Jennifer A. Riley – Class Action Defense

March 31, 2026March 31, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Announcing The Launch Of The Duane Morris California, New York, And Illinois Class Action Reviews – 2026

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. and Jennifer A. Riley

We’re excited to officially announce the release of the all-new California, New York, and Illinois Class Action Reviews, which are comprehensive new desk reference resources designed to help legal professionals and businesses better understand the evolving landscape of class action law in three of the most influential jurisdictions in the United States. California, Illinois, and New York are class action epicenters where a significant number of class actions are filed each year.

Class action litigation continues to play a critical role in shaping consumer protection statutes, employment law obligations, and corporate accountability duties. With each state bringing its own nuances, staying informed and ahead of these risks can be a challenge. The Duane Morris Class Action Team created this new collection of desk references to simplify that process, and offering clear, practical insights into the rules, trends, and key considerations that define class action practice in California, New York, and Illinois.

Each volume in the series dives deep into state-specific procedures, recent case developments, and strategic considerations. Whether you’re navigating complex litigation, advising clients, or simply seeking to expand your legal knowledge, these resources provide accessible, up-to-date guidance you can rely on. We’re proud to offer a resource that supports better decision-making and deeper understanding in an increasingly complex legal environment.

The California, New York, and Illinois Class Action Reviews – 2026 are now available. We invite you to explore the series and discover how it can support your work and enhance your perspective on class action law. You can find the California Class Action Review here, the New York Class Action Review here, and the Illinois Class Action Review here.

Stay tuned to the Class Action Weekly Wire for more information on these new additions to the Duane Morris Class Action Review series.

March 25, 2026March 25, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Maryland Federal District Court Finds That Oral Consent Is Sufficient To Make Telemarketing Calls Using A Prerecorded Voice

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, Anna Sheridan, and Ryan T. Garippo

Duane Morris Takeaways: On March 20, 2026, in Bradley, et al. v. DentalPlans.com, No. 20-CV-010904, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59569 (D. Md. Mar. 20, 2026), Judge Brandan Hurson of the U.S. District Court for District of Maryland decertified a certified class action and granted summary judgment on a named plaintiff’s Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) claim. The decision is premised on the legal conclusion that the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) lacked the authority to interpret the TCPA’s consent provisions to require prior express written consent for telemarketing calls and continues the trend of courts which are challenging the FCC’s longstanding monopoly to interpret the statute.

Case Background

DentalPlans operates a “direct-to-consumer marketplace” that sells dental savings plans, including plans offered by Cigna. In November 2018, Deborah Bradley called DentalPlans to enroll in a plan and the representative asked her whether the company had her consent to contact her using “automated dialing system or prerecorded message.” Bradley, et al. v. DentalPlans.com, No. 20-CV-01094, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10050, at *3 (D. Md. June 6, 2024). Bradley ultimately provided such consent and signed up for a dental discount plan with Cigna.

In September 2019, however, Bradley spoke to another DentalPlans representative and told that representative that she did not want her dental plan to automatically renew. As a result, DentalPlans started placing prerecorded calls to Bradley which informed her that “her membership was ending soon and that she could renew her plan.” After Bradley’s plan expired, she continued to receive prerecorded calls which “attempted to ‘win back’ [her] business by encouraging her to repurchase her Cigna plan with DentalPlans.” Id. at *5. In total, DentalPlans placed 10 “win back” calls to Bradley prior to the filing of the action.

As a result of these calls, on April 28, 2020, Bradley filed a putative class action lawsuit under the TCPA, alleging that the calls constituted unauthorized telemarketing calls using prerecorded messages. The crux of Bradley’s argument was that because these calls allegedly constituted “telemarketing” the applicable FCC regulations required prior express written consent, and oral consent would not suffice. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(2). The court agreed with Bradley’s interpretation of the regulation, granted class certification, and certified a class comprised in part of “any consumer who signed up by telephone.” Id. at *27. Bradley then sent notice to the class members and the parties continued to litigate the case.

