360 (Cal. App. June 10, 2026), the California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision in favor of Defendants in a malicious prosecution action stemming from a consumer class action over “Made in the U.S.A.” labeling on jeans.  The Court of Appeal held that a familial relationship between a named plaintiff and class counsel does not, as a matter of law, deprive a class action of probable cause, and that Apple Computer, Inc. v. Superior Court, 126 Cal.App.4th 1253(2005), does not establish a per se bar on relatives of class counsel serving as class representatives.

For companies that have faced consumer class actions and are considering malicious prosecution counterclaims, this decision underscores that the probable cause standard remains a high bar and requires a showing that any reasonable attorney would agree the underlying claims were totally and completely without merit.

Case Background

Citizens of Humanity LLC is a jeans manufacturer whose products had “Made in the U.S.A.” labels, despite Citizens Ingrid-style jeans having fabrics and components sourced from Japan and China.  Citizens of Humanity, LLC v. John Donboli et al., No. D085849, 2026 Cal. App. LEXIS 360, *7 n. 2 (Cal. App. June 10, 2026). 

In June 2014, attorneys John Donboli and JL Sean Slattery of Del Mar Law Group LLP filed a putative class action against Citizens in federal court, alleging the labels violated former California Business and Professions Code § 17533.7, the Consumers Legal Remedies Act, and the Unfair Competition Law.  Id. at *3.

In the federal court action against Citizens, Louise Clark served as the named-plaintiff who previously purchased Citizens’ Ingrid-style jeans.  Citizens later discovered Clark was attorney Slattery’s sister-in-law.  Id.  Based on this familial relationship, Citizens moved to disqualify Del Mar Law Group as class counsel.  While that motion was pending, Clark filed a motion to withdraw and substitute a new named-plaintiff, Coni Hass.  Id. at *4.  The federal court granted the motion to withdraw and substitute and found that the substitution “vitiate[d]” Citizen’s disqualification motion and also held Citizens “failed to demonstrate that [Clark] or her counsel . . . acted in bad faith” in requesting substitution.  Id.

As the action was pending, the California Legislature amended § 17533.7 to permit “Made in the U.S.A.” labeling where foreign-sourced materials constitute no more than 5% (or 10% if not domestically sourceable) of the final wholesale value of the product.  Id.  In response to the amendment, Citizens moved to dismiss.  The district court granted Citizens’ motion and allowed Hass leave to amend, but Hass elected not to amend and the case was dismissed.  Id. 

In February 2018, Citizens filed this action for malicious prosecution against attorneys Donboli and Slattery, Del Mar Law Group, and former named plaintiffs Clark and Hass (collectively “Defendants”). 

Defendants moved to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute, but the trial court denied their motion, and that ruling was later affirmed by this Court of Appeal (see Citizens of Humanity, LLC v. Hass, 46 Cal.App.5th 589 (2020)).  Citizens of Humanity, LLC, 2026 Cal. App. LEXIS 360 at *5. 

In affirming, the Court of Appeal “found two conflicting narratives . . . regarding the origin of the federal mislabeling case.”  Id. at *5-6.  It concluded one possible narrative was “that Clark was a shill plaintiff, and [her attorneys] were aware of this fact.”  The second possible narrative focused on Hass and whether Defendants “knew ‘that Hass purchased Ingrid-style jeans with a label that said ‘Made in the U.S.A.’ and components of those jeans came from a foreign country[.]’”  Id. at *6. 

After affirming, the case was remanded and the matter proceeded to trial.  After opening statements, and after Citizens presented testimony from the company’s founder, the parties asked the court “to ‘review certain exhibits, [and] deposition testimony from Clark and Hass’ and the parties ‘agreed to have the [c]ourt make a determination on probable cause’” consequently waiving their right for the jury to decide that issue.  Id. at *7.  After accepting evidence and hearing argument the trial court ruled in favor of Defendants concluding “Citizens had not established [Defendants] lacked probable cause for” the previously filed putative class action and entered judgment for Defendants.  Id. at *7-8.  Citizens appealed. 

The Court of Appeal’s Decision

The Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of the trial court. 

Citizens’ primary argument on appeal was that Defendants lacked probable cause as a matter of law because Clark, as Slaterry’s sister-in-law, was an improper class representative under Apple Computer, Inc. v. Superior Court.  Citizens relied on the Apple court’s observation that “the majority of courts . . . have refused to permit class attorneys, their relatives, or business associates from acting as the class representative.”  Citizens of Humanity, LLC, 2026 Cal. App. LEXIS 360 at *10-11.  The Court of Appeal rejected this argument on multiple grounds.

First, the Court of Appeal distinguished Apple factually and noted that the plaintiff in that case was an attorney at one of the representing firms who stood to gain monetarily from recovery of attorney fees.  Id. at *11.  The Court of Appeal reasoned that Apple addressed a “‘financial relationship and interdependence between’ the plaintiff and associated.”  Id.  Here, however, Citizens presented no information “about any ‘financial relationship’ between Slattery and Clark.”  The Court of Appeal also determined it was not “reasonable to presume ‘interdependence’ solely based on [Slattery and Clark’s] relationship as siblings-in-law.”  Id. 

Second, the Court of Appeal held that the relevant passage in Apple is, “at best” “dictum that cannot bind very reasonable attorney on threat of a malicious prosecution judgment.”  Id. at *12. 

Third, it reasoned that even if a disqualifying conflict existed, it would not be fatal to the putative class action against Citizens.  As the Court of Appeal noted “Clark could have pursued the claim with different counsel, or [Del Mar] Law Group could have proceeded with a different representative plaintiff, which is what the district court authorized here after Clark decided to withdraw.”  Id. at *13. 

Accordingly, the Court of Appeal affirmed and agreed with “the trial court’s conclusion that Apple is not determinative of the probable cause analysis here.”  Id. 

Implications For Corporate Litigants

For companies facing consumer class actions, including those with origin-of-manufacture claims such as “Made in the U.S.A.,” this decision serves as a reminder that labeling must comply with current statutory standards. 

Even assuming a company is successful in defeating a consumer class action, then companies considering malicious prosecution actions should take note that class representative conflicts, including familial relationships with class counsel, are evaluated on a fact-specific basis.  There is no per se rule of disqualification, and even where a conflict exists, it goes to the fitness of counsel or the representative, not the viability of the underlying claim itself.  As the Court of Appeal noted here, the class action can proceed with substitute counsel or a substitute plaintiff.

The decision in Citizens of Humanity, LLC, serves as a cautionary tale that even relatives of class counsel can potentially serve as class representatives and further narrows adequacy challenges to class certification.  It also demonstrates another way class counsel can creatively select representative plaintiffs while still allowing courts to scrutinize representative plaintiffs for actual conflicts on a case-by-case basis. 

Duane Morris Class Action Review – 2026/2027: Mid-Year Class Action Settlement Report & Analysis

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. and Jennifer A. Riley

Duane Morris Takeaways: Corporate defendants saw unprecedented settlement numbers across all areas of class action litigation between 2022 and 2025, and mid-year through 2026, settlement numbers are even more robust. The cumulative value of the top ten settlements across all substantive areas of class action litigation hit record highs in 2025, surpassing the highest levels ever in 2022. When the numbers for the previous few years are combined, the total signals that corporate defendants have entered a new era of heightened risks and higher stakes in the valuation of class actions.

On an aggregate basis, across all areas of litigation, class actions and government enforcement lawsuits garnered more than $79 billion in 2025, $42 billion in 2024, $51.4 billion in settlements in 2023, and a $66 billion in 2022. When combined, the four-year settlement total eclipses any other four-year period in the history of American jurisprudence.

As a prelude to the Duane Morris Class Action Review – 2027, this blog post reports on our analysis of class action settlements through the first half of 2026. The data shows that for the period of January 1 to June 30, 2026, the current year is ahead of the historically high numbers of 2025. As of the end of the first half of 2026, the aggregate settlement total across all areas of class action litigation and government enforcement lawsuits is $53.795 billion (in accounting for the top 5 settlements in the various substantive areas of law). By comparison, in 2025 at the half-way mark, the aggregate settlement total was $21.77 billion.

It is anticipated that these numbers will increase across the board by the end of the year and when measured by the top 10 settlements in each category.

More Billion Dollar Class Action Settlements

At the mid-way point of 2026, there are three settlements over the billion-dollar mark. There were eight total billion-dollar settlements in 2025. The 10 individual billion-dollar settlements in 2024 surpassed the number in 2023, and only fell short of the number of billion-dollar settlements in 2022. In 2023, parties resolved nine class actions for $1 billion or more. In 2022, parties resolved 15 class actions for $1 billion or more in settlement dollars. Together with the three thus far in 2026, corporations have seen 45 settlements of one billion dollars or more in four and a half years. This string of settlements marks the most extensive set of billion-dollar class action settlements in the history of the American court system.

The Scorecard On Leading Class Actions Settlements Halfway Through 2026

The plaintiffs’ class action bar has scored rich settlements thus far in 2026 in virtually every area of class action litigation. The following list shows the totals of the top 5 settlements at the mid-year point in 2026 in key areas of class action litigation:

$34.875 Billion – Antitrust class actions
$8.609 Billion – Products liability/Mass Tort class actions
$4.25 Billion – Government Enforcement actions
$1.979 Billion – Securities Fraud class actions
$1.535 Billion – Consumer Fraud class actions

$624 Million – Privacy class actions
$501 Million – ERISA class actions
$392.1 Million – Discrimination class actions
$323.9 Million – Wage & Hour class and collective actions

$309.7 Million – Data Breach class actions
$242.45 Million – Labor class actions
$105.05 Million – Fair Credit Reporting Act class actions
$60.93 Million – TCPA class actions

$41.9 Million – Civil Rights class actions

The high dollar settlements of the past four years suggested that the plaintiffs’ bar would continue to be equally, if not more aggressive, with their case filings and settlement positions. From the 2026 data, it certainly looks to be the case as we end the first half of the year. The data points in each category are set out in the following charts.

