Rebecca S. Bjork – Class Action Defense

November 2, 2026November 2, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

New York Federal Judge Denies Preliminary Approval Of FLSA Settlement Due To Proposed Publicity Provision And Attorneys’ Fees And Costs Requests

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Rebecca S. Bjork, and George J. Schaller

Duane Morris Takeaways: On October 28, 2026, in Cervantes, et al. v. Careathome Medical Practice, P.C., d/b/a Vesta Healthcare, et al., 26 Civ. 570, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 247415 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2026), Judge Arun Subramanian of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York denied preliminary approval of a Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) proposed settlement and requests for attorneys’ fees and costs related to an action brought pursuant to the California Labor Code and FLSA.

For companies faced with FLSA litigation, they should be aware of the standards courts employ in approving FLSA settlements. Notably, courts assess the value of the settlement compared with similar settlements approved in the circuit, courts rarely allow “publicity” provisions that deny plaintiffs from making truthful statements about the lawsuit, and courts require documentation when approving attorneys’ fees and costs requests.

Background And Proposed Settlement

Plaintiff Jocelyn Cervantes brought this putative collective action against Careathome Medical Practice, P.C., d/b/a Vesta Healthcare and Careathome Medical Practice (CA), P.C. (collectively “Defendants”) alleging that Defendants violated the FLSA and California Labor Code. Cervantes asserts that she, and the putative collective, were not compensation for 15-20 minutes of “unpaid work before the start of each shift.” Id. at 3, fn. 1. Defendants provides at home health care services nationwide.

The parties agreed to a proposed settlement agreement regarding the FLSA claims. Under the proposed settlement agreement, the key terms included a “release by opt-in plaintiffs of any claims” against Defendants in exchange for a pro rata payment from a total settlement fund of $100,700. Of that $100,700 proposed total settlement, “7,500 will be paid to named plaintiff Jocelyn Cervantes as a service award, $14,299 will go toward costs the settlement administrator incurs . . . and $35,728.80 will be paid to Cervantes’ counsel for costs and attorneys’ fees, leaving a net settlement fund of $43,172.20.” Id. at 1.

The proposed settlement agreement also contained “a ‘publicity’ provision whereby plaintiffs’ counsel and named plaintiff ‘agree that they shall not, directly or indirectly, whether verbally, in writing or otherwise, issue any press releases, make any statements to the media, advertise in any media, or make any other public statements regarding the existence of nature of this Agreement or its terms and conditions.’” Id. at 5. The parties moved for approval of the settlement agreement.

The Court’s Decision

The Court denied the parties motion for approval of the settlement agreement finding the “publicity” provision inappropriate and finding the attorneys’ fees and costs had no supporting documentation and was “unreasonably high.” Id. at 5-6.

First, the Court explained the proposed settlement amount compared to the possible range of recovery was “comparable to other settlements approved in this circuit.” Id. at 4. Plaintiff estimated that the maximum amount recoverable based on the claims alleged is “approximately $630,860” based on damages for 218 potential plaintiffs. Id. at 3, fn. 1. Defendants agreed to a settlement in the total gross amount of “$100,700, representing approximately 16% of the maximum possible recovery.” Id. at 3.

The Court found the proposed settlement amount was “fair and reasonable in light of the risks and expenses of continued litigation, both sides were represented by experienced counsel, and there [was] no evidence of fraud or collusion between the parties.” Id. at 4. The Court also noted that even if Cervantes prevailed at trial that “defendants’ serious financial problems suggest that a judgment could be difficult or impossible to collect in full.” Id. at 5.

Second, the Court determined the “publicity” provision ran afoul of the “well-settled principle” that “an FLSA plaintiff ordinarily cannot—as a matter of public policy—be prohibited from making truthful public statements concerning his lawsuit, its settlement, or the underlying facts.” Id. It explained this case was not “the very rare case . . . where confidentiality terms in a settlement agreement would be appropriate” and therefore rejected the provision. Id. at 6.

Finally, the Court rejected Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees and costs requests as unreasonable. In rejecting Plaintiff’s costs request, the Court stated the motion “contains no explanation or documentation for the costs plaintiff’s counsel seeks to recoup” and that it could not “adjudicate or approve” reasonableness of costs where “counsel made no effort to explain or document.” Id. at 6-7.

As to Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees request, the Court initially reasoned “the proposed fee is unreasonably high” where Plaintiff’s fee request represented “a whopping 77.67% as a percentage of the fund less costs and service awards.” Id. at 7. The Court also determined Plaintiff’s counsel “failed to submit adequate documentation supporting the request for fees.” Id. Counsel submitted billing records “documenting 18.4 hours of work performed through May 19, 2026” and after that date only attested to “performing ‘substantial additional work,’” without providing supporting documentation on specific tasks performed. Id. at 8. The Court held that Plaintiff’s “conclusory, after-the-fact ‘estimate’ of total hours worked, untethered from any specific dates or tasks,” did not meet the documentation required and gave no factual basis to assess reasonableness. Id.

The Court found that the proposed settlement agreement did not meet FLSA approval requirements and denied Plaintiffs’ request for attorneys’ fees and costs. Id. at 9. However, the Court explained the parties may either (i) “submit a revised settlement, request for conditional certification as an FLSA collective, and proposed attorneys’ fees for preliminary approval under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)”; or (ii) if they do not go “the conditional certification route, they may also pursue an offer of judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 68(a).” Id.

Implications For Companies

Cervantes illustrates standards that courts routinely follow in assessing FLSA settlement agreements and attorneys’ fees and costs requests. Here, the Court could not assess reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs without proper documentation and the proposed “publicity” provision was deemed inappropriate.

Companies faced with FLSA actions, and negotiating settlement agreements, should be mindful of the reasonableness standard courts use when construing such settlement agreements.

October 25, 2026October 25, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

California Court Of Appeal Finds That An Employment Arbitration Agreement Entered Into “Freely And Voluntarily” Actually Was Forced, Illegal, And Invalid Under California Law

By Eden E. Anderson, Rebecca Bjork, and Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Duane Morris Takeaways: On October 22, 2026, the California Court of Appeal held in Molina, et al. v. Triumph Residential Services, Inc., Case No. B350252, that requiring an employee to sign an arbitration agreement as a condition of employment is illegal under California Labor Code section 432.6. Thus, when an arbitration agreement is not otherwise enforceable under the FAA, an arbitration agreement that is a condition of employment is unenforceable under California law. The Court of Appeal further found that, even though the arbitration agreement at issue stated on its face that it was voluntary, it actually was not.

