Class Action Defense

April 25, 2025April 25, 2025 by Class Action Defense

The Class Action Weekly Wire – Episode 98: Key Appellate Developments In Class Actions

Duane Morris Takeaway: This week’s episode of the Class Action Weekly Wire features Duane Morris partner Jennifer Riley, senior associate Tyler Zmick, and associate George Schaller with their discussion of the notable appellate rulings shaping class action litigation in 2025.

Check out today’s episode and subscribe to our show from your preferred podcast platform: Spotify, Amazon Music, Apple Podcasts, Samsung Podcasts, Podcast Index, Tune In, Listen Notes, iHeartRadio, Deezer, and YouTube.

Episode Transcript

Jennifer Riley: Thank you for being here again for the next episode of our Friday weekly podcast, the Class Action Weekly Wire. I’m Jennifer Riley, partner at Duane Morris, and joining me today are Tyler Zmick and George Schaller. Thank you both so much for being on the podcast today.

Tyler Zmick: Thanks for having me, Jen.

George Schaller: Glad to be here, Jen.

Jennifer: So today, we wanted to discuss some trends and important rulings in the area of appeals in class action litigation. Parties have limited options when it comes to seeking interlocutory appellate review of a class certification decision. What are some typical ways in which parties can move for an interlocutory review?

Tyler: So, the main mechanism to get interlocutory appeal and review of a class certification order is Rule 23(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under that rule, a party can ask the federal appellate court for permission to appeal within 14 days of the district court issuing an order that either grants or denies class certification. Another avenue is seeking interlocutory appellate review of a district court decision under a federal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Now, Section 1292(b) appeals are especially helpful in complex cases to correct early errors of law, that, if put off until after final judgment, might require the parties to redo years of extensive litigation.

Jennifer: George, can you explain to our listeners what are the primary differences between those two options? In particular, what is the benefit of Rule 23(f)?

George: Sure, Jen, so unlike interlocutory appeals under Section 1292(b), Rule 23(f) does not require a district court to certify an issue for appeal. Moreover, Rule 23(f) does not include the potentially limiting requirements of Section 1292(b) under which the district court can certify an issue for appeal only where an order involves a controlling question of law as to which there’s substantial ground for difference of opinion, and where an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.

Jennifer: Thanks, George. So here’s a question that I get asked quite often – how likely is it that a Rule 23(f) petition will get granted by the appellate court?

Tyler: So, studies have actually been done on that very issue. And those studies show that appellate court orders or appellate courts deny approximately 75% of Rule 23(f) petitions to appeal class cert orders. And most of those denials come by way of summary orders that do not provide any reasoning. So basically, the court says ‘petition denied because I said so.’

Jennifer: Do you have any examples of some rulings granting petitions for appeal over the past year in particular?

George: Yes, so the plaintiffs in Richards, et al. v. Eli Lilly & Co. filed a collective action alleging that the defendant failed to promote older employees in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, or the ADEA. The court granted the plaintiff’s motion for conditional certification, and the defendant moved to certify an interlocutory appeal and stay the action. The court granted the defendant’s motion, and the court first analyzed whether the issue at hand was a pure question of law rather than a factual dispute. The court concluded that the question of the proper standard for collective action certification, whether it be the more lenient modest factual showing approach or the stricter preponderance of evidence standard, was a question of law suitable for appeal. The court assessed whether the resolution of the legal question would significantly impact the course of the litigation. The court also determined that clarifying the standard for certification would affect the size and scope of the collective action, thereby impacting settlement negotiations and potentially expediting or prolonging the litigation process. The court further considered whether there were substantial grounds for a difference of opinion on the legal issue. The court noted conflicting decisions in different circuits and within its own circuit, which indicated a genuine dispute over the appropriate standard for certification. Finally, the court concluded that resolving the certification issue would ultimately expedite the progression of the lawsuit. Accordingly, the court granted the defendant’s motion for an appeal, certifying the question of the proper standard for collective action certification of an ADEA claim.

Jennifer: Thanks, George, very interesting to get some of the court’s rationale in graining that petition, and we’ll see what the Court of Appeals decides in that case. Now that we are well into 2025, have there been any interesting rulings so far this year?

Tyler: Yes, there have been a few. One example of a notable ruling was issued by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in March of this year, in the case named Quint v. Vail Resorts. The plaintiffs in that case filed a class action against their employer, Vail Resorts, in federal court in Colorado, alleging violations of state and federal labor laws. Now, around the same period of time, similar claims were being pursued in California state court by a different group of employees in a case called Hamilton v. Vail. The claims in the Hamilton case were ultimately settled, so the Vail defendant in the Colorado federal case asked the court for a stay to avoid overlapping litigation on the same claims. The district court agreed and paused the federal case until all appeals in the Hamilton case were resolved. Meanwhile, in California state court, the Colorado plaintiffs objected to the Hamilton settlement, and when the state trial court overruled those objections to the settlement, the plaintiffs appealed to the California Court of Appeals, and the California Appellate Court then ruled in favor of the Colorado plaintiffs, and then allowed them to intervene in the state court trial action and the court overturned the approval of the Hamilton settlement. The defendant then requested review from the California Supreme Court, but that court declined. As a result, the condition that triggered the end of the stay in the Colorado federal court case – which was final resolution of the Hamilton appeals – was met. And so back in federal court, the Colorado plaintiffs moved to lift the stay that had been in effect in that case, and the Tenth Circuit ultimately held that the stay had already expired on its own terms, and since there was no longer an active stay to lift, the Tenth Circuit found that the appeal was moot, because there was nothing left to resolve. So, the Tenth Circuit, therefore, dismissed the appeal.