Top Class & Collective Action Litigation Settlements In 2026

Top Antitrust Class Action Settlements In 2026

The top 10 antitrust class action settlements totaled $45.99 billion in 2025, $8.412 billion in 2024, $11.74 billion in 2023, and $3.72 billion in 2022.

  1. $34 billion – In Re Payment Card Interchange Fee And Merchant Discount Antitrust Litigation, Case No. 05-MD-1720 (E.D.N.Y. June 9, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval granted to Visa’s and Mastercard’s revised settlement with merchants who accused the card networks of ‌charging too much to process payments on their credit cards).
  2. $303 million – Ray, et al. v. NCAA, Case No. 23-CV-425 (E.D. Cal. May 12, 2026) (final settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve claims from thousands of Division I volunteer coaches alleging that the organization’s rules fixed their compensation at zero).
  3. $218 million – In Re Realpage Inc. Rental Software Antitrust Litigation, Case No. 23-MD-3071 (M.D. Tenn. May 22, 2026) (May 22, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval granted to resolve claims from a second set of renters alleging antitrust claims that they colluded with revenue management firm RealPage Inc. to fix rental prices across the country).
  4. $200 million – In Re Generic Pharmaceutical Pricing Antitrust Litigation, Case No. 16-MD-2724 (E.D. Penn. Jan 23, 2026) (final settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve claims alleging antitrust claims alleging the defendants conspired with other drugmakers to inflate generic drug prices).
  5. $136 million – In Re PVC Pipe Antitrust Litigation, Case No. 24-CV-7639 (N.D. Ill. May 13, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve claims alleging that the company conspired with other polyvinyl chloride pipe producers to fix prices).

Top Civil Rights Class Action Settlements In 2026

The top 10 civil rights class action settlements totaled $580.9 million in 2025, $313.8 million in 2024, $643.15 million in 2023, and $1.31 billion in 2022.

  1. $20 million – Healy, et al. v. Jefferson County Kentucky Louisville Metro Government, Case No. 17-CV-71 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 11, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve claims alleging that the County regularly imprisons, detains  or  incarcerates  persons  longer  than ordered by Courts of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, and under conditions that violate the orders of such Courts).
  2. $15 million – Johnson, et al. v. City Of Annapolis, Case No. 21-CV-112 (D. Md. May 26, 2026) (settlement reached in two class actions to resolve claims from more than 1,400 city residents of public housing and by representatives of a former public housing resident who died alleging substandard housing conditions at properties owned and operated by the Housing Authority of the City of Annapolis (HACA).
  3. $4 million – Cody, et al. v. City Of St. Louis, Case No. 17-CV-2707 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 13, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve claims from hundreds of people who say they endured inhumane conditions while held at the city’s Medium Security Institution, commonly known as the Workhouse).
  4. $1.5 million – Coleman, et al. v. City Of Brookside, Case No. 22-CV-423 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 6, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval sought in a class action to resolve claims brought by four drivers who said they were targeted in an aggressive towing and ticketing scheme).
  5. $1.4 million – Santiago, et al. v. City Of Chicago, Case No. 22-CV-5827 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 8, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval granted in two consolidated actions to resolve claims alleging the city of Chicago tows vehicles it deems abandoned without properly notifying their owners).

Top Consumer Fraud Class Action Settlements In 2026

The top 10 consumer fraud class action settlements totaled $2.1 billion in 2025, $2.44 billion in 2024, $3.29 billion in 2023, and $8.596 billion in 2022.

  1. $436 million – Broadmoor Lumber & Plywood Co. et al. v. Toyota Industries Corp., Case No. 24-CV-6640 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve claims alleging that the defendant and its subsidiaries misled tens of thousands of business buyers into thinking the emissions of its forklift and construction engines were “the cleanest” in the industry).
  2. $425 million – In Re Capital One 360 Savings Account Interest Rate Litigation, Case No. 24-MD-311 (E.D. Va. Apr. 20, 2026) (final settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve claims alleging that Capital One deceptively advertised its 360 Savings accounts).
  3. $309 million – In Re Amazon Return Policy Litigation, Case No. 23-CV-1372 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 27, 2026) (settlement approval sought in a class action to resolve a proposed class action accusing Amazon of shortchanging customers on refunds for returned items).
  4. $240 million – Bickerstaff, et al. v. SunTrust Bank, Case No. 10EV010485 (Ga. Cir. Ct. May 26, 2026) (final settlement approval granted in a class action alleging that the bank charged illegal overdrafts on ATM and debit card transactions which harmed Georgia consumers).
  5. $125 million – National Veterans Legal Services Program, et al. v. United States, Case No. 24-1757 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 20, 2026) (settlement approval affirmed in a class action to resolve claims of hundreds of thousands of PACER users who were allegedly made to pay more than the law allowed).

Top Data Breach Class Action Settlements In 2026

The top 10 data breach class action settlements totaled $515.79 million in 2025, $593.2 million in 2024, $515.75 million in 2023, and $719.21 million in 2022.

  1. $117.5 million – Hasson, et al. v. Comcast Cable Communications LLC, Case No. 23-CV-5039 (E.D. Penn. May 13, 2026) (final settlement approval granted in a consolidated class action lawsuit alleging the internet and mobile services provider failed to implement proper cybersecurity measures to safeguard sensitive consumer information, leading to an October 2023 data breach).
  2. $46.7 million – In Re 23andMe, Inc., Customer Data Security Breach Litigation, Case No. 24-MD-3098 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2026) (final settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve claims alleging that 23andMe Inc. and affiliates had a data breach in which millions of customers’ genetic data and personally identifiable information (PII) was hacked).
  3. $31.5 million – Angus, et al. v. Flagstar Bank FSB, Case No. 21-CV-10657 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 12, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve consolidated class claims that Flagstar Bank failed to protect the personal information of customers and employees in two data breaches impacting more than 2 million people).
  4. $26 million – In Re Lakeview Loan Servicing Data Breach Litigation, Case No. 22-CV-20955 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 4, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval granted to settle a class action over their personally identifiable information potentially being accessed during a data breach).
  5. $24.5 million – In Re LastPass Data Security Incident Litigation, Case No. 22-CV-12047 (D. Mass. Feb. 2, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval granted to settle a proposed class action over a 2022 data breach that exposed the personal information of millions of people and led to the looting of cryptocurrency accounts).

Top Discrimination Class Action Settlements In 2026

The top 10 discrimination class action settlements totaled $507.10 million in 2025, $356.8 million in 2024, $762.2 million in 2023, and $597 million in 2022.

  1. $110 million – In Re Wells Fargo & Co. Hiring Practices Derivative Litigation, Case No. 22-CV-5173 (N.D. Cal. May 15, 2026) (final settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve a shareholder derivative lawsuit accusing the bank of corporate mismanagement through discriminatory hiring and lending).
  2. $100 million – Snyder-Hill, et al. v. The Ohio State University, Case No. 23-cv-2993, Knight, et al. v. The Ohio State University, Case No. 23-CV-2994, and Gonzales, et al. v. The Ohio State University, Case No. 23-CV-3051 (S.D. Ohio June 22, 2026) (board approval of a settlement agreement to resolve claims from approximately 300 former students accusing former Ohio State University sports doctor Richard Strauss of sexual abuse).
  3. $72.5 million – Doe, et al. v. Bank Of America NA, Case No. 25-CV-8520 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve claims alleging that the defendant Jeffrey Epstein’s sex trafficking and abuse).
  4. $60.5 million – Candelore, et al. v. Tinder, Inc., Case No. BC583162 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 4, 2026) (final settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve claims alleging that the company charged older users more than younger users for Tinder Plus and Tinder Gold subscriptions.
  5. $35 million – Bensky, et al. v. Darren Indyke, Case No. 24-CV-1204 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval granted in a class action alleging that the defendants helped facilitate Jeffrey Epstein’s vast sex trafficking enterprise).

Top EEOC / Government Enforcement Class Action Settlements In 2026

The top 10 EEOC / government enforcement class action settlements totaled $3.29 billion in 2025, $335.9 million in 2024, $263.58 million in 2023, and $404.5 million in 2022.

  1. $3 billion – New Jersey Department Of Environmental Protection, et al. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Case No. 19-CV-14758 & 19-CV-14766 (D.N.J. June 24, 2026) (settlement approval pending to resolve the state’s claims over contamination caused by the manufacture and discharge of forever chemicals).
  2. $575 million – United States Of America, et al. v. PacifiCorp., Case No. 24-CV-2102 (D. Ore. Feb. 20, 2026) (settlement reached to resolve claims for damages related to wildfires in Oregon and Northern California).
  3. $450 million – United States Of America, et al. v. Chemours Co., Case No. 26-CV-418 (S.D. W. Va. June 24, 2026) (proposed consent decree entered for a multi-state settlement with Chemours Co. over alleged years-long, illegal discharges of synthetic “forever chemicals” used to make products resistant to water, grease and stains).
  4. $125 million – Illinois And Peoples Gas and Northshore Gas (Ill. Cmrc. Comm. Apr. 30, 2026) (settlement reached with two gas companies and the Attorney General’s office on behalf of customers concerning costs related to Peoples Gas’ ongoing, massive program to retire cast- and ductile-iron mains).
  5. $100 million – Federal Trade Commission, et al. v. Walmart Inc., Case No. 26-CV-1655 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2026) (consent decree entered to settle claims the company misled its “Spark” delivery program drivers over the amount they would be paid, and deceived customers over how much of the tips they paid would go to their drivers).

