By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, Betty Luu, and Jamar Davis
Duane Morris Takeaway: On July 21, 2026, in Sara Reyes, et al v. Grow Smart Labor, Inc., et al, Case No. 1:24-CV-00028, Magistrate Judge Stanley Boone of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California issued findings and recommendations denying an employee’s motion for class certification under the California Labor Code. This decision is a reminder that courts scrutinizing motions for class certification will conduct a rigorous, fact-intensive analysis of each Rule 23 requirement rather than accept generalized allegations of common policies or practices. Even where numerosity is easily met, courts will closely examine whether the proposed class is sufficiently uniform across workers, supervisors, pay methods, and timekeeping systems before finding that commonality, typicality, and predominance are satisfied.
Background:
On January 5, 2024, Plaintiff Sara Reyes (“Plaintiff”) filed a class action asserting claims for violations of the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act and the California Labor Code on behalf of herself and those similarly situated in the State of California. Id. at 6.
Defendant Grow Smart Labor, Inc. (“Grow Smart”) employed Plaintiff as a grape picker and packer in August 2023 for a two-week period. Id. at 3-4. Plaintiff alleges she was paid less than the piece-rate basis, was not separately compensated for rest periods or other nonproductive time, and that Grow Smart supervisors instructed her and other employees not to take meal periods or rest breaks, instead directing them to continue working. Id. at 4-6.
On May 14, 2026, Plaintiff moved to certify a class of all non-exempt agricultural employees employed by any Grow Smart from January 5, 2021 to the present.
The Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations:
The Magistrate Judge recommended denying Plaintiff’s motion for class certification and addressed each Rule 23(a) prerequisite in turn. As to numerosity, the Magistrate Judge agreed with Plaintiff that her proposed subclasses (ranging from 160 to 1,067 members) comfortably exceeded the roughly 40-member threshold generally required in the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 22-23. On commonality, however, the Magistrate Judge found Plaintiff failed to meet her burden as to both her meal-break and piece-rate claims. Id. at 23. The Magistrate Judge reasoned that Grow Smart’s workforce was too heterogeneous to generate common answers, since employees worked for different third-party contractees, at different locations, under different supervisors, different pay methods, and different timekeeping systems. Id. at 31-32. The Court also rejected Plaintiff’s reliance on the rebuttable presumption of meal-period violations recognized in Donohue v. AMN Services, LLC, 11 Cal. 5th 58 (2021), explaining that Wage Order No. 14, unlike the wage order at issue in Donohue, exempts agricultural employers from recording meal periods when operations cease, so the absence of recorded breaks did not, on its own, establish noncompliance on a class-wide basis. Id. at 23-32.
On typicality, the Magistrate Judge found Plaintiff’s claims were not typical of the class she sought to represent. Id. at 33. Plaintiff worked only eight shifts, all for a single contractee, all on a piece-rate basis, and had no experience with the different contractees, supervisors, pay methods, or timekeeping systems used elsewhere in Grow Smart’s operations. Id. at 33-35. The Magistrate Judge also found Plaintiff could not represent employees who, beginning in March 2024, became subject to a mandatory arbitration agreement that Plaintiff herself never signed. Id. at 33-38. Because Plaintiff was not typical, the Magistrate Judge likewise found her inadequate to represent the class generally and, specifically, inadequate as to the arbitration-agreement subgroup. Id. at 38.
Turning to Rule 23(b), the Magistrate Judge found Plaintiff met neither subsection she invoked. Id. at 39. Under Rule 23(b)(2), the Magistrate Judge held that class treatment was inappropriate because Plaintiff sought individualized monetary damages (not solely injunctive or declaratory relief), which Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 360-361 (2011),forecloses under that subsection, and because the arbitration agreements and varying work conditions meant no single injunction could resolve the claims class-wide. Id. at 39-40. Under Rule 23(b)(3), the Magistrate Judge found predominance lacking for the same reasons commonality failed, and further found Plaintiff had not shown superiority, since resolving the claims would require individualized inquiries into each employee’s assignment, contractee, timekeeping format, and pay method. Id. at 41-43. Having found Plaintiff met only numerosity while failing commonality, typicality, and both invoked Rule 23(b) categories, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the motion for class certification be denied in full. Id. at 43.
It should be noted that the Magistrate Judge’s findings and recommendations remain subject to adoption by the District Judge. Under the Eastern District of California’s Local Rule 304 and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), the parties have fourteen days from service to file objections, and the District Judge will then conduct the applicable review before deciding whether to adopt, modify, or reject the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation.
Implications for Companies
This decision offers useful guidance for agricultural employers and other companies using third-party staffing arrangements across varied worksites.
The decision demonstrates that a named plaintiff’s own work history can substantially narrow the class she is permitted to represent, giving employers grounds to contest an overbroad proposed class even when certain claims otherwise survive. Further, adopting an arbitration agreement even after litigation begins can carve out a meaningful subset of the workforce from any later-certified class, since a plaintiff who never signed such an agreement cannot represent employees who did.
By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, and Ryan T. Garippo
Duane Morris Takeaways: On July 21, 2026, in Smith v. GetMeHealthCare, LLC, No. 25-CV-00568, 2026 WL 2089044 (M.D. Fla. July 21, 2026), Judge Sheri Polster Chappell, writing for the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida denied a Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) plaintiff’s motion to dismiss a common law fraud claim brought by the defendant. Although TCPA claims can prove difficult to win on a motion to dismiss, this decision provides TCPA defendants with another powerful tool at the pleadings stage and helps create opportunities for companies to educate courts on a plaintiff’s fraudulent activity early in the proceedings.
Case Background
In 2025, Plaintiff Keneisha Smith (“Plaintiff” or “Smith”) filed a TCPA lawsuit against GetMeHealthCare, LLC (“GMHC”), alleging she received 31 unwanted telemarketing calls over a 10-day period. She claims these calls were made without her consent and even though she registered her telephone number on the national do-not-call registry.
Nonetheless, on June 12, 2025, Smith answered one of these alleged telemarketing calls. She provided her name, phone number, address, date of birth, and current insurance information. The agent then transferred Smith to a GMHC employee, who helped Smith complete the enrollment process, and signed her up for an insurance plan. Even though Smith willingly signed up for insurance, she sued GMHC claiming it violated Section 227(c)(5) of the TCPA, and its implementing regulations, for calling her telephone number despite its registration on the national do-not-call registry.
But GMHC decided to put these facts in front of the Court right away. Instead of simply moving to dismiss the claims, GMHC answered the complaint and filed counterclaims for fraudulent misrepresentation and fraudulent inducement. It argued that “Smith’s willingness to participate in the June 12, 2025, call is inconsistent with her wish not to be contacted.” Id. at *1. Smith also allegedly lied about her age, her actual willingness to obtain health insurance, and her desire to be contacted in the future. In support of its counterclaims, “GMHC sent a recording of the June 12, 2025 call and attached transcript of the call” to its pleadings. Id. at *1, n.1.
In response, Smith moved to dismiss the counterclaims.
The Court’s Decision
In a well-reasoned order, Judge Chappell denied Smith’s motion to dismiss in its entirety, finding “all of Smith’s arguments to be meritless.” Id. Although Smith asserted various arguments regarding the Court’s jurisdiction and GMHC’s requested relief, the majority of the opinion focused on the actual allegations of GMHC’s counterclaim, which were sufficiently pled to survive a motion to dismiss.
In federal court, fraud claims must be pled with a heightened degree of particularity. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Under this standard, “claims of fraud must proffer ‘the who, what, when, where, and how of the fraud alleged.’” Smith, 2026 WL 2089044, at *2 (quoting Omnipol, a.S. v. Worrell, 421 F. Supp. 3d 1321, 1343 (M.D. Fla. 2019), aff’d sub nom., 32 F.4th 1298 (11th Cir. 2022))
Here, Judge Chappell found that GMHC pled all of these details and the misrepresentations could be actionable. Judge Chappell found that Smith’s alleged conduct before the call where she “consent[ed] to be contacted,” when coupled with her misrepresentations about her “age” and desire to complete “enrollment,” could plausibly constitute fraud. Smith, 2026 WL 2089044, at *3. Judge Chappell also accepted GMHC’s plausible allegations that Smith’s “motivation [was] to commit fraud” and the communication was orchestrated to form the basis of “a lawsuit against GMHC to get money.” Id. Judge Chappell also independently concluded that the recording and transcript of the call supported “most, if not all, of GMHC’s allegations.” Id.
Thus, Judge Chappel rejected “Smith’s Rule 9(b) argument” and declined to dismiss the claim. Id.
Implications For Companies
The litigation strategy in Smith is significant for companies facing TCPA lawsuits.
