Rebecca S. Bjork – Class Action Defense

June 5, 2025 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

U.S. Supreme Court DIGs A Rule 23 Case And Justice Kavanaugh Dissents, Arguing Predominance Cannot Be Met Where Classes Include Uninjured Class Members

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. and Rebecca S. Bjork

Duane Morris Takeaways: On June 5, 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a decision in Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings d/b/a Labcorp v. Davis, No. 24-304 (U.S. June 5, 2025), that dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted, an extremely rare move colloquially known as a “DIG.” Even more interesting, from the vantage point of issues that are the subject of this blog – namely, defense of class action litigation – Justice Kavanaugh wrote in dissent, stating that he would have decided the case and ruled that federal courts may not certify damages classes under Rule 23 that include both injured and uninjured class members. He reasoned that allowing such classes would not satisfy the Rule 23(b)(3) requirement that common issues predominate over individual issues. This unique decision, while it does not carry precedential weight, is instructive because the dissenting opinion provides a new roadmap for defendants facing class claims involving uninjured class members to challenge class certification, potentially keeping the door open for future review by the U.S. Supreme Court.

Background

The U.S. Supreme Court’s majority per curiam opinion dismissing the writ as improvidently granted is, as is typical, a perfunctory statement that says: “The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted.” Slip op. at 1. The dissenting opinion authored by Justice Kavanaugh provides the background of the case, at least as it informs the issues he addresses in his dissent. His dissent starts by explaining that the majority decided the case was moot, but that he found that issue to be “insubstantial.” Id. at 1. He stated that he would have decided the case.

He provided the following background information — a federal district court in California certified a Rule 23 class of blind and visually impaired individuals who sued Labcorp, a company providing diagnostic medical testing services to consumers. The plaintiffs who brought the class action alleged they were “denied full and equal enjoyment of” goods, services, and accommodations required under the Americans with Disabilities Act by “LabCorp’s [sic] failure to make its e-check-in kiosks accessible to legally blind individuals.” Id. at 2. Later, the district court issued an order refining the class definition to include “all legally blind individuals who . . ., due to their disability” were unable to use Labcorp’s e-check in kiosks in California. Id. at 3.

Labcorp appealed the class certification decision to the Ninth Circuit under Rule 23(f). Id. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court and held that even if more than a de minimis number of class members are uninjured, Rule 23 allows district courts to certify such classes. Id. After en banc review was denied by the Ninth Circuit, the U. S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide the question whether Rule 23 authorizes certification of damages classes including uninjured class members.

Justice Kavanaugh’s Dissent From The U.S. Supreme Court’s DIG

In the substance of his dissenting opinion, Justice Kavanaugh opined that the predominance requirement of Rule 23 (b)(3) precludes district courts from certifying damages classes that include individuals who have suffered no legally cognizable injury. After discussing his disagreement with the majority’s analysis of the mootness issue (relating to whether Labcorp filed its Rule 23(f) petition against the correct class certification order), he analyzed the merits of the predominance inquiry. Id. at 4-5.

He reasoned that the Ninth Circuit decision ignores several U.S. Supreme Court decisions in the class actions area that, in his view, rule out including non-injury class members in damages classes (among them Comcast v. Behrend and Wal-Mart v. Dukes.) He also pointed to the Advisory Committee notes history of Rule 23(f) to conclude that it was established to prevent efforts to “coerce businesses into costly settlements” that include an unknown number of persons to have suffered no loss at all. Id. at 6. He also opined that such settlements raise the cost of doing business such that they create public policy effects such as higher costs of living that ultimately harm consumers, retirees and workers. Id.

Implications Of The Decision

The U.S. Supreme Court’s DIG order, while exceedingly rare, is actually not the big news embedded in this decision. The dissent by Justice Kavanaugh to the DIG order provides an explanation of how future litigants facing class actions that include individuals who have no legal injury conferring standing can present the issue in arguing Rule 23(b)(3) predominance. Companies facing the litigation pressures that class actions often produce should follow this blog for future developments in what we predict will be a significant area of litigation in the coming years.

February 12, 2025February 12, 2025 by Eden Anderson

The Federal Arbitration Act Turns 100

By Eden E. Anderson, Rebecca S. Bjork, Jennifer A. Riley, and Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) turns 100 years old today.

In enacting the FAA on February 12, 1925, Congress eliminated the power of the states to require that claims be resolved in court when contracting parties instead agree to resolve their claims in arbitration. The FAA’s purpose was to reverse longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements, and to place arbitration agreements on equal footing with other contracts under the law.

As we celebrate the FAA’s 100th birthday, we highlight three key areas in which the FAA’s scope and application have come under scrutiny in recent years.