Jennifer: Thanks so much for those examples. I anticipate that appeals will continue to be granted sparingly, and the courts will continue to provide little guidance to the parties on what will and won’t be successful in terms of arguments in these petitions. So, I think the parties will have to continue to develop some novel approaches and evolve their strategies in order to continue to obtain success in this area. Well, thanks so much for all of the great analysis, George and Tyler, and thank you for being here on the podcast with me today, listeners. Thank you so much for tuning in.

Tyler: Thanks for having me, Jen, and thank you, listeners.

George: Thanks, everyone. Have a great weekend.

April 25, 2025April 25, 2025 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Consent Decree Gets Dumped: Court Refuses To Approve Vague Settlement In EEOC v. Waste Pro

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Anna Sheridan, and Brett Bohan

Duane Morris Takeaways: On April 22, 2025, in EEOC v. Waste Pro Fla., Inc., No. 23-CV-1132, (M.D. Fla. Apr. 22, 2025), Judge Wendy Berger of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida denied a joint motion for approval of a consent decree between the EEOC and Waste Pro of Florida, Inc. The Court determined that the parties failed to comply with the Middle District of Florida’s local rules and to provide specificities necessary for approval of the consent decree. For those who think that EEOC consent decrees simply get rubber-stamped, this order demonstrates that that this is not the case. This ruling illustrates the importance of litigants closely adhering to a courts’ local rules and always providing a legal and factual basis for the court to grant their motions, even when those motions are unopposed.

Case Background

On September 26, 2023, the EEOC, on behalf of charging party Fednol Pierre, filed a lawsuit against his former employer, Waste Pro of Florida, Inc. (“Waste Pro”) regarding allegations systemic racial harassment and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. (ECF 1.) The EEOC alleged that Waste Pro perpetuated a work environment that subjected Mr. Pierre to racial slurs and derogatory racial comments and retaliated against Mr. Pierre when he complained of harassment. Id. ¶¶ 36, 57.

On October 15, 2024, the parties jointly moved for approval of a consent decree. (ECF 65.) The motion spans two pages and includes details about the procedural background of the case, the claims made in the complaint, the settlement process, the decree’s compliance with the federal rules, and the decree’s public benefit. Id. Among other provisions, the agreement provided for a $1.4 million cash award to Mr. Pierre and other Black and Haitian employees and required Waste Pro to employ an officer to ensure compliance with civil rights laws. (ECF 65-1 ¶¶ 17–44.).

The Court’s Order

The Court denied the parties’ joint motion to approve the consent decree and found the motion failed on two independent grounds, including: (1) the motion did not provide a basis for approval and (2) the motion did not comply with Middle District of Florida Local Rule 3.01(a). (ECF 70 at 1.)

First, the Court determined that “the filing fails to provide this Court with any legal or factual basis” for granting the motion. Id. Courts do not rubber stamp consent decrees. See In Re Blue Cross Blue Shield Antitrust Litig. MDL 2406, 85 F.4th 1070, 1094 (11th Cir. 2023). Instead, courts must independently determine whether the agreements are “fair, adequate, and reasonable” by considering various factors. Bennett v. Behring Corp., 737 F.3d 982, 987 (11th Cir. 1984). In this case, the Court concluded that the parties had not provided it with sufficient information to undertake this analysis, so the Court could not approve the consent decree. (ECF 70 at 1.) As the parties here learned, courts generally will decline to enforce a consent decree that simply restates existing legal obligations without measurable terms.

Second, the Court held that “the filing fails to comply with Local Rule 3.01(a).” Id. The rule requires joint motions to include the word “unopposed” in the title. L.R. 3.01(a). It also requires a motion to include “a concise statement of the precise relief requested, a statement of the basis for the request, and a legal memorandum supporting the request.” Id. The parties titled the motion “Joint Motion for Approval of Consent Decree” and did not include a supporting legal memorandum; therefore, the Court determined that they failed to adhere to the requirements of the rule.

In sum, the Court concluded that it could not grant the parties’ motion without a firm factual or legal basis and that it would not excuse the parties’ violation of the local rules. (ECF 1 at 1.) Instead, it denied the motion and gave the EEOC one week to show cause why the lawsuit should not be dismissed with prejudice. Id.

Implications For Employers

The Court’s ruling in Waste Pro should serve as a stark warning to all litigants that they should always review a court’s local rules and be in the habit of giving the court a reason to rule in their favor, even when the relief they seek is unopposed.

This case demonstrates the serious consequences that can result from a lack of attention to detail. Here, the Court rejected the parties’ attempt to circumvent the Court’s independent duty to determine the fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness of the agreement.

When settling with the EEOC or any regulatory body, vague promises to “do better” will not suffice. If employers want their settlements approved, they cannot just recycle boilerplate language.

April 22, 2025 by Class Action Defense

U.S. Supreme Court Clarifies Pleading Standards In ERISA Prohibited Transactions Cases

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Rebecca S. Bjork, and Jesse S. Stavis

Duane Morris Takeaways: On April 17, 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a decision in Cunningham v. Cornell University, No. 23-1007, 2025 WL 1128943 (U.S. Apr. 17, 2025), that clarified the pleading standards for allegations of prohibited transactions under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”). The Supreme Court held that in order to survive a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs need only plead the elements of a prohibited transaction, and that there is no need to affirmatively argue that statutory exceptions do not apply. As the Supreme Court acknowledged, this ruling has the potential to unleash a floodgate of litigation over transactions that technically meet the definition of a prohibited transaction, but that are ultimately legal under one or more of the ERISA’s exceptions. However, the Justices provided a number of recommendations for responding to meritless claims. ERISA plan sponsors and administrators should carefully study these recommendations to avoid the expense of litigating threadbare accusations of violations.

