By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. and Jennifer A. Riley
Duane Morris Takeaways: As we kick off 2026, we are pleased to announce the publication of the annual edition of the Duane Morris Class Action Review. It is a one-of-its-kind publication analyzing class action trends, decisions, and settlements in all areas impacting corporations, including class certification rulings in the substantive areas of antitrust, appeals, the Class Action Fairness Act, civil rights, consumer fraud, data breaches, discrimination, EEOC-initiated and government enforcement litigation, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, labor, privacy, procedural issues, product liability and mass torts, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, securities fraud, state court class actions, the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, wage & hour class and collective actions, and the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act. The Review also highlights key rulings on attorneys’ fee awards in class actions, motions granting and denying sanctions in class actions, the largest class action settlements across all areas of law, and primers on the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act, the California Private Attorney General Act and in Generative Artificial Intelligence & Crypto cases. Finally, the Review provides insight as to what companies and corporate counsel can expect to see in 2026.
We are humbled and honored by the recent review of the Duane Morris Class Action Review by Employment Practices Liability Consultant Magazine (“EPLiC”) – the review is here. EPLiC said, “The Duane Morris Class Action Review is ‘the Bible’ on class action litigation and an essential desk reference for business executives, corporate counsel, and human resources professionals.” EPLiC continued, “The review is a must-have resource for in-depth analysis of class actions in general and workplace litigation in particular. The Duane Morris Class Action Review analyzes class action trends, decisions, and settlements in all areas impacting corporate America and provides insight as to what companies and corporate counsel can expect in terms of filings by the plaintiffs’ class action bar and government enforcement agencies like the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Department of Labor (DOL).”
We are also proud that the Review made its way into American jurisprudence on several occasions recently, with a federal district court citing our analysis on class action trends in its decision on a motion for class certification, and both petitioners and amici citing the Review in U.S. Supreme Court briefing as the authoritative source on FLSA certification statistics and the widening circuit split regarding when it is appropriate to send notice to would-be plaintiffs, under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) in a Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) collective action.
Click here to access our customized website featuring all the Review highlights, including the ten major trends across all types of class actions over the past year. Order your free copy of the e-book here and download the Review overview here.
Check out an exclusive article featuring the Review posted this morning in Forbes here. The Firm’s press release on the Review can be found here.
The 2026 Review analyzes rulings from all state and federal courts in 23 areas of law. It is designed as a reader-friendly research tool that is easily accessible in hard copy and e-book formats. Class action rulings from throughout the year are analyzed and organized into 23 chapters and 8 appendices for ease of analysis and reference.
Key Class Action Trends In 2025
Trend # 1 – Settlement Numbers Broke The $40 Billion Mark For The Fourth Year In A Row
In 2025, settlement numbers reached an unprecedented level in class action litigation. In 2024, settlement numbers broke the $40 billion mark for the third year in a row. In 2025, the cumulative value of the highest ten settlements across all substantive areas of class action litigation surpassed that benchmark and totaled $79 billion. That number is the highest value tallied in the past two decades, and exceeding the settlement numbers from 2022, 2023, and 2024 by a significant margin. In 2022, these settlement numbers totaled $66 billion; in 2023, they totaled $51.4 billion; and, in 2024, these settlement numbers totaled $42 billion. Combined, the settlement numbers of the past four years exceeded $238 billion, representing use of the class action mechanism to redistribute wealth at an unprecedented level. On an aggregate basis, across all areas of litigation, defendants settled class actions and government enforcement lawsuits for more than $79 billion in 2025.
Trend #2 – Courts Certified Classes At High Rates Across Nearly All Substantive Areas Of Class Action Litigation
Courts issued fewer decisions on motions for class certification in 2025, as compared to 2023 and 2024, but the plaintiffs’ class action bar obtained certification at a higher rate overall. Across all major areas of class action litigation in 2025, courts issued rulings on 435 motions for class certification. By comparison, in 2024, courts issued rulings on 432 motions for class certification, and, in 2023, court issued rulings on 451 motions for class certification. In 2025, however, courts granted motions for class certification at a higher rate. Courts granted 297 motions for class certification in whole or in part, a rate of approximately 68%. This number is higher than the percentage granted in 2024, where courts granted 272 motions for class certification, for a certification rate of approximately 63%, but on par with plaintiffs’ success rate in 2023. In 2023, courts granted 324 motions for class certification, for a certification rate of approximately 72%.
Trend #3 – Class Action Filings Reached New Heights
The gargantuan settlement numbers and high rates of certification have continued to fuel growth in class action filings by the plaintiffs’ class action bar. In 2025, large settlements continued to attract skilled attorneys to the plaintiffs’ side and continued to incentivize plaintiffs’ attorneys to file more and more lawsuits on a class basis. In 2025, the number of class action lawsuits filed in federal courts across the country exceeded 13,229, which equates to more than 52 class actions filed per day on each of the 250 court days in 2025.
That number represents an increase from 2024 and reflects a growth trend relative to the number of class action filed over the past four years. Indeed, the number of class action lawsuits filed in 2022 in federal courts totaled 12,071, the number of class actions filed in 2023 totaled 12,450, and the number of class actions filed in federal courts in 2024 totaled 12,029.
The number filed in 2025 represents a 9% increase over the number of class actions filed in federal court in 2022 and 2024.
Trend #4 – The Landscape Of Privacy Class Actions Continued To Shift
Continued settlements in the privacy space have inspired more members of the plaintiffs’ bar to make privacy litigation the centerpiece of their business models. Although the landscape has shifted over the past five years, the recipe has remained similar — combine archaic statutory schemes, which provide for lucrative statutory penalties, with a ubiquitous technology, to yield the threat of a potential business-crushing class action that can be made via widespread use of form letters and cookie-cutter complaints, to generate payouts on a massive scale. Privacy continued to dominate as one of the hottest areas of growth in terms of class action filings by the plaintiffs’ bar in 2025.