The Scope Of The Transportation Worker Exemption Remains Unclear

The FAA does not apply to employment contracts of seamen, railroad employees, and workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce. The scope of this so-called transportation worker exemption has been a hotbed for litigation in recent years, with the U.S. Supreme Court addressing the issue in multiple decisions. The high court’s decisions in Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon, 596 U.S. 450 (2022), Domino’s Pizza, LLC v. Carmona, et al., 143 S. Ct. 361 (2022), and Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC, 61 U.S. 246 (2024), emphasized that the transportation worker exemption is to be narrowly construed and that, for the exemption to apply, a worker must play a direct and necessary role in the free flow of goods across borders.

In the wake of these decisions, state and federal courts are now grappling with what that means and whether warehouse workers, last-mile delivery drivers, ride-hailing drivers, and fueling technicians meet the “direct and necessary role” test. While such classes of workers bear little resemblance to the seamen and railroad employees expressly excluded from the FAA’s scope, in jurisdictions hostile to arbitration, including California courts and the Ninth Circuit, the transportation worker exemption has been found to apply. It is therefore important for employers to include language in arbitration agreements that permits alternative enforcement of the agreement under state law if the FAA is found not to apply.

Does EFASHA Exempt Entire Cases From Arbitration?

On March 3, 2022, President Biden signed into law the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act (EFASHA). Under the EFASHA, an employee alleging sexual harassment or assault, whether individually or as a class representative, may pursue their claims in court rather than in arbitration, regardless of whether they agreed with their employer to arbitrate their claims.

But what happens when a plaintiff alleges such claims, but also alleges claims that permissibly can be arbitrated? Courts too have begun answering that question. Some courts have concluded that the EFASHA’s statutory language requires that the employee’s entire case remain in court, reasoning that the EFASHA makes a pre-dispute arbitration agreement invalid and unenforceable “with respect to a case” which means the entire case. (9 U.S.C. § 402(a) (emphasis added).) The court so concluded in Johnson v. Everyrealm, Inc., 657 F. Supp. 3d 535 (S.D.N.Y. 2023), in denying the employer’s motion to compel the plaintiff’s sex harassment, race discrimination, and retaliation claims to arbitration.

The outcome, however, differed in Mera v. SA Hosp. Grp., LLC, 675 F. Supp. 3d 442 (S.D.N.Y. 2023), wherein the plaintiff alleged claims that he experienced a hostile work environment on account of his sexual orientation and that he and other employees suffered state and federal wage and hour infractions. The court there determined that, because the wage and hour claims did not “relate to” the hostile work environment claim, the wage and hour claims could be compelled to arbitration. Id. at 447.

If a plaintiff can allege a plausible claim that triggers the EFASHA’s application, they may be successful in keeping all their claims in court, or possibly only some of them.

We anticipate continued litigation in this area, and an uptick in the assertion of tenuous sex-based harassment claims that might not otherwise have been plead.

Appellate Issues Raised By Recent Case And Legislative Developments

What happens to the trial court proceedings after a decision on a motion to compel arbitration has also been a hotly litigated issue.

In Smith v. Spizzirri, 601 U.S. 472 (2024), the U.S. Supreme Court held that, when a federal court finds that a dispute is subject to arbitration and a party has requested a stay of the court proceeding pending arbitration, the FAA compels the court to stay, and to not dismiss, the proceeding. Consequently, if a plaintiff’s claims are compelled to arbitration and the district court proceedings stayed, there will be no judgment with an associated right to appeal. Thus, the plaintiff’s only recourse—if they dispute the arbitration ruling—will be to seek permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal or to pursue an appeal of the forum issue long after the fact if and when they lose in arbitration.

Another stay issue that will surely be litigated concerns a 2024 amendment to California’s Code of Civil Procedure. In California, if a motion to compel arbitration is denied and that decision is appealed, there is now no longer an automatic stay of the court proceedings during the pendency of an appeal. As a result, plaintiffs can seemingly proceed with their claims in court while the employer seeks a reversal of the forum issue on appeal, unless the appellant seeks and obtains a stay from the trial court. As this law on its face disfavors arbitrate, we anticipate it will be challenged.

For a more comprehensive summary of FAA-related litigation issues, Duane Morris’s 2025 Wage & Hour Class and Collective Action Review, available here, features an entire Chapter on this topic.

