Estonia – details of 5 criminal convictions for sanctions breaches

The Estonian case law website has made available a number of further judgments relating to convictions for sanctions offences:

Case 1. Judgment dated October 6, 2025

This case was the prosecution of Mati-Dmitri Terestal (see our earlier post). It was alleged that he, and another, had made economic resources and find available to a designated person who was the head of Yle1 (a Russian state-owned media outlet). It was alleged that Terestal continued to operate the media outlet after it had been closed, through a front entity and had continued to provide economic resources in the form of technical equipment, and other assets.

It was also alleged that by hiring staff for the company this was making economic resources available to Yle1, as was the creation of web domains.

The County Court had convicted Terestal in January 2025, and sentenced him to 2 years and 4 months, this was suspended for three and a half years. He was also fined €7882.92.

The District Court disagreed with the County Court on a number of issues (including whether hiring staff without more amounted to the making available of an economic resource, but upheld the conviction. The sentence was unchanged.

The decision includes a discussion of the characteristics of control for asset freeze purposes.

Case 2. Judgment dated January 21, 2026

The prosecution entered into an agreement with the defendants that was upheld by the court following guilty pleas by the defendants.

The defendants (a company and a director that company) had set out to create a fake network of transactions and sales in order to import bitumen from Russia in breach of the EU’s sanctions. The fake transactions involved front companies in a range of jurisdictions including Kazakhstan and Hong Kong. One member of staff (who was either not prosecuted or separately prosecuted) had the role of maintaining a watching brief on changes to the EU’s sanctions in order to develop changes to the methodology for masking the Russian imports.

The company, Keystone Shipping OÜ, was fined €250,000, ordered to pay costs of €61,928.18 and had bitumen valued at €179,200 confiscated.

Andrey Kolesnikov, the sole director of the company, was fined €32,110 and costs of €1,329.

Case 3. Judgment dated March 6, 2026

The case was an appeal to the District Court from a judgment of the County Court which had found two men guilty of attempting to export a BMW car to Russia in breach of the EU’s sanctions against the export of luxury goods. Vladimir Palamarchuk was fined €3000 and Igor Palamarchuk was fined €2000. In addition the car, valued at over €50,000, was confiscated as the proceeds of crime.

The appeal, which was largely based on whether the car exceeded the 50,000 threshold, was denied and the fines and confiscation upheld.

The judgment relied on the EU’s FAQs in relation to the process for determining the price of an exported good.

Lithuania – sanctions enforcement statistics and €6.2m in fines for 2025

Lithuania’s Financial Crimes Investigation Service has issued a summary of its work for 2025, as well as a more detailed report (see pages 45-46) that includes the following:

  • 232 suspicious activity reports from financial institutions related to suspected breaches or circumvention of sanctions;
  • 77 of these were reported to other competent bodies in Lithuania or in other EU member states;
  • 45 inspections from the International Sanctions Implementation Commission;
  • €6,236,375.46m in fines for 2025 across 12 cases;
  • In addition:
    • in 2025, 27 cases were dealt with administratively with fines in these minor cases totalling more than €32,150
    • in 2024, 19 cases were dealt with administratively with fines totalling €28,000
    • in 2023, 12 cases were dealt with administratively (the value of the fines is not given)

The report also notes that 1 of the cases related to public procurement, 1 to the failure to provide information, 5 to circumvention, and 20 to the use of a bank designated by the EU.

UK – OFSI imposes Russian sanctions fine of £1,000,920.59

The UK’s Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation has issued a Penalty Notice against Sabre Global Technologies Limited (SGTL) imposing a fine of just over £1m against this UK entity.

SGTL continued to provide services to JSC Ural Airlines after that entity was designated in May 2022 and after the fact of the designation was communicated to SGTL by its lawyers on the same day.

Three payments were made to SGTL by JSC Ural Airlines between June and September 2022 totalling $906,576.30. These payments were blocked by SGTL’s bank.

In October 2022 SGTL self-disclosed the breaches to OFSI.

The Penalty Notice identified the following breaches:

  1. by invoicing JSC Ural Airlines SGTL made available a financial benefit (and so “funds”) in the form of the discharge of a debt obligation by the airline;
  2. by continuing to provide the airline with access to a product providing travel content up until 6 December 2022, SGTL was making an “economic resource” available to the airline;
  3. by exploring alternative payment routes to avoid the UK, including the making of a “test” payment of $200 to SGTL’s US bank account, SGTL was circumventing the UK’s sanctions in breach of regulation 19.

These breaches, especially the continued offering of SGTL’s product, were assessed as having a value of £2,634,001.54.

OFSI assessed the breaches as being in the “most serious” category given the value, the duration and the efforts at circumvention. The fine was assessed at the maximum of 50% of the value, and then the company obtained a 20% discount to reflect self-disclosure.

The Penalty Notice makes several other “Notes on Compliance”:

  1. firms must not test, reroute, restructure, or otherwise manipulate payment pathways in order to avoid, evade, or defeat the effect of UK sanctions. Attempts to engineer alternative channels, including staging of payments through third countries, may constitute circumvention and a breach in and of itself. Such conduct will be treated as aggravating and will significantly increase the seriousness of any case“;
  2. firms must be vigilant in identifying what may constitute an “economic resource” under UK sanctions regulations. Economic resources are assets of every kind, whether tangible or intangible, movable or immovable, which are not funds but can be used to obtain funds, goods, or services. Services that can be exchanged, directly or indirectly, for funds, goods, or services may constitute an economic resource even if they are intangible or provided digitally. In particular, firms should not assume that software, data services, or digital tools fall outside the scope of financial sanctions. A service that enables a designated person or entity to generate revenue, maintain operations, or otherwise obtain an economic advantage may amount to making an economic resource available“; and
  3. Although it is reasonable for a firm to take some time to assess the nature and extent of the breach, or seek legal advice, this should not delay an effective response to the breach. In practice, firms should contact OFSI early to inform us of a breach or potential breach. Where full disclosure is not possible, firms should make an early disclosure with partial information on the basis that it is still working out the facts and will make a further and full disclosure as soon as possible“.