The Molina decision is a must read for any employer seeking to compel arbitration under California law, as it teaches important lessons on the evidence an employer should submit with its motion.

Case Background

At the time of her hire with Triumph Residential Services (Triumph), Tiffany Molina signed an arbitration agreement which stated that she was “freely and voluntarily” agreeing to arbitration of claims arising out of her employment. Id. at 4. After her employment ended, Ms. Molina filed a wage and hour class action lawsuit against Triumph. Triumph moved to compel individual arbitration and to dismiss the class claims pursuant to a class action waiver in the arbitration agreement. The parties agreed that their arbitration agreement was not governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), and thus Triumph sought to enforce the arbitration agreement under California law. With its motion to compel, Triumph submitted a declaration asserting that Ms. Molina “was free to accept the Arbitration Agreement, attempt to negotiate out of it or look for other employment.” Id. at 4.

In opposing the motion, Ms. Molina argued that California Labor Code section 432.6 made her arbitration agreement unlawful. Labor Code section 432.6 makes it illegal (indeed, criminal) for an employer to impose an arbitration agreement on an employee as a “condition of employment.” It also prohibits an employer from requiring an employee to take any affirmative action to opt out of an arbitration agreement. Usually, when the FAA governs an arbitration agreement, Labor Code section 432.6 is preempted. However, as noted, here the parties agreed the FAA did not apply. Ms. Molina asserted, without any evidentiary support of her own, that her arbitration agreement had been forced upon her as a condition of employment.

The trial court denied Triumph’s motion, concluding that Labor Code section 432.6 invalidated the arbitration agreement. Even though the arbitration agreement on its face stated it was “freely and voluntarily” signed, the trial court deemed that insufficient to show the agreement was voluntary and not a condition of employment. It determined that the employer bears the burden of proof to establish a valid an enforceable agreement to arbitrate, and that Triumph failed to offer evidence that its employees were not required to sign the arbitration agreement.

The Decision

In a decision certified for publication, the Court of Appeal affirmed. It held that the only exception to Labor Code section 432.6’s application is when an arbitration agreement is otherwise enforceable under the FAA. Because Ms. Molina’s arbitration agreement was not enforceable under the FAA, then the agreement had to be voluntary to be enforceable under California law.

Without addressing which party bears the burden of proof, the Court of Appeal further held that the evidence established Ms. Molina’s arbitration agreement was not voluntary even though it said on its face that it was. And on this point, Triumph’s declaration proved fatal because it stated that Ms. Molina’s choices were to either “accept the Arbitration Agreement . . . or look for other employment.” Id. at 4. That meant the agreement was unlawfully a condition of employment. Id. at 15. Additionally, Triumph’s declaration stated that Ms. Molina could “negotiate out of” the agreement, which too violated Labor Code section 432.6 because it signified that Ms. Molina had to take affirmative action to avoid signing the arbitration agreement presented to her. Id. Because Ms. Molina’s arbitration agreement was not voluntary and not enforceable under the FAA, it was “illegal (indeed, criminal)” and unenforceable under California law. Id. at 8.

Implications For Employers

The Molina decision teaches an important lesson to any employer seeking to enforce an arbitration agreement that is not governed by the FAA. Even if an arbitration agreement states that it is voluntary, the employer should proffer additional evidence to confirm that employees are not required to sign, e.g., a declaration indicating that some employees do not sign. In this instance, the employer offered a declaration stating the exact opposite, and sandbagged its own motion as a result.

August 10, 2026August 10, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

You’ve Got Email: The Ninth Circuit Affirms Denial Of Motion To Compel Arbitration Where Four Email Messages Containing Arbitration Agreement Sent To Employee Went Unopened

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Eden E. Anderson, and Rebecca S. Bjork

Duane Morris Takeaways: On August 5, 2026, a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a decision denying a motion to compel arbitration brought by an employee on a representative basis under California law against his employer. In Rickes v. Thermo Fisher Scientific, Inc., et al., No. 25-5138 (9th Cir. Aug. 5, 2026), the Ninth Circuit decided that a district court had properly determined that there was insufficient evidence that the plaintiff assented to the arbitration agreement that had been sent to his work email address by his employer four times. The panel decided the evidence showed the plaintiff never opened the emails, supporting his declaration that he was not aware of those emails and never saw them until after he filed suit. The Ninth Circuit then held that the district court correctly decided that the plaintiff’s continued employment after he received the emails could not be construed as consent to arbitrate workplace claims because silence does not constitute assent.

Employers with a workforce in California who are considering rolling out or updating arbitration programs should take note and consider designing and implementing appropriate non-coercive, non-electronic methods of following up with employees who do not open or respond to such emails.

Case Background

Plaintiff Scott Rickes brought a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California against his employer, Thermo Fisher Scientific, Inc. (“Thermo Fisher”), alleging he and others similarly situated whom he seeks to represent were unlawfully subjected to age discrimination under California law. Thermo Fisher moved to compel arbitration, relying on emails the company sent to the plaintiff’s work email address that contained a link to an agreement to arbitrate claims such as this. Thermo Fisher relied on evidence it submitted to the district court to demonstrate that it sent that email to the plaintiff four times in 2019. The plaintiff, however, declared that he never saw those emails because he was very busy at work and it was not uncommon for him to have unopened emails. Id. He argued that there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate that he assented to the arbitration agreement and therefore it could not be enforced.

The district court denied Thermo Fisher’s motion to compel arbitration, finding no evidence that an agreement to arbitrate had been reached by the parties under California contract formation principles. Thermo Fisher appealed the district court’s ruling.

The Ninth Circuit’s Decision

On August 5, 2026, a panel of the Ninth Circuit, in an unpublished decision, unanimously affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit agreed no evidence had been submitted to demonstrate that the plaintiff had ever opened any of the emails containing a link to the arbitration agreement. Asa result, there was no evidence that the plaintiff saw the arbitration agreement.

In explaining its rationale, the Ninth Circuit first noted that a contract can only be formed with mutual assent. Under California law, this requires both notice of an agreement and mutual assent to it. Mutual assent is absent when a party has not received notice of the proposed contract.

The Ninth Circuit also concluded that while “outward manifestations” of assent can be objectively inferred by a party’s conduct at times, such is not the case where this plaintiff’s conduct was mere silence in response to the offer to form an agreement to arbitrate claims related to his employment. Id. at 3.