Background

Section 1106 of the ERISA supplements the well-established common-law fiduciary duties binding plan administrators by defining a number of “prohibited transactions” that are deemed “likely to injure the … plan.” Commissioner v. Keystone Consol. Industries, Inc., 508 U.S. 152, 160 (1993). Under Section 1106, a plan is prohibited from engaging in certain transactions with a “party in interest,” a category that includes not only plan administrators, sponsors, and officers, but also entities “providing services to [the] plan. § 1002(14).

The issue with Section 1106 is that it prohibits, on its face, a number of transactions that are necessary for the operation of a modern retirement or benefits plan. For example, Subsection 1106(a)(1), which was at issue in Cunningham, prohibits a fiduciary from transferring or furnishing any assets, goods, services, or facilities to a party in interest. Because plan sponsors frequently transfer assets to administrators, who are parties in interest, they are technically engaged in prohibited transactions. However, a separate section of the statute — Section 1108 — provides 21 exceptions to this prohibition, including one common-sense one exempting transactions that involve “[c]ontracting or making reasonable arrangements with a party in interest for office space, or legal, accounting, or other services necessary for the establishment or operation of the plan, if no more than reasonable compensation is paid therefor.” § 1108(b)(2)(A).

At issue in Cunningham were the pleading standards for claims under Section 1106. Defendant Cornell University retained TIAA and Fidelity to provide investment options and recordkeeping services to participants in defined-contribution 403(b) plans. In exchange, Cornell compensated these administrators with fees paid by plan participants. This is a very standard arrangement that, on its face, violated Section 1106(a)(1), but also fell under the exception set forth in Section 1108(b)(2)(A).

The named plaintiff in Cunningham, a participant in the plan, sued on behalf of a putative class alleging that Cornell had engaged in prohibited transactions. The complaint merely set forth the elements of a prohibited transaction, and did not address the Section 1108 exceptions. Cornell moved to dismiss the complaint. The District Court granted the motion, holding that, in addition to pleading the statutory elements, a plaintiff in a prohibited transactions case must also allege “some evidence of self-dealing or other disloyal conduct.” Cunningham v. Cornell University, No. 16 Civ. 6525, 2017 WL 4358769, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2017), aff’d, 86 F.4th 961 (2d Cir. 2023), rev’d and remanded, No. 23-1007, 2025 WL 1128943 (U.S. Apr. 17, 2025). On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the grant of dismissal, but for different reasons. The Second Circuit held that while there is no requirement to plead self-dealing or other disloyal conduct, a plaintiff alleging a violation of Section 1106 must also show that the transaction does not qualify for an exception under Section 1108. Cunningham v. Cornell University, 86 F.4th 961, 975 (2d Cir. 2023). This ruling placed the Second Circuit in conflict with the Eighth Circuit, which had held that there is no requirement to address Section 1108 to survive a motion to dismiss. See Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 601. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the circuit split.

The Supreme Court’s Decision

In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Sonia Sotomayor, the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit’s grant of dismissal. In siding with the plaintiffs, the Supreme Court held that the Section 1108 exceptions are affirmative defenses, not implied elements, and that a plaintiff need only provide a plausible argument that Section 1106 has been violated to survive a motion to dismiss.

The Supreme Court noted that Section 1106(a)(1)(C) contains only three elements. A plaintiff must allege that a fiduciary: (1) caused a plan to engage in a transaction; (2) that the fiduciary knew or should have known constituted the direct or indirect furnishing of goods, services, or facilities; (3) between the plan and a party in interest. Cunningham, 2025 WL 1128943, at *4. According to the Supreme Court, establishing these elements is sufficient to plead a violation, and “[n]othing in that section removes from its categorical bar transactions that were necessary for the plan or involved reasonable compensation.” Id. Although Section 1108 sets out a number of exemptions, these exemptions are affirmative defenses, which must be established by the defendant. The Supreme Court noted that it would be impractical to require plaintiffs to demonstrate that none of the twenty-one separate statutory exceptions or hundreds of regulatory exceptions apply. Id. at *6.

Plaintiff argued that lowering the pleading standards would result in “an avalanche of meritless litigation,” but the Supreme Court reasoned that defendants and courts have access to tools to prevent meritless claims from moving forward. Id. at *7. For example, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7 allows district courts to require plaintiffs to file a reply to a defendant’s answer to show why asserted exceptions do not apply. Defendants can also argue that there is no injury in fact to convey standing. Finally, in cases where it is obvious that a Section 1108 exception applies and that plaintiffs have no good-faith basis to believe that the law is violated, courts can issue sanctions under Rule 11 or take advantage of the ERISA’s fee-shifting provisions to penalize plaintiffs for meritless allegations. Id. at *8.

In a brief concurring opinion, Justice Samuel Alito, who was joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and Brett Kavanaugh, noted that the result, while consistent with the ERISA’s statutory text, would likely cause “untoward practical results” because almost all plan fiduciaries must engage parties in interest to provide certain services. The concurrence urged District Courts to use all tools at their disposal, including reply pleadings pursuant to Rule 7, to prevent meritless cases from proceeding to discovery. Id.

Implications Of The Decision

The Supreme Court’s ruling in Cunningham substantially lowers the bar for plaintiffs alleging prohibited transactions, and will likely lead to an uptick, if not an explosion, in filings. Defendants in these cases can no longer point to a plaintiff’s failure to discuss statutory exceptions to secure a motion to dismiss. Rather, defendants must provide clear evidence that an exception applies in their responsive pleadings. Where necessary, defendants should be prepared to petition District Courts to allow for a reply pleading under Rule 7. This is a rarely used tool, but it is one that courts may have to employ more frequently in the aftermath of Cunningham. And where defendants believe that a claim is entirely baseless and has been made in bad faith, they should encourage courts to use the full array of tools at their disposal, including fee-shifting and Rule 11 sanctions, to disincentivize meritless litigation.