As many companies know, it is common for a consenting customer to invite telemarketing calls, and then “deceptively play[] along” upon receipt of those calls, only to turn around and sue the caller in a TCPA class action. Abramson v. Oasis Power LLC, No. 18-CV-00479, 2018 WL 4101857, at *5 (W.D. Pa. July 31, 2018). When companies try to explain these tactics to courts at the pleadings stage, the concerns are often brushed away as “unpersuasive.” Id. The reason that strategy is ineffective is because “[p]rior express consent is an affirmative defense to a claim under the TCPA” and typically must be resolved after discovery. Murphy v. DCI Biologicals Orlando, LLC, No. 12-CV-1459, 2013 WL 6865772., at *4 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 31, 2013) (quotations omitted).
With the benefit of discovery, companies can often demonstrate the “Plaintiff invited the initial call . . . [and] further calls by playing along on the first call” as a basis why a class should not be certified because it is a unique defense that “will distract from the claim to the Class’s detriment.” Sapan v. Fed. Sav. Bank, No. 23-CV-00075, 2025 WL 3050064, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2025) (denying class certification based on typicality); see also Sapan v. Veritas Funding, LLC, No. 23-CV-00468, 2023 WL 6370223, at (C.D. Cal. July 28, 2023) (same). But it requires a significant investment to litigate a claim through class certification, and many companies are looking for an exit opportunity prior to that stage in the proceedings.
Smith provides companies with a tool to get these facts in front of courts at the earliest stages of the litigation and shape the judge’s impression of the case. It also provides companies with additional recourse as common law fraud opens up the door to tort damages that are traditionally off the table in TCPA cases. For example, in Illinois, there is an argument that “actions at common law fraud provide for the award of attorney fees and costs, as well as punitive damages.” Father & Sons, Inc. v. Taylor, 703 N.E.2d 532, 547 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998).
Further, even if the counterclaim cannot result in the entire action being dismissed at the outset of a case, it can create leverage for the company to negotiate a favorable exit from the litigation early on. And, if the case proceeds to discovery regardless, the counterclaim can prove useful given that “a defense or counterclaim defeats typicality if it is likely to become the litigation’s focus.” Hirsch v. USHealth Advisors, LLC, 337 F.R.D. 118, 133 (N.D. Tex. 2020).
Thus, corporate counsel facing TCPA actions should be carefully considering the facts in their cases to determine whether they support the use of a similar counterclaim or other creative procedural defenses.
By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, and Ryan T. Garippo
Duane Morris Takeaways: On July 14, 2026, in Steidinger, et al. v. Blackstone Medical Services, No. 25-2398, 2026 WL 2028517 (7th Cir. July 14, 2026), Judge Thomas Kirsch, writing for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, affirmed the dismissal of a putative class action complaint and held that 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5) of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) does not create a private right of action for the receipt of unwanted text messages.
The decision is significant because it represents the first federal appellate decision squarely holding that text messages are not “telephone calls” within the meaning of Section 227(c)(5) and significantly reduces potential TCPA-related liability for companies operating in the Seventh Circuit.
Case Background
The plaintiffs in this case are a group of individuals (“Plaintiffs”) who received text messages and calls from Blackstone Medical Services (“Blackstone”) promoting the company’s home sleep tests. Plaintiffs alleged that they received these communications even though they were either registered on the national do-not-call registry or after they communicated to Blackstone that they did not want to be contacted. As a result, Plaintiffs filed a putative class action complaint against Blackstone, alleging violations of the TCPA and Florida’s mini-TCPA law, seeking statutory damages, an injunction, and declaratory relief. Specifically, Plaintiffs sued under Section 227(c)(5) of the TCPA which provides plaintiffs with a private right of action for certain “violation[s] of the regulations prescribed under this subsection.” 47 U.S.C. §227(c)(5)(a).
Blackstone moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ TCPA claims. It argued that because the private right of action in Section 227(c)(5) is limited to any “person who has received more than one telephone call,” the provision only applies to “telephone calls” and not text messages. The U.S. District Court for the Central District of Illinois agreed with Blackstone. Jones v. Blackstone Med. Servs., LLC, 792 F. Supp. 3d 894, 902 (C.D. Ill. 2025).The district court concluded “based on a plain reading of the TCPA and its implementing regulations, Section 227(c)(5) does not apply to text messages.” Id. The district court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claim and dismissed the lawsuit. Plaintiffs appealed.
The Seventh Circuit’s Ruling
In a 13-page opinion, Judge Thomas Kirsch, writing for the Seventh Circuit, succinctly concluded “that § 227(c)(5) does not permit plaintiffs to sue for the receipt of unwanted texts.” Steidinger, 2026 WL 2028517, at *1.
The Seventh Circuit explained that Section 227(c)(5) creates a private right of action for any individual “who has received more than one telephone call within any 12-month period” in violation of the regulations implementing that subjection. Id. at *2(quoting 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5)). Thus, the dispute hinged on the meaning of the term “telephone call” when the statute was passed in 1991. Id.
As Judge Kirsch explained, in 1991, a “telephone” was defined as “[a]n instrument for reproducing sounds at a distance” and a “call” was defined as “to get or try to get into communication by telephone.” Id. Therefore, a “telephone call” would have “referred to communication via sound.” Id. But “[t]ext messages do not reproduce sounds” and would not have been thought of as calls (especially given that the first text message was not sent till 1992). Id.
After observing other structural elements of the TCPA which would suggest narrower reading of the term “telephone call,” the Seventh Circuit also rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that the Federal Communications Commission’s (“FCC”) interpretation of “call,” which included text messages, was entitled to deference. In McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. v. McKesson Corporation, 606 U.S. 146, 168 (2025), the U.S. Supreme Court had already determined that courts are “not bound by the FCC’s interpretation of the TCPA.” Thus, the Seventh Circuit determined that it would not afford deference to the FCC’s interpretation.
Finally, the Seventh Circuit opined on the public policy concerns remedied by the TCPA. The Seventh Circuit explained that, when Congress passed the TCPA, it “specifically found that telemarketing calls create a public safety risk when they seize telephone lines needed for emergency or medical assistance.” Steidinger, 2026 WL 2028517, at *5. But “[s]pam text messages don’t pose this risk, making it unsurprising, or at the very least reasonable, that § 227(c)(5)’s private right of action would cover telephone calls but not messages.” Id.
In short, “[r]epeated, unwanted text messages are undoubtedly a nuisance. But they do not fall within the private right of action created by § 227(c)(5).” Id.
Implications For Companies
The Steidinger decision is likely the single most important decision in the post-McKesson era.
For TCPA cases filed in Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin, a company cannot be sued based on text messages that were allegedly made in violation of the TCPA’s implementing regulations. As a result, the typical claims that are often brought under Section 227(c)(5) will no longer be available to plaintiffs where the communications in question were text messages. These claims include situations where a company allegedly violated the national do-not-call registry’s requirements, their own internal do-not-call registry’s requirements, where texts were made without caller identification information, where texts were made during “quiet hours,” and other claims typically brought under Section 227(c)(5). Steidinger should take each of these claims off the table within these jurisdictions.
Steininger, however, is not the end of this fight. In Howard v. Republican National Committee, 164 F.4th 1119, 1123-24 (9th Cir. 2026), the Ninth Circuit determined (albeit while considering a Section 227(b)(3) claim) that text messages were covered by the broad definition of the phrase “any call” as applicable in that case. Although there may theoretically be some daylight between the phrase “any call” as interpreted in Howard, and the phrase “telephone call” as interpreted in Steidinger, this decision certainly signals a growing methodological division between these two circuits.
While Steininger is undoubtably beneficial for companies, corporate counsel should be mindful that this case does not mean their texts are unregulated for at least three reasons. First, even in the Seventh Circuit, private plaintiffs can still theoretically bring claims under Section 227(b)(3) if the texts are made using an “automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). Second, there are also other federal, state, and local jurisdictions which prohibit the conduct previously protected by the TCPA in the Seventh Circuit. And third, Steininger only removes the risk of a federal class action lawsuit under Section 227(c)(5), it does not eliminate the risk of an FCC enforcement action related to a company’s text messaging programs.
We will be monitoring any developments in this space and corporate counsel should continue to check in regularly as the TCPA landscape continues to shift.
By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, and Elizabeth G. Underwood
Duane Morris Takeaways: On July 6, 2026, in Shellenberger v. AIG WarrantyGuard, Inc., et al., No. 25-1448 (9th Cir. July 6, 2026), Judges Christen, Hurwitz, and Bade of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed a district court’s dismissal of a putative class action alleging that AIG WarrantyGuard, Inc. and Whirlpool Corporation violated the Washington Consumer Protection Act (“CPA”) in connection with a KitchenAid service plan. The Ninth Circuit held that the named Plaintiff plausibly alleged that the Defendants’ offer letter and service contract, taken together, had the capacity to deceive a reasonable consumer, and that the district court erred in resolving that fact-intensive question at the motion to dismiss stage.
This ruling serves as a cautionary tale for companies that market service plans, particularly where buyout provisions or qualifiers in the fine print may be read as cutting against the offerings set out in consumer offer letters.