As a result, the Ninth Circuit considered – and rejected – Fisher Scientific’s argument that where a current employee continues to work at his position after having been informed that an arbitration agreement will govern any employment claims going forward, such employee is legally considered to have assented to arbitration by inference. Due to his silence, the Ninth Circuit decided the plaintiff could not have been deemed to have accepted the agreement by failing to opt out within forty-five days.

Finally, the Ninth Circuit dispensed with Fisher Scientific’s argument that continued employment despite unsigned arbitration agreements can constitute assent to arbitration because the cases cited were inapposite. Some applied to situations where a plaintiff was subject to an employment agreement that he agreed to that contained an arbitration clause (which is not the case in this matter) and others applied to cases where an employee signed a receipt saying they received an agreement or an employee handbook containing an arbitration provision (again not at issue in this matter).

Implications For Employers

Employers with a workforce in California should heed this ruling if they are planning on rolling out new or revised arbitration agreements to cover potential employment law claims. Relying solely upon electronic means to implement such a workplace arbitration program is likely insufficient to bind employees. Employers should consider planning for non-electronic follow-up contact methods to reach employees who do not respond to emailed requests to consent to arbitration agreements; implementing tracking methods to identify such employees; and carefully crafting such follow-up communications to neutrally and in a non-coercive manner inform the employees of the need to open the email and respond to it in a timely manner. Doing so could mean the difference between facing expensive and protracted litigation in California state or federal court involving potential additional aggrieved individuals and perhaps defending a single plaintiff arbitration matter at much lower costs.

June 22, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

The Third Circuit’s FLSA Overtime Gap Time Decision Opens Up Circuit Split

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Rebecca S. Bjork, and Olga A. Romadin

Duane Morris Takeaways: On June 3, 2026, addressing an issue of first impression on overtime gap time, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in U.S. Department of Labor v. Comprehensive Healthcare Mgmt. Servs. LLC, No. 24-2842, 2026 WL 1582064 (3d Cir. June 3, 2026), partially reversed an order of a district court that had awarded damages to the U.S. Department of Labor(“DOL”), which had brought a lawsuit on behalf of 6,000 healthcare employees, alleging various overtime violations under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) by Comprehensive Healthcare Management Services LLC (“Comprehensive”). On appeal, Comprehensive argued that the district court had erred in finding that the FLSA affords a remedy for overtime gap time claims, which address non-overtime hours in a non-exempt employee’s workweek, as well as misapplied a lower burden of proof to some of the claims against it, had erred in its finding that certain employees were nonexempt, and in some of its factual findings. The Third Circuit agreed with the employer in part, and vacated and remanded the matter to the district court.

Case Background

In 2018, the DOL brought a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania against fifteen nursing and assisted living entities owned and operated by Comprehensive Healthcare Management Services LLC and its chief executive officer, alleging that the defendants had failed to pay hourly employees for all hours worked and the appropriate rate of pay, as well as failing to keep accurate pay records in violation of the FLSA. Id. at *1. One of the claims involved overtime gap time, which occurs when an employee who exceeds the overtime threshold does not receive pay for all non-overtime hours worked. Id.

In January 2024, the district court held a bench trial, following which it ruled in favor of the DOL, finding that there were “system errors” in the calculation of pay. Id. at *2. The district court explained that the defendants’ timekeeping system had not kept an accurate record of employees’ working hours, and Comprehensive paid employees for scheduled hours instead of hours they actually worked, as well as that the system automatically deducted meal breaks, even if employees had worked through them, and that the defendants had failed to accurately pay overtime wages. Id. The district court found that employees were not paid the required one-and-one-half regular rate required under the FLSA, and that the regular rate did not include pay that was required to be calculated in it, including shift differentials, bonuses, and other types of pay. Id. The district court also concluded that some employees had been improperly classified as exempt from the FLSA’s overtime requirement. Id. The district court, noting that the Third Circuit had not yet ruled upon the “viability of overtime gap time claims,” nonetheless awarded $35,804,438.20 in damages against Comprehensive for these violations. Id. at *3. Comprehensive appealed.

The Third Circuit’s Decision

On appeal, Comprehensive argued that the district court had erred in finding that claims for overtime gap time were cognizable under the FLSA. Id. at *3. The Third Circuit noted a disagreement among the circuits, with the Second Circuit having opined that overtime gap time claims were not cognizable under the FLSA in Lundy v. Cath. Health Sys. Of Long Island, Inc., 711 F.3d 106, 115-17 (2d Cir. 2013), while the Fourth Circuit found that they were in Conner v. Cleveland County, 22 F.4th 412, 426 (4th Cir. 2022). Id. Writing for the majority in a split panel decision, Third Circuit Chief Judge Michael A. Chagares explained that “[w]hen the statutory language is clear, the text is the beginning and the end of our inquiry.” Id. at *4. On review of the text of the FLSA, the appellate court found no mention of overtime gap time and concluded that the statute does not provide a remedy to overtime gap claims. Id. In finding that there was no support in the text of the statute for an overtime gap claims, the court of appeals rejected the Labor Secretary’s argument that under § 207 of the FLSA, the term “regular rate” contemplates an overtime requirement, and so requires that a regular rate must be paid for all hours worked. Id. Further, the Third Circuit was unconvinced by the Secretary’s reference to the DOL’s guidance, which stated that overtime under the FLSA requires the payment of all straight time worked during non-overtime hours, finding that this ran counter to the unambiguous text of the Act. Id. at *4-5. Finally, agreeing with the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the Third Circuit determined that individuals seeking to bring such claims could do so under state laws. Id. at *5. Thus, agreeing with Comprehensive, the Third Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling finding that Comprehensive had violated the FLSA by failing to compensate certain employees for overtime gap time. Id.

In reviewing the remaining arguments brought by Comprehensive, the Third Circuit court found that the district court did not err in applying a lower evidentiary burden to the claims against Comprehensive under the Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946) burden-shifting framework, where an employee alleging an employer failed to keep adequate records may do so by producing sufficient evidence prior to the burden being shifted to the employer to counter the claims. Id. at *5-6. Noting that the district court based its findings on the time and pay records produced by Comprehensive, the appellate court concluded that “Mt. Clemens did not affect the analysis for these claims.” Id. at *6. The Third Circuit also found no clear error in the district court’s factual findings or finding of an ongoing pattern or practice of regular rate miscalculation, writing that the single witness that Comprehensive had produced in support of its contention that employees were paid for all hours worked instead of based on their scheduled hours was found to be unreliable by the district court, and that the Secretary of Labor had produced more concrete proof in the form of an investigation, and documentary proof corroborated by hundreds of employees. Id. Next, the Third Circuit affirmed the lower court’s finding that employees at different facilities were regularly not paid for work performed through meal breaks based on a representative sample of employee testimony and the testimony of the company’s regional consultant. Id. at *7.