April 21, 2025April 22, 2025 by Class Action Defense

Idaho Federal Court Denies Beauty Product Manufacturer’s Bid To Strike Punitive Damages In EEOC Retaliation Suit

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., George J. Schaller, and Brett Bohan

Duane Morris Takeaways: On April 15, 2025, in EEOC v. Elevation Labs, LLC, No. 23-CV-00318, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73702 (D. Idaho Apr. 15, 2025), Judge Lynn Winnmill of the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho denied Elevation Lab’s untimely motion to strike punitive damages for the EEOC’s failure to comply with Idaho state law. The EEOC lawsuit asserts allegations of retaliation after a former employee complained of discrimination.

This ruling illustrates the significance of asserting timely defenses and that federal courts analyze procedural motions, including motions to strike, with strict adherence to the operative federal rule of civil procedure. In this case, the Court relied on Defendant’s failure to demonstrate striking the EEOC’s prayer for punitive damages was warranted under procedural rules.

Case Background

On July 7, 2023, the EEOC, on behalf of charging party Rachel Johnson, filed a lawsuit against her former employer, Elevation Labs, LLC (“Elevation”) regarding allegations of retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The EEOC alleged Elevation retaliated against Ms. Johnson after she complained of discrimination. Id. at *2. The EEOC’s Complaint included allegations for punitive damages against Elevation within its prayer of relief. Id.

On September 18, 2023, Elevation answered the Complaint. Id. After the parties litigated for over a year-and-a-half and engaged in discovery, Elevation moved to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) on February 26, 2025. Id. Elevation argued the EEOC did not comply with Idaho Code § 6-1604(2), which requires plaintiffs to “obtain court permission before including a request for punitive damages in the complaint,” before it filed suit. Id.

The Court’s Order

The Court denied Elevation’s motion to strike and found the motion failed on two independent grounds, including: (1) the motion was untimely and (2) the motion lacked merit. Id. at *1.

First, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), a party may file a motion to “strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Id. at *3. In addition, a party must move to strike “within 21 days after being served with the pleading.” Id. Elevation however did not move to strike until almost 17 months after service of the Complaint, and therefore, the Court denied the motion as untimely. Id.

Second, the Court held that, even if it considered the merits of the motion to strike, Elevation’s motion still failed. Id. In liberally applying Rule 12(f), the Court determined “whether the prayer for punitive damages should be stricken because the EEOC did not comply with the gatekeeping mechanism in [the] Idaho Code § 6-1604(2) – the motion lacks merit.” Id at *4. The Court opined that the EEOC asserted a federal claim in federal court, “[w]hich of course means that federal law governs the substance and procedure of its claim.” Id. Elevation did not dispute this rule but nevertheless contended federal law “is silent with respect to any pleading standard or procedural prerequisite,” so the Idaho Code must fill “the silence.” Id.

The Court disagreed. The Court instead held the only prerequisite to requesting punitive damages in Title VII cases requires the EEOC to plead “sufficient factual matter to permit a reasonable inference that defendant engaged in intentional discrimination with malice or reckless indifference to plaintiff’s federally protected rights.” Id. at *5. The Court further held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(3) fills the silence and enables litigants to seek “different types of relief” in their pleadings permitting plaintiffs to seek punitive damages without first seeking court permission. Id.

In sum, the Court determined that state procedural law on the ability to request punitive damages had no place in federal court proceedings involving federal law claims. See id. Instead, federal substantive and procedural law exclusively govern such claims. See id. at *6. Therefore, the Court denied Elevation’s motion to strike the EEOC’s prayer of relief for punitive damages finding Elevation’s reliance on Idaho state law was misplaced and its motion was untimely. Id.

Implications For Employers

The Court’s ruling in Elevation Labs signals the EEOC’s continued litigation enforcement efforts in federal courts for retaliation claims and its pursuit of all available damages.

This case demonstrates the pitfalls of moving under inapplicable state court rules in federal court. Here, the Court rejected Elevation’s attempt to inject state court procedural requirements and the Court disagreed that state statutory requirements impact federal claims under Title VII.

Employers, when embroiled in EEOC litigation, must analyze their defenses swiftly to assert a timely defense and to ensure that defense is applicable. Otherwise, Employers may find themselves moving too late and, without defenses, creating exposure in already difficult litigation.

April 17, 2025 by Class Action Defense

The Class Action Weekly Wire – Episode 97: Key Trends In Antitrust Class Actions

Duane Morris Takeaway: This week’s episode of the Class Action Weekly Wire features Duane Morris partners Jerry Maatman and Sean McConnell and senior associate Daniel Selznick with their discussion of the key trends analyzed in the 2025 edition of the Antitrust Class Action Review, including the rise of pricing algorithm claims and notable class certification rulings.

Bookmark or download the Antitrust Class Action Review – 2025, which is fully searchable and viewable from any device.

Episode Transcript

Jerry Maatman: Welcome to our listeners. Thank you for being here today for our weekly podcast series, the Class Action Weekly Wire. I’m Jerry Maatman of Duane Morris, and joining me today are Sean McConnell, the chair of the Duane Morris Antitrust and Competition Group, and senior associate Daniel Selznick, who are both from our Philadelphia office. Gentlemen, thank you for being on the podcast today.

Sean McConnell: Thank you, Jerry, happy to be part of the podcast.

Daniel Selznick: Yeah, thanks, Jerry. Glad to be here.

Jerry: Today on the podcast we’re discussing the recent publication of this year’s edition of the Duane Morris Antitrust Class Action Review. Listeners can find this e-book publication on our blog, the Duane Morris Class Action Defense Blog. Sean, can you tell our listeners a little bit about this desk reference publication?