As noted, the landscape has shifted over the past five years. In 2023, many plaintiffs’ attorneys targeted session replay technology, which captures and reconstructs a user’s interaction with a website, or website chatbots, which are programs that simulate conversation through voice or text, or biometric technologies, which capture traits like fingerprints or facial scans for purposes of identification. Over the past two years, the focus for many plaintiffs’ class action lawyers has shifted to website pixels – pieces of code embedded on websites to track activity and, in some circumstances, to provide information about that activity to third-party social media and analytics providers. Plaintiffs have launched thousands of claims via form letters, cookie-cutter complaints, and mass arbitration campaigns.
In 2025, while plaintiffs pulled back on filings in areas like biometric privacy, we saw a surge in litigation over internet tracking technologies based on a patchwork quilt of state-level laws, including the California Invasion of Privacy Act (“CIPA”).
Trend #5 – Exceptions Continued To Erode The Rule In The Arbitration Space
Arbitration agreements with class action waivers provide the foundation for one of the most potent defenses to class action litigation. While the U.S. Supreme Court has continued to promote arbitration agreements, plaintiffs have continued to attack their enforceability, and courts across the country have continued to apply exceptions in inconsistent and expansive ways. One of the most impactful examples is the transportation worker exemption, which courts have applied expansively to local workers, such that the U.S. Supreme Court is poised to examine the exemption again, for a third time in the past five years. A defendant’s ability to enforce an arbitration agreement containing a class or collective action waiver continues to reign as one of the most impactful defenses in terms of shifting the pendulum of class action litigation. The U.S. Supreme Court cleared the last hurdle to widespread adoption of such agreements with its decision in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, et al., 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018). In response, more companies of all types and sizes updated their onboarding systems, terms of use, and other types of agreements to require that employees and consumers resolve any disputes in arbitration on an individual basis. In 2025, defendants continued to win most of the motions to compel arbitration they filed. Across substantive areas of class action litigation, courts issued rulings on approximately 189 motions to compel arbitration, and defendants prevailed on 122 of those rulings, for a success rate of approximately 65%.
Trend #6 – Data Breaches Filings Continued To Grow As The Playbook Became More Refined
Data breach class action filings continued to expand in 2025, marking it as one of the fastest growing areas in the complex litigation space. Plaintiffs filed approximately 1,822 data privacy class actions in 2025. This represents an average of more than 150 fillings per month and more than seven filings per business day. These numbers reflect growth of more than 18% over the number of data privacy class actions filed in 2024 and growth of more than 200% over the number of data privacy class actions filed just three years ago in 2022.
Trend #7 – The Trump Administration’s Policies Had A Profound Impact On Government Enforcement Litigation
While the EEOC and DOL historically have been among the most aggressive litigants in terms of their pursuit of claims, the Trump Administration has had a profound impact on these agencies and their enforcement agendas. President Trump ran for election on a platform that runs counter to many of the “emerging issues” on the EEOC’s priority list, foreshadowing a realignment of litigation priorities. The Trump Administration has kept its promise of less government oversight and regulation and has shifted the priorities of these agencies to more closely match the administration’s objectives. In several respects, FY 2025 represented a hard pivot in EEOC enforcement targets. While total filings decreased, the new administration foreshadowed a new direction and targeted approach in upcoming EEOC enforcement.
Trend #8 – Chasms Among Circuits Continued To Expand In Several Areas Crucial To Class Action Litigation
In 2025, case law continued to develop in fragmented ways among the federal circuits on issues material to plaintiffs’ ability to maintain and certify class actions, enhancing the likelihood of and incentive for forum shopping. In terms of standards governing conditional certification of FLSA, EPA, and ADEA matters, 2025 saw the crystallization of four distinct standards, ranging in the burdens applicable to plaintiffs, as well as in the review and consideration of the evidence presented. A second chasm relates to courts’ approaches uninjured class members, or the notion that each member of a putative class as defined might not have experienced a concrete injury sufficient to provide such individual standing to pursue a claim. A third chasm reflects courts’ divergent views relative to personal jurisdiction and whether a court that cannot exercise general personal jurisdiction must have a basis for specific personal jurisdiction as to each putative class member. These fractures have made forum selection more consequential than ever. Plaintiffs are increasingly skewing their filings toward federal circuits where they anticipate a greater likelihood of a favorable outcome, including toward jurisdictions where judges are taking a more lenient approach to certification or a more permissive view on issues like standing and jurisdiction. To date, efforts to persuade the U.S. Supreme Court to take up cases that would resolve these splits have failed, so we expect they will continue to drive uncertainty in class-related litigation through 2026.
Trend #9 – Artificial Intelligence Impacted The Class Action Landscape On Multiple Levels
In 2025, Artificial Intelligence – AI – continued to influence class action litigation on multiple fronts. First, we saw a growth of class action lawsuits targeting AI, including in the copyright area and employment space, as well as the securities fraud area with claims of “AI washing.” Second, we saw an increasing number of courts and lawyers err in their use of AI to generate documents filed on dockets across the country and encountered numerous examples of the ways in which AI is continuing to impact the efficiencies that underlie the litigation process.
Trend #10 – California Continued Its Dominance As “Ground Zero” For Expansion Of Representative Litigation
The California Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) inspired more representative lawsuits than any other statute in America over the past three years. According to the California Department of Industrial Relations, the number of PAGA notices filed in 2025 approached 9,900, which surpasses the 9,464 PAGA notices in 2024. The so-called PAGA reform legislation passed in 2024 by California lawmakers seemingly did little to nothing to curb interest in these cases. The PAGA created a scheme to “deputize” private citizens to sue their employers for penalties associated with violations of the California Labor Code on behalf of other “aggrieved employees,” as well as the State. A PAGA plaintiff may pursue claims on a representative basis, i.e., on behalf of other allegedly aggrieved employees, but need not satisfy the class action requirements of Rule 23. Thus, the PAGA provides the plaintiffs’ class action bar a mechanism to harness the risk and leverage of a representative proceeding without the threat of removal to federal court under the CAFA and without the burden of meeting the requirements for class certification. The PAGA’s popularity in recent years, however, also flows from its status as one of the most viable workarounds to workplace arbitration agreements. Thus, it presents one of the most pervasive litigation risks to companies doing business in California.