Finally, the Third Circuit agreed with Comprehensive that the district court’s determination that certain employees were not exempt from the FLSA’s overtime requirements was an error because it had applied the “plain and unmistakable” burden of proof to its analysis, but under the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 584 U.S. 79 (2018), an employer seeking to prove an employee’s exempt status does so by a preponderance of the evidence, and vacated the part of the lower court’s decision and remanded it for further proceedings. Id. at *8-9.

In a partial dissent, U.S. Circuit Court Judge Jane R. Roth wrote that the text of the FLSA “is far from clear,” and the case law defining a regular rate offered additional confusion that could be addressed by making the actual rate, contracted rate, and regular rate of pay to be the same, aligning with the Fourth Circuit decision in Conner and the U.S. Department of Labor guidance that the majority declined to endorse. Id. at *10-11.

Implications For Employers

Employers with a workforce falling under the FLSA should take heed in ensuring that exempt employees, such as those working in an executive, administrative, or professional capacity, meet the statutory minimums such as salary requirements to qualify as bona fide exempt from overtime requirements. Maintaining accurate pay and time records for exempt and non-exempt workers and conducting regular audits may serve well in defending against miscalculation allegations, as the appellate court here confirmed the lower court’s conclusion based on records provided by the company.

This federal appellate court decision further signals a circuit split on the issue of whether overtime gap time claims are cognizable under the FLSA, with the Third Circuit here joining the Second Circuit in deciding that under the plain meaning of the text they are not, while the Fourth Circuit maintains that the FLSA does offer relief for plaintiffs seeking to bring such claims.

June 1, 2026June 1, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Fourth Circuit Closes Door On Third Party ERISA And WARN Act Class-Wide Liability

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Rebecca S. Bjork, and Olga A. Romadin

Duane Morris Takeaways: On May 26, 2026, a unanimous panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit issued an opinion affirming a federal district court’s dismissal of a putative class action alleging violations of the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (“WARN”) Act and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) in Tony Messer v. Garrison Investment Group, LP, No. 25-1657, 2026 WL 1465139 (4th Cir. May 26, 2026). Citing a 1996 U.S. Supreme Court decision, the Fourth Circuit ruled that the plaintiffs could not pursue a private equity firm they had voluntarily dismissed from their earlier suit for a judgment against their former employer because the district court had no jurisdiction over the firm.

Case Background

On October 19, 2018, plaintiffs, a group of several hundred former employees, brought a class action against Bristol Compressors International, LLC (“BCI”) and Garrison Investment Group LP, as BCI’s alter ego and successor, alleging that the manufacturer had failed to provide sufficient notice of the plant’s closure in violation of the WARN Act, and that it had failed to comply with ERISA in terminating the employee severance plan. Id. at *1. Following certification of three sub-classes and completion of discovery, Garrison moved for summary judgment, arguing that it could not be held vicariously liable for the actions of BCI. Id. Both Garrison and BCI also argued that the employee severance plan had been properly terminated, that members of a subclass had released their claims by signing an agreement, and that other workers had received proper notice of the plant closure under the WARN Act. Id. Plaintiffs moved to voluntarily dismiss Garrison without prejudice, citing conservation of resources, which Garrison opposed, predicting that if plaintiffs were unable to collect a judgment against BCI they would seek to collect it from Garrison instead. Id. at *2. The district court granted the plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss without prejudice. Id. Additionally, the district court granted partial summary judgment to BCI on the severance plan, and found that those workers who had signed an agreement releasing all of their claims against BCI could not participate in the suit. Id. At the subsequent trial on the remaining WARN Act claims, the district court found BCI liable, and awarded a judgment totaling $1,392,915.40, which, following an appeal to the Fourth Circuit and reversal of summary judgment on the severance plan, was increased to $4,078,105.11 on remand. Id.

In August 2024, unable to collect the judgement against BCI following its insolvency and dissolution, the plaintiffs brought an action against Garrison, its agents, owners, and related entities, alleging that it was BCI’s alter ego and seeking to pierce the corporate veil. Id. at *3. Plaintiffs argued that federal jurisdiction was proper because Garrison controlled BCI when it had violated federal laws, but the district court granted Garrison’s motion to dismiss, citing lack of subject matter jurisdiction as the judgement had been awarded against BCI following voluntary dismissal of Garrison from the earlier case, and, alternatively, finding that the statute of limitations. Id. The plaintiffs appealed.

The Fourth Circuit’s Decision

The Fourth Circuit determined that there was no federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and agreed with the district court’s interpretation of Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349 (1996), where the U.S. Supreme Court found that federal courts do not have ancillary jurisdiction to impose liability over a party that was “not otherwise liable.” Id. at *3.

In, Peacock, an ERISA class action, the Supreme Court declined to extend subject matter jurisdiction over an officer and shareholder of the plaintiff’s former employer following a judgment of liability against the employer and determination that the officer and shareholder was a non-fiduciary third party and not liable for the judgement. Id. at *4. Noting that the Messer plaintiffs brought the action against Garrison “solely” because BCI could not pay, that no new violations were being alleged, and that neither ERISA nor the WARN Act impose liability on third parties, the Fourth Circuit found “no independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. at *5. Further, the Fourth Circuit wrote that U.S. Department of Labor regulations explicitly “foreclose the applicability of duplicative theories of recovery such as piercing the corporate veil,” and the practice is disfavored both within the Fourth Circuit and other circuits. Id. at *5-6.

The Fourth Circuit was unconvinced by plaintiffs’ argument that their claims against Garrison were independent of its suit against BCI, which it dismissed on a brief overview of the record and conclusion that this was a mere attempt to piece the corporate veil in order to extend liability to Garrison. Id. at *6.

Finally, the Fourth Circuit, emphasizing the limited jurisdiction of federal courts, declined to exercise ancillary jurisdiction over the claims against Garrison on the grounds that the plaintiffs had voluntarily dismissed its claims against Garrison in their earlier suit, and proceeded to litigate exclusively against BCI, which in effect made BCI the only entity liable for the judgement. Id. at *7.

Implications For Employers

The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Messer highlights both the importance of maintaining practices that conform with applicable law, and proactive engagement with workforces who may fall under ERISA and the WARN Act when enacting reductions in force or similar measures. Key to this case, for example, was how employees were offered compensation in exchange for liability waivers. Further, this decision underscores how companies with outside ownership should consider the strategic advantage of litigating separately from affiliates, especially when risking joint and several liability.