Top ERISA Class Action Settlements In 2026

The top 10 ERISA class action settlements totaled $680.30 million in 2025, $413.3 million in 2024, $580.5 million in 2023, and $399.6 million in 2022.

  1. $332 million – McCutcheon, et al. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., Case No. 16-CV-4170 (S.D. N.Y. Jan. 14, 2026) (final settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve claims alleging that Colgate-Palmolive violated ERISA by miscalculating pension benefits for retirees who took lump-sum distributions between 1989 and 2005).
  2. $48 million – Hoak, et al. v. Ledford, Case No. 15-CV-3983 (N.D. Ga. May 13, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval sought in a class action to resolve claims alleging that the defendant failed to provide annuity payments for life).
  3. $44.4 million – In Re AME Church Employee Retirement Fund Litigation, Case No. 22-MD-3035 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 24, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval granted in a multidistrict litigation from a class of African Methodist Episcopal Church workers who alleged that mismanagement of their annuity retirement plan allowed a rogue employee to embezzle $90 million).
  4. $42 million – Halter, et al. v. Providence Health & Services, Case No. 25-CV-210 (W.D. Wash. June 4, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve claims alleging that Providence mismanaged its employees’ retirement plan by failing to use money forfeited by departing workers to reduce administrative expenses).
  5. $35 million – Iron Workers District Council Of New England Health And Welfare Fund, et al. v. Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd., Case No. 23-CV-11131 (D. Mass. Apr. 3, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve claims from a coalition of union healthcare funds alleging that the defendant schemed to delay generic competition for its QVAR asthma inhalers).

Top FCRA, FDPCA, And FACTA Class Action Settlements In 2026

The top 10 FCRA, FDPCA, and FACTA class action settlements totaled $74.77 million in 2025, $42.43 million in 2024, $100.15 million in 2023, and $210.11 million in 2022.

  1. $56.85 million – Stoff, et al. v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A., Case No. 37-2020-00020808-CU-BT-CTL (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 17, 2026) (final settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve claims alleging that the company violated the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) by failing to report CARES Act forbearances accurately).
  2. $14.3 million – Ray, et al. v. AdaptHealth Corp., Case No. 22-CV-898 (M.D.N.C. June 1, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval sought in a class action to resolve claims alleging that the company violated the North Carolina Debt Collection Act by overcharging and trying to collect debts from patients who had returned medical equipment to the company).
  3. $13.5 million – Scroggins, et al. v. LexisNexis Risk Solutions FL Inc., Case No. 22-cv-00545 (E.D. Va. Mar. 16, 2026) (final settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve claims alleging that the defendant incorrectly reported some consumers as deceased). 
  4. $13 million – VanderKodde, et al. v. Elliott, Case No. 17-CV-203 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 13, 2026) (final settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve claims from debtors who alleged that a creditor law firm charged unlawfully high post-judgment interest rates during debt collection).
  5. $7.4 million – Keim, et al. v. Trader Joe’s, Case No. 19STCV36790 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 5, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve claims alleging that the grocery store violated the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act by providing customers with printed receipts that displayed both the first six and last four digits of their card numbers).

Top FLSA / Wage & Hour Class And Collective Settlements In 2026

The top 10 FLSA / wage & hour class and collective action settlements totaled $430.58 million in 2025, $614.55 million in 2024, $742.5 million in 2023, and $574.55 million in 2022.

  1. $162 million – Calderon, et al. v. Public Partnerships LLC, Case No. 25-CV-2320 (E.D.N.Y. June 23, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval sought in a class action to resolve claims alleging that the company failed to timely and accurately pay about 200,000 personal assistants).
  2. $86 million – Callister, et al. v. Swedish Health Services, Case No. 21-2-16148-7 (Wash. Super. Ct. May 8, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval granted in a class action alleging that the company failed to provide required second meal periods for employees working shifts longer than 10 hours, and underpaid workers through a policy of rounding time entries).
  3. $38.7 million – Pruess, et al. v. Presbyterian Health Plan Inc., Case No. 19-CV-629 (D.N.M. Jan. 9, 2026) (D.N.M. June 24, 2026) (final settlement approval granted to resolve claims alleging that the defendant failed to pay overtime compensation to care workers in violation of the FLSA).
  4. $19.2 million – Diaz, et al. v. New York Paving Inc., Case No. 18-CV-4910 (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2026) (final settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve claims alleging that the defendant failed to pay for pre- and post-shift work and for overtime compensation).
  5. $18 million – Abarca, et al. v. Werner Enterprises Inc., Case No. 14-CV-319, Smith, et al. v. Werner Enterprises Inc., Case No. 15-CV-287, and Vester, et al. v. Werner Enterprises Inc., Case No. 17-CV-145 (D. Neb. Feb. 5, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval granted in a collective action to resolve claims alleging that Werner failed to pay minimum wages for non-driving work time, including time spent in sleeper berths, waiting for loads, performing pre-trip and post-trip inspections and attending to cargo security).

Top Labor Class Action Settlements In 2026

The top 10 labor class action settlements totaled $210.5 million in 2025, $237.0 million in 2024 and $129.67 million in 2023.

  1. $200.2 million – Brown, et al. v. JBS, Inc., Case No. 22-CV-2946 (D. Colo. Jan. 15, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve claims between former employees and Agri Beef, American Foods Group, Cargill, Hormel, JBS, National Beef, Nebraska Beef, Perdue Farms, Quality Pork, Seaboard Foods, Triumph Foods and Tyson Foods alleging that the companies unlawfully conspired to suppress the wages of workers at their processing plants).
  2. $27.5 million – Hoffman, et al.  v. United Airlines, Inc., Case No. 21-CV-6395 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 11, 2026) (settlement reached in a class action to settle a lawsuit by former employees who say the defendant mishandled recent voluntary buyout programs).
  3. $9.5 million – Dorrell, et al. v. Constellation Energy Corp., Case No. 25-CV-2251 (D. Md. May 12, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval sought in a class action alleging that the company conspired with other major nuclear power generation companies to illegally limit compensation for employees).
  4. $3 million – Bailey, et al. v. Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc., Case No. 24-CV-2749 (W.D. Tenn. May 1, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval sought in a class action to resolve claims alleging that the defendant failed to retroactively reimburse the tobacco penalties paid by certain employees who subsequently complete a quit-smoking program, and of failing to inform workers that recommendations from their personal physicians will be considered in the course of assessing penalties).
  5. $2.25 million – Brinkman, et al. v. Target Corporation, Case No. 24-2- 25091-3 (Wash. Super. Ct. May 5, 2026) (final settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve claims alleging that the company failed to disclose wage scales and salary ranges in Washington job postings).

Top Privacy Class Action Settlements In 2026

The top 10 privacy class action settlements totaled $801.85 million in 2025, $2.01 billion in 2024, $1.32 billion in 2023, and $896.7 million in 2022.

  1. $250 million – Landsheft, et al. v. Apple Inc., Case No. 25-CV-2668 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval sought in a class action to resolve claims alleging that Apple misled millions of iPhone buyers by falsely touting artificial intelligence capabilities for its Siri voice assistant in 2024).
  2. $135 million – Taylor, et al. v. Google LLC, Case No. 20-CV-7956 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval sought in a class action class action alleging Google illegally consumes the cellular data consumers have purchased from their cellular providers).
  3. $115 million – Katz-Lacabe, et al. v. Oracle America Inc., No. 24-7648 (9th Cir. Feb. 13, 2026) (final settlement approval affirmed in a privacy lawsuit over the defendant’s online data-collection practices despite the objections of one class member).
  4. $68 million – In Re Google Assistant Privacy Litigation, Case No. 19-CV-4286 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve claims alleging that Google eavesdropped on and recorded confidential communications without user consent).
  5. $56 million – Frasco, et al. v. Flo Health Inc., Case No. 21-CV-757 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve from Flo users who alleged Google illegally intercepted the private menstrual health data of millions of users without their consent).

Top Products Liability And Mass Tort Class Action Settlements In 2026

The top 10 products liability / mass tort class action settlements totaled $17.9 billion in 2025, $23.40 billion in 2024, $25.83 billion in 2023, and $50.32 billion in 2022.

  1. $7.25 billion – King, et al. v. Monsanto Co., Case No. 2622-CC00325 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Mar. 4, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval granted to resolve current and future claims across the U.S. that weed killer Roundup causes non-Hodgkin lymphoma).
  2. $773 million – In Re National Prescription Opiate Litigation, Case No. 17-MD-2804 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 14, 2026) (Albertsons Cos. Inc. and the attorneys general of California, Colorado, Illinois, and Oregon agreed to a settlement in principle to end claims brought by states, local governments, and Native American tribes over its role in the opioid crisis).
  3. $318 million – In Re 650 Fifth Avenue and Related Properties, Case No. 08-CV-10934 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2026) (settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve claims stemming from the federal government’s forfeiture action against a 36-story Midtown Manhattan office tower linked to the Iranian government).
  4. $180 million – The Diocese of Camden, New Jersey, Case No. 20-BK-21257 (D.N.J. Bank. Ct. Feb. 17, 2026) (settlement reached pending approval by the bankruptcy court in a class action to resolve a dispute arising from claims of sexual abuse by members of the Diocesan clergy).
  5. $88.5 million – In Re National Prescription Opiate Litigation, Case No. 17-MD-2804 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 29, 2026) (final settlement agreement granted with Amneal Pharmaceuticals and several states to resolve litigation over its role in creating and fueling the opioid overdose epidemic).

Top Securities Fraud Class Action Settlements In 2026

The top 10 securities fraud class action settlements totaled $3.45 billion in 2025, $2.55 billion in 2024, $5.4 billion in 2023, and $3.25 billion in 2022.