DentalPlans ultimately filed a motion for reconsideration of the court’s order granting class certification. In that motion, Dental Plans argued, inter alia, that the court’s reliance on 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(2) was misplaced following the U.S. Supreme Court’s mandate that district courts are “not bound by the FCC’s interpretation of the TCPA.” McLaughlin Chiropractic Assocs., Inc. v. McKesson Corp., 606 U.S. 146, 168 (2025). The parties then briefed that issue.

The Court’s Decision

In a thorough 24-page opinion, Judge Hurson walked through the proper interpretation of the phrase “prior express consent” as used in the TCPA and the scope of Congress’s delegation to the FCC.

In so doing, Judge Hurson turned to the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Insurance Marketing Coalition Ltd. v. FCC, 127 F.4th 303, 312 (11th Cir. 2025), which explained that the “TCPA gives the FCC only the authority to ‘reasonably define’ the TCPA’s consent-provisions” and not create a non-statutory consent regime. Judge Hurson, therefore, reasoned that because the phrase “prior express written consent” was not contained in the statute, the proper interpretation of the statute’s actual language hinged on the authority that Congress delegated to the FCC.

Similarly, Judge Hurson looked to the Fifth Circuit’s very recent decision in Bradford v. Sovereign Pest Control of Texas, Inc., 167 F.4th 809, 812 (5th Cir. 2026), which held the TCPA provides “no basis for concluding that telemarketing calls require prior express written consentbut not oral consent.” (emphasis in original).

Based on these opinions, because the “written consent” language does not appear in the statute, Judge Hurson concluded that Congress needed to delegate the interpretation of the TCPA to the FCC for its current interpretation to stand. But no such delegation is contained in the TCPA. As a result, the “best interpretation” of the statute was that “express consent” is the only requirement imposed by the TCPA, even if the consent is obtained orally.

Therefore, because Bradley provided oral consent to DentalPlans receive such to prerecorded messages when she signed up for her dental plan, she (and, the class) had no viable claims. The court, accordingly, granted summary judgment on Bradley’s individual claim and decertified the previously certified class action.

Implications For Companies

The Bradley decision continues an important trend for companies making telemarketing calls to consumers.

As we explained here, when the Fifth Circuit decided Bradford, the written consent requirement has long been thought of as one of the hallmarks of the FCC’s regulatory regime and is often used by the plaintiff’s bar to assert technical violations of the TCPA even where it is clear that a customer approved of such calls. But the current trend shows that the underlying regulatory scheme is quickly eroding with each decision that passes.

Nevertheless, the decisions in Bradford and Bradley represent only the middle ground on these issues. Other courts would go further and hold that Congress’s entire delegation of any of its authority “run[s] afoul of the nondelegation doctrine, since there are no delimitations on the discretion it grants the” FCC. McGonigle v. Pure Green Franchise Corp., No. 25-CV-61164, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8059, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 15, 2026). Thus, the landscape of positions on such issues is wide ranging and changing by the day.

As a result of this shifting landscape, corporate counsel, and companies engaged in telemarketing, should continue to monitor this blog to stay apprised of any updates as new decisions continue to modify the FCC’s longstanding interpretation of the TCPA.

March 24, 2026March 24, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Announcing The Duane Morris ERISA Class Action Review – 2026!

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. and Jennifer A. Riley

Duane Morris Takeaway: The surge of class action litigation filed under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq., over the last several years persisted in 2025, with class action litigators in the plaintiffs’ bar continuing to focus on challenges ERISA fiduciaries’ management of 401(k) and other retirement plans. Plaintiffs continue to assert that ERISA fiduciaries breached their fiduciary duties of prudence and loyalty by, among other things, offering expensive or underperforming investment options and charging participants excessive recordkeeping and administrative fees. Hundreds of fee and expense class actions have been filed since 2020, driven by a number of familiar plaintiffs’ class action law firms alongside some new entrants into the space.