May 28, 2026May 28, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

U.S. Supreme Court Delivers Arbitration Exemption To Last-Mile Local Drivers

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, Eden Anderson, Rebecca Bjork, Ryan T. Garippo, and Olga A. Romadin

Duane Morris Takeaways: On May 28, 2026, in Flowers Foods, Inc. v. Brock, 2026 WL 1485669 (U.S. May 28, 2026), and in a much-anticipated ruling following a grant of certiorari from the 10th Circuit’s decision in Brock v. Flowers Foods, Inc., 121 F. 4th 753 (10th Cir. 2024), Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a unanimous opinion for the U.S. Supreme Court that affirmed the applicability of the Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”) transportation worker exemption for “last-mile” delivery drivers. Today’s opinion builds on the Supreme Court’s prior decisions in Southwest Airlines Company v. Saxon, 596 U.S. 450 (2022), and Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park Street, LLC, 601 U.S. 246 (2024, to expand the FAA exemption for transportation workers seeking to bypass arbitration. The decision has significant implications for companies who employ delivery drivers and the logistics industry generally, and will play an important factor in re-shaping the arena of class and collective action litigation.

Case Background

Angelo Brock, a Denver-based delivery franchisee who had purchased distribution rights to baked goods produced by Flowers Foods, Inc. (known as a “last-mile” delivery driver), brought a putative class and collective action in a Colorado federal district court alleging that Flowers Foods had underpaid its franchisees in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and state laws. Id. at *2. “Brock picks up [Flowers Foods’] products from a warehouse in Colorado and delivers them to local stores, all without leaving the State.” Id. He also signed an arbitration agreement. Id. As a result, Flowers Foods filed a motion to compel arbitration under the terms of the agreement that it entered into with its franchisees, which the district court denied, citing 9 U.S.C. § 1., which exempts workers engaged in interstate commerce, and is commonly known as the FAA’s transportation worker exemption. Id.

In denying Flowers Foods’ motion, the district court concluded that Brock fell within the ‘‘transportation worker exemption” of § 1 of the FAA, which exempts transportation workers who engaged in interstate commerce from arbitration. Thus, even though Brock did not cross state lines, the district court reasoned that he had engaged in the transportation of the company’s products – which were created outside of the state – because he delivered those products in Colorado. Id. As a result, the district court declined to compel arbitration. Id.

Following an appeal of that decision by Flowers Foods, which argued that a worker who does not leave the state, like Brock, does not qualify for the exemption, the 10th Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision based on its determination that Brock’s “intrastate route formed a constituent part of the . . . interstate journey” of the cross-border delivery of Flowers Foods’s products. Id. Flowers Foods then sought review from the U.S. Supreme Court.

The U.S. Supreme Court granted Flowers Foods’ petition for writ of certiorari and sought to answer the question of whether a worker can fall under the “transportation worker exemption” for interstate workers under § 1 of the FAA if they neither cross state lines nor interact with vehicles that do. Id. at *3.

The Supreme Court Decision

In a unanimous decision, Justice Neil M. Gorsuch authored the 8-page opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court that affirmed the 10th Circuit’s ruling and held that “transportation workers” are exempt from the reach of the FAA, citing the statutory text, historical use, and U.S. Supreme Court precedent.

The Supreme Court cited its three recent decisions addressing § 1 of the FAA, including New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 586 U.S. 105 (2019), Southwest Airlines Company v. Saxon, 596 U.S. 450 (2022), and Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park Street., LLC, 601 U.S. 246 (2024), to reject Flowers Food’s argument that in order to qualify for the exemption, a worker must cross state lines or engage with a vehicle that does. Id. Based on the statutory text, the Supreme Court found nothing in the language of the FAA requiring crossing state lines or interacting with a vehicle that does so. Under the definition for “interstate commerce” provided by Black’s Law Dictionary, the Supreme Court further noted, the transportation of goods between states includes intrastate activity. Id.

The Supreme Court also cited historic use of “interstate commerce” by referencing case law from the 19th and early 20th centuries, including discussing a case concerning steamship transportation of goods called The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557 (1871), where the Supreme Court had found that a steamer that operated in one state without direct contact with other vessels transporting the goods into other states was found to engage in interstate transportation because the goods were destined for other states. Id. at *4.

Further, the Supreme Court rejected Flowers Foods’ argument that prior precedent was erroneously based on the U.S. Constitution’s Commerce Clause, and not the FAA. The Supreme Court noted that the similarity in the language between the Clause and § 1 were “probative” of the common conception of the meaning of the term used by both at the time that the FAA was enacted. Id.

Finally, the Supreme Court declined to find that the distribution agreement between Flowers Foods and Brock was relevant to the analysis. The Supreme Court did not find any significance to the fact that the agreement was signed by Brock’s independent company, and thus affirmed the judgment of the 10th Circuit by expanding the transportation worker exemption to individuals who do not travel to other states or come into contact with vehicles that do. Id. at *5.

Implications For Employers

As we predicted in a previous post in October 2025 (here – blog post), the Supreme Court’s decision is highly significant for logistics companies and deliver driver employees. This decision further expands the “transportation worker exemption” to make it much more difficult for employers to compel arbitration in class and collective actions brought by workers in transportation and transportation-adjacent positions. The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision, which was designed to prevent an analysis that hinges on “game of tag” with vehicles engaged interstate commerce, now has the potential to sweep in a wide variety of workers whose conduct is only tangentially related to movement of a company’s products across state lines.

Despite this blow to employers’ arbitration defenses, there are still some arguments for companies to assert in order to maintain their arbitration programs. By its own terms, the Supreme Court’s opinion is limited to whether § 1 requires a bright line rule that workers who “never cross[] state lines and never interact[] with vehicles that do” are outside of the FAA exemption and does not opine on whether a worker could be so attenuated from interstate commerce that they fall outside the scope of the exemption. Further, some arbitration agreements may be enforceable under state law and, therefore, the choice of law provisions in those these agreements will likely be the difference maker in whether a class action will survive a motion to compel arbitration or not. As a result, corporate counsel – particularly in the logistics industry – should follow the developments in this space closely, because their arbitration programs are under siege and a new wave of class actions is likely headed for their organizations.