  1. $740 million – In Re Didi Global Securities Litigation, Case No. 21-CV-5807 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2026) (final settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve claims by investors alleging that defendants violated the federal securities laws by making false and misleading statements and omissions in the Registration Statement and engaged in deceptive conduct in connection with DiDi’s June 30, 2021 Initial Public Offering (IPO).
  2. $500 million – Sjunde AP-Fonden, et al. v. The Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Case No. 18-CV-12084 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2026) (settlement reached in a class action brought by investors who asserted that they lost money after it came to light that the company was allegedly involved in a bribery scandal tied to Malaysia’s sovereign wealth fund).
  3. $250 million – Crews, Jr., et al. v. Rivian Automotive, Inc., Case No. 22-CV-1524 (C.D. Cal. May 20, 2026) (final settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve claims from investors alleging that the company misled investors in connection with its Initial Public Offering).
  4. $250 million – Sjunde AP-Fonden, et al. v. Activision Blizzard Inc., Case No. 2022-1001 (Del. Chanc. Ct. May 22, 2026) (settlement reached with Microsoft Corp. to end shareholder litigation over its $75.4 billion acquisition of Activision Blizzard Inc.
  5. $239 million – In Re Celgene Corp. Securities Litigation, Case No. 18-CV-4772 (D.N.J. May 8, 2026) (final settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve claims alleging that the Celgene and two of its former officers violated the federal securities laws by making material misrepresentations and omissions during the regarding certain Celgene products and product candidates).

Top TCPA Class Action Settlements In 2026

The top 10 TCPA class action settlements totaled $69.1 million in 2025, $84.73 million in 2024, $103.45 million in 2023, and $134.13 million in 2022.

  1. $28 million – Campbell, et al. v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., Case No. 22-CV-2261 (C.D. Ill. May 11, 2026) (final settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve claims alleging that Sirius XM made telephone calls to persons registered on the National Do Not Call Registry or Sirius XM’s Internal Do Not Call Registry).
  2. $10.5 million – Fried, et al. v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., d/b/a Kaiser Permanente, Case No. 2025-016220-CA-01 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 28, 2026) (final settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve claims from class members who alleging they received text messages sent by or on behalf of Kaiser after the person communicated that they did not wish to receive text messages by replying to the messages with a “stop” or similar opt-out instruction, in alleged violation of the TCPA and the Florida Telephone Solicitation Act (FTSA). 
  3. $9.95 million – Jackson, et al. v. Gen Digital Inc., Case No. 25-CV-535 (D. Ariz. Jan. 28, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve claims alleging that the cybersecurity software company wrongfully placed prerecorded telephone calls regarding a LifeLock or Norton account to consumers who did not have an account with either company, or Gen Digital, in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act).
  4. $6.5 million – Walston, et al. v. National Retail Solutions, Inc. d/b/a NRS Pay, Case No. 24-CV-083 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Jan. 14, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve claims alleging that the defendant placed prerecorded telemarketing telephone calls to cellular telephone numbers to individuals who did not give their prior express written consent in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act).
  5. $5.975 million – Ryan, et al. v. Wilshire Law Firm, P.L.C., Case No. 2025-022621 (Fla. Cir. Ct. June 3, 2026) (final settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve claims alleging that the defendant violated the TCPA by sending pre-recorded messages to cellular telephone numbers).

Unanimous Seventh Circuit Panel Limits TCPA Liability For Downstream Telemarketers

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, and Ryan T. Garippo

Duane Morris Takeaways: On June 24, 2026, in Hossfeld v. Allstate Insurance Co., No. 25-1518, 2026 WL 1815908 (7th Cir. June 24, 2026), Judge Amy St. Eve, writing for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, reversed a summary judgment ruling in a class action against Allstate Insurance Co. (“Allstate”) and held that the plaintiff failed to establish vicarious Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) liability for calls placed by a subcontracted telemarketer.  The decision is a significant win for companies in the lead generation space and forces plaintiffs to prove downstream agency for the calls at issue.

Case Background

Allstate sells car insurance policies nationwide.  To make these sales, Allstate works with insurance agents to help sell its policies.  In this case, Allstate contracted with two insurance agents, Jason Fleming and Daniel Gilmond.  Fleming and Daniels signed contracts, which authorized them to work with “Non‑Contracted Telemarketers,” who do not contract directly with Allstate.  Id. at *2.  The “Non‑Contracted Telemarketers,” however, were required to comply with Allstate’s do-not-call policies.  Id.

In 2020, Fleming and Daniels retained a “Non‑Contracted Telemarketer,” called Transfer Kings, to attempt to sell Allstate policies to interested consumers.  Id.  But, without informing Allstate or the agents, Transfer Kings subcontracted its duty to a third company, called Atlantic, which actually placed the calls.  Atlantic bought “lead” lists from a fourth company, KP Leads, which represented that the list of consumers had consented to the calls.  One lead was Plaintiff Robert Hossfeld (“Hossfeld”) who had been on Allstate’s internal do-not-call registry since July 10, 2020.

In reliance on the “lead” list from KP Leads, Atlantic made twelve calls to Hossfeld, between November 2020 and February 2021, and tried to sell him Allstate insurance policies.  As a result, Hossfeld sued Allstate under 47 U.S.C. §227(c)(5) of the TCPA and its internal do‑not‑call regulations under 47 C.F.R. §64.1200(d).  Ultimately, Hossfeld moved for class certification and summary judgment, whereas Allstate moved for summary judgment.  The district court denied class certification, but granted summary judgment for Hossfeld, holding that Allstate was vicariously liable for the calls in question.  Allstate appealed the summary judgment ruling, and Hossfeld appealed the denial of class certification.

The Seventh Circuit’s Ruling

Judge St. Eve, writing for the Seventh Circuit, reversed the district court’s summary judgment holding and found that Hossfeld failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Allstate was liable for Atlantic’s calls under any agency theory.

First, Judge St. Eve reasoned that in order to impute Atlantic’s conduct to Allstate, Atlantic must be Allstate’s “subagent.” She reasoned that “subagency” exists when “a principal . . . authorize[s] its agent to appoint an additional party to perform some of the tasks the principal delegated to the agent.”  Hossfeld, 2026 WL 1815908, at *4.  If authorized, subagents may appoint additional subagents.  Id.  “But for this to occur, there must be appointing authority at each level to support an agency relationship between each subagent and the principal.”  Id.  Here, there was no evidence Allstate ever communicated with Transfer Kings before it hired Atlantic or even knew Transfer Kings existed before the lawsuit was filed.  Allstate, therefore, did not delegate any agency decisions to Transfer Kings or authorize the hiring of additional subagents.  Simply put, Fleming and Daniels likely had the authority to hire Transfer Kings on Allstate’s behalf, but Transfer Kings did not have the authority to hire Atlantic and claim that the decision should be imputed to Allstate.

Second, Judge St. Eve reasoned that Hossfeld’s second argument, i.e., that Transfer Kings had apparent authority to hire Atlantic, also failed.  Apparent authority must be created by the principal’s words or conduct toward the plaintiff. In this case, Allstate was the principal.  Thus, because Hossfeld offered no evidence that Allstate ever represented to him that Atlantic was its agent, or otherwise interacted with him, Hossfeld could not establish that Allstate vested Atlantic with apparent authority.

Third, Hossfeld’s last argument that “Allstate ratified Atlantic’s calls to him by accepting benefits arising from the non-compliant calls” also failed.  Id. at *7.  Hossfeld’s ratification theory would have required him to show Allstate knowingly accept the benefits of an unauthorized act.  But “Hossfeld admit[ed] he never obtained insurance or any other services from Allstate,” and thus Allstate never retained any benefit from Hossfeld specifically.  Id.  Thus, the Seventh Circuit found that no reasonable jury could find that this conduct rose to the level of ratification.

Fourth, the Seventh Circuit turned to the class certification ruling and affirmed the denial of class certification.  Judge St. Eve explained Hossfeld only identified 33 unique telephone numbers on Allstate’s internal do‑not‑call list that Transfer Kings or Atlantic had called as part of the same campaign to sell insurance.  The Seventh Circuit has recognized that “a forty-member class is often regarded as sufficient to meet the numerosity requirement.” Id. at *9 (quoting Orr v. Shicker, 953 F.3d 490, 498 (7th Cir. 2020)) But 33 putative class members “easily” falls “below the general forty‑member benchmark.”  Id.  Thus, because the “only mechanism for disturbing the district court’s class certification ruling is to reverse it if . . . the court abused its discretion,” the Seventh Circuit was left with no choice but to affirm.

Implications For Companies

Hossfeld is a powerful and practical decision for companies that use telemarketing vendors, such as lead generators.  Because plaintiffs must show actual or apparent authority at each level of delegation to prevail on a subagency theory, corporate counsel should ensure that multiple levels of delegation are not authorized by their companies’ vendor agreements.  This prophylactic measure is the type of “easy fix” which will prevent massive class action lawsuits down the line.

Corporate counsel should also ensure that their vendor agreements require outside vendors, or lead generators, to comply with existing TCPA policies to minimize any risk that the principal should be liable for its agents’ (or subagents’) failure to follow applicable law.  TCPA class actions can be devastating for an organization, and front-end compliance goes a long way.