Poland – sanctions enforcement statistics with nearly 2500 cases registered

A lengthy article in the Belarusian Investigative Center on alleged sanctions circumvention regarding Belarusian wood pellets, includes data obtained from the Polish Prosecutor’s office on sanctions enforcement:

  • 187 criminal cases were pending as of mid-2026 for circumvention of sanctions against Belarus and Russia (see our earlier post from May 2026 where the figure was 191);
  • nearly 2,500 sanctions cases have been registered;
  • 85% of these 2500 cases, or over 2100, concerned Belarus; and
  • At least 91 criminal proceedings were specifically related to wood-processing products.

Latvia – trial begins in significant case for the EU’s Russian sanctions

Further to our earlier post, trial has begun today in Riga of Eduard Tsehoval, the former head of the property known as Moscow House, in Latvia.

The prosecution alleges that Moscow House was ultimately owned or controlled by designated persons, Moscow’s Mayor Sergey Sobyanin, or by President Putin in their respective official capacities.

It is alleged that Mr Tsehoval oversaw the continued collection of rent by Moscow House after the imposition of sanctions, thereby making funds available to designated persons.

If the prosecution is successful on the basis of the property being controlled by President Putin, this case could have significant ramifications in the way Russian state-owned property is treated under the EU’s Russian sanctions.

Estonia – conviction for supplying press articles to Russian designated person

The District Court in Viru has convicted Aleksei Toom of sanctions offences and sentenced his to nine months in prison suspended for one year conditional upon no further offending.

Mr Toom’s conviction was for authoring over 100 press articles for a media outlet that is controlled by Dmitry Kiselyov, a designated person under the EU’s Russian sanctions.

Mr Toom’s employment had ended in October 2020, but he continued to write under the pen name Paul Tomson until December 2023.

The Prosecution, and the court, took the view that such articles were an economic resource, and that Russia Today’s portal, Baltnews, was controlled by Mr Kiselyov.

Netherlands – two arrested on suspicion breaching the sanctions on a designated person

The Dutch FIOD has issued a press release relating to the arrest of 59 and 37 year-old men from Amsterdam and the Hague respectively. Three business premises were also raised and searched.

The investigation relates to a web-hosting company founded in 2022 and designated by the EU in May 2025 for its role in the facilitation of “destabilizing activities directed against the European Union, including interference, cyberattacks and the spread of disinformation”. Following the designation the 57-year old set up a new company in the Netherlands which is alleged to have acted as a front for the continuing operations of the sanctioned entity.

A second Dutch company, of which the 39-year old was the sole shareholder and director is alleged to have played a facilitating role in providing interet connectivity.

UK – OFSI fines bank £165,000 for processing transfers to an entity wholly-owned by designated person

The UK’s Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation has issued a Penalty Notice against the London branch of Deutsche Bank AG fining it £165,000.

The fine related to two payments made in June 2022 and July 2022 that had been voluntarily reported to OFSI in September 2022. The “pace” of resolving this matter is in keeping with previous cases from OFSI.

The first payment leading to the fine was of £356,429.27 processed on 29 June 2022 in favour of a company called Okko LLC. Earlier that same day the UK had designated the 100% shareholder of Okko, JSC New Opportunities.

The second payment of £279,189.48 was made a month later.

OFSO took the view (particularly in light of the second payment) that even though there had been a limited window to stop the first payment, nonetheless there was such a window. The screening methods used by Deutsche Bank failed to identify that a newly-designated entity wholly-owned the intended transferee. This failing continued for the next month and was not purely a function of the short window for the first payment.

OFSI also took the view that the breaches could only be seen as such after the UK adopted a strict liability rule for the civil enforcement of sanctions breaches on 15 June 2022. An additional payment made before this date, was not considered a “breach” for this reason.

The notice was resolved under OFSI’s new settlement regime, and involved a 45% discount on what would otherwise have been a £300,000 fine based on the self-disclosure and Deutsche Bank agreeing to settle.

Switzerland – investigation into financial sanctions circumvention

As part of the Annual Report for 2025, Switzerland’s Federal Police Agency (Fedpol) has included information on an investigation into Russian funds held by an unidentified sanctioned Russian oligarch (the report uses the name “Aleksandr*” but this is not the person’s real name.

The report makes mention of a number of suspicious activity reports filed by Swiss private banks, and cooperation with an unnamed foreign country led to a significant investigation:

The investigation revealed that Oleg and Dimitri owned assets in several cantons. The competent foreign criminal prosecution authority submitted a request for mutual legal assistance to the Federal Office of Justice with the aim of searching the premises and seizing the assets of Oleg and Dimitri, in particular bank accounts and real estate. A cantonal public prosecutor’s office was responsible for processing the request for mutual legal assistance. fedpol coordinated the case in Switzerland and abroad. By the end of 2025, the operation was underway, with more than 50 Swiss investigators and prosecutors from several cantons involved.

The seizures would first take place in Switzerland, with further actions in other European countries scheduled to follow. To this day, this remains one of the largest cases involving money laundering for the purpose of evading sanctions“.

The report does not discuss the outcomes of the investigation so far.

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The opinions expressed on this blog are those of the author and are not to be construed as legal advice.

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