Case Background
Plaintiff Hadassah Shellenberger (“Plaintiff”) filed a putative class action against AIG WarrantyGuard, Inc. and Whirlpool Corporation (collectively, “Defendants”), asserting a claim under the CPA, Wash. Rev. Code §§ 19.86.020, 19.86.093. Id. at 1. Plaintiff alleged that Defendants’ offer letter created the impression “that the KitchenAid Service Plan would provide repairs or replacements for covered malfunctions, with repairs performed by KitchenAid-certified technicians, at no out-of-pocket expense to her.” Id. at 3. Plaintiff further alleged that this impression was inconsistent with the terms of the service contract, which included a buyout option, exercisable at Defendants’ sole discretion, allowing Defendants to technically satisfy all obligations under the contract without ever providing a repair or replacement. Id.
The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s CPA claim, finding that she had failed to plausibly allege the first element of a CPA claim, namely, “whether the defendant has engaged in an unfair or deceptive act or practice.” Id. at 2. Plaintiff appealed the ruling to the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 1.
The Ninth Circuit’s Decision
The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that the district court erred in dismissing Plaintiff’s CPA claim. Id. at 7. The Ninth Circuit determined that Plaintiff’s interpretation of the offer letter was “facially plausible” because the offer letter mentioned only repairs and replacements as modes of performance, while the buyout option in the service contract provided an alternative manner of performance that was “inconsistent with the advertised benefits.” Id. at 3.
The Ninth Circuit rejected Defendants’ arguments that caveats in the offer letter and a fine-print disclaimer made Plaintiff’s interpretation implausible, finding the disclaimer language “insufficiently clear to change the apparent meaning of the offer letter’s representations.” Id. at 4 (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, the Ninth Circuit similarly rejected the argument that qualifiers, such as “covered” and “where applicable”, defeated Plaintiff’s reading, concluding that those terms plausibly limited only the specific representations immediately next to them. Id. at 5.
Finally, the Ninth Circuit highlighted that whether a representation is misleading to a reasonable consumer is “a fact-intensive question not typically susceptible to resolution at the motion to dismiss stage.” Id. at 7.
Implications For Companies
This decision underscores that companies cannot avoid liability at the motion to dismiss stage under the CPA and other similar consumer protection statutes by simply pointing to fine-print disclaimers or qualifying words like “covered” or “where applicable.” Instead, courts will look to whether that fine print is clear enough to actually change the overall impression created by a company’s offer letter.
Overall, companies should audit consumer-facing offer letters and relevant marketing materials against discretionary provisions in service contracts to ensure consistency and compliance, especially where materials promise specific modes of performance, such as repair or replacement by certified technicians as seen in this case, that could be undercut by a seller’s discretion to satisfy its obligations through a different mechanism.
By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, Daniel D. Spencer, and Kenny T. Tran
Duane Morris Takeaways: On June 30, 2026, Governor Newsom signed Assembly Bill 2155 (AB 2155), which amends California Code of Civil Procedure section 1281 to provide that any arbitration agreement deemed unenforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) is likewise unenforceable under the California Arbitration Act (CAA). The amendment is designed to align California law with federal law by ensuring that the same limitations, exceptions, and exemptions governing the enforceability of arbitration agreements under the FAA also apply under the CAA.
Overview
AB 2155 expressly incorporates two significant FAA exemptions into the CAA, including: (1) the “transportation worker” exemption, which applies to contracts of employment for seamen, railroad employees, and other classes of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce; and (2) the federal Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA), which renders predispute arbitration agreements unenforceable with respect to claims involving sexual assault or sexual harassment disputes.
AB 2155 becomes effective on January 1, 2027, and the legislation contains no indication that it applies retroactively. Prior to this amendment, employers frequently argued that even if the FAA did not govern an arbitration agreement, the agreement remained enforceable under the CAA because California law did not recognize the FAA’s transportation worker exemption. AB 2155 eliminates that argument. Beginning January 1, 2027, if an arbitration agreement is unenforceable under the FAA due to the transportation worker exemption, it will likewise be unenforceable under the CAA.
Implications for Employers
Employers, particularly those whose operations involve interstate commerce, should review their arbitration agreements and dispute resolution strategies in anticipation of AB 2155’s effective date. The amendment is likely to increase litigation challenging the enforceability of arbitration agreements, including class and representative actions brought by transportation workers and claims falling within the scope of the EFAA.
Duane Morris Takeaway: In the first half of 2026, across all major types of class actions, courts issued rulings on more than 155 motions to grant or deny class certification, and plaintiffs succeeded in obtaining or maintaining certification in 97 rulings, with an overall success rate of 63%. In contrast, comparing apples to apples, in the first half of 2025, courts issued rulings on more than 211 motions to grant or deny class certification, and plaintiffs succeeded in obtaining or maintaining certification in 145 rulings, with an overall success rate of 69%.
Percentages for year over year rulings for 2022 to 2025 are below. Across all major areas of class action litigation in 2025, courts issued rulings on 435 motions for class certification. Courts granted 297 motions for class certification in whole or in part, a rate of approximately 68%. In 2024, courts issued rulings on 432 motions to grant or to deny class certification. Of these, plaintiffs succeeded in obtaining or maintaining certification in 272 rulings, for an overall success rate of 63%. In 2023, by comparison, courts issued rulings on 451 motions to grant or to deny class certification, and plaintiffs succeeded in obtaining or maintaining certification in 324 rulings, an overall success rate of nearly 72%. In 2022, courts issued rulings on 335 motions to grant or to deny class certification, and plaintiffs succeeded in obtaining or maintaining certification in 247 rulings, an overall success rate of nearly 74%.
In 2026, the number of motions that courts considered varied significantly by subject matter area, and the number of rulings varied across substantive area:
The following list summarizes the results in each of ten key areas of class action litigation.
FCRA – 100% granted / 0% denied (2 of 2 granted / 0 of 2 denied) TCPA – 100% granted / 0% denied (2 of 2 granted / 0 of 2 denied) RICO – 100% granted / 0% denied (1 of 1 granted / 0 of 1 denied) WARN Act – 100% granted / 0% denied (1 of 1 granted / 0 of 1 denied)A Security Fraud – 80% granted / 20% denied (8 of 10 granted / 2 of 10 denied) Antitrust – 71% granted / 29% denied (5 of 7 granted / 2 of 7 denied) Consumer Fraud – 71% granted / 29% denied (10 of 14 granted / 4 of 14 denied) Civil Rights – 65% granted / 35% denied (13 of 20 granted / 7 of 20 denied) ERISA – 64% granted / 36% denied (9 of 14 granted / 5 of 14 denied) FLSA / Wage & Hour (Conditional Certification) – 58% granted / 42% denied (39 of 67 granted / 28 of 67 denied) Discrimination – 50% granted / 50% denied (2 of 4 granted / 2 of 4 denied) FLSA / Wage & Hour (Decertification) – 50% granted / 50% denied (1 of 2 granted / 1 of 2 denied) Privacy – 44% granted / 56% denied (4 of 9 granted / 5 of 9 denied) Products Liability / Mass Torts – 0% granted / 100% denied (0 of 1 granted / 1 of 1 denied) Data Breach – 0% granted / 0% denied (no class certification rulings in 2026)
The plaintiffs’ class action bar obtained 100% success rates in four areas, FCRA, TCPA, RICO, and WARN. There have only been two FCRA and TCPA certification rulings in 2026, and one each for RICO and WARN, which were all granted by the court for a 100% success rate. In cases alleging securities fraud violations, plaintiffs succeeded in obtaining orders certifying classes in 8 of 10 rulings, for a success rate of 80%. In cases alleging antitrust violations, plaintiffs managed to obtain class certification rulings in 5 of 7 rulings issued during the first half of 2026, a success rate of 71%. And in wage & hour litigation, plaintiffs were not nearly as successful as in previous years. They succeeded in obtaining orders certifying classes and/or collective actions in 39 of 67 rulings issued during 2026, a success rate of only 58%.
Courts Issued More Rulings In FLSA Collective Actions and Wage & Hour Class Actions Than In Any Other Areas Of Law
For the first half of calendar year 2026, courts issued more certification rulings in FLSA collective actions and wage & hour class actions than in other types of cases. Plaintiffs historically have been able to obtain conditional certification of FLSA collective actions at a high rate, which surely has contributed to the number of filings in this area. Of the 67 rulings addressing first-stage motions for conditional certification, the court granted 39, for a success rate of a much lower than typical 58%
In contrast, from January 1 to July 1, 2025, issued 74 rulings. Of these, 71 addressed first-stage motions for conditional certification of collective actions under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and 3 addressed second-stage motions for decertification of collective actions. Of the 71 rulings that courts issued on motions for conditional certification, 58 rulings favored plaintiffs, for a success rate of 82%.