According to data maintained by the California Department of Industrial Relations, the number of PAGA notices filed with the LWDA has increased exponentially over the past two decades. In 2024, notices exceeded 9,464 for the first time and, in 2025, the number of PAGA notices reached a new all-time high of over 9,981.
III. What Should Companies Expect In 2026?
Class action litigation is a staple of the American judicial system. The volume of class action filings has increased each year for the past decade, and 2026 is likely to follow that trend. In this environment, programs designed to ensure compliance with existing laws and strategies to mitigate class action litigation risks are corporate imperatives. The plaintiffs’ bar is nothing if not innovative and resourceful. Given the massive class action settlement figures from 2022 through 2025 (a combined total of $238 billion), coupled with the ever-developing law, corporations can expect more lawsuits, expansive class theories, and an equally if not more aggressive plaintiffs’ bar in 2026. These conditions necessitate planning, preparation, and decision-making to position corporations to withstand and defend class action exposures.
We hope the Duane Morris Class Action Review provides practical insights into complex potential strategies relevant to all aspects of class action litigation and other claims that can cost billions of dollars and require changes to business practices in order to resolve such claims.
By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. and Tyler Zmick
Duane Morris Takeaways: In Svoboda, et al. v. Amazon.com Inc., No. 25-1361, 2025 WL 3654053 (7th Cir. Dec. 17, 2025), a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed an order granting class certification in a case alleging that Amazon’s “virtual try-on” technology violated the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”). In doing so, the Seventh Circuit dealt Amazon a significant blow by allowing Plaintiffs to proceed on behalf of a class comprised of hundreds of thousands of people who used Amazon’s technology. The Svoboda decision is the most recent example of the plaintiffs’ bar successfully obtaining class certification in an Illinois privacy class action, and it shows that even the most sophisticated companies can face exposure arising out of their data collection and retention practices.
Background
Plaintiffs alleged that Amazon sells makeup and eyeware products through its mobile shopping application and that the company’s “virtual try-on” (“VTO”) technology incorporates augmented reality to overlay the products on images of users, allowing shoppers to see how makeup and eyewear products look on their faces. To superimpose a product over an image of a user’s face, Plaintiffs claimed that the VTO software detects a person’s facial features to determine where to virtually overlay a given makeup or eyewear product.
Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs filed a class action in September 2021, claiming that Amazon violated the BIPA by collecting, capturing, storing, or otherwise obtaining the facial geometry and associated personal identifying information of thousands of Illinois residents who used Amazon’s VTO technology.
On March 30, 2024, Judge Jorge L. Alonso of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois certified a class of individuals who used the VTO feature on Amazon’s mobile website or app while in Illinois on or after September 7, 2016 (our previous blog post on the district court’s order can be found here). Amazon subsequently appealed the class certification order to the Seventh Circuit.
The Seventh Circuit’s Opinion
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the class certification order and held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in certifying a class of Amazon VTO users within Illinois.
The Seventh Circuit began by identifying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)’s four class-certification requirements (i.e., numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy) and by explaining that Plaintiffs must also satisfy Rule 23(b)(3), which requires that “questions of law or fact common to class members predominate” over individual questions and that “a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” The Seventh Circuit further noted that Amazon’s appeal challenged the district court’s order only with respect to Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance and superiority requirements.
In affirming the district court’s predominance ruling, the Seventh Circuit found that the same conduct (specifically, Amazon’s alleged use of the VTO application) unites Plaintiffs’ BIPA claims and that issues relating to the functionality of the VTO software, Amazon’s alleged use of class members’ biometric data, and legal questions about whether that use violated the BIPA were common to the class and could be resolved by the district court “in one stroke.”
The Seventh Circuit then turned to the individualized questions identified by Amazon, including the question of whether a class member was in Illinois at the time he or she used Amazon’s VTO tool. Regarding this “locational element,” the Seventh Circuit observed that class members must prove that they were in Illinois when they used the VTO tool to have viable BIPA claims and that the lack of such proof also raised questions relating to class member identification and manageability. The Seventh Circuit further acknowledged that common proof of location may only be available for a subset of claimants, while “individualized inquiries will be necessary for others.” Id. at *5 (“For example, where billing address and geolocation data point to different states, or are unavailable for an alleged VTO use, individual affidavits or other proof will be necessary to show that the claimant used the VTO in Illinois.”).
The Seventh Circuit ultimately ruled that the location of potential class members could generally be determined using (i) users’ billing addresses, (ii) users’ IP addresses and geolocation data, and (iii) personal affidavits from class members attesting that they used the VTO application while in Illinois, and that individualized questions connected to proof of location would not predominate over common questions. See also id. (“[I]t is not uncommon for class actions to have a ‘final phase’ for class members to submit individualized proof of a claim….A phase requiring individual presentations of proof on all (or part of) an element of a claim does not defeat predominance. Stated another way, an individual question does not predominate where common questions of law and fact relevant to liability otherwise generate significant efficiencies and the individual question is manageable.”) (citation omitted). The Seventh Circuit also rejected Amazon’s due process challenge to the district court’s predominance finding because the company would have the opportunity to challenge class members’ individual proof of location.
Implications For Corporate Counsel
Svoboda is one of many cases demonstrating the dangers associated with collecting or retaining biometric information without implementing BIPA-compliant policies. The opinion is also a reminder that the larger the company, the larger the potential class size (and accompanying statutory damages award). The class in Svoboda contained over one hundred thousand individuals, illustrating the potentially significant exposure associated with running afoul of Illinois privacy laws.
Corporate counsel should also remember that the Seventh Circuit’s discussion in Svoboda applies to all class actions (not just those alleging BIPA violations) in which it may not be possible to identify a class member’s location at the time of the alleged privacy violation. As noted above, due process does not require that class counsel be able to uncover such information for all class members at the certification stage. See also, e.g., Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 672 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[C]ourts should not decline certification merely because the plaintiff’s proposed method for identifying class members relies on affidavits.”).
By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. and Justin R. Donoho
Duane Morris Takeaways: On December 23, 2025, Judge William Alsup of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California entered an order in Bartz, et al. v. Anthropic PBC, Case No. 24-CV-5417 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2025), requiring five law firms seeking a fee award in connection with a class action settlement to file a declaration setting forth the full extent of any of the firms’ actual or proposed fee-sharing agreements and the extent to which any arrangement may result in some class members receiving a sweeter recovery than other class members. Judge Alsup also ordered preservation of all communications and other documents relating to such side deals.