April 30, 2026April 30, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Georgia Federal Court Holds That To Establish Article III Standing To Sue In Data Breach Class Actions, The Named Plaintiffs’ Injury-In-Fact Requirement Demands Nuanced And Detailed Pleadings

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Rebecca S. Bjork, and Ryan Garippo

Duane Morris Takeaways: On April 23, 2026, in Hall v. Bitcoin Depot, Inc., Case No. 25-CV-04317 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 23, 2026), Judge William Ray of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia dismissed a putative class action alleging that users of Bitcoin Depot’s cryptocurrency ATMs were at significant risk of identity theft and attendant personal, social and financial harms due to a data breach. The District Court held that the Named Plaintiff did not properly plead a cognizable injury sufficient to confer Article III standing to sue, due to not pleading any specific misuse of his data. The decision clarifies the legal standards within the Eleventh Circuit regarding standing requirements in data breach class action cases, thus providing helpful and nuanced guidance for defendants facing similar lawsuits. This is especially true because the dismissal was granted without prejudice, affording the Named Plaintiff an opportunity to cure his defective pleading and potentially setting the stage for further litigation on this issue.

Case Background

Quincey Hall sued Bitcoin Depot, Inc. in federal court in the Northern District of Georgia on behalf of a putative class of consumers who used the company’s cryptocurrency ATMs. Id. at 2. After a data breach occurred affecting the ATMs, approximately 26,000 individuals’ personally identifiable information was exposed online. Id. After being notified by Bitcoin Depot that his information was amongst that involved in the breach, Hall filed his class action lawsuit as a “proposed representative of a class of individuals ‘impacted by [Bitcoin Depot’s] failure to safeguard, monitor, maintain and protect’ their personal information prior to the data breach.” Id.

Hall’s Complaint alleged that because of the data breach, he and the putative class members are “at [a] significant risk of identity theft and various other forms of personal, social and financial harm.” Id. at 3. He alleged that Bitcoin Depot is liable for common law tort and contract claims, as well as for violations of the Georgia Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act and he sought both monetary damages and injunctive relief. Id.

Bitcoin Depot filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) based both on a failure to state a claim and for lack of standing to sue under Article III of the Constitution. Id.

The Court’s Decision

Judge Ray granted Bitcoin Depot’s motion to dismiss the complaint and he did so without prejudice, allowing the Named Plaintiff an opportunity to correct his defective pleading. Id. at 10. The court’s analysis of the legal requirements for standing in data breach cases is clarifying because it demonstrates that nuance matters when considering whether the injury-in fact requirement for Article III standing is properly pled.

First, the court explained that to constitute a case or controversy within the meaning of Article III, the plaintiff must have standing to sue (id. at 3), and in the context of a class action lawsuit “only one named plaintiff must have standing as to any particular claim in order for it to advance.” Id. at 5 (citation omitted).

Second, the court explained that to demonstrate standing, a named plaintiff must show that “[he] has suffered ‘an injury in fact that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical[.]’” Id. Furthermore, when seeking damages specifically, the court explained that “the mere risk of future harm, standing alone, cannot qualify as a concrete harm.” Id. (quoting TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 436 (2021). And for injunctive relief, too, the named plaintiff must establish that there is a “substantial risk that, in the near future, they will suffer an injury.” Id.

Third, the court applied these standards to the allegations in the Named Plaintiff’s complaint and held that those allegations were insufficient to establish Article III standing. Hall had only pled a risk of identity theft and the resulting potential adverse impacts on him and putative class members. He had not pled any facts that his specific information had been leaked to known criminal dark websites that in similar circumstances have survived motions to dismiss in data breach cases. Id. at 9 (citing, inter alia, Green-Cooper v. Brinker, Int’l., Inc., 73 F. 4^th883, 889 (11^th Cir. 2023).) In short, the Named Plaintiff had failed to allege that there was any misuse of his stolen identity data, and that was fatal to his pleading under the established rules for Article III standing.

Implications For Data Breach Class Action Defendants

Data breach class actions are abundant, as corporate counsel working in this space know. As such, it is crucial for all to have an understanding of the possible defenses available at the pleading stage to reduce litigation risk and force potentially meritless claims to a second round of pleading and motion to dismiss practice. Understanding how district courts analyze nuances in plaintiffs’ pleadings relating to this important area of the law – Article III standing – is critical to launching a successful defense to any such claims.

February 18, 2026February 18, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Fourth Circuit Splits The Baby In Deciding That Virginia District Court Erred By Striking Class Allegations Under One Subsection Of Rule 23 But Not Another

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Rebecca S. Bjork, and Anna Sheridan

Duane Morris Takeaways: On February 9, 2026, in Oliver, et al. v. Navy Federal Credit Union, Case No. 24-1656 (4th Cir. Feb. 9, 2026), the Fourth Circuit issued a 2-1 ruling partially affirming a district court’s order striking class allegations from a complaint alleging racial discrimination in mortgage lending before any discovery had occurred. In addition to the parties’ briefs, the Fourth Circuit received briefs from four amici supporting the defendant, indicating substantial interest in the outcome of the appeal. Navy Federal Credit Union prevailed in the district court on its motion to strike the class allegations from the complaint pled under Rule 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3). On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the decision striking the Rule 23(b)(2) allegations because it found that the district court acted prematurely, given the legal standards governing when courts are authorized to do so (which it helpfully clarified). However, under those same legal standards, the majority concluded that the district court properly struck the plaintiffs’ Rule 23(b)(3) allegations. The dissenting judge concurred with the decision to affirm striking the Rule 23(b)(3) allegations but would also have affirmed the ruling striking the Rule 23(b)(2) allegations.

The decision is a helpful illustration of how defendants facing class action litigation can use the mechanism of Rule 23(c)(1)(A) to eliminate class-wide exposure early in the process, along with the limitations of such an approach.

Case Background

Laquita Oliver and nine other named plaintiffs, who all are either Black or Latino, brought a putative class action against Navy Federal Credit Union in 2023 alleging that the lender systematically discriminates against minority mortgage loan applicants based on their race. Slip op. at 3. Plaintiffs allege that the lender uses a “semi-automated underwriting process” and a single form for collecting information from every applicant that includes information that can be proxies for race, resulting in unlawful intentional and disparate impact discrimination. Id. at 4, 15-16. They sought class-wide relief for “all minority residential loan applicants from 2018 through the present” whose loans were denied, issued with less favorable terms, or processed more slowly than non-minority applicants. Id. at 4. Plaintiffs sought certification of a class to provide injunctive and declaratory relief generally applicable to the class as a whole under Rule 23(b)(2), and also certification under Rule 23(b)(3) – allowing class treatment where common issues predominate over individualized issues. Id. at 16.