California Federal Court Grants In Part And Denies In Part Workday’s Motion To Dismiss In Mobley v. Workday

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Adam D. Brown, and Elizabeth G. Underwood

Duane Morris Takeaways: In the closely watched AI-related litigation entitled Mobley, et al. v. Workday, Inc., No. 23-CV-00770 (N.D. Cal. June 22, 2026) (ECF No. 360), Judge Rita F. Lin of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California issued an order denying in part and granting in part Workday’s motion to dismiss.  The Court denied Workday’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”) claims, holding that Plaintiffs adequately alleged a nexus to California because Workday allegedly designs, develops, and operates its algorithmic screening tools from its California headquarters.  Id. at 3-4.  The Court also denied the motion as to one of the plaintiffs’ Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) claim, determining that her new proxy-discrimination factual allegations fell within the scope of a prior order granting leave to amend to address certain deficiencies in a prior iteration of Plaintiffs’ Complaint, despite Workday’s argument to the contrary.  Id. at 8.  However, the Court granted Workday’s motion to dismiss as to Plaintiff Rowe’s newly asserted race-based disparate impact claim because Rowe did not seek leave to add a race-based claim, and therefore Rowe could not add this claim to the Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”).  Id. at 9.

For employers and AI vendors defending against AI employment discrimination claims, this decision provides important guidance on how defendants can successfully move to strike unauthorized claims and legal theories that exceed the scope of court-granted leave to amend.

This development follows the Court’s previous Discovery Order, which we blogged on here, Workday’s unsuccessful Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, which we blogged about here, Workday’s first successful Motion to Dismiss, which we blogged on here, and the EEOC’s amicus brief filing, which we blogged about here.

Case Background

Plaintiffs Derek Mobley, Jill Hughes, Sheilah Johnson-Rocha, and FaithLinh Rowe brought this action against Workday, alleging that Workday’s algorithm-based applicant screening tools discriminated against them and other similarly situated job applicants based on race, age, and disability.  Id. at 1.  After the Court ruled on two rounds of motions to dismiss, Mobley proceeded on claims for disparate impact discrimination based on race under Title VII, disability under the ADA, and age under the ADEA.  Id. at 1-2.

On November 12, 2025, Mobley sought leave to file a further amended complaint adding three new named plaintiffs and claims for sex-based discrimination under Title VII and sex-based, race-based, and age-based discrimination under the FEHA.  Id. at 2.  The Court found good cause for the late amendment under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 15 and 16.  Id.  Workday moved to dismiss the resulting Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), and the motion was granted in part and denied in part.  Id.  Plaintiffs were given leave to remedy deficiencies in their FEHA claims, which lacked allegations of a nexus to California, and Hughes was given leave to amend her ADA claim.  Id.  Plaintiffs then filed a TAC.  Id.

Subsequently, Workday filed a motion to dismiss and to strike portions of the TAC, arguing Plaintiffs’ FEHA claims failed to plead a non-conclusory nexus between the alleged misconduct and California, and that the other amendments were unauthorized because they fell outside the scope of Plaintiffs’ leave to amend.  Id. at 1.

The Court’s Decision

The decision addressed several issues.

Plaintiffs’ FEHA Claims Were Plausibly Asserted

First, the Court denied Workday’s motion to dismiss the FEHA claims, finding that Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that Workday, whose principal place of business is in California, participated in the alleged misconduct from its California headquarters.  Id. at 3.  The TAC alleged that Workday’s tools were “designed, developed, maintained, and controlled from [Workday’s] California headquarters” and that the “screening, scoring, and rejection” of Plaintiffs’ applications “originate[d] in and [was] carried out from California.”  Id. at 4.  The Court reasoned that the TAC adequately alleged “material participation in the allegedly unlawful discriminatory employment decisions by an actor (Workday, through its algorithmic decision-making tools) in California.”  Id.

The Court rejected Workday’s argument that its liability as an agent under the FEHA must turn on the liability of its customers, relying on the California Supreme Court’s decision in Raines v. U.S. Healthworks Medical Grp., 534 P.3d 40 (Cal. 2023).  Id.  Under Raines, Workday is not subject to derivative liability based on its employer-customer’s liability but instead “is directly liable for its ‘own engagement in FEHA-regulated activities on the employer’s behalf.’”  Id. (quoting Raines, 534 P.3d at 53).

The Court also rejected Workday’s contention that applying the FEHA to its California-based conduct would amount to an impermissible extraterritorial application, reasoning that wrongful conduct within California’s borders is not properly understood as “extraterritorial” regardless of where an aggrieved worker resides.  Id. at 5-7.

Plaintiff Hughes’s Amended ADA Claim Was Permissible

Second, the Court denied Workday’s motion as to the permissibility of Plaintiff Hughes’s ADA claim.  Id. at 8.  The TAC alleged that “algorithmic hiring tools can identify and rely upon [ ] proxy indicators of illness or health-related limitations” such as “medical-related leave, or patterns consistent with treatment and recovery,” and “can disproportionately flag and screen out such applicants based on inferred health status rather than job-related qualifications.”  Id.  The Court rejected Workday’s argument that the Court had not authorized new theories of proxy discrimination for physical disabilities, reasoning that the additional allegations were squarely within the scope of the leave to amend.  Id.

Plaintiff Rowe’s Race-Based Disparate Impact Claim Was Dismissed

Third, the Court dismissed Plaintiff Rowe’s race-based disparate impact claim under Title VII, which sought for the first time to assert discrimination based on her race as an Asian American.  Id. at 9.  The Court reasoned that the Second Amended Complaint did not contain such a claim and that Plaintiffs had not previously sought or received authorization to add the claim, as the prior race-related allegations were limited to African American and Black applicants.  Id.

Plaintiffs’ Direct-Employer Theory Was Stricken

Finally, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ new legal theory that Workday is liable as an employer because it used the challenged recruitment and hiring procedures in screening and selecting its own employees, explaining that this legal theory was unauthorized.  Id. at 10.

Implications For Employers

This decision highlights that companies developing and operating AI-driven hiring tools in and/or from California may be subject to the FEHA for their own California-based conduct, even when the affected applicants reside and apply for jobs out of state.

Moreover, the Court’s treatment of the amendments to the complaint underscores the importance of carefully observing the scope of court-granted leave to amend.  While the Court permitted new proxy-discrimination allegations supporting an existing ADA claim, the Court dismissed and struck a new race-based theory and a new direct-employer theory that exceeded the scope of the amendments the Court had authorized, illustrating that plaintiffs cannot use amendments to incorporate entirely new claims or theories without leave.

No Retake Allowed: New York Federal Court Denies EEOC’s Motion For Reconsideration In Equal Pay Act Case Against School District

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Olga A. Romadin, and Elizabeth G. Underwood

Duane Morris Takeaways: On June 18, 2026, Judge Anthony J. Brindisi of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York denied the EEOC’s motion for reconsideration of the Court’s earlier order denying cross-motions for summary judgment in EEOC v. Hunter-Tannersville Central School District, No. 1:21-CV-00352, 2026 WL 1759441 (N.D.N.Y. June 18, 2026).  The district court found that the EEOC failed to satisfy the standard for reconsideration, reasoning that the EEOC had not identified an intervening change in controlling law, new evidence, or a clear error warranting relief.

This ruling is significant for employers defending Equal Pay Act claims and reinforces the high burden parties must satisfy to obtain reconsideration, namely, that a motion for reconsideration cannot be used to relitigate old issues or present evidence that was previously available.

Case Background

On March 26, 2021, the EEOC filed this action against the Hunter-Tannersville Central School District (“District”) alleging that the District violated § 206(d)(1) of the Equal Pay Act of 1963 by paying a former District superintendent, Dr. Susan T. Vickers (“Vickers”), less than her male colleagues for substantially equal work.  Id. at *1.  In response, the District denied the allegations and raised a statutory affirmative defense, asserting that any alleged pay disparity resulted from factors other than sex under 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)(iv).  Id.

After several years of discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.  Id.  The Court denied both motions, finding that genuine disputes of material fact precluded summary judgment in favor of either party.  Id.  The EEOC then timely moved for reconsideration, which the District opposed.  Id.

The Court’s Decision

The Court ultimately denied the EEOC’s motion for reconsideration of the Court’s order denying cross-motions for summary judgment.  Id.

First, the EEOC argued that the Court had erroneously accepted certain facts as undisputed after overlooking contrary evidence, specifically a deposition exhibit that the EEOC admittedly did not submit with its prior motion papers.  Id.  However, the Court rejected this argument for two reasons.  Id.  The omitted deposition exhibit did not qualify as “new evidence” because it was readily available at the time of the earlier briefing.  Id.  Moreover, the EEOC did not show that the omitted evidence was inconsistent with any of the challenged findings.  Id. at *2.

Next, the EEOC contended that the Court misapplied Second Circuit precedent on the question of substantial equivalence.  Id.  The Court disagreed, explaining that the Second Circuit has made clear that “[w]hether two positions are ‘substantially equivalent’ for Equal Pay Act purposes is a question for the jury.”  Id. (quoting Lavin-McEleney v. Marist Coll., 239 F.3d 476, 480 (2d Cir. 2001)).  In particular, the Court determined that the EEOC did not show a clear error in the Court’s application of the law because the “expansive record” included “sufficient evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Vickers’ comparators had different or additional job responsibilities and performance requirements.”  Id.

The EEOC also argued that the Court failed to require the District to “prove” that the pay disparities between Vickers and her comparators stemmed from gender-neutral factors.  Id. at *3.  The Court, however, determined that the EEOC’s argument misunderstood the relative burdens on a motion for summary judgment.  Id.  While the District would have needed to “prove” its affirmative defense as a matter of law to succeed on its own motion, to survive the EEOC’s motion and get to trial, “the District was only required to identify sufficient evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that ‘the pay disparity in question result[ed] from a differential based on any factor except for sex.’”  Id. (quoting Eisenhauer v. Culinary Inst. of Am., 84 F.4th 507, 522–23 (2d Cir. 2023)).  The Court found the District met that standard.  Id.