The ruling is significant because it shows that only appointed class counsel may be eligible to receive a fee award in connection with a class action settlement, and may not outsource its responsibilities to non-appointed counsel or seek any other arrangements that may favor some class members to the detriment of other class members. Furthermore, the ruling shows that any such side deals must be disclosed publicly prior to any final approval of a class action settlement.
Background
This case is one of several class actions that plaintiffs have filed alleging that developers of generative artificial intelligence (“gen AI”) violated copyright laws by generating infringing outputs and/or by using unauthorized copies of copyrighted works as inputs to train the developer’s models.
Many of these gen AI class actions are “bet-the-company” lawsuits, even for the world’s largest companies. Plaintiffs in gen AI class actions typically invoke the Copyright Act in order to seek millions — and sometimes even billions — of dollars on the theory that thousands or millions of unauthorized copies of copyrighted works, times up to $150,000 per copyrighted work for willful infringement, equals a crushing, settlement-inspiring number.
In Bartz, the parties reached a $1.5 billion settlement, which the Court preliminary approved, and which we blogged about previously here and here.
Following preliminary approval, two law firms appointed as class counsel and three additional non-appointed firms filed a petition for fees to be awarded in connection with the class action settlement. The fee petition sought $225 million for class counsel and $75 million for the non-appointed law firms. Id. at 3, 7. These three non-appointed firms had agreed to gather contact information for the class list and to provide input on the claim form and claims process, two for the publisher class members (“Publishers’ Coordination Counsel”), and one for the author class members (“Authors’ Coordination Counsel”). Id. at 3.
The Court’s Decision
The Court declined to rule on the fee petition, ordering that a number of disclosures and preservation efforts be made first in order “to set the record straight” concerning aspects of the fee petition. Id. at 1. Such was necessary, according to the Court, because it appeared that counsel may have entered into one or more “side deals.” Id. at 3.
As the Court explained, “[t]wo and only two law firms were ever appointed class counsel.” Id. at 1. Moreover, “preliminary approval and the class notices confirmed that only two firms were approved to serve the class … Those firms never proposed a fee splitting scheme, and none was ever even preliminarily approved.” Id. at 7.
As to the three non-appointed law firms, the Court found that they “cannot appoint [themselves] class counsel by showing up. Nor can class counsel appoint someone else to do its work.” Id. at 2. As the Court further explained, it had not had a chance to vet the non-appointed counsel for conflicts, or to prevent duplication of effort by overlapping law firms. Id. at 8. In addition, the Court found it concerning that “we do not yet know whether ‘Publishers’ Coordination Counsel’ will share any part of their bonanza with one or more publishers so as to give those publishers a premium to not opt out … and thereby avoid triggering [the defendant]’s right to about the settlement.” Id. Furthermore, the class notice “never alerted class members that still other lawyers would come out of the woodwork to seek a third again whatever their class counsel would seek for its work.” Id. (emphasis added).
For these reasons, the Court ordered that, within one week, all law firms who filed fee petitions or on whose behalf fee petitions were filed, must publicly file a declaration (not under seal) setting forth the “full extent” to which such firm agreed or made a proposal “to share any portion(s) of any fee award in this class action or in any other class action (putative or certified) involving any party (or class member) herein,” and stating as to each such agreement or proposal its date, terms, the extent to which it is verbal and the extent to which it is in writing (or in an email or text or other message), and the parties and the names of all persons who made the agreement. Id. at 10. The Court also ordered public disclosure in a declaration of the “full extent to which any arrangement has been made or proposed by which any class member would receive a sweeter recovery than other class members.” Id. at 10-11. Finally, the Court further ordered that “[a]ll emails, messages, and written materials relating to any of the above shall be preserved for future potential discovery.” Id. at 11.
Implications For Companies
The Bartz fee petition order is as extraordinary as it is unique. It offers strong precedent for any company defending a large class action and preparing to enter into a class action settlement. Specifically, Bartz shows that plaintiffs’ firms seeking any portion of a fee award in connection with such a settlement will need to publicly disclose any side deals prior to any final settlement approval. Therefore, settling defendants should consider seeking to discover any side-deal information before entering into such settlement. That way, any obstacles to final settlement approval such as that presented by the Bartz fee petition order might be considered before the parties reach any settlement.
By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Justin R. Donoho, and Hayley Ryan
Duane Morris Takeaways: On December 11, 2025, President Donald J. Trump signed Executive Order 14365 titled “Ensuring a National Policy Framework for Artificial Intelligence.” The Order targets what it characterizes as a “patchwork” of State-by-State AI regulation and directs federal agencies to pursue a more uniform, national framework. Rather than serving as a technical AI governance roadmap, the Order focuses on limiting State AI laws through federal funding leverage, potential preemption, and expanded use of FTC enforcement authority. The discussion below highlights the Order’s core objectives and key implications for companies and employers. The Executive Order is required reading for any organizations deploying AI or thinking of doing so.
The Executive Order’s Core Objectives
Reduce State AI Regulation By Framing It As A Competitiveness Problem
The Order emphasizes U.S. leadership in artificial intelligence and asserts that divergent State regulatory regimes increase compliance costs, especially for startups, and may impede innovation and deployment. It also raises concerns that certain State approaches could pressure companies to embed “ideological” requirements into AI systems.
Create Leverage Through Federal Funding: BEAD Broadband Money As The “Carrot And Stick”
Within 90 days, the Secretary of Commerce is directed to issue a policy notice describing the circumstances under which States may be deemed ineligible for certain broadband deployment funding under the Broadband Equity Access and Deployment (BEAD) program if they impose specified AI-related requirements. The notice is also intended to explain how fragmented State AI laws could undermine broadband deployment and high-speed connectivity goals.
Move Toward A Federal Reporting And Disclosure Standard
Within 90 days after the Order’s State-law “identification” process (discussed below), the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), in consultation with a Special Advisor for AI and Crypto, is instructed to consider whether to initiate a proceeding to adopt a federal reporting and disclosure standard for AI models that would preempt conflicting State requirements.