To that end, the class action team at Duane Morris is pleased to present the 2026 edition of the ERISA Class Action Review. We hope it will demystify some of the complexities of ERISA class action litigation and keep corporate counsel updated on the ever-evolving nuances of these issues. We hope this book – manifesting the collective experience and expertise of our class action defense group – will assist our clients by identifying developing trends in the case law and offering practical approaches in dealing with consumer fraud class action litigation.

Click here to bookmark or download a copy of the ERISA Class Action Review – 2026 e-book.

Check back to listen to the Class Action Weekly Wire podcast episode on ERISA class action trends coming soon!

March 24, 2026March 24, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Nevada Federal Court Certifies A $3 Million Dollar TCPA Class Action Against Individual Nevada Realtor

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, and Ryan T. Garippo

Duane Morris Takeaways: On March 13, 2026, in Garvey, et al. v. Gaitan, No. 23-CV-00920, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53447 (D. Nev. Mar. 13, 2026), Judge Andrew Gordon of the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada certified a Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) class action against an individual realtor for violation of the statute’s prohibition against consentless prerecorded voice messages. The decision serves as a cautionary tale for companies and their individual agents, particularly those entities engaged in direct-to-consumer marketing, to consult experienced TCPA counsel in connection with their marketing campaigns to limit their potential exposure.

Case Background

In 2023, Britney Gaitan, a realtor based in Las Vegas, used an online third-party service to accumulate the homeowner contact information for home sellers whose online real estate listings were either withdrawn or expired. Gaitan then uploaded that list into a software that allowed her to send a prerecorded ringless voicemail message to the list of the home sellers she created. As a result, on March 3, 2023, and March 16, 2023, Gaitan sent these prerecorded voice messages to everyone on her list, including Wayne Garvey, one of the homeowners. Gaitan had no documentation that she received prior consent before placing these ringless voicemail messages.

Garvey ultimately filed suit against Gaitan alleging that she violated the TCPA’s prohibition on consentless prerecorded voice messages codified at 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). Garvey also sought to maintain the case as a class action and represent the owners of the 983 unique cell phone numbers that were called 1,983 times over the course of the two days. Put differently, Garvey ultimately asked the court to certify a class worth up to $2,974,500 or $1,500 per call.

The Court’s Ruling

On March 13, 2026, Chief Judge Andrew Gordon granted Plaintiff’s motion and certified a class against Gaitan. Although Gaitan raised arguments in response to many of the necessary elements for a plaintiff to certify a class action, the dispute largely hinged on Rule 23’s predominance requirement — i.e., whether a common questions of law or fact predominate over issues affecting only certain individual class members. To that end, Gaitan argued that four individualized issues would predominate.

First, Gaitan asserted that individualized inquiries were required to determine whether any class member actually listened to the voicemail. The problem, however, is that “Gaitan cite[d] no law that states a recipient must listen to the voicemail to suffer an injury under the TCPA.” Garvey, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53447, at *12. To the contrary, the Federal Communications Commission (the “FCC”) only requires that a prerecorded voicemail must be “completed” to implicate the statute, and Garvey submitted such common proof via expert testimony. In short, the court concluded that these completed calls are “a central, common question of the class’s TCPA claims that predominates over any individualized issues.” Id. at *15.

Second, Gaitan asserted the same argument (i.e., an individualized issue as to whether any class member listened to the call) but repurposed it under the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III of the U.S. Constitution. For the same reason, the court concluded that because Gaitan could not cite “any law that the putative class members need to listen to the prerecorded message to be injured under the TCPA . . . they have Article III standing if Gaitan used a prerecorded voice in her ringless voicemail drops when calling their cell phones, and they need not prove any other harm.” Id. at *18. This argument was overruled.

Third, Gaitan asserted that there was individualized inquires as to whether any given class member consented to receive prerecorded voice messages. As the court aptly observed, Gaitan “indicated that she has no documentation showing that she obtained consent from any putative class members.” Id. at *19. Gaitan tried to point to the terms of the multiple listing service (“MLS”), which supposedly require a homeowner to provide his or her phone number to create a listing, and argued this action constitutes consent to receive such calls. Although the court was unconvinced, it correctly observed that the consent defense would apply to the entire class and thus “Gaitan has not provided evidence that determining whether some MLS users consented to being contacted about their property is an individualized issue.” Id. at *20.