At the decertification stage, courts generally have conducted a closer examination of the evidence and, as a result, defendants historically have enjoyed an equal if not higher rate of success on these second-stage motions as compared to plaintiffs. The results so far in 2026 have not supported that typical success. There have only been 2 rulings thus far that courts issued on motions for decertification of collective actions, and only 1 ruling favored defendants, for a success rate of 50%.
An analysis of the rulings demonstrates that a disproportionate number emanated from traditionally pro-plaintiff jurisdictions, including the judicial districts within the Second Circuit (16 decisions) and Ninth Circuit (14 decisions), which include New York and California, respectively.
Takeaways From Certification Statistics Midway Through 2026
Notable thus far at the halfway point of the year, there have been a very small number of rulings emanating from the Fifth and Sixth Circuits (2 and 1 decisions, respectfully), which was true in 2025 as well. There have overall been less rulings issued by the courts, and at a lower success rate than previous years.
We will continue to track class certification trends in 2026 and will report on final numbers in the Duane Morris Class Action Review – 2027, which will be published in the first week of January. Stay tuned!
Duane Morris Takeaways: Corporate defendants saw unprecedented settlement numbers across all areas of class action litigation between 2022 and 2025, and mid-year through 2026, settlement numbers are even more robust. The cumulative value of the top ten settlements across all substantive areas of class action litigation hit record highs in 2025, surpassing the highest levels ever in 2022. When the numbers for the previous few years are combined, the total signals that corporate defendants have entered a new era of heightened risks and higher stakes in the valuation of class actions.
On an aggregate basis, across all areas of litigation, class actions and government enforcement lawsuits garnered more than $79 billion in 2025, $42 billion in 2024, $51.4 billion in settlements in 2023, and a $66 billion in 2022. When combined, the four-year settlement total eclipses any other four-year period in the history of American jurisprudence.
As a prelude to the Duane Morris Class Action Review – 2027, this blog post reports on our analysis of class action settlements through the first half of 2026. The data shows that for the period of January 1 to June 30, 2026, the current year is ahead of the historically high numbers of 2025. As of the end of the first half of 2026, the aggregate settlement total across all areas of class action litigation and government enforcement lawsuits is $53.795 billion (in accounting for the top 5 settlements in the various substantive areas of law). By comparison, in 2025 at the half-way mark, the aggregate settlement total was $21.77 billion.
It is anticipated that these numbers will increase across the board by the end of the year and when measured by the top 10 settlements in each category.
More Billion Dollar Class Action Settlements
At the mid-way point of 2026, there are three settlements over the billion-dollar mark. There were eight total billion-dollar settlements in 2025. The 10 individual billion-dollar settlements in 2024 surpassed the number in 2023, and only fell short of the number of billion-dollar settlements in 2022. In 2023, parties resolved nine class actions for $1 billion or more. In 2022, parties resolved 15 class actions for $1 billion or more in settlement dollars. Together with the three thus far in 2026, corporations have seen 45 settlements of one billion dollars or more in four and a half years. This string of settlements marks the most extensive set of billion-dollar class action settlements in the history of the American court system.
The Scorecard On Leading Class Actions Settlements Halfway Through 2026
The plaintiffs’ class action bar has scored rich settlements thus far in 2026 in virtually every area of class action litigation. The following list shows the totals of the top 5 settlements at the mid-year point in 2026 in key areas of class action litigation:
$34.875 Billion – Antitrust class actions $8.609 Billion – Products liability/Mass Tort class actions $4.25 Billion – Government Enforcement actions $1.979 Billion – Securities Fraud class actions $1.535 Billion – Consumer Fraud class actions $624 Million – Privacy class actions $501 Million – ERISA class actions $392.1 Million – Discrimination class actions $323.9 Million – Wage & Hour class and collective actions $309.7 Million – Data Breach class actions $242.45 Million – Labor class actions $105.05 Million – Fair Credit Reporting Act class actions $60.93 Million – TCPA class actions $41.9 Million – Civil Rights class actions
The high dollar settlements of the past four years suggested that the plaintiffs’ bar would continue to be equally, if not more aggressive, with their case filings and settlement positions. From the 2026 data, it certainly looks to be the case as we end the first half of the year. The data points in each category are set out in the following charts.
Top Class & Collective Action Litigation Settlements In 2026
Top Antitrust Class Action Settlements In 2026
The top 10 antitrust class action settlements totaled $45.99 billion in 2025, $8.412 billion in 2024, $11.74 billion in 2023, and $3.72 billion in 2022.
$34 billion – In Re Payment Card Interchange Fee And Merchant Discount Antitrust Litigation, Case No. 05-MD-1720 (E.D.N.Y. June 9, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval granted to Visa’s and Mastercard’s revised settlement with merchants who accused the card networks of charging too much to process payments on their credit cards).
$303 million – Ray, et al. v. NCAA, Case No. 23-CV-425 (E.D. Cal. May 12, 2026) (final settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve claims from thousands of Division I volunteer coaches alleging that the organization’s rules fixed their compensation at zero).
$218 million – In Re Realpage Inc. Rental Software Antitrust Litigation, Case No. 23-MD-3071 (M.D. Tenn. May 22, 2026) (May 22, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval granted to resolve claims from a second set of renters alleging antitrust claims that they colluded with revenue management firm RealPage Inc. to fix rental prices across the country).
$200 million – In Re Generic Pharmaceutical Pricing Antitrust Litigation, Case No. 16-MD-2724 (E.D. Penn. Jan 23, 2026) (final settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve claims alleging antitrust claims alleging the defendants conspired with other drugmakers to inflate generic drug prices).
$136 million – In Re PVC Pipe Antitrust Litigation, Case No. 24-CV-7639 (N.D. Ill. May 13, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve claims alleging that the company conspired with other polyvinyl chloride pipe producers to fix prices).
Top Civil Rights Class Action Settlements In 2026
The top 10 civil rights class action settlements totaled $580.9 million in 2025, $313.8 million in 2024, $643.15 million in 2023, and $1.31 billion in 2022.
$20 million – Healy, et al. v. Jefferson County Kentucky Louisville Metro Government, Case No. 17-CV-71 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 11, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve claims alleging that the County regularly imprisons, detains or incarcerates persons longer than ordered by Courts of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, and under conditions that violate the orders of such Courts).
$15 million – Johnson, et al. v. City Of Annapolis, Case No. 21-CV-112 (D. Md. May 26, 2026) (settlement reached in two class actions to resolve claims from more than 1,400 city residents of public housing and by representatives of a former public housing resident who died alleging substandard housing conditions at properties owned and operated by the Housing Authority of the City of Annapolis (HACA).
$4 million – Cody, et al. v. City Of St. Louis, Case No. 17-CV-2707 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 13, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve claims from hundreds of people who say they endured inhumane conditions while held at the city’s Medium Security Institution, commonly known as the Workhouse).
$1.5 million – Coleman, et al. v. City Of Brookside, Case No. 22-CV-423 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 6, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval sought in a class action to resolve claims brought by four drivers who said they were targeted in an aggressive towing and ticketing scheme).
$1.4 million – Santiago, et al. v. City Of Chicago, Case No. 22-CV-5827 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 8, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval granted in two consolidated actions to resolve claims alleging the city of Chicago tows vehicles it deems abandoned without properly notifying their owners).
Top Consumer Fraud Class Action Settlements In 2026
The top 10 consumer fraud class action settlements totaled $2.1 billion in 2025, $2.44 billion in 2024, $3.29 billion in 2023, and $8.596 billion in 2022.
$436 million – Broadmoor Lumber & Plywood Co. et al. v. Toyota Industries Corp., Case No. 24-CV-6640 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve claims alleging that the defendant and its subsidiaries misled tens of thousands of business buyers into thinking the emissions of its forklift and construction engines were “the cleanest” in the industry).
$425 million – In Re Capital One 360 Savings Account Interest Rate Litigation, Case No. 24-MD-311 (E.D. Va. Apr. 20, 2026) (final settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve claims alleging that Capital One deceptively advertised its 360 Savings accounts).
$309 million – In Re Amazon Return Policy Litigation, Case No. 23-CV-1372 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 27, 2026) (settlement approval sought in a class action to resolve a proposed class action accusing Amazon of shortchanging customers on refunds for returned items).
$240 million – Bickerstaff, et al. v. SunTrust Bank, Case No. 10EV010485 (Ga. Cir. Ct. May 26, 2026) (final settlement approval granted in a class action alleging that the bank charged illegal overdrafts on ATM and debit card transactions which harmed Georgia consumers).
$125 million – National Veterans Legal Services Program, et al. v. United States, Case No. 24-1757 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 20, 2026) (settlement approval affirmed in a class action to resolve claims of hundreds of thousands of PACER users who were allegedly made to pay more than the law allowed).
Top Data Breach Class Action Settlements In 2026
The top 10 data breach class action settlements totaled $515.79 million in 2025, $593.2 million in 2024, $515.75 million in 2023, and $719.21 million in 2022.