Use The FTC Act As An Enforcement Anchor And Tee Up Preemption Arguments
Within 90 days, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is directed, in consultation with other federal agencies, to issue a policy statement addressing how the FTC Act’s prohibition on unfair or deceptive acts or practices applies to AI models, with the express objective of preempting conflicting State laws.
Establish A Federal AI Litigation Task Force To Challenge State AI Laws
The Executive Order goes beyond policy statements and funding leverage by directing the Attorney General, within 30 days, to establish an AI Litigation Task Force dedicated exclusively to challenging State AI laws that conflict with the Order’s national policy objectives. The Task Force is authorized to pursue constitutional and preemption-based challenges, signaling an intent to bring coordinated, affirmative litigation against State AI regimes.
That enforcement effort is reinforced by a parallel State-law triage process. Within 90 days, the Secretary of Commerce must publish an evaluation identifying “onerous” State AI laws for potential challenge, particularly those that require AI systems to alter truthful outputs or compel disclosures that may implicate First Amendment or other constitutional concerns. Together, these provisions signal an intent to move quickly from policy articulation to test cases aimed at curbing State-level AI regulation.
Implications For Companies
Compliance Strategy May Shift, But Uncertainty Rises First
Although companies may welcome relief from conflicting State AI mandates, the Executive Order is likely to increase near-term uncertainty. Preemption disputes are likely, and the Order directs agency action rather than establishing a comprehensive statutory framework. Companies should avoid scaling back State-law compliance prematurely and should assume any federal override will be contested until resolved through rulemaking and litigation.
Class Action Exposure Will Shift, Not Disappear
Even if State AI laws are narrowed, plaintiffs’ lawyers are likely to pursue claims under more traditional theories, including consumer protection (particularly AI marketing and disclosure claims), employment discrimination, privacy and biometrics statutes, and contract or misrepresentation theories. The Order’s emphasis on FTC unfair and deceptive practices enforcement suggests that federal consumer protection standards may become the new focal point for both regulatory scrutiny and follow-on civil litigation.
Employment Risk Remains
Employers should expect ongoing scrutiny of AI use in hiring, promotion, and performance management, including disparate impact claims, vendor-liability arguments, and discovery disputes over model documentation, adverse impact analyses, and validation. Defensible governance, testing, and documentation remain critical.
Federal Contracting And Funding May Come With New AI Representations
If federal agencies adopt standardized AI disclosures, companies operating in regulated industries or participating in broadband initiatives may face new contract provisions governing AI use, along with enhanced reporting and audit obligations.
What Companies Should Do Now
Companies should begin by identifying where and how AI tools are being deployed, particularly in consumer-facing and employment-related contexts, and evaluating those uses under existing disclosure, privacy, and anti-discrimination laws. Public-facing statements about AI capabilities should be reviewed to ensure they are accurate and defensible, as increased regulatory and litigation focus on unfair or deceptive practices is likely to heighten scrutiny of AI-related claims. Companies should also review vendor relationships to confirm that contracts clearly address testing and validation obligations, incident response, audit rights, and appropriate allocation of risk for privacy and discrimination claims. Finally, organizations should remain prepared for continued regulatory change by maintaining State-law compliance readiness while monitoring federal agency actions that may shape a national AI framework.
Bottom Line
This Executive Order is a significant policy signal. The federal government is positioning itself to reduce State-by-State AI regulation and replace it with a framework centered on federal disclosure requirements and consumer protection enforcement. Companies should view the Order as an opportunity to prepare for a likely federal compliance baseline, without assuming State-law exposure will disappear in the near term.
By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. and Jennifer A. Riley
Duane Morris Takeaway: Happy Holidays to our loyal readers of the Duane Morris Class Action Defense Blog! Our elves are busy at work this holiday season in wrapping up our start-of-the-year kick-off publication – the Duane Morris Class Action Review – 2026. We will go to press in early January and launch the 2026 Review from our blog and our book launch website. This announcement also marks our 600th blog post.
The 2026 Review builds on the success of our previous editions and represents our 22nd annual study of the class action space. It will be the biggest and most comprehensive edition yet, at over 750 pages. The 2026 Review has more analysis than ever before, with discussion of over 1,700 class certification rulings from federal and state courts over this past year. The Review will be available for download as an E-Book too.
The Review is a one-of-its-kind publication analyzing class action trends, decisions, and settlements in all areas impacting Corporate America, including the substantive areas of antitrust, appeals, the Class Action Fairness Act, civil rights, consumer fraud, data breach, EEOC-Initiated and government enforcement litigation, employment discrimination, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, labor, privacy, procedural issues, product liability and mass torts, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, securities fraud, state court class actions, the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, wage & hour class and collective actions, and the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act. The Review also highlights key rulings on attorneys’ fee awards in class actions, motions granting and denying sanctions in class actions, and the top-class action settlements in each area. It also will contain a brand-new appendix featuring analysis of rulings in the generative artificial intelligence and crypto space. Finally, the Review provides insight as to what companies and corporate counsel can expect to see in 2026.
The Duane Morris Class Action Review was recently cited in briefing to the U.S. Supreme Court in as the authoritative source on FLSA certification statistics and the widening circuit split regarding when it is appropriate to send notice to would-be plaintiffs, under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) in a Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) collective action.
In its review of our practice group’s resource, Employment Practices Liability Consultant Magazine (“EPLiC”) said, “The Duane Morris Class Action Review is ‘the Bible’ on class action litigation and an essential desk reference for business executives, corporate counsel, and human resources professionals.” EPLiC continued, “The review is a must-have resource for in-depth analysis of class actions in general and workplace litigation in particular.
With the submission of our analysis to the U.S. Supreme Court, we are humbled and proud to be cited as the authoritative source in the class action space. The Review is also relied on by some of the world’s largest plaintiffs’ firms and federal judges, see, e.g., Laverenz v. Pioneer Metal Finishing, LLC, 746 F. Supp. 3d 602, 614 (E.D. Wis. 2024). The Duane Morris Class Action Review is the “one stop shop” and authoritative source on collective action certification rates, collective action trends and analysis, and the implications, pressures, and contours that parties face when engaged in FLSA collective action litigation.