Fourth, Gaitan asserted that individualized inquiries were required to determine whether any individual owner of a telephone number was a “residential telephone line” within the meaning of the TCPA. The primary problem, however, is that residential telephone subscriber status is not an element of a claim under Section 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) unlike other sections of the TCPA. In other words, this argument was wholly inapplicable and “does not defeat class certification.” Id. at *21.

As a result, once the realtor’s most significant objection to class certification was overruled, it was a near forgone conclusion that a class would be certified and thus the court proceeded to grant Garvey’s motion.

Implications For Companies

There are multiple cautionary messages embedded in Gaitan for those engaged in direct-to-consumer marketing. The most salient three takeaways are listed below.

The first (and, most important) lesson of Gaitan is to obtain “express consent” prior to making calls using an artificial or prerecorded voice message. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). It can be difficult to defend a TCPA class action without a consent defense and Gaitan is no different.

The second lesson is that TCPA liability does not only attach to companies but may also be applied “to any person within the United States” who makes such calls. Id. Here, Britney Gaitan is the sole defendant facing TCPA liability and thus Gaitan’s personal assets are likely on the line for any resulting judgment. But that is not the end of the story. Many similar agencies have indemnification agreements with their agents, which require the agency to pay for the liabilities incurred by the agent. To the extent such an agreement exists here, both Gaitan and her agency may have exposure for this TCPA liability.

The third lesson is to ensure that any TCPA defense strategy is prophylactic in nature and crafted in collaboration with defense counsel well versed in this space. In this case, Gaitan raised arguments based on wholly inapplicable portions of the statute or asserted defenses with little chance of success given the facts of the dispute. If Gaitan consulted with experienced defense counsel in advance of the calls, then this situation could have been avoided. But once the calls are made, the best course of action is for a TCPA defendant to contact experienced defense counsel to help navigate any resulting class actions.

March 20, 2026March 20, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Illinois Supreme Court Rules That Employees Must Be Paid For Pre-Shift COVID-19 Screenings Under Illinois Wage Law

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, and Tyler Zmick

Duane Morris Takeaways: In Johnson, et al. v. Amazon.com Services, LLC, 2026 IL 132016 (Mar. 19, 2026), the Illinois Supreme Court held that unlike the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), Illinois’s Minimum Wage Law (“IMWL”) requires employers to compensate hourly employees for time spent completing pre-shift COVID-19 screenings and other “preliminary or postliminary” activities. In doing so, the Illinois Supreme Court embraced an employee-friendly interpretation regarding the scope of compensable time under the IMWL. Johnson is a must-read opinion for companies that impacts all employers with hourly, non-exempt employees working in Illinois.

Background

Plaintiffs were former hourly Amazon employees who worked at the company’s distribution warehouses in Illinois. In March 2020, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Amazon began requiring employees to undergo COVID-19 symptom screenings before they could enter the warehouses and clock in for their shifts. According to Plaintiffs, it “took 10 to 15 minutes on average” to complete the pre-shift screenings. See Johnson, 2026 IL 132016,¶ 4.

Plaintiffs subsequently filed a class action lawsuit alleging that Amazon violated the FLSA and IMWL by not paying them and other warehouse employees for time spent undergoing the mandatory screenings.

Amazon moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Plaintiffs’ claims failed because under the FLSA an hourly employee need not be compensated for time spent on “activities which are preliminary to or postliminary to” the employee’s principal work duties. See 29 U.S.C. § 254 (a)(2). In granting Amazon’s motion and dismissing Plaintiffs’ FLSA and IMWL claims, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois reasoned that “state and federal courts frequently look to case authority interpreting and applying the FLSA for guidance in interpreting the [IMWL].” Johnson, 2026 IL 132016,¶ 7.

Plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Rather than ruling on the substance of the appeal, however, the Seventh Circuit certified the following question to the Illinois Supreme Court: “whether Section 4a of [the IMWL] incorporates the [FLSA’s] exclusion from compensation for ‘employee activities that are preliminary or postliminary to their principal activities.’” Id. ¶ 1.