Sean: Absolutely, Jerry. In 2024, class action litigation involving antitrust claims had several key developments. Most antitrust class actions are settled before trial, and one of the most crucial phases in the cases is class certification. Thus, the order granting or denying a motion to certify a class in these cases is critical. To assist with understanding what this means for employers facing antitrust claims, Duane Morris has released the Antitrust Class Action Review for 2025, which analyzes the key rulings and litigation developments from 2024, and the significant trends that are apt to impact these types of actions in 2025. We hope that companies will benefit from this resource in their compliance with these evolving laws and standards.

Jerry: I’ve always thought and viewed class certification decisions as the Holy Grail in these sorts of cases. Daniel, what in your mind are the takeaways from the publication with regard to litigation in this space over the past year?

Daniel: Sure. So, one of the most notable shifts we’ve seen is the rise in cases involving pricing algorithms, information sharing, and data management. This trend really mirrors the technological evolution within organizations. So as businesses rely more heavily on automated pricing and complex data systems, plaintiffs’ lawyers are adapting their strategies to challenge those tools under antitrust laws.

Jerry: Sean, in your experience, how are these new strategies playing out in the courts? How did the plaintiffs do this past year?

Sean: Great question, Jerry. We saw a major development in the Gibson v. Cendyn Group case in the Ninth Circuit, where the Department of Justice actually stepped in. They argued that certain types of information sharing can be illegal even if there’s no explicit agreement on prices. That’s a pretty aggressive position. And while it’s yet to be clear if courts will accept it, I’d expect that stance to influence the plaintiffs’ bar going forward. And despite the change in administration, we’ve seen consistent positions from both DOJ and FTC with respect to information sharing going forward in 2025.

Jerry: Very interesting in terms of how that theory evolved. Daniel, what about labor market cases that in the year before had been very, very hot – how did those turn out over the last 12 months?

Daniel: So, in contrast to recent years, 2024 actually saw fewer challenges related to labor market restraints. And one possible reason is the DOJ’s limited success in prosecuting those cases which might be giving plaintiffs pause before jumping into that area.

Jerry: Let’s pivot to the issue of class certification, that Holy Grail of the plaintiffs’ bar. Sean, I understand there was quite a bit of activity this year in the pharmaceutical space.

Sean: Yes, absolutely, Jerry. Once again, Big Pharma and life sciences remained a core focus for antitrust class actions. A big factor is the structure of the pharmaceutical industry – when the supply chain and harm mechanism are relatively straightforward, courts are more likely to certify a class. For example, In Re Lipitor and In Re Actos, both cases from mid-to-late 2024, we saw the courts granting class certification based on those clearer market structures.

Jerry: Daniel, one of the things we’ve seen in other spaces is a huge battle over predominance, and how defendants latch onto that particular defense to sometimes prevent class certification. How did that play out in this space over the past 12 months?

Daniel: Yeah. So, Jerry, that’s still a major battleground courts are doing deep dives into whether plaintiffs can provide class wide evidence that shows that common issues predominate. So it’s not just a box-checking exercises – judges are really scrutinizing the proposed evidence, and that was a recurring theme in 2024.

Jerry: How about on the issue of numerosity under Rule 23(a)(1) in terms of how that’s played out in the antitrust sector?

Daniel: Sure. So you know, the numerosity requirement provides that plaintiffs must show that it’s impractical to join all members individually. And in antitrust cases, courts tend to say that fewer than 20 members likely won’t cut it, but over 40 usually will. So, for classes in that 20-to-40 range, courts look at other factors. A great example from this past year is the In Re EpiPen Direct Purchaser Litigation. And in that case, even where there was a proposed class of over 40 members, all of which, whom you know, had pretty large claims, the court said that joinder was not impractical, and therefore denied certification, so it shows how fact-specific the analysis can be.

Jerry: We, of course, studied class certification rates across the board in all spaces of litigation, and the plaintiffs’ bar did pretty well, and certified cases at a range of about 65 to 66% across the board. How did things go for the plaintiffs’ bar in the antitrust sector?

Sean: In 2024, Jerry, it was pretty consistent with respect to antitrust cases where class certification was granted in 68% of those actions, a total of 15 out of 22 motions from the past year. So, while a majority of plaintiffs were successful, there’s still a significant portion facing uphill battles, especially where the evidence class structure and damages and market dynamics are quite complex.

Jerry: That’s an interesting look at inside baseball statistics. I’ve always thought that the business model of the plaintiffs’ bar in this area is identify and file the case, certify the case, and then monetize the case. In terms of the study of class action settlements in the antitrust area, how did the plaintiffs’ bar do in 2024?

Sean: Plaintiffs were hugely successful in 2024, although not quite as successful as 2023. The top 10 antitrust class action settlements totaled just over $8.42 billion in 2024, compared to $11.74 billion in 2023, which had been a nearly threefold increase over the 2022 amount.

Jerry: Those are certainly eye-popping numbers in terms of settlements. My sense is 2025 is apt to see even bigger, if not consistent numbers, in terms of those top 10 antitrust settlements. Well, thank you, Sean and Daniel, for being here today, and thank you listeners for tuning into this week’s Class Action Weekly Wire.

Daniel: Thanks, Jerry. Glad to be on. And thank you, listeners.

Sean: Thanks so much, everyone.

April 15, 2025April 15, 2025 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Here It Is – The Second Edition Of The Duane Morris Antitrust Class Action Review – 2025!

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. and Jennifer A. Riley

Duane Morris Takeaway: Class action litigation involving antitrust claims had several key developments in 2024, despite a relative lack of actual verdicts. Because antitrust remedies often allow recovery of treble damages, the incentive to settle these cases is often paramount. Additionally, plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees that may be substantial because of the complexity of this kind of litigation. As a result, most antitrust class actions are settled before trial, and one of the most crucial phase in these cases is class certification. Thus, the order granting or denying a motion to certify a class in these cases is critical.