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and a motion to strike the class allegations in the complaint under Rule 12(f) and Rule 23(d)(1)(D). Id. at 5. It argued the case could not proceed as a class action due to myriad differences between the loan products they offer, and because the plaintiffs “failed to explain how an undefined underwriting process could produce discriminatory effects for class members who applied for different [loan] products.” Id. The district court denied the motion to dismiss but granted to motion to strike the class allegations, and the Plaintiffs appealed to the Fourth Circuit. Id. at 5.

The Fourth Circuit’s Decision

A divided panel of the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision striking the Rule 23(b)(3) class allegations from Plaintiffs’ complaint before any discovery had occurred but reversed the decision to strike the class allegations seeking injunctive and declaratory relief under Rule 23(b)(2). The dissenting judge would have affirmed the district court’s decision in full.

As a threshold matter, which this blog’s more wonkish readers will appreciate, the Court of Appeals took the time to sort through a procedural miasma present in Rule 23 litigation relating to motions to strike class allegations. Navy Federal Credit Union, like many other defendants before them, had moved to strike under Rule 12(f) – which allows courts to strike material from complaints that they deem to be “redundant, immaterial, impertinent or scandalous” (id. at 7) – along with Rule 23(d)(1)(D), which allows them to order that a party amend their pleadings to remove class allegations. Id. at 8. The Fourth Circuit determined that those rules, as a logical and practical matter, cannot form the basis for a district court to issue an order striking class allegations, but instead, Rule 23(c)(1)(A) does. Id. at 6, 9. That rule requires district courts to decide class certification issues at “an early practicable time.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(A). Because a decision to strike class allegations necessarily implies that those allegations cannot possibly form the basis for a decision on class certification, the Fourth Circuit concluded that Rule 23(c), which is entirely concerned with the class certification process, is the proper procedural vehicle. Id. at 6-9. Even though Navy Federal Credit Union did not raise that rule as its procedural mechanism for seeking to strike the class allegations, the Court of Appeals decided it would do so sua sponte in affirming the order striking the Rule 23(b)(3) class. Id. at 9, n.1.

Then, the majority explained how district courts should analyze allegations in class action complaints when defendants move to strike them to determine whether the time is right to do so. In other words, such motions may not be granted prematurely, and district courts within the Fourth Circuit must now do so by looking to the face of the complaint. Applying the 1978 precedent established in Goodman v. Schlesinger, 584 F.2d 1325 (4th Cir. 1978), it decided that if the class claims fail as a matter of law, district courts may strike them before any discovery has occurred. Id. at 6. However, district courts commit legal error if they grant such motions where the dispute cannot readily be resolved by looking at the complaint alone. Id. at 11-12. The majority concluded that just as a district court may never grant class certification based solely on the face of the complaint, a court may deny class certification at that preliminary stage only if the class allegations do not satisfy Rule 23’s class certification requirements as a matter of law. Id. at 13.

Finally, the majority examined whether the district court erred when it granted Navy Federal Credit Union’s motion to strike both class claims before discovery occurred. It decided that the district court exceeded its discretion when it struck the Rule 23(b)(2) class claim, but it was not error to strike the Rule 23(b)(3) class claim. Id. at 14. The majority noted that while it was not entirely clear based on the record before why the district court ruled the way it did on the defendant’s motion, the language used indicated a concern from the district court judge about the manageability of the Rule 23(b)(3) class claims and whether a class action would be a superior method for trying such claims, given the material variations in the types of mortgage products applied for and their various requirements. Id. at 14-15. Thus, the plaintiffs’ factual allegations could not be tried on a class-wide basis consistent with Rule 23. But the allegations relating to the Rule 23(b)(2) injunctive relief class was different, the majority concluded. The allegations underlying that class claim are far more cohesive and centralized than the others, making it error for the district court to strike those allegations under Rule 23. Id. at 16-18.

Implications For Class Action Defendants

When companies are sued in class actions, it is crucial for them to have corporate counsel that understand not only the stakes and extreme exposure risk such lawsuits present, but also the nuances and often-changing jurisprudence governing Rule 23. Motions to strike class allegations are a very powerful tool for such companies to use, and the Fourth Circuit’s decision is a welcome clarification of how to think deliberately and critically about the prospects for such motion practice to succeed. The key is to understand the relationship between the specific facts alleged in such complaints and the requirements of Rule 23, in all of its nuances.

December 11, 2025December 11, 2025 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

California Federal Court Holds That Minors Can Be Bound To Arbitration In A Class Action Context

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Eden E. Anderson, and Rebecca S. Bjork

Duane Morris Takeaways: On December 9, 2025, Judge Yvonne Rogers of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California held in Williams, et al. v. Moon Active Ltd., Case No. 4:25-CV-01626 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2025), that when a minor to a contract states her intent to disaffirm “all contracts” with a defendant, such disaffirmance of a contract “as a whole” presents an issue of contract validity for an arbitrator to resolve, and is not a specific challenge to an arbitration clause’s delegation provision that a court must resolve. Under the Williams decision, if a minor wants a court to rule upon the validity of a delegation provision contained within an arbitration agreement, then the minor must specifically disaffirm the delegation provision and not merely the whole of the contract within which the delegation provision appears. As such, this ruling is a required read for corporate counsel managing litigation risks through arbitration program.

Case Background

D.K., a minor, used the defendant’s Coin Master mobile game, which allowed users to purchase coins to spin a slot machine feature. When D.K. created an account to play Coin Master, a pop up screen asked her to confirm she was over 18 and that she had read and agreed to Terms and Conditions (Terms) applicable to her usage, with a hyperlink to those Terms also furnished. The opening paragraph of the Terms mentioned in bold that the Terms included an arbitration clause, and provided a link directly to the section of the Terms containing the arbitration clause. The arbitration clause included a delegation provision whereby any disputes concerning the enforceability, validity, scope or severability were delegated to the arbitrator to resolve.

D.K.’s mother filed a class action lawsuit on her behalf asserting claims for negligence, unjust enrichment, and violations of California’s unfair competition law, and her counsel then sent letters to the defendant indicating that D.K. disaffirmed “all contracts” with the company. Id. at 3. The defendant moved to compel arbitration.

The Decision

The court granted the motion to compel arbitration. The court first addressed whether an arbitration contract had been formed. Because California law permits a minor to contract in the same manner as an adult subject to the power of disaffirmance, and because conspicuous notice of the arbitration clause was furnished, the court held the Terms were a validly formed contract between the parties.