The Illinois Supreme Court’s Decision

The Illinois Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that the IMWL provides “a right of overtime compensation for Illinois employees” and also sets forth 10 “specific exceptions to the general right to overtime compensation.” Johnson, 2026 IL 132016,¶ 12 (citing 820 ILCS 105/4a(1)-(2)). Importantly, the Court observed that four of Section 4a(2)’s 10 exceptions incorporate certain provisions of the FLSA and/or related federal regulations, yet none of the exceptions reference FLSA regulations regarding the exclusion of “preliminary or postliminary activities” from the definition of compensable time. See id. ¶¶ 14, 16.

The Illinois Supreme Court further noted that the IMWL gives the Illinois Director of the Department of Labor (“IDOL”) authority to define the IMWL’s terms. See 820 ILCS 105/10(a). Pursuant to that authority, IDOL promulgated a regulation defining “hours worked” as “all the time an employee is required to be on duty, or on the employer’s premises, or at other prescribed places of work, and any additional time the employee is required or permitted to work for the employer.” 56 Ill. Adm. Code 210.110. In addition to acknowledging the breadth of this definition, the Illinois Supreme Court emphasized that while IDOL referenced provisions of the FLSA and related federal regulations in certain statutory definitions, IDOL did not reference the FLSA regulations “that establish a preliminary or postliminary activities exclusion from ‘hours worked.’” Johnson, 2026 IL 132016 ¶ 16; see also id. (“To the contrary, IDOL defines ‘hours worked’ to include all time an employee is required to be on the employer’s premises, which contradicts the potential applicability of any such exclusion.”).

Accordingly, the Illinois Supreme Court held that a plain reading of Section 4a and IDOL’s definition of “hours worked” reveals that the Illinois legislature did not incorporate the FLSA’s “preliminary and postliminary activities exclusion” into the IMWL. Rather, the legislature delegated the authority to define “hours worked” to IDOL, who “adopted a definition of ‘hours worked’ that necessarily includes preliminary and postliminary activities, explicitly encompassing all time that an employee is required to be on an employer’s premises.” Id. ¶ 18.

In so holding, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected Amazon’s argument that the FLSA’s “preliminary and postliminary activities exclusion” should apply to the IMWL because the IMWL’s general overtime provision “is patterned after the general overtime provision found in…the FLSA.” Id. ¶ 19. The Court reasoned that “while section 4a of the [IMWL] contains the same general overtime provision of the FLSA, it does not include the preliminary and postliminary activity exclusion that is set forth in the FLSA….[T]o accept Amazon’s invitation would be to read exceptions into the statute that depart from its plain language, in violation of our well-established rules of statutory interpretation.” Id. ¶ 20.

Implications Of The Decision

The Illinois Supreme Court’s opinion in Johnson is required reading for companies with hourly employees working in Illinois. The decision definitively answers the question whether the IMWL incorporates the FLSA’s “preliminary or postliminary activities exclusion” – a question that, until now, has been heavily litigated.

Johnson is also a reminder of the importance of complying with federal and state wage-and-hour statutes, as laws in many jurisdictions (including Illinois) impose additional requirements on employers that are not found in the FLSA. See, e.g., Johnson, 2026 IL 132016, ¶ 20 (noting that the overtime provisions of the IMWL and the FLSA “are not parallel but rather state the same general rule with marked differences in their respective statements of exceptions”). Companies must be vigilant to ensure they comply with wage-and-hour laws in all jurisdictions where they have hourly employees.

March 17, 2026March 17, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Announcing The Third Edition Of The Duane Morris Products Liability & Mass Torts Class Action Review!