The class action team at Duane Morris is pleased to present the 2025 edition of the Antitrust Class Action Review. We hope it will demystify some of the complexities of antitrust class action litigation and keep corporate counsel updated on the ever-evolving nuances of these issues. We hope this book – manifesting the collective experience and expertise of our class action defense group – will assist our clients by identifying developing trends in the case law and offering practical approaches in dealing with antitrust class action litigation.

Click here to bookmark or download a copy of the Antitrust Class Action Review – 2025 e-book.

Stay tuned for more Antitrust class action analysis coming soon on our weekly podcast, the Class Action Weekly Wire.

April 14, 2025 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Visualize This: The Sixth Circuit Holds That The VPPA Applies Only To Consumers Of Audio-Visual Materials

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Shannon Noelle, and Ryan T. Garippo

Duane Morris Takeaways: On April 3, 2025, in Salazar, et al. v. Paramount Global, d/b/a 247Sports, Case No. 23-5748, 2025 WL 1000139 (6th Cir. Apr. 3, 2025), the Sixth Circuit departed from two other federal circuits (i.e., the Second and Seventh Circuits) in its interpretation of “consumers” covered by the Video Privacy Protection Act (“VPPA”), and affirmed the district court’s dismissal of a putative class action on the basis that only consumers of audio-visual related materials are covered by the protections of the Act. The Sixth Circuit’s holding narrows the scope and reach of the statute and is a welcome reprieve for companies offering video content on their websites in connection with advertising technology (“adtech”).

Background

In September 2022, Michael Salazar brought a putative class action against Paramount Global (i.e., the owner of 247Sports.com), claiming that the media company violated the VPPA because it installed Meta Pixel on its website. Salazar alleged that Meta Pixel, a form of adtech, tracked his and putative class members’ video viewing history and disclosed it to Meta without his consent. He sought to represent a putative class of subscribers to 247Sports.com’s newsletter which contained links to articles (that could contain videos), photographs, and other content.

Salazar, however, did not allege that he was a subscriber of audio visual materials as contemplated by the statute. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1)-(4). To the contrary, he alleged that he was a subscriber of 247Sports.com’s newsletter, and that 247Sports.com separately provided audio visual materials to its customers. Salazar v. Paramount Global, 683 F.Supp. 3d 727, 744 (M.D. Tenn. 2023). But, the district court determined that Salazar’s interpretation of the VPPA was “unavailing.” Id. Indeed, “there [was] no allegation in the complaint that Plaintiff accessed audio visual content through the newsletter (or at all, for that matter). The newsletter [was] therefore not audio visual content, which necessarily means that Plaintiff [was] not a ‘subscriber’ under the VPPA.” Id.

Salazar is no stranger to this legal issue. Last year, in a virtually identical case, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, dismissed a putative VPPA class action brought by Salazar on the basis that “signing up for an online newsletter did not make Salazar a VPPA ‘subscriber.’” Salazar v. National Basketball Association, 118 F.4th 533, 536-37 (2d Cir. 2024). Salazar appealed that decision to the Second Circuit, which reversed the lower court, and held that the VPPA protects “consumers regardless of the particular goods or services rented, purchased, or subscribed to.” Id. at 549. If blog readers would like to learn more about the Second Circuit’s decision, a link to our post is included here.

Salazar appealed this case on the same grounds as his Second Circuit win and asked the Sixth Circuit to determine whether he was considered a “subscriber” and thus, a “consumer” under the VPPA.

The Sixth Circuit’s Decision

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling and agreed that to be considered a “consumer” under the VPPA an individual must purchase goods or services of an audio-visual nature.

Judge John Nalbandian, writing for the Sixth Circuit, reasoned that the term “subscriber” must be viewed in its broader context, and in harmony with the other words in the statute such not to render associational words inconsistent or superfluous. Applying these canons, the Sixth Circuit explained that the words “goods and services” informed the meaning of the term “subscriber.” By using the terms together, the statute was intended to encompass only audio-visual goods or services provided by a video tape service provider, as opposed to any and all goods and services, provided by that company. In other words, if a video tape service provider makes “hammers” or a “Flintstones sweatshirt or a Scooby Doo coffee mug,” a consumer of such goods would not fall under the purview of the VPPA. Paramount Global, 2025 WL 100139, at *10.

In so holding, the Sixth Circuit departed from the Second and Seventh Circuits, including the near-identical lawsuit brought by Salazar himself, that found the phrase “goods or services” to encompass all goods and services that a provider places in the marketplace. Judge Rachel Bloomekatz, penning the dissent, reached the same conclusion. She opined that, under the majority’s interpretation, a provider could “stitch[] together” non-video transactions to provide information about audio-visual transactions that could reveal a consumer’s personal information. Id. At *12. The majority found such concerns unavailing and reasoned that the type of information available from the videos on Paramount Global’s website was not inherent to the newsletter and was “accessible to anyone, even those without a newsletter subscription.” Id. at *7.

As a result, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to dismiss the complaint without leave to amend.

Implications For Companies

Circuit splits in the federal courts are increasingly rare. It is nearly unprecedented, however, to have a situation where one litigant has created a federal circuit split with himself. Salazar could file one lawsuit in New York and his claims would go forward. But, if the exact same lawsuit was filed in Tennessee, then dismissal would be the proper remedy.

This patchwork system may be difficult for corporate counsel, tasked with ensuring their companies’ adtech compliance, to follow. But, the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Paramount Global is better than the alternative and could pave the way for other circuits to similarly limit the scope of the VPPA in their relevant jurisdictions.