Finally, the Court rejected the EEOC’s argument that the Court failed to apply the law requiring the District to prove that longevity and negotiation were gender-neutral factors.  Id.  In rejecting the EEOC’s argument, the Court noted that the EEOC cited no controlling authority for the proposition that longevity and negotiations cannot constitute factors other than sex, identifying several courts within the Second Circuit that have found such factors to be legitimate factors other than sex.  Id.

Because the Court declined to reconsider its earlier ruling, the Court indicated that the EEOC’s contingent requests regarding the issues of willfulness, good faith, and damages were rendered moot.  Id. at *4.

Implications For Employers

The Court’s decision underscores that motions for reconsideration are subject to a demanding standard and cannot be used as a second opportunity to relitigate issues or present evidence that was available during an earlier round of briefing.

This decision also reinforces that the question of whether two job positions are “substantially equivalent” under the Equal Pay Act is a fact-intensive inquiry properly reserved for a jury, and that shared job descriptions alone do not establish substantial equivalence as a matter of law.  Id. at *2.

Lastly, the Court’s analysis confirms that longevity and salary negotiations remain viable “factors other than sex” under the Equal Pay Act in the Second Circuit.  Id. at *3.  Employers should therefore document the legitimate, gender-neutral factors underlying compensation decisions to support a potential affirmative defense in the event of an Equal Pay Act challenge.

The Third Circuit’s FLSA Overtime Gap Time Decision Opens Up Circuit Split

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Rebecca S. Bjork, and Olga A. Romadin

Duane Morris Takeaways: On June 3, 2026, addressing an issue of first impression on overtime gap time, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in U.S. Department of Labor v. Comprehensive Healthcare Mgmt. Servs. LLC, No. 24-2842, 2026 WL 1582064 (3d Cir. June 3, 2026), partially reversed an order of a district court that had awarded damages to the U.S. Department of Labor(“DOL”), which had brought a lawsuit on behalf of 6,000 healthcare employees, alleging various overtime violations under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) by Comprehensive Healthcare Management Services LLC (“Comprehensive”). On appeal, Comprehensive argued that the district court had erred in finding that the FLSA affords a remedy for overtime gap time claims, which address non-overtime hours in a non-exempt employee’s workweek, as well as misapplied a lower burden of proof to some of the claims against it, had erred in its finding that certain employees were nonexempt, and in some of its factual findings. The Third Circuit agreed with the employer in part, and vacated and remanded the matter to the district court.

Case Background

In 2018, the DOL brought a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania against fifteen nursing and assisted living entities owned and operated by Comprehensive Healthcare Management Services LLC and its chief executive officer, alleging that the defendants had failed to pay hourly employees for all hours worked and the appropriate rate of pay, as well as failing to keep accurate pay records in violation of the FLSA. Id. at *1. One of the claims involved overtime gap time, which occurs when an employee who exceeds the overtime threshold does not receive pay for all non-overtime hours worked. Id.

In January 2024, the district court held a bench trial, following which it ruled in favor of the DOL, finding that there were “system errors” in the calculation of pay. Id. at *2. The district court explained that the defendants’ timekeeping system had not kept an accurate record of employees’ working hours, and Comprehensive paid employees for scheduled hours instead of hours they actually worked, as well as that the system automatically deducted meal breaks, even if employees had worked through them, and that the defendants had failed to accurately pay overtime wages. Id. The district court found that employees were not paid the required one-and-one-half regular rate required under the FLSA, and that the regular rate did not include pay that was required to be calculated in it, including shift differentials, bonuses, and other types of pay. Id. The district court also concluded that some employees had been improperly classified as exempt from the FLSA’s overtime requirement. Id. The district court, noting that the Third Circuit had not yet ruled upon the “viability of overtime gap time claims,” nonetheless awarded $35,804,438.20 in damages against Comprehensive for these violations. Id. at *3. Comprehensive appealed.

The Third Circuit’s Decision

On appeal, Comprehensive argued that the district court had erred in finding that claims for overtime gap time were cognizable under the FLSA. Id. at *3. The Third Circuit noted a disagreement among the circuits, with the Second Circuit having opined that overtime gap time claims were not cognizable under the FLSA in Lundy v. Cath. Health Sys. Of Long Island, Inc., 711 F.3d 106, 115-17 (2d Cir. 2013), while the Fourth Circuit found that they were in Conner v. Cleveland County, 22 F.4th 412, 426 (4th Cir. 2022). Id. Writing for the majority in a split panel decision, Third Circuit Chief Judge Michael A. Chagares explained that “[w]hen the statutory language is clear, the text is the beginning and the end of our inquiry.” Id. at *4. On review of the text of the FLSA, the appellate court found no mention of overtime gap time and concluded that the statute does not provide a remedy to overtime gap claims.  Id. In finding that there was no support in the text of the statute for an overtime gap claims, the court of appeals rejected the Labor Secretary’s argument that under § 207 of the FLSA, the term “regular rate” contemplates an overtime requirement, and so requires that a regular rate must be paid for all hours worked. Id. Further, the Third Circuit was unconvinced by the Secretary’s reference to the DOL’s guidance, which stated that overtime under the FLSA requires the payment of all straight time worked during non-overtime hours, finding that this ran counter to the unambiguous text of the Act. Id. at *4-5. Finally, agreeing with the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the Third Circuit determined that individuals seeking to bring such claims could do so under state laws. Id. at *5. Thus, agreeing with Comprehensive, the Third Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling finding that Comprehensive had violated the FLSA by failing to compensate certain employees for overtime gap time. Id.

In reviewing the remaining arguments brought by Comprehensive, the Third Circuit court found that the district court did not err in applying a lower evidentiary burden to the claims against Comprehensive under the Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946) burden-shifting framework, where an employee alleging an employer failed to keep adequate records may do so by producing sufficient evidence prior to the burden being shifted to the employer to counter the claims. Id. at *5-6. Noting that the district court based its findings on the time and pay records produced by Comprehensive, the appellate court concluded that “Mt. Clemens did not affect the analysis for these claims.” Id. at *6. The Third Circuit also found no clear error in the district court’s factual findings or finding of an ongoing pattern or practice of regular rate miscalculation, writing that the single witness that Comprehensive had produced in support of its contention that employees were paid for all hours worked instead of based on their scheduled hours was found to be unreliable by the district court, and that the Secretary of Labor had produced more concrete proof in the form of an investigation, and documentary proof corroborated by hundreds of employees. Id. Next, the Third Circuit affirmed the lower court’s finding that employees at different facilities were regularly not paid for work performed through meal breaks based on a representative sample of employee testimony and the testimony of the company’s regional consultant. Id. at *7.

Finally, the Third Circuit agreed with Comprehensive that the district court’s determination that certain employees were not exempt from the FLSA’s overtime requirements was an error because it had applied the “plain and unmistakable” burden of proof to its analysis, but under the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 584 U.S. 79 (2018), an employer seeking to prove an employee’s exempt status does so by a preponderance of the evidence, and vacated the part of the lower court’s decision and remanded it for further proceedings. Id. at *8-9.

In a partial dissent, U.S. Circuit Court Judge Jane R. Roth wrote that the text of the FLSA “is far from clear,” and the case law defining a regular rate offered additional confusion that could be addressed by making the actual rate, contracted rate, and regular rate of pay to be the same, aligning with the Fourth Circuit decision in Conner and the U.S. Department of Labor guidance that the majority declined to endorse. Id. at *10-11.

Implications For Employers

Employers with a workforce falling under the FLSA should take heed in ensuring that exempt employees, such as those working in an executive, administrative, or professional capacity, meet the statutory minimums such as salary requirements to qualify as bona fide exempt from overtime requirements. Maintaining accurate pay and time records for exempt and non-exempt workers and conducting regular audits may serve well in defending against miscalculation allegations, as the appellate court here confirmed the lower court’s conclusion based on records provided by the company.

This federal appellate court decision further signals a circuit split on the issue of whether overtime gap time claims are cognizable under the FLSA, with the Third Circuit here joining the Second Circuit in deciding that under the plain meaning of the text they are not, while the Fourth Circuit maintains that the FLSA does offer relief for plaintiffs seeking to bring such claims.

The Duane Morris Class Action Defense Blog’s 700th Post!

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Duane Morris Takeaways: Since its inception in September of 2022, the Duane Morris Class Action Defense blog has posted 700 times! There have been over 100,000 views to blog posts, with thousands of people reading about class action litigation developments. There are so many highlights from the last 700 posts, but we wanted to provide just a few for you here. Click on the links below to see all the hot trends in class action litigation.

We launched the third edition of the Duane Morris Class Action Review, which is a one-of-its-kind publication analyzing class action trends, decisions, and settlements in all areas impacting Corporate America. The Review has been prominently featured in the media and is a must-have for all human resources professionals and corporate counsel.

We also published mini-books focused on specialized areas of law (including ERISA, Products Liability & Mass Torts, FCRA, Discrimination, Consumer Fraud, Antitrust, TCPA, Data Breach and Privacy, Wage & Hour and PAGA, and EEOC and Government-Enforcement), various unique industries (including Higher Education, Insurance, Energy, Oil, & Gas, Transportation, Automotive, & Logistics, Healthcare, Hospitality, and Digital Assets & Blockchain), and state-specific laws in class action litigation and on EEOC-Initiated litigation.

Every week on the blog, we feature attorneys and experts discussing the latest class action developments and rulings on the Class Action Weekly Wire Podcast. Tune in each week for a new episode! Some of the most popular podcasts were featuring the dismissal of a class action in a data breach area, a discussion on the California’s Supreme Court’s win for employers, and the overview of class action litigation in the digital assets and blockchain sector.

Click here to read our most viewed blog post of 2026, entitled “AI Hallucinated Case Citations Prompt Sanctions And Delay Class Action Settlement.” Over 2,000 people read this post! Other top reads included our analysis of a 2024 ruling in Illinois dismissing class action privacy claims, an overview of the American Tort Reform Association’s picks for the top Judicial Hellholes in 2025, and our always sought-after annual blog post covering the developments in EEOC FY Filings.