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. and Jennifer A. Riley

Duane Morris Takeaways: Clients, ranging from some of the world’s largest manufacturers and insurance companies to startup companies and individual inventors, turn to Duane Morris for counsel and representation in claims involving products liability and toxic torts. For years, Duane Morris has worked with clients to develop cost-containment and strategic litigation plans designed to minimize the risk, business disruption and potentially staggering cost of products liability and toxic tort litigation. Our goal is to provide value by acting as proactive counselors and advisors, rather than simply responding to particular problems in isolation. To that end, the class action team at Duane Morris is pleased to present the Products Liability & Mass Torts Class Action Review – 2026. This publication analyzes the key rulings and developments in 2025 and the significant legal decisions and trends impacting both product liability class action litigation and mass tort litigation for 2026. We hope that companies and employers will benefit from this resource and assist them with their compliance with these evolving laws and standards.

Click here to bookmark or download a copy of the Products Liability & Mass Torts Class Action Review – 2026 e-book.

Stay tuned for more products liability and mass tort class action analysis coming soon on our weekly podcast, the Class Action Weekly Wire.

March 12, 2026March 12, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Join Us For A Mid-Year Review of EEOC Litigation and Strategy

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, and Daniel D. Spencer

Duane Morris Takeaway: Please join us for our webinar, Mid-Year Review of EEOC Litigation and Strategy, which will take place on Tuesday, April 7, 2026 at 11:30 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. Central. Click here to register to attend!

Join Duane Morris partners Jerry Maatman, Jennifer Riley and Daniel Spencer for a live panel discussion analyzing the latest impact of the dramatic changes at the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, including its new strategic priorities and the array of EEOC lawsuits filed in the first six months of fiscal year 2026. Moving through FY 2026 with significant changes implemented by the Trump administration, employers’ compliance with federal workplace laws and agency guidance remains a business imperative. Our virtual program will empower corporate counsel, human resource professionals and business leaders with key insights into the EEOC’s latest enforcement initiatives and provide strategies designed to minimize the risk of drawing the agency’s scrutiny.

March 11, 2026March 11, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Illinois Court Holds “Interested Party” Enforcement Provision Of The Day And Temporary Labor Services Act Unconstitutional

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, and Gregory Tsonis

Duane Morris Takeaways: In a significant decision issued on March 6, 2026, Judge Neil H. Cohen of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, held that Section 67 of the Illinois Day and Temporary Labor Services Act (“DTLSA”), 820 ILCS 175/67, is unconstitutional because it improperly authorizes private parties to enforce the statute in a manner that usurps the constitutional authority of the Illinois Attorney General. The ruling arose in Figueroa, et al. v. Visual Pak Holdings, LLC, et al., No. 2025 CH 04411 (Cir. Ct. Cook County Mar. 6, 2026), and can be found here.

The court concluded that the statute’s “interested party” enforcement provision effectively creates a qui tam-style enforcement mechanism without the safeguards that preserve the Attorney General’s control over litigation brought on behalf of the State. Because the statute does not require notice to the Attorney General and gives the Attorney General no authority to intervene, control, dismiss, or settle such cases, the court held that the provision violates the Illinois Constitution. The ruling could significantly affect the growing wave of DTLSA litigation brought by worker advocacy organizations and may reshape how the statute is enforced going forward.

Background On The Day And Temporary Labor Services Act And Figueroa Lawsuit

The Illinois Day and Temporary Labor Services Act, 820 ILCS 175/1 et seq., regulates staffing agencies that provide temporary or day laborers to client companies. The statute imposes obligations on staffing agencies and the client companies that utilize temporary labor. These obligations include registration requirements, disclosure rules governing job assignments, and compliance with wage and safety protections designed to regulate the temporary labor industry.

In recent years, amendments to the statute expanded its scope and enforcement mechanisms, including provisions mandating equal pay to equivalent permanent employees, safety training, recordkeeping and disclosure requirements, and joint compliance obligations between staffing agencies and the companies that receive temporary workers.