In the meantime, however, corporate counsel for companies based in Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee can rest a little easier knowing that – they can offer newsletters without worrying that adtech, installed solely on their websites – will somehow subject them to draconian VPPA liability.

April 14, 2025 by Class Action Defense

Join Us For Our Mid-Year EEOC Strategy And Litigation Review Webinar

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, Alex W. Karasik, and Gregory Tsonis

A Most Transformative Year: New EEOC Litigation And Enforcement Priorities

Mark your calendars for our biannual webinar analyzing the latest EEOC developments on Monday, May 5, 2025 from 12:00 p.m. to 12:30 p.m. Central. Reserve your virtual seat for the program here.

Join Duane Morris partners Jerry Maatman, Jennifer Riley, Alex Karasik and Greg Tsonis for a live panel discussion analyzing the latest impact of the dramatic changes at the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, including its new strategic priorities and the array of EEOC lawsuits filed in the first six months of fiscal year 2025. In its annual performance report for FY 2024, the EEOC touted a record $700 million in monetary recoveries for workers through litigation and administrative avenues. Moving into FY 2025 with a $33.22 million budget increase for the EEOC and significant changes implemented by the Trump administration, employers’ compliance with federal workplace laws and agency guidance remains a corporate imperative.

Our panel will empower corporate counsel, human resource professionals and business leaders with key insights into the EEOC’s latest enforcement initiatives and strategies designed to minimize the risk of drawing the agency’s scrutiny in what projects to be a transformative year for the Commission.

Stay tuned for the 2025 edition of Duane Morris’ EEOC Litigation Review and key EEOC-related analysis on the Class Action Weekly Wire Podcast.

April 10, 2025April 10, 2025 by Class Action Defense

The Class Action Weekly Wire – Episode 96: Key Trends In FCRA Class Actions

Duane Morris Takeaway: This week’s episode of the Class Action Weekly Wire features Duane Morris partners Jerry Maatman and Shireen Wetmore and special counsel Shannon Noelle with their discussion of the key trends analyzed in the 2025 edition of the FCRA Class Action Review, including notable Third and Eleventh Circuit rulings shaping related litigation in 2025.

Bookmark or download the FCRA Class Action Review – 2025, which is fully searchable and viewable from any device.

Episode Transcript

Jerry Maatman: Welcome to our listeners. Thank you for being here for our weekly podcast series, the Class Action Weekly Wire. I’m Jerry Maatman, a partner with Duane Morris, and joining me today are Shireen Wetmore and Shannon Noelle. Thanks so much for being here on our podcast.

Shireen Wetmore: Thanks, Jerry, happy to be part of the podcast.

Shannon Noelle: Thanks for having me, Jerry.

Jerry: Today on the podcast we’re discussing the first-ever publication of the Duane Morris Fair Credit Reporting Act, or FCRA, Class Action Review. Listeners can find our new e-book publication on our blog, the Duane Morris Class Action Defense Blog. Shireen, can you tell our listeners about this new publication and desk reference?

Shireen: Absolutely, Jerry. This Review is brand new, and it dives deep into the world of consumer protection laws. Specifically, the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA or the FACT Act), which amends FCRA, and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). A lot of alphabet soup here. These statutes have long been fodder for significant litigation, particularly for class actions. So, Duane Morris created this Review to analyze the key rulings and developments in these areas in 2024 and the significant legal decisions and trends that will be impacting this type of class action litigation for 2025. We hope that companies will benefit from this resource in their compliance with these evolving laws and standards.

Jerry: Great. Let’s start a little bit with the basics. The FCRA, as enacted by Congress, aims to ensure that consumer reporting agencies act responsibly and fairly, but at the same time it’s been an engine for class action litigation. Shannon, can you give us a quick overview of what our listeners need to know about the FCRA?

Shannon: Absolutely. The FCRA is focused on ensuring that consumer reporting agencies, CRAs, maintain accuracy, fairness, and respect for consumers’ privacy rights. It mandates that CRAs follow reasonable procedures to ensure that consumer reports are as accurate as possible. The law also requires employers to disclose when they’re obtaining a consumer report on an applicant for a job and to follow specific procedures if they decide to take adverse action based on the report. FCRA violations often come down to technicalities – things like failure to provide proper disclosures or obtaining consent incorrectly – and the penalties can be significant, ranging from $100 to $1,000 per violation, with punitive damages up to $2,500. If the violation is deemed willful, because of the way the law is structured, it’s relatively easy for plaintiffs to bring class action lawsuits, especially when there are clear procedural missteps that affect many people. Even if actual damages aren’t proven, these technical violations can still lead to successful lawsuits.

Jerry: Thank you. By contrast, Shireen, what about the FACTA? What are the issues in that particular space of litigation?

Shireen: So, the FACTA amended the FCRA, and it was aimed at enhancing consumer protections. It requires consumer reporting agencies, just as Shannon mentioned, to present information in a clear, more understandable manner. And the FACTA really emphasizes the need for better protections against identity theft under the FCRA and the FACT Act. There are significant penalties, nuanced protections that can lead to very large lawsuits with what may seem like only informational injuries. However, there have been some significant Supreme Court rulings over the years that have limited the scope of these lawsuits, and especially when it comes to proving actual harm or injury in fact.

Jerry: Thanks, and then let’s address the last one in Chapter 12 – the alphabet soup statutes – the FDCPA. The statute governs debt collection practices, and while it doesn’t address credit reporting directly, it’s closely related, because debt collectors obviously rely upon credit reports when they pursue collection. The FDCPA regulates how they can communicate with individuals, the information they must disclose, and their conduct during the collection process. In essence, it’s a companion statute that protects consumers in the broader context of credit and debt. What were the notable trends under these statutes over the last 12 months?