February 11, 2025February 11, 2025 by Rebecca S. Bjork

Kansas Federal Court Declines To Revisit Motion for Summary Judgment Order In EEOC Lawsuit And Rejects Interlocutory Appeal Request By Employer

By Rebecca S. Bjork, Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., and Anna Sheridan

Duane Morris Takeaways: A Federal Judge in Kansas recently refused a request for reconsideration of summary judgment and a request for interlocutory appeal on the correct legal standard for hostile work environment claims post-Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, Mo. In EEOC v. Chipotle Services, LLC, Case No. 23-CV-2439 (D. Kan. Feb. 10, 2025) (linked here), Judge Kathryn H. Vratil of the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas found that appellate review of the Muldrow standard used at summary judgment likely would not affect the case substantially, but rather lead to delay before the case would proceed in the same manner regardless of a decision by the Tenth Circuit. The opinion also rejected the employer’s motion for reconsideration to rehash arguments it should have made on summary judgment – in the Court’s view, an inappropriate use of a motion for reconsideration. This decision not only highlights the importance of timely arguments made at the appropriate stage of litigation, but also counsels employers to analyze and balance the potential outcomes of motions with the time and costs associated with non-dispositive or only partially dispositive motions.

Case Background

Areej Saifan, a Muslim woman, and former Chipotle crew member, alleged in a Charge of Discrimination that she experienced religious harassment from a co-worker during her employment. Saifan alleges that a co-worker repeatedly asked to see Saifan’s hair, which was covered by hijab, and on at least one occasion, the co-worker physically pulled on the hijab, partially uncovering Saifan’s hair. Saifan resigned the next day. After investigating the Charge, the EEOC filed suit on behalf of Ms. Saifan against Chipotle alleging that Chipotle (1) subjected Saifan to unlawful religious harassment, (2) constructively discharged her, and (3) retaliated against her for reporting religious harassment.

Chipotle filed a motion for summary judgment on all three of the EEOC’s Title VII claims but was unsuccessful on all counts.

On December 17, 2024, defendant filed two motions, asking the Court to (1) reconsider its order on defendant’s summary judgment motion, and (2) certify an interlocutory appeal.

The Court’s Ruling

Judge Vratil dismissed defendant’s motion for reconsideration as “simply a rehash of arguments that it made or could have made on summary judgment.” Slip Op. at 5. The Court rejected each of Defendant’s positions as an argument that “it [Defendant] could have raised in summary judgment briefing and chose not to.” Id. at 8. The Court found that Chipotle had not met its burden of showing an intervening change in the controlling law, availability of new evidence, or the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice as is required by the local Kansas rules.

Judicial economy also took center stage in this ruling when the Court denied the motion to certify its Memorandum and Order for immediate appeal, finding that an interlocutory appeal would not materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. While the question of whether Muldrow changed the legal standard for hostile work environment is a controlling question of law, the Court determined that Chipotle failed to establish that the Tenth Circuit would likely dispose or affect the EEOC’s claims for trial. As such, an interlocutory appeal would only delay, rather than expedite or eliminate trial.

Implications For Employers

Employers often may want to fight a non-dispositive decision that feels unfair. However, this decision counsels employers to consider the implications of motions practice before proceeding if the requested outcome would not materially change the future of the case.

January 16, 2025January 17, 2025 by Rebecca S. Bjork

Post-Removal Amendment To Hybrid State/Federal Law Complaint Dropping Federal Law Claims Requires Remand To State Court, Says SCOTUS

By Rebecca S. Bjork, Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., and Jennifer A. Riley

Duane Morris Takeaway: In a unanimous decision issued on January 15, 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court decided in Royal Canin U. S. A. v. Wullschleger, No. 23-677 (U.S. Jan. 15, 2025), that when a plaintiff files a civil suit under both state and federal law and subsequently amends the complaint to drop the federal law claims, the case must be remanded to state court due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the district court. This decision lends clarity to employers who have been navigating a circuit split on the question of whether federal district court subject matter jurisdiction is determined at the time of removal to federal court, or whether subsequent amendments abandoning federal claims destroys such jurisdiction. This issue arises over and over again in class action litigation.

Introduction

In a decision that will provoke readers’ memories (fondly or otherwise) of first year civil procedure class in law school, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a plaintiff’s deceptive marketing lawsuit originally stating both state and federal causes of action, that later dropped the federal claim in an amended complaint, must be remanded to state court. In a 9-0 decision, Justice Kagan explained that once the state law claims are stripped away, no federal subject matter jurisdiction exists and remand is required. Deciding a split amongst the circuit courts, the Supreme Court sided with the Eighth Circuit – and against the First, Third, Fourth, Sixth and Eleventh Circuits – in deciding that when a case is removed to federal court, an amended complaint dropping the federal claims destroys the district court’s jurisdiction.

This is obviously of interest for employers facing federal statutory class-wide claims involving issues such as wage and hour and discrimination, that also implicate overlapping state statutes.

The Ruling In Royal Canin U. S. A. v. Wullschleger

The U.S. Supreme Court issued its unanimous decision in Royal Canin U. S. A. v. Wullschleger, No. 23-677 (U.S. Jan. 15, 2025). In this case, the plaintiff purchased the defendant’s dog food that requires a prescription to obtain, believing that it contains medicine that off-the shelf dog food does not. Id. at 4. After learning that it does not, she filed suit in Missouri state court alleging violations of the state’s statute against deceptive marketing practices. Her complaint also included a claim under the federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. 301 (“FDCA”), that also forbids deceptive marketing practices.