Central to the dispute in Figueroa was Section 67 of the statute, which authorizes enforcement actions by so-called “interested parties.” The statute defines an “interested party” broadly as “an organization that monitors or is attentive to compliance with public or worker safety law, wage and hour requirements, or other statutory requirements.” 820 ILCS 175/5. Under Section 67, these organizations may file civil actions after providing notice to the Illinois Department of Labor and certain requirements are met, and can seek injunctive relief to compel compliance with the statute even if the organization itself did not employ the workers and did not suffer a direct injury. Pursuant to Section 67(d) of the DTLSA, an “interested party” that prevails in a civil suit can recover 10% of any statutory penalties awarded, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.

The Figueroa litigation was brought by temporary workers and the Chicago Workers’ Collaborative (“CWC”), a nonprofit worker advocacy organization, alleging violations of the DTLSA by the defendants. The defendants moved to dismiss CWC’s claims in the complaint, asserting that CWC lacks standing to bring suit because its standing is based Section 67 of the DTLSA, which is unconstitutional. The defendants also moved to dismiss the individual plaintiffs’ claims and challenged venue in Cook County, as CWC is the only entity located in Cook County and the defendants and employee plaintiffs are located in Lake County, Illinois.

Because the challenge implicated the constitutionality of a state statute, the Illinois Attorney General intervened in the case to defend the law.

The Court’s Decision

After first establishing that CWC lacked associational standing that would allow it to bring claims, the court turned to assessing the constitutionality of Section 67, on which CWC’s standing relied.

The court first analyzed whether Section 67 of the DTLSA is a “qui tam” statute. Under a “qui tam” enforcement mechanism, private parties may bring lawsuits on behalf of the government and receive a portion of the penalty recovered. “Qui tam” statutes are not inherently unconstitutional, but typically contain procedural safeguards that ensure the government retains ultimate control over the litigation. Although the Attorney General “argue[d] that section 67 is not a qui tam statute,” the court noted that the Attorney General took the opposite position in another case, Staffing Services Association of Illinois v. Flanagan, Case No. 1:23-cv-16208 (N.D. Ill). Ultimately, because the State, and not the interested party, is the entity with “an actual and substantial interest” in the action, the court had little difficulty concluding that “Section 67 is a qui tam statute.” Id. at 5.

Next, the court turned to whether Section 67 of the DTLSA improperly usurps the power of the Attorney General to represent the state. Under the Illinois Constitution, the Attorney General serves as the State’s chief legal officer and possesses the authority to enforce state law on behalf of the public. While the legislature may create private rights of action, it cannot enact statutes that effectively transfer the State’s enforcement authority to private actors. Qui tam statutes found constitutional, such as the False Claims Act, “provide for control over the litigation by the Attorney General by granting the Attorney General authority to intervene at any time, authority to control the litigation. and the authority to dismiss or settle the litigation at any time regardless of the wishes of the qui tam plaintiff.” Id. at 5.

By contrast, the court concluded, the DTLSA contains none of those safeguards. Section 67 does not require notice to the Attorney General when an interested party files suit, nor does it give the Attorney General authority to intervene, take control of the case, or dismiss or settle the action. The statute therefore allows private organizations to pursue enforcement litigation entirely independent of the State.

The Attorney General argued that such explicit authority over suits was unnecessary in the statutory text of the DTLSA, as the Attorney General Act provides the Attorney General with authority to intervene, initiate, and enforce any proceedings concerning “the payment of wages, the safety of the workplace, and fair employment practices.” Id. at 6 (quoting 15 ILCS 205/6.3(b)). The court, however, noted that the DTLSA does not require an “interested party” to provide the Attorney General with notice that it filed a suit under Section 67, and thus the Attorney General “cannot exercise its authority to represent the State if it has no notice of the filing of suit under Section 67” of the DTLSA. Id. at 6. As a result, the court held, the lack of notice “renders section 67 an unconstitutional usurpation of the Attorney General’s authority[.]” Id. at 6.

Although the failure to provide notice was sufficient to find Section 67 unconstitutional, the court also held that Section 67 was also unconstitutional on the separate grounds that it “does not grant the Attorney General any control over the interested party’s suit.” Id. The court found unpersuasive the argument that the Attorney General Act provides the Attorney General with the right to intervene, reasoning that “[a] right to intervene is not the same as a right to control the litigation, including the right to dismiss that litigation over the objections of the plaintiff. Id. Because the statute allows private actors to enforce public rights without oversight or control by the Attorney General, the court concluded that Section 67 improperly interferes with the Attorney General’s constitutional authority and is therefore unconstitutional.