Thank you, loyal followers, for making the Class Action Defense blog your stop for class action litigation related information, trends, and analysis. We truly appreciate it! Please keep coming back, we promise to keep the content fresh and informative!

Seventh Circuit Affirms Summary Judgment For Tortilla Manufacturer El Milagro In Sexual Harassment Suit

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, Gregory Tsonis, and George J. Schaller

Duane Morris Takeaways: On May 27, 2026, in Sanchez, v. El Milagro, Inc., 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 14984 (7th Cir. May 26, 2026), the Seventh Circuit issued an opinion that affirmed a district court’s decision granting summary judgment in favor of tortilla manufacturer El Milagro, Inc. (“El Milagro”) for claims of sexual harassment in the workplace in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and the Illinois Human Rights Act (“IHRA”). 

The opinion fully vindicated the Company’s defenses, and clarifies that a prompt and thorough investigation coupled with appropriate action to bring harassment to an end are crucial to avoid liability under sexual harassment law. 

Background

In 2022, Plaintiff Alma Sanchez filed a Class Action Complaint against her employer, El Milagro, Inc. (“El Milagro”), a tortilla manufacturer and distributor of tortilla products, alleging a sexually hostile work environment in violation of the IHRA and, subsequently, Title VII.

Plaintiff alleged she joined El Milagro in July 2019. Plaintiff claimed that in 2020, co-worker Francisco Gutierrez sexually harassed her by “inappropriately touching her three times,” although the Seventh Circuit’s opinion noted that Plaintiff’s version of events changed in numerous ways over time.  Id. 

According to the subsequent statement to Human Resources that Plaintiff submitted after the third alleged incident, Gutierrez “inappropriately touched [Plaintiff] first in October or November 2019, then in March 2020, and finally in August 2020.”  Id. *4-5.  Her Complaint, however, alleged that “Gutierrez touched her first in May or June 2020, then in July 2020, and finally in August 2020.”  Id. *5. 

As to her first alleged incident of harassment, Plaintiff’s Complaint asserted that Gutierrez “intentionally ‘rubbed his genitals’ against her buttocks as he passed her on the production line and then continued to walk away.”  Id.  In her deposition, however, Plaintiff testified that “she believe[d] Gutierrez purposefully touched her because ‘there were many ways for him to pass through without touching [her],” that he did not “touch her for long because ‘he made it look like he was passing by,’” and when she felt the contact and turned around “[h]e had already passed.”  Id.  In her later statement to Human Resources, Plaintiff wrote that Gutierrez “said sorry” but at her deposition, she testified that Gutierrez “turned around and stare[d] at me like watching and saying ‘oops.’”  Id. *5-6. 

Plaintiff alleged she verbally reported this incident two hours later to Supervisor Arturo Brito, which Brito denied.  Id. *6.  In her HR statement, Plaintiff “stated that although she mentioned this incident to Brito, she did not tell him Gutierrez’s name.”  At her deposition, however, Plaintiff claimed that “she ‘specifically told Brito that Mr. Gutierrez had rubbed his genitals on my buttocks’” but, when asked outright, she “agreed that she did not share Gutierrez’s name with [the supervisor] when she reported the first incident.”  Id.  No Human Resources report was made about this incident at the time.

Plaintiff also asserted Gutierrez “sexually harassed her for the second time in July 2020” and claimed that he “groped her buttock with his hand.”  Id. *6-7.  Plaintiff contradicted herself about whether and when she reported this incident.  In her HR statement, she wrote that she “could not have reported the incident because the factory had been permanently shut down because of the pandemic, but later claimed in the lawsuit that she did report the harassment to Brito the day after it happened.  Id. *7.  Plaintiff alleged that she informed Brito about this incident, but no complaint about this alleged incident was sent to El Milagro’s Human Resources department.  Id.  

The third incident occurred on August 29, 2020, and Plaintiff contended that “Gutierrez touched her buttocks for ‘a short time,’ or ‘a few seconds’ while she was stooping down to put down boxes that she was holding.”  Id.  In her written statement to HR, Plaintiff claimed that “Gutierrez touched her buttocks with one hand”  but asserted during the lawsuit that “Gutierrez groped her with both hands when she bent over to put down a box that she was carrying.”  Id.  

After reporting the third incident to Brito, Plaintiff submitted a written statement to Human Resources describing the three incidents.  Gutierrez’s statement claimed he accidentally touched Plaintiff while packing tortillas and apologized.  Id.  Plaintiff later testified that she “had not seen anyone else experience sexually harassing conduct at any time during her employment at El Milagro.”  Id.  Plaintiff also alleged subsequent verbal harassment by other coworkers, but Plaintiff did not tell Brito or El Milagro’s HR the names of those individuals.  Id. *9.

The district court granted El Milagro summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims.  It also ruled that Plaintiffs’ class action claims could not be certified. Plaintiff appealed the district court’s decision on her individual claim to the Seventh Circuit.

The Seventh Circuit’s Opinion

The Seventh Circuit, in an opinion written by Judge Kenneth F. Ripple, affirmed the district court’s decision granting summary judgment in favor of El Milagro and fully vindicated its position.

As to the controlling legal standard, the Seventh Circuit first concluded that while Title VII and the IHRA do not contain identical language, “both this court and Illinois state courts consistently state that the analytical standards are the same.”  Id. *9.  Thus, “[t]o constitute actionable sexual harassment, the activity ‘must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive working environment.”  Id. *10.  While noting that “physical acts are considered ‘more severe than harassing comments alone,’” the Court also noted that “physical harassment lies along a continuum just as verbal harassment does.”  Id. *12.

Turning to the merits, the Seventh Circuit noted an employer is liable under the IHRA and Title VII “only if it was negligent in controlling working conditions.”  To prove such negligence, the Seventh Circuit explained Plaintiff must establish two points: (1) that El Milagro had “notice or knowledge of the harassment,” and (2) that El Milagro “did not take ‘prompt and appropriate corrective action reasonably likely to prevent harassment from recurring.”  Id. *16. 

Assuming that Plaintiff reported the first two incidents to Brito, as she claimed, the Seventh Circuit concluded that Plaintiff could not establish El Milagro’s knowledge of the first two incidents of alleged harassment.  Based on the record evidence, the Court reasoned that “what she told Brito led him to believe that she was complaining of accidental touching that happened because the production lines on which she and Gutierrez worked had close quarters.”  Id. at *21.  As a result, the Seventh Circuit concluded that “[w]e do not believe that a reasonable jury could conclude from [Plaintiff’s] deposition testimony, or any other evidence in the record related to her reporting of the first two incidents, that she gave Brito ‘enough information to make a reasonable employer think that there was some probability that she was being sexually harassed.’”  Id. *20-21. 

As to the third incident, all three judges agreed that investigation and corrective measures taken by El Milagro’s Human Resources department were sufficient.  The Seventh Circuit noted that “[a]n HR employee interviewed [Plaintiff] and Gutierrez separately,” “HR concluded that the events described by [Plaintiff] could not be substantiated,” and that El Milagro “provided [Plaintiff] with a letter, dated September 16, informing her that the case was closed and that it had told Gutierrez, in a ‘call of attention’ letter, to immediately change his behavior toward her.”  Id. *21-22.  The Seventh Circuit also determined that “[a]lthough El Milagro did not interview any witnesses, [Plaintiff] did not identify any.”  Id. *22.

Thus, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the “prompt investigation” was “the hallmark of a reasonable corrective action” (id.) and that “El Milagro’s investigation shows that it ‘took the harassment seriously and took appropriate steps to bring the harassment to an end.’ . . . [i]t had in place a viable and appropriate mechanism for reporting the misbehavior.”  Id.   A jury could not reasonably conclude, the Seventh Circuit held, that “El Milagro was negligent in fulfilling its responsibilities in responding to the situation.”  Id. 

Finally, as to alleged verbal harassment that occurred after HR investigated, the Seventh Circuit concluded that Plaintiff “did not report to anyone the names of the people who made the harassing comments that she overheard after the investigation concluded so El Milagro could not investigate them.”  Id. 

Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Implications For Employers

The Seventh Circuit’s opinion clarifies what constitutes proper notice in alleged incidents of sexual harassment and reasonable corrective measures taken when an employer is properly on notice, including prompt investigations to bring alleged harassment to an end. 

Employers should evaluate their sexual harassment policies and practices to ensure that reporting mechanisms, documentation, and investigation process are sound and that reports of harassment are communicated promptly to those responsible for investigating them.  A thorough investigation and quick implementation of reasonable corrective measures can often insulate employers from liability under either Title VII or the IHRA. 

President Trump’s New National Enforcement Program For The EEOC And What It Means For Employers

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., George J. Schaller, and Ryan T. Garippo

Duane Morris Takeaways:  On June 4, 2026, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the “EEOC”) announced its National Enforcement Plan (the “NEP”) for fiscal years 2025 – 2029.  The NEP reflects the EEOC’s new priorities under President Donald Trump and formally rescinds the agency’s strategic objections during President Joseph Biden’s administration. 

Employers should take note of this development as it is clear that the NEP signals a forthcoming crackdown on: (1) employers’ diversity, equity, and inclusion (“DEI”) programs; (2) instances of “anti-American” bias; (3) efforts to limit “single-sex spaces” for transgender individuals; and (4) failures to provide religious accommodations.

The EEOC’s National Enforcement Plan

As readers of this blog will know, the EEOC looks and acts differently under President Trump than it did under President Biden.  President Biden’s strategic priorities, which we wrote about here, here, and here, largely focused on discrimination resulting from the use of artificial intelligence, preventing systemic harassment, enforcing equal pay obligations, and protecting historically marginalized groups.  President Trump’s EEOC is a lot different.