As to whether D.K. had disaffirmed the Terms by sending a letter to the defendant disaffirming “all contracts,” the court agreed with the defendant that such issue was a validity challenge to the Terms as a whole that needed to be resolved by the arbitrator pursuant to the delegation clause. D.K. argued that the delegation clause could not apply since she had disaffirmed the Terms. In rejecting this argument, the court explained that while courts are permitted to decide specific challenges to delegation clauses, it is arbitrators who, pursuant to delegation clauses, are to determine challenges to the validity of an arbitration agreement as a whole. The court found that D.K.’s letter, which disaffirmed “all contracts,” was a challenge to the Terms as a whole because the letter did not single out the arbitration clause or its delegation provision. In so holding, the court distinguished the circumstances that were present in J.R. v. Electronic Arts, 98 Cal.App.5th 1107 (2024) because the minor there has specifically disaffirmed “any” contract rather than “all contracts.”

Implications of the Decision

The Williams decision highlights the importance of the wording used when a minor seeks to disaffirm an arbitration agreement.

Under Williams, for a court to address the validity of a delegation provision within an arbitration agreement, the minor must specifically disaffirm the delegation provision itself and not generally disavow “all contracts.”

December 1, 2025December 1, 2025 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

District Of Columbia Federal Court Declines To Narrow EEOC’s Pregnancy-Bias Suit Against Security Firm

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Rebecca Bjork, and Anna Sheridan

Key Takeaways: In EEOC v. Security Assurance Management Inc., No. 25-CV-00181, 2025 WL 2911781 (D.D.C. Oct. 14, 2025), Judge Rudolph Contreras of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia refused to pare back the EEOC’s pregnancy and lactation claims against Security Assurance Management, Inc. (“SAM”), leaving all five causes of action under the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (PWFA) and both Title VII counts intact. Applying Rule 12(c), the Court held – in an order denying Defendant’s Partial Motion to Dismiss – the “heavy burden” on a defendant seeking judgment on the pleadings and determined that the EEOC’s theories — though factually overlapping — targeted distinct harms and therefore were not “duplicative.” The Court’s refusal to dismiss any of the EEOC’s PWFA counts sends a clear signal that defendants will face an uphill battle when trying to narrow pregnancy-related claims at the pleadings stage, particularly after filing an answer.

Case Background

The EEOC filed suit under Title VII and the PWFA on behalf of Simone Cooper, a special police officer who was reassigned after the client at her post did not want her working at the site while pregnant. (Compl. ¶ 17). As the court summarized, the EEOC “brings this employment discrimination action against Security Assurance Management, Inc. pursuant to Title VII … and the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act,” alleging that SAM “disciplined and removed an employee, Simone Cooper (‘Ms. Cooper’), from her assignment due to her pregnancy-related condition and her need for accommodations.” Id. at *3.

After her maternity leave, Cooper was placed at a Hampton Inn post where she “was breastfeeding and had the pregnancy-related medical condition of lactation.” Id. The court noted that she “could nonetheless perform the essential functions of her job as an Unarmed Special Police Officer,” but SAM “repeatedly denied or ignored Ms. Cooper’s accommodation requests.” Id. The consequences were significant, as “Ms. Cooper leaked through her clothing during the workday on at least two occasions,” and because SAM provided no adequate space, “Ms. Cooper had to pump in her car in the Hampton Inn parking lot.” Id.

Despite outreach by Cooper, her union representative, and her attorney, the company allegedly did not engage in any interactive process. SAM eventually issued a written warning for “excessive absenteeism” that included days she was not scheduled and the day she left after leaking through her uniform. Id. at *4. She was later removed from the schedule entirely.

The complaint asserts seven claims, including two under Title VII and five under the PWFA for failure to accommodate, adverse action based on accommodation requests, denial of employment opportunities, retaliation, and interference. After it filed its Answer, SAM filed a partial motion to dismiss seeking dismissal of three of the counts as purportedly duplicative.

The Court’s Ruling

Because SAM filed an Answer before seeking dismissal, the court treated the request as a Rule 12(c) motion. As Judge Contreras explained, such a motion “will be granted only if Defendant can demonstrate that no material fact is in dispute and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” and at this early stage the movant “shoulders a heavy burden of justification.” Id. at *6.

The Court began with its definition, citing from Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran’s “duplicative claim test.” It explained that “duplicative claims are those that stem from identical allegations, that are decided under identical legal standards, and for which identical relief is available.” Id. at *7 (quoting Wultz, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1, 81 (D.D.C. 2010)). SAM argued that several PWFA claims were repetitive, but after analyzing each count, the Court held otherwise.

Most notably, SAM asserted that the “Adverse Actions” claim duplicated the PWFA retaliation claim because both concerned similar employment decisions. Judge Contreras disagreed, emphasizing that the counts “assert different motivations for Defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct.” Id. at *8. The adverse-action theory centers on actions taken “on account of” Cooper’s accommodation requests, while retaliation requires adverse treatment because she opposed unlawful practices. “Because Count Two (Adverse Actions) and Count Four (Retaliation) arise from different allegations,” the court concluded, “the claims are not duplicative.” Id. at *9.

The Court applied the same reasoning to SAM’s attempt to collapse the PWFA adverse-action, denial-of-opportunities, and interference counts into the single failure-to-accommodate claim. Those theories, Judge Contreras explained, each addressed different harms and are evaluated under distinct legal standards. As a result, “none are duplicative,” and the Court denied the motion in full. Id. at* 7.

Implications For Employers

This opinion is a reminder that overlapping facts do not automatically render multiple statutory claims redundant — especially under the PWFA, where Congress created several discrete causes of action aimed at different workplace harms. Courts are giving each theory breathing room rather than collapsing them into a single “pregnancy discrimination” count.

Procedurally, the decision warns defendants against using post-Answer motions to trim suits. Under Rule 12(c), the movant faces a “heavy burden,” and close questions typically favor allowing the case to proceed to discovery.

Substantively, the facts the Court credited (removing a visibly pregnant worker at a client’s request, ignoring repeated lactation-related accommodation needs, forcing pumping in a car, and disciplining a worker for consequences of inadequate accommodations) are the kinds of scenarios likely to support claims not just under the PWFA, but also under Title VII.

The decision reinforces that the PWFA is a powerful, stand-alone statute with multiple actionable theories. Courts will not readily prune these claims at the pleading stage, and the EEOC is deploying them aggressively. Employers should treat pregnancy-related accommodation requests with the same rigor as disability accommodations – engage promptly, document communications, provide appropriate space and break time, and avoid client-driven decisions that move or remove pregnant workers.