Because Section 67 was found unconstitutional, the court dismissed CWC’s claims for lack of standing and the case was appropriately transferred to a proper venue in Lake County, which could properly consider the arguments for dismissal of the individual plaintiffs.

Implications For Employers

The Figueroa decision could significantly affect the enforcement landscape under the DTLSA, though it is likely to face appellate review. Employers operating in Illinois should therefore closely monitor further developments as the courts continue to address the scope and enforcement of the statute.

In recent years, worker advocacy organizations have increasingly relied on Section 67 to bring enforcement actions seeking injunctive relief against staffing agencies and the companies that utilize temporary labor. By holding that provision unconstitutional, the decision calls into question the viability of those lawsuits and may substantially limit the ability of advocacy groups to initiate DTLSA litigation. As a result, the ruling may shift enforcement of the statute more squarely toward state regulators, including the Illinois Department of Labor and the Attorney General’s Office. While this could reduce the number of private enforcement actions filed by advocacy organizations, employers should expect that regulatory authorities will continue to scrutinize staffing practices and DTLSA compliance.

Finally, employers should not interpret the ruling as diminishing the importance of DTLSA compliance. Importantly, the decision does not invalidate the DTLSA itself, but strikes only the statute’s “interested party” enforcement mechanism as unconstitutional. The statute’s substantive requirements remain in effect, including the provisions governing wage protections, safety obligations, and responsibilities shared between staffing agencies and client companies. Staffing agencies and employers that utilize temporary labor should continue to review their staffing arrangements and compliance practices carefully.

March 10, 2026March 10, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Announcing The Second Edition Of The FCRA Class Action Review!

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. and Jennifer A. Riley

Duane Morris Takeaway: Courts have often noted that Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) violations lend themselves to resolution through class action litigation, and FCRA class actions have increased partially because of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA) amendments, passed in 2003. In 2025, in FCRA cases, the class action plaintiff’s bar continued to look for any technical failure of an employer to provide disclosures or obtain proper authorization from an applicant. Of note, although these authorization and disclosure requirements may appear to be relatively straightforward, case law has created additional requirements separate and distinct from the plain statutory requirements, which may not be obvious from a plain and ordinary reading of the FCRA alone.

To that end, the class action team at Duane Morris is pleased to present the second edition of the FCRA Class Action Review. We hope it will demystify some of the complexities of FCRA, FACTA, and Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) class action litigation and keep corporate counsel updated on the ever-evolving nuances of these issues. We hope this book – manifesting the collective experience and expertise of our class action defense group – will assist our clients by identifying developing trends in the case law and offering practical approaches in dealing with these types of class action litigation.

Click here to bookmark or download a copy of the Duane Morris FCRA Class Action Review – 2026 eBook.

Stay tuned for more FCRA/FACTA/FDCPA class action analysis coming soon on our weekly podcast, the Class Action Weekly Wire.

March 5, 2026March 5, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Announcing The Release Of The Duane Morris Discrimination Class Action Review – 2026!

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. and Jennifer A. Riley

Duane Morris Takeaways: Legal compliance to prevent discrimination is a corporate imperative. Companies and business executives operate in the court of public opinion and workplace inequality continues to grab headlines and remains forefront in the public eye. In this environment, employers can expect discrimination class actions to reach even greater heights in 2025. To that end, the class action team at Duane Morris is pleased to present the second edition of the Discrimination Class Action Review – 2026.

This publication analyzes the key discrimination-related rulings and developments in 2025 and the significant legal decisions and trends impacting discrimination class action litigation for 2026. We hope that companies and employers will benefit from this resource in their compliance with these evolving laws and standards.

Click here to bookmark or download a copy of the Discrimination Class Action Review – 2026 e-book. Look forward to an episode on the Review coming soon on the Class Action Weekly Wire!