$117.5 million – Hasson, et al. v. Comcast Cable Communications LLC, Case No. 23-CV-5039 (E.D. Penn. May 13, 2026) (final settlement approval granted in a consolidated class action lawsuit alleging the internet and mobile services provider failed to implement proper cybersecurity measures to safeguard sensitive consumer information, leading to an October 2023 data breach).
$46.7 million – In Re 23andMe, Inc., Customer Data Security Breach Litigation, Case No. 24-MD-3098 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2026) (final settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve claims alleging that 23andMe Inc. and affiliates had a data breach in which millions of customers’ genetic data and personally identifiable information (PII) was hacked).
$31.5 million – Angus, et al. v. Flagstar Bank FSB, Case No. 21-CV-10657 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 12, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve consolidated class claims that Flagstar Bank failed to protect the personal information of customers and employees in two data breaches impacting more than 2 million people).
$26 million – In Re Lakeview Loan Servicing Data Breach Litigation, Case No. 22-CV-20955 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 4, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval granted to settle a class action over their personally identifiable information potentially being accessed during a data breach).
$24.5 million – In Re LastPass Data Security Incident Litigation, Case No. 22-CV-12047 (D. Mass. Feb. 2, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval granted to settle a proposed class action over a 2022 data breach that exposed the personal information of millions of people and led to the looting of cryptocurrency accounts).
Top Discrimination Class Action Settlements In 2026
The top 10 discrimination class action settlements totaled $507.10 million in 2025, $356.8 million in 2024, $762.2 million in 2023, and $597 million in 2022.
$110 million – In Re Wells Fargo & Co. Hiring Practices Derivative Litigation, Case No. 22-CV-5173 (N.D. Cal. May 15, 2026) (final settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve a shareholder derivative lawsuit accusing the bank of corporate mismanagement through discriminatory hiring and lending).
$100 million – Snyder-Hill, et al. v. The Ohio State University, Case No. 23-cv-2993, Knight, et al. v. The Ohio State University, Case No. 23-CV-2994, and Gonzales, et al. v. The Ohio State University, Case No. 23-CV-3051 (S.D. Ohio June 22, 2026) (board approval of a settlement agreement to resolve claims from approximately 300 former students accusing former Ohio State University sports doctor Richard Strauss of sexual abuse).
$72.5 million – Doe, et al. v. Bank Of America NA, Case No. 25-CV-8520 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve claims alleging that the defendant Jeffrey Epstein’s sex trafficking and abuse).
$60.5 million – Candelore, et al. v. Tinder, Inc., Case No. BC583162 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 4, 2026) (final settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve claims alleging that the company charged older users more than younger users for Tinder Plus and Tinder Gold subscriptions.
$35 million – Bensky, et al. v. Darren Indyke, Case No. 24-CV-1204 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval granted in a class action alleging that the defendants helped facilitate Jeffrey Epstein’s vast sex trafficking enterprise).
Top EEOC / Government Enforcement Class Action Settlements In 2026
The top 10 EEOC / government enforcement class action settlements totaled $3.29 billion in 2025, $335.9 million in 2024, $263.58 million in 2023, and $404.5 million in 2022.
$3 billion – New Jersey Department Of Environmental Protection, et al. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Case No. 19-CV-14758 & 19-CV-14766 (D.N.J. June 24, 2026) (settlement approval pending to resolve the state’s claims over contamination caused by the manufacture and discharge of forever chemicals).
$575 million – United States Of America, et al. v. PacifiCorp., Case No. 24-CV-2102 (D. Ore. Feb. 20, 2026) (settlement reached to resolve claims for damages related to wildfires in Oregon and Northern California).
$450 million – United States Of America, et al. v. Chemours Co., Case No. 26-CV-418 (S.D. W. Va. June 24, 2026) (proposed consent decree entered for a multi-state settlement with Chemours Co. over alleged years-long, illegal discharges of synthetic “forever chemicals” used to make products resistant to water, grease and stains).
$125 million –Illinois And Peoples Gas and Northshore Gas (Ill. Cmrc. Comm. Apr. 30, 2026) (settlement reached with two gas companies and the Attorney General’s office on behalf of customers concerning costs related to Peoples Gas’ ongoing, massive program to retire cast- and ductile-iron mains).
$100 million – Federal Trade Commission, et al. v. Walmart Inc., Case No. 26-CV-1655 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2026) (consent decree entered to settle claims the company misled its “Spark” delivery program drivers over the amount they would be paid, and deceived customers over how much of the tips they paid would go to their drivers).
Top ERISA Class Action Settlements In 2026
The top 10 ERISA class action settlements totaled $680.30 million in 2025, $413.3 million in 2024, $580.5 million in 2023, and $399.6 million in 2022.
$332 million – McCutcheon, et al. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., Case No. 16-CV-4170 (S.D. N.Y. Jan. 14, 2026) (final settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve claims alleging that Colgate-Palmolive violated ERISA by miscalculating pension benefits for retirees who took lump-sum distributions between 1989 and 2005).
$48 million – Hoak, et al. v. Ledford, Case No. 15-CV-3983 (N.D. Ga. May 13, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval sought in a class action to resolve claims alleging that the defendant failed to provide annuity payments for life).
$44.4 million – In Re AME Church Employee Retirement Fund Litigation, Case No. 22-MD-3035 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 24, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval granted in a multidistrict litigation from a class of African Methodist Episcopal Church workers who alleged that mismanagement of their annuity retirement plan allowed a rogue employee to embezzle $90 million).
$42 million – Halter, et al. v. Providence Health & Services, Case No. 25-CV-210 (W.D. Wash. June 4, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve claims alleging that Providence mismanaged its employees’ retirement plan by failing to use money forfeited by departing workers to reduce administrative expenses).
$35 million – Iron Workers District Council Of New England Health And Welfare Fund, et al. v. Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd., Case No. 23-CV-11131 (D. Mass. Apr. 3, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve claims from a coalition of union healthcare funds alleging that the defendant schemed to delay generic competition for its QVAR asthma inhalers).
Top FCRA, FDPCA, And FACTA Class Action Settlements In 2026
The top 10 FCRA, FDPCA, and FACTA class action settlements totaled $74.77 million in 2025, $42.43 million in 2024, $100.15 million in 2023, and $210.11 million in 2022.
$56.85 million – Stoff, et al. v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A., Case No. 37-2020-00020808-CU-BT-CTL (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 17, 2026) (final settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve claims alleging that the company violated the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) by failing to report CARES Act forbearances accurately).
$14.3 million – Ray, et al. v. AdaptHealth Corp., Case No. 22-CV-898 (M.D.N.C. June 1, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval sought in a class action to resolve claims alleging that the company violated the North Carolina Debt Collection Act by overcharging and trying to collect debts from patients who had returned medical equipment to the company).
$13.5 million – Scroggins, et al. v. LexisNexis Risk Solutions FL Inc., Case No. 22-cv-00545 (E.D. Va. Mar. 16, 2026) (final settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve claims alleging that the defendant incorrectly reported some consumers as deceased).
$13 million – VanderKodde, et al. v. Elliott, Case No. 17-CV-203 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 13, 2026) (final settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve claims from debtors who alleged that a creditor law firm charged unlawfully high post-judgment interest rates during debt collection).
$7.4 million – Keim, et al. v. Trader Joe’s, Case No. 19STCV36790 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 5, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve claims alleging that the grocery store violated the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act by providing customers with printed receipts that displayed both the first six and last four digits of their card numbers).
Top FLSA / Wage & Hour Class And Collective Settlements In 2026
The top 10 FLSA / wage & hour class and collective action settlements totaled $430.58 million in 2025, $614.55 million in 2024, $742.5 million in 2023, and $574.55 million in 2022.
$162 million – Calderon, et al. v. Public Partnerships LLC, Case No. 25-CV-2320 (E.D.N.Y. June 23, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval sought in a class action to resolve claims alleging that the company failed to timely and accurately pay about 200,000 personal assistants).
$86 million – Callister, et al. v. Swedish Health Services, Case No. 21-2-16148-7 (Wash. Super. Ct. May 8, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval granted in a class action alleging that the company failed to provide required second meal periods for employees working shifts longer than 10 hours, and underpaid workers through a policy of rounding time entries).
$38.7 million – Pruess, et al. v. Presbyterian Health Plan Inc., Case No. 19-CV-629 (D.N.M. Jan. 9, 2026) (D.N.M. June 24, 2026) (final settlement approval granted to resolve claims alleging that the defendant failed to pay overtime compensation to care workers in violation of the FLSA).
$19.2 million – Diaz, et al. v. New York Paving Inc., Case No. 18-CV-4910 (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2026) (final settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve claims alleging that the defendant failed to pay for pre- and post-shift work and for overtime compensation).