We look forward to providing the 2026 edition of the Review to all our loyal readers in early January. Stay tuned and Happy Holidays!
By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Eden E. Anderson, and Rebecca S. Bjork
Duane Morris Takeaways: On December 9, 2025, Judge Yvonne Rogers of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California held in Williams, et al. v. Moon Active Ltd., Case No. 4:25-CV-01626 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2025), that when a minor to a contract states her intent to disaffirm “all contracts” with a defendant, such disaffirmance of a contract “as a whole” presents an issue of contract validity for an arbitrator to resolve, and is not a specific challenge to an arbitration clause’s delegation provision that a court must resolve. Under the Williams decision, if a minor wants a court to rule upon the validity of a delegation provision contained within an arbitration agreement, then the minor must specifically disaffirm the delegation provision and not merely the whole of the contract within which the delegation provision appears. As such, this ruling is a required read for corporate counsel managing litigation risks through arbitration program.
Case Background
D.K., a minor, used the defendant’s Coin Master mobile game, which allowed users to purchase coins to spin a slot machine feature. When D.K. created an account to play Coin Master, a pop up screen asked her to confirm she was over 18 and that she had read and agreed to Terms and Conditions (Terms) applicable to her usage, with a hyperlink to those Terms also furnished. The opening paragraph of the Terms mentioned in bold that the Terms included an arbitration clause, and provided a link directly to the section of the Terms containing the arbitration clause. The arbitration clause included a delegation provision whereby any disputes concerning the enforceability, validity, scope or severability were delegated to the arbitrator to resolve.
D.K.’s mother filed a class action lawsuit on her behalf asserting claims for negligence, unjust enrichment, and violations of California’s unfair competition law, and her counsel then sent letters to the defendant indicating that D.K. disaffirmed “all contracts” with the company. Id. at 3. The defendant moved to compel arbitration.
The Decision
The court granted the motion to compel arbitration. The court first addressed whether an arbitration contract had been formed. Because California law permits a minor to contract in the same manner as an adult subject to the power of disaffirmance, and because conspicuous notice of the arbitration clause was furnished, the court held the Terms were a validly formed contract between the parties.
As to whether D.K. had disaffirmed the Terms by sending a letter to the defendant disaffirming “all contracts,” the court agreed with the defendant that such issue was a validity challenge to the Terms as a whole that needed to be resolved by the arbitrator pursuant to the delegation clause. D.K. argued that the delegation clause could not apply since she had disaffirmed the Terms. In rejecting this argument, the court explained that while courts are permitted to decide specific challenges to delegation clauses, it is arbitrators who, pursuant to delegation clauses, are to determine challenges to the validity of an arbitration agreement as a whole. The court found that D.K.’s letter, which disaffirmed “all contracts,” was a challenge to the Terms as a whole because the letter did not single out the arbitration clause or its delegation provision. In so holding, the court distinguished the circumstances that were present in J.R. v. Electronic Arts, 98 Cal.App.5th 1107 (2024) because the minor there has specifically disaffirmed “any” contract rather than “all contracts.”
Implications of the Decision
The Williams decision highlights the importance of the wording used when a minor seeks to disaffirm an arbitration agreement.
Under Williams, for a court to address the validity of a delegation provision within an arbitration agreement, the minor must specifically disaffirm the delegation provision itself and not generally disavow “all contracts.”
By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.
Duane Morris Takeaways: The American Tort Reform Association (“ATRA”) annually publishes its “Judicial Hellholes Report,” focusing on litigation issues and identifying jurisdictions likely to have unfair and biased administration of justice. The ATRA recently published its 2025-2026 Report and this year there was a brand-new entry for the #1 position as the most challenging venue for defendants – the courts of Los Angeles. Readers can find a copy here and the executive summary here.
The Judicial Hellholes Report is an important read for corporate counsel facing class action litigation because it identifies jurisdictions that are generally unfavorable to defendants. The Report defines a “judicial hellhole” as a jurisdiction where judges in civil cases systematically apply laws and procedures in an unfair and unbalanced manner, generally to the disadvantage of defendants. The Report is a “must read” for anyone litigating class actions and making decisions about venue strategy.
The 2025-2026 Hellholes
In its recently released annual report, the ATRA identified eight jurisdictions on its 2025-2026 hellholes list – which, in order, include: (1) Los Angeles (with massive nuclear verdicts, abusive litigation practices, and predatory no-injury lawsuits); (2) New York City (at this spot for the second time in a row, with expansive theories of product liability for tech companies and lawsuit abuses); (3) South Carolina (particularly due to a bias against corporate defendants in asbestos litigation); (4) Louisiana (namely, with the coastal litigation trial which concluded in a nine-figure verdict and various political biases); (5) Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas (for mass torts litigation); (6) St. Louis, Missouri (with focuses on junk science in the courtrooms and out-of-town ADA litigation); (7) Cook, Madison, and St. Clair Counties, Illinois (for baby formula and asbestos litigation); and (8) King County, Washington and the Washington Supreme Court (for junk science in the courtrooms and novel climate change litigation).
According to the ATRA’s analysis, these venues are less than optimal for corporate defendants and often attract plaintiffs’ attorneys, particularly for the filing of class action lawsuits. As a result, corporate counsel should take particular care if they encounter a class action lawsuit filed in one of these venues.
The “Watch List”
The ATRA also included six jurisdictions on its “Watch List” — up from only one on the previous list. These are listed in no precise order, and according to the Report, bear watching due to expansive liability and concerning trends. The Watch List selections include: Gwinnett, Fulton, and Cobb Counties in Georgia, after Georgia as a whole fell from the Hellholes list after significant reforms, these counties could remain problematic); Pennsylvania Supreme Court (which was previously listed in the Hellholes list with the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, and was moved to the Watch List after reforming some of the issues with forum shopping; Texas (with pro-plaintiff leanings and nuclear verdicts in trial courts); Michigan Supreme Court (which has yet to issue several high-profile, long-awaited decisions); Louisiana (on the watch list see how 2025 civil justice reforms impact the courts); and Kentucky (with regard to the trial court’s large verdict awards).