Royal Canin, seeking perhaps to avoid being thrown to the dogs in a state court jury pool, decided to file a notice of removal of the plaintiff’s lawsuit to federal district court based on federal question jurisdiction (the plaintiff’s FDCA count). Id. at 4-5. In response, the plaintiff amended her complaint, dropping the FDCA claim, and only seeking relief under Missouri state law. Id. at 5. She then moved to remand to state court where she originally filed her complaint, but the district court denied her motion. Id. She ultimately appealed the dismissal of her amended complaint on the merits to the Eighth Circuit, and it reversed the district court’s decision to maintain jurisdiction of the matter and remanded it to state court. Id. Royal Canin sought certiorari to resolve the circuit split, and the Supreme Court obliged and affirmed the Eight Circuit’s ruling.

Basis Of The Supreme Court’s Opinion

In a very systematic and straightforward opinion of the Court, Justice Kagan explained why the limitations on federal court jurisdiction established by statute (e.g., 28 U.S.C. 1331 – cases “arising under” federal law) mandate SCOTUS’ unanimous conclusion. Long-established precedent holds that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Also, Congress has determined the scope of “supplemental jurisdiction,” where federal courts interpret and apply state law but only so long as they have concurrent federal jurisdiction to do so in the litigation. 28 U.S.C. 1367. And, the Supreme Court emphasized another statute that mandates that if at any time it appears that the federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case “must” be remanded to state court. 28 U.S.C. 1447(c). Id. at 3-4.

Applying these principles, the Supreme Court rejected Royal Canin’s argument that such limitations do not apply once a case has been removed to federal court and so-called “removal jurisdiction” exists. The Supreme Court explained, “Royal Canin argues that our precedent makes an exception for when an amendment [to a complaint] follows a lawsuit’s removal, but that is to read two bits of gratuitous language for a good deal more than they are worth.” Id. at 6. The Supreme Court continued that “Nothing in § 1367’s text . . . distinguishes between cases removed to federal court and cases originally filed there.” Id. at 8. And, unfortunately for Royal Canin, the Supreme Court has already held that in such a circumstance relating to original jurisdiction, the amended complaint is what determines jurisdiction, not the one at the time of removal. Id. As a result, the Supreme Court concluded that when the plaintiff “reconfigured her case to make it only about state law” her suit “became one for a state court.” Id. at 20.

Implications For Employers

As employers know, many class and collective action lawsuits are filed by plaintiffs that allege both state law and federal law claims. The classic example is a hybrid class and collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act and a similar but often more onerous state statute governing how employees are paid. In our experience, many plaintiffs add their state law claims in order to extend the relevant statute of limitations period, for example, or sweep in certain state law substantive claims that are not available under a governing federal law.

Royal Canin U. S. A. v. Wullschleger will simplify litigation strategy decisions for employers with nationwide workforces. However, it remains to be seen how the plaintiffs’ bar will respond in terms of crafting both original and amended complaint strategies in the employment law space. We will be following developments closely and will provide our analysis and insights here.

December 4, 2024 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Rhode Island Federal Court Rules That Defendants Waived Their Right To Arbitration By Refusing To Pay AAA Filing Fees

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Rebecca S. Bjork, and Eden E. Anderson

Duane Morris Takeaway: In 5-Star General Store, et al. v. American Express Co., 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 217246 (D.R.I. Dec. 2, 2024), Judge Mary McElroy of the U.S. District Court for the District Court of Rhode Island held that the defendants could not move to compel arbitration on the issue of whether it was required to pay filing fees to the American Arbitration Association. This ruling presents an unusual twist to arbitration issues typically resolved by federal courts and is a cautionary warning for companies.

Background

The 5-Star General Store case is an antitrust action brought by merchants who resolved certain claims with American Express entities in arbitration relating to the acceptance of the defendants’ credit cards for purchases at their stores. After the final order was issued, the defendants refused to pay their share of the filing fees to the American Arbitration Association, which totaled more than $17 million. The AAA administratively closed the case and the plaintiffs filed a class action relative to those fees. The defendants moved to compel arbitration of the lawsuit’s claims and to strike the plaintiffs’ class allegations.