$18 million – Abarca, et al. v. Werner Enterprises Inc., Case No. 14-CV-319, Smith, et al. v. Werner Enterprises Inc., Case No. 15-CV-287, and Vester, et al. v. Werner Enterprises Inc., Case No. 17-CV-145 (D. Neb. Feb. 5, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval granted in a collective action to resolve claims alleging that Werner failed to pay minimum wages for non-driving work time, including time spent in sleeper berths, waiting for loads, performing pre-trip and post-trip inspections and attending to cargo security).
Top Labor Class Action Settlements In 2026
The top 10 labor class action settlements totaled $210.5 million in 2025, $237.0 million in 2024 and $129.67 million in 2023.
$200.2 million – Brown, et al. v. JBS, Inc., Case No. 22-CV-2946 (D. Colo. Jan. 15, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve claims between former employees and Agri Beef, American Foods Group, Cargill, Hormel, JBS, National Beef, Nebraska Beef, Perdue Farms, Quality Pork, Seaboard Foods, Triumph Foods and Tyson Foods alleging that the companies unlawfully conspired to suppress the wages of workers at their processing plants).
$27.5 million – Hoffman, et al. v. United Airlines, Inc., Case No. 21-CV-6395 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 11, 2026) (settlement reached in a class action to settle a lawsuit by former employees who say the defendant mishandled recent voluntary buyout programs).
$9.5 million – Dorrell, et al. v. Constellation Energy Corp., Case No. 25-CV-2251 (D. Md. May 12, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval sought in a class action alleging that the company conspired with other major nuclear power generation companies to illegally limit compensation for employees).
$3 million – Bailey, et al. v. Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc., Case No. 24-CV-2749 (W.D. Tenn. May 1, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval sought in a class action to resolve claims alleging that the defendant failed to retroactively reimburse the tobacco penalties paid by certain employees who subsequently complete a quit-smoking program, and of failing to inform workers that recommendations from their personal physicians will be considered in the course of assessing penalties).
$2.25 million – Brinkman, et al. v. Target Corporation, Case No. 24-2- 25091-3 (Wash. Super. Ct. May 5, 2026) (final settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve claims alleging that the company failed to disclose wage scales and salary ranges in Washington job postings).
Top Privacy Class Action Settlements In 2026
The top 10 privacy class action settlements totaled $801.85 million in 2025, $2.01 billion in 2024, $1.32 billion in 2023, and $896.7 million in 2022.
$250 million – Landsheft, et al. v. Apple Inc., Case No. 25-CV-2668 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval sought in a class action to resolve claims alleging that Apple misled millions of iPhone buyers by falsely touting artificial intelligence capabilities for its Siri voice assistant in 2024).
$135 million – Taylor, et al. v. Google LLC, Case No. 20-CV-7956 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval sought in a class action class action alleging Google illegally consumes the cellular data consumers have purchased from their cellular providers).
$115 million – Katz-Lacabe, et al. v. Oracle America Inc., No. 24-7648 (9th Cir. Feb. 13, 2026) (final settlement approval affirmed in a privacy lawsuit over the defendant’s online data-collection practices despite the objections of one class member).
$68 million – In Re Google Assistant Privacy Litigation, Case No. 19-CV-4286 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve claims alleging that Google eavesdropped on and recorded confidential communications without user consent).
$56 million – Frasco, et al. v. Flo Health Inc., Case No. 21-CV-757 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve from Flo users who alleged Google illegally intercepted the private menstrual health data of millions of users without their consent).
Top Products Liability And Mass Tort Class Action Settlements In 2026
The top 10 products liability / mass tort class action settlements totaled $17.9 billion in 2025, $23.40 billion in 2024, $25.83 billion in 2023, and $50.32 billion in 2022.
$7.25 billion – King, et al. v. Monsanto Co., Case No. 2622-CC00325 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Mar. 4, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval granted to resolve current and future claims across the U.S. that weed killer Roundup causes non-Hodgkin lymphoma).
$773 million – In Re National Prescription Opiate Litigation, Case No. 17-MD-2804 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 14, 2026) (Albertsons Cos. Inc. and the attorneys general of California, Colorado, Illinois, and Oregon agreed to a settlement in principle to end claims brought by states, local governments, and Native American tribes over its role in the opioid crisis).
$318 million – In Re 650 Fifth Avenue and Related Properties, Case No. 08-CV-10934 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2026) (settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve claims stemming from the federal government’s forfeiture action against a 36-story Midtown Manhattan office tower linked to the Iranian government).
$180 million – The Diocese of Camden, New Jersey, Case No. 20-BK-21257 (D.N.J. Bank. Ct. Feb. 17, 2026) (settlement reached pending approval by the bankruptcy court in a class action to resolve a dispute arising from claims of sexual abuse by members of the Diocesan clergy).
$88.5 million – In Re National Prescription Opiate Litigation, Case No.17-MD-2804 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 29, 2026) (final settlement agreement granted with Amneal Pharmaceuticals and several states to resolve litigation over its role in creating and fueling the opioid overdose epidemic).
Top Securities Fraud Class Action Settlements In 2026
The top 10 securities fraud class action settlements totaled $3.45 billion in 2025, $2.55 billion in 2024, $5.4 billion in 2023, and $3.25 billion in 2022.
$740 million – In Re Didi Global Securities Litigation, Case No. 21-CV-5807 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2026) (final settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve claims by investors alleging that defendants violated the federal securities laws by making false and misleading statements and omissions in the Registration Statement and engaged in deceptive conduct in connection with DiDi’s June 30, 2021 Initial Public Offering (IPO).
$500 million – Sjunde AP-Fonden, et al. v. The Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Case No. 18-CV-12084 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2026) (settlement reached in a class action brought by investors who asserted that they lost money after it came to light that the company was allegedly involved in a bribery scandal tied to Malaysia’s sovereign wealth fund).
$250 million – Crews, Jr., et al. v. Rivian Automotive, Inc., Case No. 22-CV-1524 (C.D. Cal. May 20, 2026) (final settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve claims from investors alleging that the company misled investors in connection with its Initial Public Offering).
$250 million – Sjunde AP-Fonden, et al. v. Activision Blizzard Inc., Case No. 2022-1001 (Del. Chanc. Ct. May 22, 2026) (settlement reached with Microsoft Corp. to end shareholder litigation over its $75.4 billion acquisition of Activision Blizzard Inc.
$239 million – In Re Celgene Corp. Securities Litigation, Case No. 18-CV-4772 (D.N.J. May 8, 2026) (final settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve claims alleging that the Celgene and two of its former officers violated the federal securities laws by making material misrepresentations and omissions during the regarding certain Celgene products and product candidates).
Top TCPA Class Action Settlements In 2026
The top 10 TCPA class action settlements totaled $69.1 million in 2025, $84.73 million in 2024, $103.45 million in 2023, and $134.13 million in 2022.
$28 million – Campbell, et al. v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., Case No. 22-CV-2261 (C.D. Ill. May 11, 2026) (final settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve claims alleging that Sirius XM made telephone calls to persons registered on the National Do Not Call Registry or Sirius XM’s Internal Do Not Call Registry).
$10.5 million – Fried, et al. v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., d/b/a Kaiser Permanente, Case No. 2025-016220-CA-01 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 28, 2026) (final settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve claims from class members who alleging they received text messages sent by or on behalf of Kaiser after the person communicated that they did not wish to receive text messages by replying to the messages with a “stop” or similar opt-out instruction, in alleged violation of the TCPA and the Florida Telephone Solicitation Act (FTSA).
$9.95 million – Jackson, et al. v. Gen Digital Inc., Case No. 25-CV-535 (D. Ariz. Jan. 28, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve claims alleging that the cybersecurity software company wrongfully placed prerecorded telephone calls regarding a LifeLock or Norton account to consumers who did not have an account with either company, or Gen Digital, in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act).
$6.5 million – Walston, et al. v. National Retail Solutions, Inc. d/b/a NRS Pay, Case No. 24-CV-083 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Jan. 14, 2026) (preliminary settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve claims alleging that the defendant placed prerecorded telemarketing telephone calls to cellular telephone numbers to individuals who did not give their prior express written consent in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act).
$5.975 million – Ryan, et al. v. Wilshire Law Firm, P.L.C., Case No. 2025-022621 (Fla. Cir. Ct. June 3, 2026) (final settlement approval granted in a class action to resolve claims alleging that the defendant violated the TCPA by sending pre-recorded messages to cellular telephone numbers).
By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, and Ryan T. Garippo
Duane Morris Takeaways: On June 24, 2026, in Hossfeld v. Allstate Insurance Co., No. 25-1518, 2026 WL 1815908 (7th Cir. June 24, 2026), Judge Amy St. Eve, writing for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, reversed a summary judgment ruling in a class action against Allstate Insurance Co. (“Allstate”) and held that the plaintiff failed to establish vicarious Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) liability for calls placed by a subcontracted telemarketer. The decision is a significant win for companies in the lead generation space and forces plaintiffs to prove downstream agency for the calls at issue.