Shannon: One major trend we’ve seen in 2024 is a reduction in class certification success rates. Courts granted class certification in only 38% of FCRA, FACTA, and FDCPA cases, which is down from 75% in 2023. This could be partly due to the 2021 TransUnion decision and the increasing complexity of FCRA violations. Employers and consumer reporting agencies are now more careful about complying with technical requirements and plaintiffs are facing higher hurdles improving harm.

Shireen: Yeah, and another thing we’re seeing is the rise of state level laws that track the FCRA, but they impose even stricter standards. I’m sitting here in California – we definitely have some states like California, New York, and Texas, they have their own consumer credit reporting laws – and companies need to stay on top of both the federal and the state regulations to avoid potentially very significant liability.

Jerry: As our clients see in many spaces, there’s quite a patchwork quilt of laws and the legal environment is under constant change and flux. Were there important rulings in this space in 2024 that our listeners need to keep in mind?

Shannon: There certainly were. The Third Circuit issued a significant ruling in favor of the defendant in Barclift, et al. v. Keystone Credit Services, LLC. The defendant was a debt collector there, and engaged RevSpring, a third-party vendor, to print and mail debt collection notices to individuals, including the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleged defendant shared her personal information with RevSpring without her consent in violation of the FDCPA. The district court dismissed the plaintiff’s allegations without prejudice, ruling that she lacked standing because her alleged injuries were not sufficiently concrete, and thus she failed to allege a concrete injury under Article III standing requirements. On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. The Third Circuit determined that the plaintiff’s intangible harms must have a close relationship to alleged recognized harms for standing purposes, and the Third Circuit concluded that the plaintiff failed to establish standing because she could not show a close relationship between the harm she alleged, which was disclosure of personal information to the mailing vendor, and harms traditionally recognized by disclosure of personal information, including humiliation or embarrassment due to the public disclosure of sensitive information, and the Third Circuit opined that harm from internal disclosures such as that alleged by the plaintiff did not align with harms traditionally recognized in privacy torts that depend on public disclosure, unless there’s a sufficient likelihood of external dissemination.

Jerry: That’s a really interesting ruling, and certainly shows the range and kinds of information that are protected and what goes beyond just the mere scope of the information. Are there any other appellate rulings, Shireen, that you think our listeners ought to keep uppermost in mind for the coming year?

Shireen: Yeah, the Eleventh Circuit ruled on standing issues in Santos, et al. v.Healthcare Revenue Recovery Group, LLC. You know, these standing issues have been getting ironed out, up and down to the Supremes and back, quite a bit over the last 10 or so years. Here, the plaintiffs allege that the defendant provided inaccurate credit reports. The district court initially denied class certification, reasoning that consumers seeking statutory damages for willful FCRA violations needed to prove actual damages. The plaintiffs argued that they could recover statutory damages without proving actual damages and the case focused on interpreting 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1)(A), which allows consumers to seek statutory damages ranging from again $100 to $1,000 for willful violations. And on appeal, the Eleventh Circuit clarified that under statute, consumers do not need to prove actual damages to obtain statutory damages. The court noted that the statute distinguishes between the actual damages required under one provision and the damages available under the second, which does not require proof. So, the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation aligned with decisions from other circuits, and furthermore, the court ruled that the district court’s denial of class certification was based on incorrect interpretation of the damages provision, and remanded the case for further proceedings. So, we’ll be keeping an eye on that as well.

Jerry: In terms of settlement dollars overall in 2024, how successful was the plaintiffs’ bar in monetizing their class claims.

Shireen: So, there was actually a big drop in the numbers recovered in the top 10 cases in 2024 over 2023. In2024, the top 10 FCRA FACT Act, and FDCPA. Settlements totaled $42.43 million, and in 2023, that was a $100 million. So, more than double. Alittle bit surprising, but we’ll look to see what happens in 2025.

Jerry: Yeah, my prediction is in 2025 – my sense is those numbers are going to double, if not triple. and that’ll be an area that we’ll be tracking with interest in the Duane Morris Class Action Review for 2026. Well, thank you both for being here and for sharing your thought leadership with respect to class action litigation in this space. Listeners, please stop by our blog for a free copy of the FCRA Class Action Review e-book.

Shannon: Thanks so much for the opportunity, Jerry.

Shireen: Thanks, Jerry. Thanks, listeners.

April 8, 2025April 8, 2025 by Class Action Defense

Announcing The Inaugural Edition Of The Duane Morris FCRA Class Action Review!

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. and Jennifer A. Riley

Duane Morris Takeaway: Courts have often noted that Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) violations lend themselves to resolution through class action litigation, and FCRA class actions have increased partially because of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA) amendments, passed in 2003. In 2024, in FCRA cases, the class action plaintiff’s bar continued to look for any technical failure of an employer to provide disclosures or obtain proper authorization from an applicant. Of note, although these authorization and disclosure requirements may appear to be relatively straightforward, case law has created additional requirements separate and distinct from the plain statutory requirements, which may not be obvious from a plain and ordinary reading of the FCRA alone.

To that end, the class action team at Duane Morris is pleased to present the inaugural edition of the FCRA Class Action Review. We hope it will demystify some of the complexities of FCRA, FACTA, and Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) class action litigation and keep corporate counsel updated on the ever-evolving nuances of these issues. We hope this book – manifesting the collective experience and expertise of our class action defense group – will assist our clients by identifying developing trends in the case law and offering practical approaches in dealing with these types of class action litigation.

Click here to bookmark or download a copy of the Duane Morris FCRA Class Action Review – 2025 eBook.

Stay tuned for more FCRA/FACTA/FDCPA class action analysis coming soon on our weekly podcast, the Class Action Weekly Wire.