The Court’s Ruling

The court denied the defendants’ motion to compel arbitration on whether they were required to pay the AAA filing fees and denied the defendants’ motion to strike the plaintiffs’ class allegations. The plaintiffs sought to represent more than 5,000 merchants accepting the defendants’ cards. They argued that the defendants had waived their right to arbitration by failing to pay their share of the arbitration fees because they were in default of the agreement under § 3 of the FAA. First, the court ruled that it, not an arbitrator, had the authority to decide whether the defendants defaulted on the arbitration agreement. Although the court found no controlling case law authority directly on point, it decided to follow the Fifth, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, which have held that courts may decide whether failure to pay arbitration fees constitutes a default under § 3.

Second, the court focused on whether the defendants were in default of the agreement. Relying on Black’s Law Dictionary, which defines “default” as “the omission or failure to perform a legal or contractual duty; esp., the failure to pay a debt when due,” the court found the issue to be clear and concluded that the defendants defaulted on the arbitration agreement. Id. at *12. It also opined that a second arbitration likely would not fare any better than the first and the parties would end up before the court again.

Third, the court rejected the defendants’ claim that the plaintiffs lacked clean hands and therefore should not be allowed to pursue their claims in court. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs did not change their theory of their case sufficiently when filing the instant case to rescind the defendants’ waiver of arbitration. Therefore, the court denied the defendants’ motion to compel arbitration.

Finally, the court also denied the defendants’ motion to strike the plaintiffs’ class allegations because the class was ascertainable by objective means and the class definition was not “fail safe” because it did not contain a legal conclusion that determines eligibility for class membership. Id. at *32-33. The court further considered and rejected the defendants’ claims that the plaintiffs’ requests for injunctive and declaratory relief under Rule 23(b)(2) and 23(c)(4), including certification of issues classes, should be stricken at the pleading stage.

Implications For Companies:

This ruling should serve as a cautionary tale to companies that regularly seek to enforce mandatory arbitration agreements when those agreements require individual arbitration. The defendants’ failure to pay filing fees for thousands of individual arbitrations could lead to a complete waiver of the ability to compel arbitration of the claims in the future.

July 23, 2024 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Ninth Circuit Broadly Applies The FAA’s Transportation Worker Exemption To Fueling Technicians To Green Light Their Class Action And Side-Step Arbitration

By Eden E. Anderson, Rebecca S. Bjork, and Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Duane Morris Takeaways: On July 19, 2024, in Lopez v. Aircraft Service International, Inc., Case No. 23-55015 (9th Cir. July 19, 2024), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the Federal Arbitration Act’s (FAA) transportation worker exemption applies to an airplane fueling technician. Even though the technician had no hands-on contacts with goods, the Ninth Circuit held that was not required because fuel is necessary to flying the plane that holds the goods. The decision is yet another from the Ninth Circuit broadly applying the FAA’s transportation worker exemption, in spite of multiple recent decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court directing narrow that loop hole to mandatory arbitration. The Lopez decision presents an obstacle for employers seeking to enforce arbitration agreements and class action waivers within the Ninth Circuit, thereby opening the door to arguments that workers who do not even handle goods in the stream of commerce are exempt from arbitration if their work somehow supports the mechanism by which the goods travel.

Case Background

Danny Lopez worked as a fueling technician at Los Angeles International Airport. He added fuel to airplanes. After Lopez filed a wage & hour class action against his employer, the employer moved to compel arbitration. The district court denied the motion, concluding that Lopez was an exempt transportation worker because he was directly involved in the flow of goods in interstate or foreign commerce. It reasoned that, although Lopez did not handle goods in commerce, he was directly involved in the maintenance of the means by which the goods were transported. The employer appealed on the grounds that the FAA’s transportation worker exemption is to be narrowly construed and that Lopez did not have any hands-on contact with goods and direct participation in their movement.

The Ninth Circuit’s Decision

The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by mentioning the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2022 decision in Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon, 596 U.S. 450 (2022). In Saxon, the U.S. Supreme Court instructed that the transportation worker exemption is to be narrowly construed and does not turn on the industry within which the work is performed. Saxon held that airline ramp agents are nonetheless transportation workers exempt from the FAA because, in loading and unloading cargo onto airplanes, ramp agents play a “direct and necessary role in the free flow of goods across borders” and are “actively engaged in the transportation of those goods across via the channels of foreign or interstate commerce.” Id. at 458. Perceiving that the transportation worker exemption continued to be misapplied by lower courts, the U.S. Supreme Court repeated this same guidance this year in Bissonnette v. Le Page Bakeries Park St., LLC, 601 U.S. 246 (2024), and cautioned that the exemption should not be applied broadly to all workers who load and unload goods as they pass through the stream of interstate commerce.

While mentioning this recent controlling authority, the Ninth Circuit harkened back to its 2020 analysis of the transportation worker exemption in Rittman v. Amazon.com, Inc., 971 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2004), deeming it consistent with Saxon and Bissonnette. In Rittman, the Ninth Circuit held that Amazon delivery drivers making local, last mile deliveries of products from Amazon warehouses to customers’ homes were exempt transportation workers engaged in interstate or foreign commerce. Applying “the analytical approach applied in Rittman,” the Ninth Circuit concluded that Lopez was an exempt transportation worker because his fueling of airplanes was a “vital component” of the plane’s ability to fly. Id. at 12.