Case Background
Allstate sells car insurance policies nationwide. To make these sales, Allstate works with insurance agents to help sell its policies. In this case, Allstate contracted with two insurance agents, Jason Fleming and Daniel Gilmond. Fleming and Daniels signed contracts, which authorized them to work with “Non‑Contracted Telemarketers,” who do not contract directly with Allstate. Id. at *2. The “Non‑Contracted Telemarketers,” however, were required to comply with Allstate’s do-not-call policies. Id.
In 2020, Fleming and Daniels retained a “Non‑Contracted Telemarketer,” called Transfer Kings, to attempt to sell Allstate policies to interested consumers. Id. But, without informing Allstate or the agents, Transfer Kings subcontracted its duty to a third company, called Atlantic, which actually placed the calls. Atlantic bought “lead” lists from a fourth company, KP Leads, which represented that the list of consumers had consented to the calls. One lead was Plaintiff Robert Hossfeld (“Hossfeld”) who had been on Allstate’s internal do-not-call registry since July 10, 2020.
In reliance on the “lead” list from KP Leads, Atlantic made twelve calls to Hossfeld, between November 2020 and February 2021, and tried to sell him Allstate insurance policies. As a result, Hossfeld sued Allstate under 47 U.S.C. §227(c)(5) of the TCPA and its internal do‑not‑call regulations under 47 C.F.R. §64.1200(d). Ultimately, Hossfeld moved for class certification and summary judgment, whereas Allstate moved for summary judgment. The district court denied class certification, but granted summary judgment for Hossfeld, holding that Allstate was vicariously liable for the calls in question. Allstate appealed the summary judgment ruling, and Hossfeld appealed the denial of class certification.
The Seventh Circuit’s Ruling
Judge St. Eve, writing for the Seventh Circuit, reversed the district court’s summary judgment holding and found that Hossfeld failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Allstate was liable for Atlantic’s calls under any agency theory.
First, Judge St. Eve reasoned that in order to impute Atlantic’s conduct to Allstate, Atlantic must be Allstate’s “subagent.” She reasoned that “subagency” exists when “a principal . . . authorize[s] its agent to appoint an additional party to perform some of the tasks the principal delegated to the agent.” Hossfeld, 2026 WL 1815908, at *4. If authorized, subagents may appoint additional subagents. Id. “But for this to occur, there must be appointing authority at each level to support an agency relationship between each subagent and the principal.” Id. Here, there was no evidence Allstate ever communicated with Transfer Kings before it hired Atlantic or even knew Transfer Kings existed before the lawsuit was filed. Allstate, therefore, did not delegate any agency decisions to Transfer Kings or authorize the hiring of additional subagents. Simply put, Fleming and Daniels likely had the authority to hire Transfer Kings on Allstate’s behalf, but Transfer Kings did not have the authority to hire Atlantic and claim that the decision should be imputed to Allstate.
Second, Judge St. Eve reasoned that Hossfeld’s second argument, i.e., that Transfer Kings had apparent authority to hire Atlantic, also failed. Apparent authority must be created by the principal’s words or conduct toward the plaintiff. In this case, Allstate was the principal. Thus, because Hossfeld offered no evidence that Allstate ever represented to him that Atlantic was its agent, or otherwise interacted with him, Hossfeld could not establish that Allstate vested Atlantic with apparent authority.
Third, Hossfeld’s last argument that “Allstate ratified Atlantic’s calls to him by accepting benefits arising from the non-compliant calls” also failed. Id. at *7. Hossfeld’s ratification theory would have required him to show Allstate knowingly accept the benefits of an unauthorized act. But “Hossfeld admit[ed] he never obtained insurance or any other services from Allstate,” and thus Allstate never retained any benefit from Hossfeld specifically. Id. Thus, the Seventh Circuit found that no reasonable jury could find that this conduct rose to the level of ratification.
Fourth, the Seventh Circuit turned to the class certification ruling and affirmed the denial of class certification. Judge St. Eve explained Hossfeld only identified 33 unique telephone numbers on Allstate’s internal do‑not‑call list that Transfer Kings or Atlantic had called as part of the same campaign to sell insurance. The Seventh Circuit has recognized that “a forty-member class is often regarded as sufficient to meet the numerosity requirement.” Id. at *9 (quoting Orr v. Shicker, 953 F.3d 490, 498 (7th Cir. 2020)) But 33 putative class members “easily” falls “below the general forty‑member benchmark.” Id. Thus, because the “only mechanism for disturbing the district court’s class certification ruling is to reverse it if . . . the court abused its discretion,” the Seventh Circuit was left with no choice but to affirm.
Implications For Companies
Hossfeld is a powerful and practical decision for companies that use telemarketing vendors, such as lead generators. Because plaintiffs must show actual or apparent authority at each level of delegation to prevail on a subagency theory, corporate counsel should ensure that multiple levels of delegation are not authorized by their companies’ vendor agreements. This prophylactic measure is the type of “easy fix” which will prevent massive class action lawsuits down the line.
Corporate counsel should also ensure that their vendor agreements require outside vendors, or lead generators, to comply with existing TCPA policies to minimize any risk that the principal should be liable for its agents’ (or subagents’) failure to follow applicable law. TCPA class actions can be devastating for an organization, and front-end compliance goes a long way.
By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, Gregory Tsonis, and George J. Schaller
Duane Morris Takeaways: On May 27, 2026, in Sanchez, v. El Milagro, Inc., 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 14984 (7th Cir. May 26, 2026), the Seventh Circuit issued an opinion that affirmed a district court’s decision granting summary judgment in favor of tortilla manufacturer El Milagro, Inc. (“El Milagro”) for claims of sexual harassment in the workplace in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and the Illinois Human Rights Act (“IHRA”).
The opinion fully vindicated the Company’s defenses, and clarifies that a prompt and thorough investigation coupled with appropriate action to bring harassment to an end are crucial to avoid liability under sexual harassment law.
Background
In 2022, Plaintiff Alma Sanchez filed a Class Action Complaint against her employer, El Milagro, Inc. (“El Milagro”), a tortilla manufacturer and distributor of tortilla products, alleging a sexually hostile work environment in violation of the IHRA and, subsequently, Title VII.
Plaintiff alleged she joined El Milagro in July 2019. Plaintiff claimed that in 2020, co-worker Francisco Gutierrez sexually harassed her by “inappropriately touching her three times,” although the Seventh Circuit’s opinion noted that Plaintiff’s version of events changed in numerous ways over time. Id.
According to the subsequent statement to Human Resources that Plaintiff submitted after the third alleged incident, Gutierrez “inappropriately touched [Plaintiff] first in October or November 2019, then in March 2020, and finally in August 2020.” Id. *4-5. Her Complaint, however, alleged that “Gutierrez touched her first in May or June 2020, then in July 2020, and finally in August 2020.” Id. *5.
As to her first alleged incident of harassment, Plaintiff’s Complaint asserted that Gutierrez “intentionally ‘rubbed his genitals’ against her buttocks as he passed her on the production line and then continued to walk away.” Id. In her deposition, however, Plaintiff testified that “she believe[d] Gutierrez purposefully touched her because ‘there were many ways for him to pass through without touching [her],” that he did not “touch her for long because ‘he made it look like he was passing by,’” and when she felt the contact and turned around “[h]e had already passed.” Id. In her later statement to Human Resources, Plaintiff wrote that Gutierrez “said sorry” but at her deposition, she testified that Gutierrez “turned around and stare[d] at me like watching and saying ‘oops.’” Id. *5-6.
Plaintiff alleged she verbally reported this incident two hours later to Supervisor Arturo Brito, which Brito denied. Id. *6. In her HR statement, Plaintiff “stated that although she mentioned this incident to Brito, she did not tell him Gutierrez’s name.” At her deposition, however, Plaintiff claimed that “she ‘specifically told Brito that Mr. Gutierrez had rubbed his genitals on my buttocks’” but, when asked outright, she “agreed that she did not share Gutierrez’s name with [the supervisor] when she reported the first incident.” Id. No Human Resources report was made about this incident at the time.
Plaintiff also asserted Gutierrez “sexually harassed her for the second time in July 2020” and claimed that he “groped her buttock with his hand.” Id. *6-7. Plaintiff contradicted herself about whether and when she reported this incident. In her HR statement, she wrote that she “could not have reported the incident because the factory had been permanently shut down because of the pandemic, but later claimed in the lawsuit that she did report the harassment to Brito the day after it happened. Id. *7. Plaintiff alleged that she informed Brito about this incident, but no complaint about this alleged incident was sent to El Milagro’s Human Resources department. Id.
The third incident occurred on August 29, 2020, and Plaintiff contended that “Gutierrez touched her buttocks for ‘a short time,’ or ‘a few seconds’ while she was stooping down to put down boxes that she was holding.” Id. In her written statement to HR, Plaintiff claimed that “Gutierrez touched her buttocks with one hand” but asserted during the lawsuit that “Gutierrez groped her with both hands when she bent over to put down a box that she was carrying.” Id.