The “Dishonorable Mentions”
The ATRA included a few jurisdictions on its “Dishonorable Mentions” list, for making unsound decisions, engaging in abusive practices, or other actions that “erode the fairness of a state’s civil justice system.” The venues on the list include: (i) the Fourth Circuit (views on public nuisance); (ii) a Colorado Court (due to problematic evidentiary decision); and (iii) Ohio Appellate Courts (which permitted unlimited noneconomic damages).
Points Of Lights
In addition, the ATRA recognized that several jurisdictions made significant positive improvements this year, highlighting decisions by a Colorado court that dismissed a medical monitoring damages theory, the Delaware Supreme Court, which rejected junk science, the Maine Supreme Court, as it declined to broaden the scope of public nuisance liability, a North Carolina court which addressed legislative authority to limit noneconomic damages, and the Utah Supreme Court, which eliminated “phantom damages” windfalls.
Implications For Employers
The Judicial Hellholes Report often mirrors the experience of companies in high-stakes class actions, as California, New York, South Carolina, Louisiana, Pennsylvania, Missouri, Illinois, and Washington are among the leading states where plaintiffs’ lawyers file class actions. These jurisdictions are linked by class certification standards that are more plaintiff-friendly and more generous damages recovery possibilities under state laws.
By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Rebecca Bjork, and Anna Sheridan
Key Takeaways: In EEOC v. Security Assurance Management Inc., No. 25-CV-00181, 2025 WL 2911781 (D.D.C. Oct. 14, 2025), Judge Rudolph Contreras of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia refused to pare back the EEOC’s pregnancy and lactation claims against Security Assurance Management, Inc. (“SAM”), leaving all five causes of action under the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (PWFA) and both Title VII counts intact. Applying Rule 12(c), the Court held – in an order denying Defendant’s Partial Motion to Dismiss – the “heavy burden” on a defendant seeking judgment on the pleadings and determined that the EEOC’s theories — though factually overlapping — targeted distinct harms and therefore were not “duplicative.” The Court’s refusal to dismiss any of the EEOC’s PWFA counts sends a clear signal that defendants will face an uphill battle when trying to narrow pregnancy-related claims at the pleadings stage, particularly after filing an answer.
Case Background
The EEOC filed suit under Title VII and the PWFA on behalf of Simone Cooper, a special police officer who was reassigned after the client at her post did not want her working at the site while pregnant. (Compl. ¶ 17). As the court summarized, the EEOC “brings this employment discrimination action against Security Assurance Management, Inc. pursuant to Title VII … and the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act,” alleging that SAM “disciplined and removed an employee, Simone Cooper (‘Ms. Cooper’), from her assignment due to her pregnancy-related condition and her need for accommodations.” Id. at *3.
After her maternity leave, Cooper was placed at a Hampton Inn post where she “was breastfeeding and had the pregnancy-related medical condition of lactation.” Id. The court noted that she “could nonetheless perform the essential functions of her job as an Unarmed Special Police Officer,” but SAM “repeatedly denied or ignored Ms. Cooper’s accommodation requests.” Id. The consequences were significant, as “Ms. Cooper leaked through her clothing during the workday on at least two occasions,” and because SAM provided no adequate space, “Ms. Cooper had to pump in her car in the Hampton Inn parking lot.” Id.
Despite outreach by Cooper, her union representative, and her attorney, the company allegedly did not engage in any interactive process. SAM eventually issued a written warning for “excessive absenteeism” that included days she was not scheduled and the day she left after leaking through her uniform. Id. at *4. She was later removed from the schedule entirely.
The complaint asserts seven claims, including two under Title VII and five under the PWFA for failure to accommodate, adverse action based on accommodation requests, denial of employment opportunities, retaliation, and interference. After it filed its Answer, SAM filed a partial motion to dismiss seeking dismissal of three of the counts as purportedly duplicative.
The Court’s Ruling
Because SAM filed an Answer before seeking dismissal, the court treated the request as a Rule 12(c) motion. As Judge Contreras explained, such a motion “will be granted only if Defendant can demonstrate that no material fact is in dispute and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” and at this early stage the movant “shoulders a heavy burden of justification.” Id. at *6.
The Court began with its definition, citing from Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran’s “duplicative claim test.” It explained that “duplicative claims are those that stem from identical allegations, that are decided under identical legal standards, and for which identical relief is available.” Id. at *7 (quoting Wultz, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1, 81 (D.D.C. 2010)). SAM argued that several PWFA claims were repetitive, but after analyzing each count, the Court held otherwise.
Most notably, SAM asserted that the “Adverse Actions” claim duplicated the PWFA retaliation claim because both concerned similar employment decisions. Judge Contreras disagreed, emphasizing that the counts “assert different motivations for Defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct.” Id. at *8. The adverse-action theory centers on actions taken “on account of” Cooper’s accommodation requests, while retaliation requires adverse treatment because she opposed unlawful practices. “Because Count Two (Adverse Actions) and Count Four (Retaliation) arise from different allegations,” the court concluded, “the claims are not duplicative.” Id. at *9.
The Court applied the same reasoning to SAM’s attempt to collapse the PWFA adverse-action, denial-of-opportunities, and interference counts into the single failure-to-accommodate claim. Those theories, Judge Contreras explained, each addressed different harms and are evaluated under distinct legal standards. As a result, “none are duplicative,” and the Court denied the motion in full. Id. at* 7.
Implications For Employers
This opinion is a reminder that overlapping facts do not automatically render multiple statutory claims redundant — especially under the PWFA, where Congress created several discrete causes of action aimed at different workplace harms. Courts are giving each theory breathing room rather than collapsing them into a single “pregnancy discrimination” count.
Procedurally, the decision warns defendants against using post-Answer motions to trim suits. Under Rule 12(c), the movant faces a “heavy burden,” and close questions typically favor allowing the case to proceed to discovery.
Substantively, the facts the Court credited (removing a visibly pregnant worker at a client’s request, ignoring repeated lactation-related accommodation needs, forcing pumping in a car, and disciplining a worker for consequences of inadequate accommodations) are the kinds of scenarios likely to support claims not just under the PWFA, but also under Title VII.