Implications Of The Decision

The Lopez decision is yet another from the Ninth Circuit broadly applying the FAA’s transportation worker exemption, in spite of multiple recent decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court directing narrow interpretation. The Lopez decision opens the door to arguments that workers who do not even handle goods in the stream of commerce are exempt from arbitration if their work somehow supports the mechanism by which the goods travel.

February 19, 2024 by Eden Anderson

Illinois Federal Court Orders Samsung To Defend 806 Individual BIPA Claims In Arbitration And Pay $311,000 In Arbitration Filing Fees

By Eden E. Anderson, Rebecca Bjork, and Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Duane Morris Takeaways: On February 15, 2024, the Judge Harry Leinenweber of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted a motion to compel arbitration in Hoeg et al. v. Samsung Electronics of America, Inc., Case No. 23-CV-1951 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 15, 2024), and sent 806 individual privacy claims to arbitration and ordered Samsung to pay $311,000 to cover its share of arbitration filing fees in those matters. The decision highlights the potential downsides of class action waivers in arbitration agreements, as well as the importance of coupling a class action waiver with a well-crafted mass arbitration provision designed to streamline arbitration proceedings and, hopefully, limit exposure and litigation costs.

Case Background

Samsung required customers to execute agreements to binding arbitration and those agreements waive the right to pursue class claims. The arbitration agreements provided that electronic acceptance, opening product packaging, product usage, or product retention amounted to acceptance of the arbitration agreement.

In 2022, 806 customers, all of whom alleged they had purchased and used Samsung products, filed individual arbitration actions against Samsung alleging violations of the Illinois Biometric Privacy Act (“BIPA”). After Samsung failed to pay $311,000 in arbitration filing fees due in the matters, AAA administratively closed the cases in January 2023. The plaintiffs then moved to compel arbitration.

The Court’s Decision

The Court granted the motion to compel arbitration and, in doing so, was highly critical of Samsung’s tactics in seeking to stall the prosecution of the claims. The Court found that the plaintiffs alleged they purchased and used Samsung products, and thereby assented to arbitration. While Samsung argued those allegations were conclusory and did not show the existence of agreements to arbitrate, the Court noted that Samsung’s approach “flips the evidentiary burden on its head” because, as the party opposing arbitration, it was Samsung’s burden to dispute the existence of an agreement to arbitrate. Id. at 9.

As to its failure to pay the arbitration filing fees, the Court expressed great displeasure with Samsung, noting that its “repeated failure to pay after multiple deadlines, without any showing of hardship, is a classic refusal to pay scheme in violation of Section 4” of the Federal Arbitration Act. Id. at 15. The Court also highlighted that Samsung’s tactics had delayed plaintiffs’ prosecution of their claims for two years. The Court further denied Samsung’s request that the matters be stayed so that it could pursue an appeal and ordered Samsung to pay the outstanding arbitration fees.

Implications Of The Decision

The Hoeg decision highlights the potential downsides of class action waivers, which have spurred the plaintiffs’ bar to pursue hundreds or even thousands of individual arbitrations all at once. The decision also underscores the importance of adding a mass arbitration provision to an arbitration agreement. Such a provision, if well-crafted, may serve to streamline those proceedings, facilitate resolution, and limit exposure. Some jurisdictions have enacted laws aimed at punishing a retailer’s or employer’s failure to pay arbitration fees. For example, in California, if arbitration fees are not timely paid, it results in a material breach of the arbitration agreement and could lead to the imposition of sanctions including “the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees and costs, incurred by the employee or consumer as a result of the material breach.” (Cal. Civil Code § 1281.99.)

January 4, 2024 by Eden Anderson

Permanent Injunction Issued Precluding Enforcement Of California’s Ban On Mandatory Arbitration Agreements

By Eden Anderson, Rebecca Bjork, and Gerald Maatman, Jr.

Duane Morris Takeaways: Last year, the Ninth Circuit held in Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Bonta, 62 F.4th 473 (9th Cir. 2023), that California Assembly Bill (AB) 51 — a statute that attempted to criminalize employers’ use of mandatory arbitration agreements — was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act. In Bonta, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a preliminary injunction prohibiting the State of California from enforcing AB 51. On January 1, 2024, following remand in the case, the district court entered a permanent injunction that enjoins the State from enforcing the Labor and Government Code sections enacted as part of AB 51, and awarding the plaintiffs, as prevailing parties, $822,496. The district court’s order brings finality, judgment, and ultimate success to a strong coalition of employer interests who banded together to challenge California’s attempt to criminalize the use of mandatory arbitration agreements.