After reporting the third incident to Brito, Plaintiff submitted a written statement to Human Resources describing the three incidents. Gutierrez’s statement claimed he accidentally touched Plaintiff while packing tortillas and apologized. Id. Plaintiff later testified that she “had not seen anyone else experience sexually harassing conduct at any time during her employment at El Milagro.” Id. Plaintiff also alleged subsequent verbal harassment by other coworkers, but Plaintiff did not tell Brito or El Milagro’s HR the names of those individuals. Id. *9.
The district court granted El Milagro summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims. It also ruled that Plaintiffs’ class action claims could not be certified. Plaintiff appealed the district court’s decision on her individual claim to the Seventh Circuit.
The Seventh Circuit’s Opinion
The Seventh Circuit, in an opinion written by Judge Kenneth F. Ripple, affirmed the district court’s decision granting summary judgment in favor of El Milagro and fully vindicated its position.
As to the controlling legal standard, the Seventh Circuit first concluded that while Title VII and the IHRA do not contain identical language, “both this court and Illinois state courts consistently state that the analytical standards are the same.” Id. *9. Thus, “[t]o constitute actionable sexual harassment, the activity ‘must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive working environment.” Id. *10. While noting that “physical acts are considered ‘more severe than harassing comments alone,’” the Court also noted that “physical harassment lies along a continuum just as verbal harassment does.” Id. *12.
Turning to the merits, the Seventh Circuit noted an employer is liable under the IHRA and Title VII “only if it was negligent in controlling working conditions.” To prove such negligence, the Seventh Circuit explained Plaintiff must establish two points: (1) that El Milagro had “notice or knowledge of the harassment,” and (2) that El Milagro “did not take ‘prompt and appropriate corrective action reasonably likely to prevent harassment from recurring.” Id. *16.
Assuming that Plaintiff reported the first two incidents to Brito, as she claimed, the Seventh Circuit concluded that Plaintiff could not establish El Milagro’s knowledge of the first two incidents of alleged harassment. Based on the record evidence, the Court reasoned that “what she told Brito led him to believe that she was complaining of accidental touching that happened because the production lines on which she and Gutierrez worked had close quarters.” Id. at *21. As a result, the Seventh Circuit concluded that “[w]e do not believe that a reasonable jury could conclude from [Plaintiff’s] deposition testimony, or any other evidence in the record related to her reporting of the first two incidents, that she gave Brito ‘enough information to make a reasonable employer think that there was some probability that she was being sexually harassed.’” Id. *20-21.
As to the third incident, all three judges agreed that investigation and corrective measures taken by El Milagro’s Human Resources department were sufficient. The Seventh Circuit noted that “[a]n HR employee interviewed [Plaintiff] and Gutierrez separately,” “HR concluded that the events described by [Plaintiff] could not be substantiated,” and that El Milagro “provided [Plaintiff] with a letter, dated September 16, informing her that the case was closed and that it had told Gutierrez, in a ‘call of attention’ letter, to immediately change his behavior toward her.” Id. *21-22. The Seventh Circuit also determined that “[a]lthough El Milagro did not interview any witnesses, [Plaintiff] did not identify any.” Id. *22.
Thus, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the “prompt investigation” was “the hallmark of a reasonable corrective action” (id.) and that “El Milagro’s investigation shows that it ‘took the harassment seriously and took appropriate steps to bring the harassment to an end.’ . . . [i]t had in place a viable and appropriate mechanism for reporting the misbehavior.” Id. A jury could not reasonably conclude, the Seventh Circuit held, that “El Milagro was negligent in fulfilling its responsibilities in responding to the situation.” Id.
Finally, as to alleged verbal harassment that occurred after HR investigated, the Seventh Circuit concluded that Plaintiff “did not report to anyone the names of the people who made the harassing comments that she overheard after the investigation concluded so El Milagro could not investigate them.” Id.
Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court.
Implications For Employers
The Seventh Circuit’s opinion clarifies what constitutes proper notice in alleged incidents of sexual harassment and reasonable corrective measures taken when an employer is properly on notice, including prompt investigations to bring alleged harassment to an end.
Employers should evaluate their sexual harassment policies and practices to ensure that reporting mechanisms, documentation, and investigation process are sound and that reports of harassment are communicated promptly to those responsible for investigating them. A thorough investigation and quick implementation of reasonable corrective measures can often insulate employers from liability under either Title VII or the IHRA.
By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, Jamar D. Davis, and Kenny Tran
Duane Morris Takeaways: On June 1, 2026, in Andrew Harrington et al. v. Cracker Barrel Country Store Inc., No. 21-CV-000940, 2026 WL 1532921 (D. Ariz. June 1, 2026), Judge Diane J. Humetewa of the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona, reaffirmed the Ninth Circuit’s determination that 28 U.S.C. section 1631 does apply to personal jurisdiction issues.
The ruling serves as a blueprint for corporate counsel on jurisdictional defenses in nationwide wage & hour lawsuits
Case Background
Plaintiffs, former Cracker Barrel employees, brought an FLSA collective action seeking redress for alleged failure to pay proper wages. Id. at *1. Cracker Barrel filed a Motion to Dismiss due to the existence of a valid arbitration agreement. Id. A subset of the Plaintiffs who did not continue with arbitration refused to relent, filing a First Amended Complaint asserting that that their signed arbitration agreements were invalid because the Plaintiffs were minors when they signed the agreements. Id. Again, Cracker Barrel filed a Motion to Dismiss contending that the Court lacked personal jurisdiction as none of the named Plaintiffs were from Arizona or worked in Cracker Barrel Arizona stores. Id. The Court subsequently granted Cracker Barrel’s second Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Id. Remaining steadfast, the Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint adding an Arizona Cracker Barrel employee as a plaintiff. Id. In denying Cracker Barrel’s third Motion to Dismiss, the Court held that the addition of the Arizona Cracker Barrel employee cured the jurisdictional defect. Id.
Following the grant of conditional certification, Cracker Barrel filed a Motion to Certify an Interlocutory Appeal. Id. The Court certified for appeal two questions, including, “[w]hether Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of California, San Francisco Cnty., 582 U.S. 255, 265 (2017), prevents a District Court from sending notice under Section 216(b) of the FLSA to individuals over whom the Court lacks specific personal jurisdiction.” Id. The Ninth Circuit answered in the affirmative and held that “Bristol-Myers applies in collective actions under the FLSA and to that end, specific personal jurisdiction must be analyzed for every individual plaintiff proceeding under the collective action.” Id. In real word application, this meant that the Plaintiffs attempt to cure their Second Amended Complaint by adding an Arizona Cracker Barrel employee was ineffective as specific personal jurisdiction must be satisfied for all Plaintiffs in the collective action. Id. In other words, the Ninth Circuit determined that the District Court lacked personal jurisdiction over the non-Arizona Plaintiffs. Id. at *3.
In response, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Sever and Transfer Non-Arizona Plaintiffs to the U.S. District Court for the District Court of Massachusetts. Id. at *1.
The Court’s Decision
Plaintiffs cited three statues, 28 U.S.C. Sections 1404, 1406, and 1631, to advance their motion. Id. at *2. The Court found that Section 1404 did not apply to Plaintiffs’ Motion. Id. The Court also clarified that Section 1406 did not apply to Plaintiffs’ Motion as the statute is appropriate when making an attempt to transfer a case if the initial court is not in the proper venue. Id. The Court noted that that venue “is not a jurisdiction component” and that Section 1406 is only proper if the defendant moved to dismiss (or transfer) for improper venue. Id.
The Court observed that Section 1631 did not apply to Plaintiffs’ Motion as it “is used specifically to cure deficiencies in jurisdiction.” Id. The statute, however, hinges on a “want of jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1631. All circuits agree that “want of jurisdiction” applies to subject matter jurisdiction; however, there is a circuit split on whether the term applies to personal jurisdiction. Harrington, 2026 2026 WL 1532921, at *2. The Ninth Circuit typically finds that Section 1631 applies to personal jurisdiction. Id.
In the end, the Court made the decision to sever the non-Arizona plaintiffs and transfer their claims to the District Court of Massachusetts because there was a “want of jurisdiction” for the non-Arizona plaintiffs and because the legislative history, plain text, and the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of Section 1631 (that the statute applies to personal jurisdiction) allowed for the transfer. Id. at 3.
Implications For Employers
Employers should remain diligent to confirm that personal jurisdiction applies for each plaintiff proceeding under a collective action. This is because attempts by the plaintiff’s bar to retain jurisdiction with the addition of a single plaintiff who is a resident of the location for the presiding court are futile. Further, this decision reaffirms the application of the Ninth Circuit’s reading of Section 1631 — namely, that “want of jurisdiction” applies to personal jurisdiction issues. Companies defending nationwide wage and hour actions should closely evaluate whether transfer motions can be used strategically when personal jurisdiction defects exist, especially in cases involving large groups of opt-in plaintiffs from multiple states.