The decision reinforces that the PWFA is a powerful, stand-alone statute with multiple actionable theories. Courts will not readily prune these claims at the pleading stage, and the EEOC is deploying them aggressively. Employers should treat pregnancy-related accommodation requests with the same rigor as disability accommodations – engage promptly, document communications, provide appropriate space and break time, and avoid client-driven decisions that move or remove pregnant workers.
By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Brett Bohan, and Andrew Quay
Duane Morris Takeaways: On November 25, 2025, in Coleman, et al. v. Burger King Corp., Case No. 22-CV-20925, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 231422 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 25, 2025), Judge Roy K. Altman of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida denied a motion for class certification of three nationwide classes of consumers against one of the Burger King after the lawsuit narrowly survived two motions to dismiss. The Court held that due to the predominance of individual questions between the proposed classes, and plaintiffs’ lack of class-wide evidence to support certification, the plaintiffs failed to establish the prerequisites for class certification from the sale of “Whoppers” and “Big Kings” across the country. The opinion illustrates the hurdles plaintiffs face when attempting to certify multi-state, let alone nationwide, classes, and the fundamental, yet effective arguments corporate counsel can raise to defeat them.
Case Background
Plaintiffs, a group of Burger King consumers alleging that Burger King materially overstates the size of its burgers in advertisements, sought certification of three nationwide classes. Id. at *2. Plaintiffs sought certification under Rule 23(b)(3), which allows a district court to certify a class only if “the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Id. at *6-7 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)). Plaintiffs insisted that they each purchased a burger because of the advertising and would not have if the size of the burgers had been portrayed accurately. Id. at *3. Notably, the plaintiffs did not offer any substantive analysis on variations between state laws despite their request for certification of nationwide classes.
Burger King responded that plaintiffs’ motion could not satisfy predominance and superiority under Rule 23(b)(3) and commonality and typicality under Rule 23(a). Id. at *8. Burger King argued that plaintiffs’ lack of class-wide evidence, coupled with Burger King’s affirmative defenses that raise additional individualized questions, was fatal to their motion for class certification. Id. at *33. Also weighing against predominance, Burger King argued, the proposed class members “were exposed to a wide variety of advertisements,” and “[n]o single photograph of a burger . . . can represent the appearances of the burgers every other class member received.” Id. at *23, 28.
The Court’s Opinion
In a 35-page opinion, Judge Roy K. Altman denied plaintiffs’ motion for class certification for failing to carry their Rule 23 burden. Explaining that plaintiffs are not entitled to “a mere pleading standard” on a motion for class certification, and that they must “affirmatively demonstrate” their compliance with each element of Rule 23, the Court held that plaintiffs failed to establish predominance and superiority under Rule 23(b)(3) and, at minimum, commonality under Rule 23(a). Id. at *5 (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011)).
As for predominance, the Court explained that Plaintiffs needed to be able to prove “the relative smallness of the burgers [they bought compared to the burgers in the advertisements] with a few pieces of common evidence that apply with equal force to everyone.” Id. at *30. Plaintiffs could not do that, the Court held, because each putative class member saw a particular advertisement and received a specific burger. Id. Plus, by seeking certification of nationwide or multi-state classes, plaintiffs bear the heavy burden to demonstrate that “variations in state law” do not threaten to “swamp any common issues and defeat predominance.” Id. at *10 (quoting Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1261 (11th Cir. 2004)). Plaintiffs’ motion for certification did not provide “any analysis of potential state-law conflicts,” thus “utterly fail[ing]” to meet their burden of showing that common issues of law predominate. Id. at *12.
The Court further agreed that Burger King’s affirmative defenses raised additional individualized inquiries. If the Court were to grant certification, a “potentially significant percentage” of the putative class members may be precluded from pursuing their claims by virtue of an arbitration clause and class action waiver that loyalty rewards program users had agreed to, and with respect to at least one class, numerous plaintiffs and putative class members did not properly notify Burger King of the alleged breaches within a reasonable time after they discovered the alleged breaches.
For similar reasons, the Court rejected plaintiffs’ proffered method of calculating class-wide damages by subtracting the price of the burger from the value of the item as determined by the jury. Id. at *45. Burger King menu items vary by location, and the prices likely differed throughout the class period, so the Court would need to confirm when and where each individual plaintiff purchased a burger in order to compute damages. Id. at *46.
Turning to superiority, the Court held that plaintiffs’ proposed classes “would create an administrative nightmare.” Id. at *51. Plaintiffs contended that “there are no significant or unusual difficulties in managing this case” because Burger King’s liability “can be proven by its uniform advertisements and photographs of the actual Menu Items served to customers, which are common to the entire class.” Id. at *50. The Court rejected plaintiffs’ conclusory argument because the proposed class involves millions of consumers stretching to 2018, “very few of whom are likely to have retained proof of (or even remember) their fast-food purchases.” Id. at *52.
Finally, though not necessary for denying class certification, the Court held that plaintiffs failed to show that common questions they raised, such as whether Burger King’s advertisements are materially misleading, can be raised through class-wide evidence. Id. at *54. While plaintiffs offered questions common to the class, they failed to show that a class-wide proceeding would “generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.” Id. at *55 (quoting Dukes, 564 U.S. at 350).
In sum, after narrowly surviving two motions to dismiss, plaintiffs were unable to surmount their burden at the class certification stage, and the Court denied their motion for class certification.
Implications For Companies
The Court’s holding in Coleman demonstrates the burden that plaintiffs must overcome when seeking to certify a class. Coleman shows that plaintiffs cannot rest on the allegations in their complaints to satisfy the elements of class certification and must instead put forth evidence from which courts may determine commonality and predominance.
In cases involving allegations of consumer fraud, it may not be sufficient for plaintiffs to establish that they were all deceived by the same allegedly fraudulent behavior. Instead, to certify a nationwide class, plaintiffs may also need to overcome differences between locations; difficulties in supplying reliable, supporting proof; and variations between state laws.
Additionally, Coleman represents a reminder of the continued utility of an arbitration agreement for defeating class certification, even where the agreement may not extend to all members of the class.