Case Background

AB 51, effective January 1, 2020, added Section 432.6 to the California Labor Code and Section 12953 to the California Government Code. Labor Code Section 432.6 makes it a misdemeanor for employers to require employees or applicants to waive “any right, forum, or procedure for violation of any provision of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act” or the California Labor Code. Government Code Section 12953 makes it an unlawful employment practice to violate Labor Code Section 432.6.

In December 2019, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, California Chamber of Commerce, National Retail Federation, California Retailers Association, National Association of Security Companies, Home Care Association of America, and the California Association for Health Services at Home (“Plaintiffs”) filed a complaint against the State of California challenging AB 51 as preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).

The district court granted the Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits. California appealed, and challenged only the district court’s holding that AB 51 was likely to be preempted by the FAA. A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit initially reversed the district court in a September 2021 opinion but, after a rehearing petition was filed, the Ninth Circuit withdrew its opinion and issued a new opinion, which affirmed the district court’s preliminary injunction order and held that the FAA preempts AB 51.

The District Court’s Issuance Of A Permanent Injunction

After the decision, the case was remanded to the district court and, on January 1, 2024, the district court issued an order permanently enjoining the State of California from enforcing Labor Code Section 432.6 and Government Code Section 12953. Additionally, the district court awarded the Plaintiffs, as prevailing parties, $822,496 in attorneys’ fees. The order was obtained via stipulation of the parties whereby they agreed that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Bonta was dispositive of the legal issues in the case and further agreed to the amount of attorneys’ fees to be paid by the State.

Implications For Employers

The district court’s order brings finality, judgment, and ultimate success to a strong coalition of employer interests who banded together to challenge AB 51. Employers in California may permissibly use mandatory arbitration agreements. However, the use of mandatory arbitration agreements potentially can be problematic when it comes to enforcing the agreement. When an applicant or employee must sign an arbitration agreement as a condition of employment, the agreement is a contract of adhesion that will likely be found to be procedurally unconscionable. Thus, a court may refuse to enforce a mandatory arbitration agreement if there are also terms in the agreement that are substantively unconscionable and non-severable.

September 6, 2023September 6, 2023 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Maryland Federal District Court Dismisses Class Action Alleging Website Privacy Violations For Lack Of Article III Standing

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley and Rebecca S. Bjork

Duane Morris Takeaways: On September 1, 2023, Judge Deborah Chasanow of the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland granted a motion to dismiss a class action alleging that the website of defendant Jetblue Airways violated users’ privacy rights under the Maryland Website and Electronic Surveillance Act (“MWES”A). Finding that the named Plaintiff lacked Article III standing to bring the lawsuit, the Court relied upon the lack of any allegations in the Complaint that any of Plaintiff’s personal information was captured by the alleged use of a session replay code. As a result, his Complaint lacked any allegation of a concrete harm that is necessary to bestow standing by virtue of suffering an injury-in-fact. Employers are well-served to examine their websites for the level of risk they might pose of exposure to litigation of this kind, which is currently being filed in more and more courts around the country.

Case Background

Jetblue Airways Corp. (“Jetblue”) was sued by Matthew Straubmuller in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, alleging that he and a putative class of website users who had visited Jetblue’s website were entitled to damages from Jetblue for violation of the MWESA. Slip Op. at 2. The purpose of that statute is two-fold: both to be a useful tool in crime prevention; and to ensure that “interception of private communications is limited.” Id. at 8.

Plaintiff alleged Jetblue’s website uses a “session replay code” and that this allows for Jetblue to track users electronic communications with the website in real time, and also can enable reenactments of a user’s visit to the website, and that these constitute actionable privacy violations under the provisions of the MWESA.

JetBlue filed a motion to dismiss. It asserted that that Plaintiff lacked Article III standing to bring his claims. It contended that Plaintiff alleged a mere procedural violation of the MWESA and did not allege a concrete harm necessary to establish an injury-in-fact to confer standing.

The District Court’s Decision

Judge Chasnow granted Jetblue’s motion to dismiss. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in TransUnion v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021), she rejected Plaintiff’s argument that a statutory violation alone is a concrete injury. The Judge opined that “Courts must independently decide whether a plaintiff has suffered a concrete harm because a plaintiff cannot automatically satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement whenever there is a statutory violation.” Slip Op. at 5-6 (quoting TransUnion (“under Article III, an injury in law is not an injury in fact.”). And more to the point, she cited case law interpreting the MWESA itself to this effect, which Plaintiff had not cited. Id.