On June 4, 2026, the EEOC’s Chair Andrea Lucas (R) and Commissioner Brittany Panuccio (R) rolled out the agency’s new NEP over the objection of Commissioner Kalpana Kotagal (D).  The NEP describes the agency’s areas of strategic focus because “it is not feasible for the [EEOC] to devote the same amount of resources to each charge.”  (NEP at 2.)  Thus, “the agency must continue to be strategic about the matters it prioritizes to maximize the agency’s impact.”  (Id.)  To that end, the EEOC identified four major areas where it intends to be more proactive in its enforcement efforts, each of which is discussed more fully below.

First, the EEOC stated an explicit intention to attempt to “[r]emedy[] DEI-related race and sex discrimination.”  (Id. at 6.)  In particular, the EEOC cited the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services, 605 U.S. 303 (2025), Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, Missouri, 601 U.S. 346 (2024), and Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 600 U.S. 181 (2023) as the basis for its decision.  As a result, we expect to see continued efforts from President Trump’s administration to crackdown on DEI programs both in the workplace and in higher education.

Second, the EEOC states that it plans to prosecute claims with an intent to “protect[] American workers from anti-American national origin discrimination.”  (NEP at 6.)  This prosecutorial decision tracks with last year’s first-of-its-kind settlement against LeoPalace Resort, which we blogged about here, where a group of American workers alleged that they were subject to less favorable treatment than their Japanese colleagues.  We can also expect these enforcement actions to continue throughout the second Trump administration.

Third, the EEOC intends to ensure access for women to “single-sex spaces at work” due to the “binary nature of sex.”  (Id.)  This objective continues to signal a rollback of President Biden’s efforts to enforce protections in favor of transgender workers, and tracks with the agency’s decision last year to dismiss all lawsuits seeking to enforce such protections.  As readers will recall, we blogged about the decision to dismiss these lawsuits here because they were purportedly based on “gender ideology extremism.”  This area is one where there is the potential for a significant uptick in EEOC enforcement actions and investigations.

Fourth, the EEOC stated its continued commitment to “religious liberty rights” including the right “to receive religious accommodations and be free from religious discrimination, harassment, and related retaliation.”  (Id.)  As we explained here, however, employers can expect certain types of religious bias to be policed more heavily than others.  In accordance with President Trump’s policy platform, EEOC Chair Lucas has explicitly cited “antisemitism” as the basis for the current emphasis on religious discrimination.  This enforcement priority tracks with recent appellate court decisions, such as EEOC v. Center One, LLC, No. 22-2943, 2024 WL 379956, at *4 (3d Cir. Feb. 1, 2024), where the Third Circuit held that forcing an employer to work on Yom Kippur and Rosh Hashanah could create “’intolerable’ conditions of discrimination.”  Thus, the EEOC is signaling its intent to continue to build on precedent like Center One in the religious discrimination space.

Implications For Employers

Employers should take note of these enforcement priorities as it previews the types of cases that the EEOC intends to pursue both through investigations and litigation.  Thus, if they have not already, corporate counsel should consider whether any revisions are necessary to their organization’s DEI programs as well as to any policies concerning differential treatment provided based on national origin, sex, or religion.

Further, if an organization receives notice of an EEOC charge or subpoena – particularly one targeting a pattern, practice, or policy based on the above-mentioned objectives – it should take such allegations extremely seriously and contact experienced counsel to help them navigate the process.

Colorado Federal Court Denies EEOC Application To Enforce Administrative Subpoenas Against Psychological Testing Firm In Discrimination Investigation

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Tiffany Alberty, and Brett Bohan

Duane Morris Takeaways: On June 3, 2026, in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Psychological Dimensions, No. 1:26-MC-00072 (D. Colo. June 3, 2026), Senior Judge R. Brooke Jackson of the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado denied the EEOC’s application for an order to show cause as to why two administrative subpoenas served on Psychological Dimensions should not be enforced. The EEOC sought information regarding a pre-offer psychological assessment administered to job applicants for the Arapahoe County Sheriff’s Office. The Court concluded that the subpoenas sought information that had nothing to do with the discrimination allegedly suffered by the charging party and declined to hold that the EEOC’s investigative authority is unlimited.

Courts typically give wide berth to the EEOC with its administrative, pre-lawsuit subpoenas, but this ruling illustrates that courts may impose meaningful limits on the EEOC’s subpoena power where the information sought bears no connection to the harm alleged by the individual claimant.

Case Background

On June 10, 2020, Jessica Roe applied for a position as a Public Information Liaison at the Arapahoe County Sheriff’s Office (“ACSO”). (ECF 20 at 1) The application process included both pre-offer and post-offer phases. During the pre-offer phase, Ms. Roe completed a 430-plus question psychological examination, sometimes referred to as a “Job Suitability Assessment,” administered by Psychological Dimensions, a contractor to the ACSO. (Id.) Ms. Roe also took a polygraph test, provided writing samples, and participated in interviews. (Id. at 2) Following these steps, Ms. Roe was informed she was one of three finalists, had additional interviews, and was offered the job contingent upon further medical, psychological, and background investigation. (Id.)

In the post-offer phase, Ms. Roe completed another extensive psychological examination and met with the Chief Psychologist of Psychological Dimensions. (Id.)During that meeting, she disclosed a mental health diagnosis, a mental health provider, and additional information regarding prescriptions she had been given. (Id.) She was also asked to release information for the diagnosing doctors. (Id.) However, when Psychological Dimensions attempted to verify the information, the diagnosing provider could not confirm Ms. Roe had been a patient or provide records to Psychological Dimensions due to its document retention policy, so the psychologist was unable to “pass” her. (Id.) On September 14, 2020, the ACSO rescinded the job offer because Ms. Roe did not pass the post-offer psychological exam. (Id.)

On June 4, 2021, Ms. Roe filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC, alleging retaliation and discrimination based on sex in violation of Title VII and disability in violation of the ADA. (Id. at 3) Nearly three years later, on March 20, 2024, Ms. Roe filed an Amended Charge to expand the allegations to include discrimination based on race, color, sex, religion, national origin, retaliation, age, disability, genetic information, and pregnancy, invoking additional federal statutes. (Id.)

On August 28, 2025, as part of its investigation, the EEOC served two administrative subpoenas on Psychological Dimensions — one pursuant to the ADEA and one pursuant to the ADA and Title VII. (Id.) The subpoenas required Psychological Dimensions to produce the Job Suitability Assessments and related communications for all individuals who answered affirmatively that they had experienced workplace sexual harassment, filed formal complaints against an employer, been involved in lawsuits, or appeared in legal proceedings. (Id. at 4)

On September 10, 2025, Psychological Dimensions objected to the subpoenas, arguing that the information was not relevant, that compliance would be unduly burdensome (requiring at least 1,500 hours), that the request infringed on the privacy and HIPAA rights of non-parties, and that the request sought proprietary trade secrets. (Id.) The parties were unable to resolve the dispute, and the EEOC filed an application for an order to show cause. (Id. at 5)

The Court’s Order

The Court denied the EEOC’s application on procedural and substantive grounds.

As an initial matter, the EEOC argued that Psychological Dimensions’ objections were both procedurally defective and untimely. (Id.) The EEOC noted that the September 10, 2025, objection letter identified only the ADEA subpoena, and there is no administrative procedure for objecting to ADEA subpoenas. (Id.) The EEOC also pointed out that objections to subpoenas issued pursuant to the ADA or Title VII are due within five days after service, making Psychological Dimensions’ objections untimely. (Id. at 5-6) The Court acknowledged the untimeliness — the objections were filed thirteen days after service — but declined to treat this delay as dispositive. (Id.)

Turning to the substance of the subpoenas, the Court identified what it characterized as a “bigger problem.” (Id. at 6) The Court recognized that the four questions in the Job Suitability Assessment potentially punished applicants for exercising their rights under discrimination laws, and the subpoenas sought information to determine whether persons who answered “yes” to those questions were consistently denied employment at the ACSO. (Id. at 7) However, that information had “no application to the charging party, Ms. Roe.” (Id.) The Court’s rationale was that it was undisputed that Ms. Roe answered “no” to all four questions, was found suitable for the position, made the short list of three finalists, and was offered the job. (Id.) The reasons her offer was rescinded were found in the post-offer evaluation, not in the pre-offer Job Suitability Assessment.

Ultimately, the Court determined it was “unwilling to hold that the EEOC’s authority to investigate discrimination in the workplace is unlimited, or that an individual’s claim that she lost a job opportunity due to discrimination opens the door to compelling a third party to produce information that has nothing to do with the discrimination allegedly suffered by the claimant.” (Id. at 7-8) For this reason, the Court denied the EEOC’s application for an order to show cause on its two administrative subpoenas. (Id. at 8)

Implications For Employers

The Court’s decision in Psychological Dimensions is a significant ruling for employers and third-party contractors who face EEOC subpoenas during the investigation of discrimination charges. The decision signals that courts may impose meaningful limits on the scope of the EEOC’s investigative subpoena power where the information sought lacks a nexus to the actual harm alleged by the charging party.

This case demonstrates that, although the EEOC’s subpoena power is broad, it is not boundless. Where the EEOC seeks to expand an investigation beyond the facts that are relevant to the charging party’s claims, courts may be willing to deny enforcement of those subpoenas. Employers who receive subpoenas that they believe extend beyond the scope of the underlying charge should carefully consider whether the information sought bears a meaningful connection to the claimant’s allegations and should be prepared to articulate that disconnect to a court.

© 2009- Duane Morris LLP. Duane Morris is a registered service mark of Duane Morris LLP.

The opinions expressed on this blog are those of the author and are not to be construed as legal advice.

Proudly powered by WordPress