As a way of underlining its ruling, the Court noted that Jetblue had submitted a June 12, 2023 decision coming to the exact same conclusion involving a nearly identical complaint filed against Jetblue in the Southern District of California in Lightoller v. Jetblue Airways Corp. Id. at 4.n.1. Other cases involving similar rulings are presently percolating throughout the federal district courts. Id. at 7 (collecting cases).

Implications For Employers

Judge Chasnow’s decision in Straubmuller v. Jetblue Airways Corp. provides corporate counsel with a good opportunity to set up a time to talk with their company’s information technology officers to discuss litigation risks related to websites and how they interact with employees, prospective employees and customers. As more plaintiffs-side attorneys file lawsuits alleging privacy violations like the ones alleged against Jetblue in both state and federal courts around the country, many have a good chance of surviving motions to dismiss. Preventing class action lawsuits are far superior to defending them.

July 19, 2023 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

D.C. Circuit Issues A “How-To” Ruling Regarding Issue Certification For Rule 23 Class Actions

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. and Rebecca S. Bjork

Duane Morris Takeaways: On July 18, 2023, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled that district courts must analyze the predominance and superiority requirements for certification of a class action when considering an “issue class” under Rule 23(c). In Harris v. Medical Transportation Management, Inc., No. 22-7033 (D.C. Cir. July 18, 2023), the three-judge panel ruled that the district court erred when it certified an “issue” class under Rule 23(c)(4) without first undertaking an analysis of whether the class certification prerequisites of Rule 23(a) and 23(b) had also been satisfied. The case was remanded for further proceedings. The D.C. Circuit’s decision ought to be required reading for employers with large workforces and those dealing with wage & hour class actions. It bears watching whether the district court’s analysis of the rigorous requirements of Rule 23(b) on remand also results in a pro-certification decision, given the instructions provided on remand.

Case Background

In Harris, the named plaintiffs were non-emergency medical drivers for the defendant, a company that provides transportation to individuals on public assistance who require transit getting to medical appointments. They alleged that they and a class of other drivers who they seek to represent in a class action lawsuit were denied minimum and overtime pay in violation of District of Columbia and federal wage and hour laws. Slip op. at 5-6.

Whether defendant MTM could as a matter of law be held liable as the drivers’ employer is a threshold question in the litigation. Id. at 6. The district court certified issues classes as to (i) whether MTM is the drivers’ joint employer (along with its sub-contractors); and (ii) whether MTM is a general contractor under D.C. law and thus strictly liable. Id. at 8. The district court did so despite finding previously that the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) was not met under the facts of the case specifically as they relate to the payment system for the drivers. Id. at 7-8.

MTM appealed the issue certification ruling.

The D.C. Circuit’s Decision

In a straightforward ruling, but one that delves into the complexities of Rule 23 with law-professor like precision, the D.C. Circuit panel consisting of Judges Millett, Childs and Rogers determined that the district court could not certify the issue classes under Rule 23(c)(4) without deciding whether those classes also meet the requirements of Rule 23(a) – commonality and typicality – and 23(b) – predominance and superiority. In essence, the D.C. Circuit read the plain language of Rule 23 and observed that sub-sections (a), (b) and (c) all bear on the certification inquiry conducted by the district court and therefore must be considered on an equal basis. Id. at 14-15.

In the penultimate statement of the holding, Judge Childs opined that “Rule 23’s text and structure offer no quarter to the view that Rule 23(c)(4) creates an independent type of class action that is freed from all of Rule 23’s other class action prerequisites. So the district court should have ensured that the issue class that it certified met all, and not just some, of Rule 23(a) and (b)’s preconditions to class status.” Id. at 15-16.

The D.C. Circuit instructed the district court that it must analyze on remand each of the potential class actions available under Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance analysis. Id. at 19-20. It discussed various ways in which Rule 23(c)(4) can be applied in the context of the joint employer analysis that is at issue in Harris, such as bifurcating the liability issue from remedial claims, or where affirmative defenses may muddy the waters of class-wide evidence in a certified issues class. Id. at 21-22.

In a similar vein, Judge Childs instructed that summary judgment motions on discrete issues represent another way in which district courts could management issue certified class actions where the predominance of individualized issues threaten to overrun the common proof. Id. at 24-25.

Implications For Employers

The D.C. Circuit opinion in Harris v. MTM provides corporate counsel and executives a clear and easily understandable explanation of how Rule 23(b) and (c) intersect with one another when an issue class or classes are certified in class action litigation. District courts cannot certify issue classes under Rule 23(c)(4) without undertaking the rigorous analysis required to conclude that a class action is superior and manageable, that common issues will predominate over individualized issues, and that there are common and typical issues to be resolved in the first place. And by suggesting specific mechanisms that a district court has at its disposal for case management purposes such as targeted summary judgment motions, the decision provides reasonable strategies to consider when facing class action litigation.