Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. – Page 11 – Class Action Defense

May 4, 2023 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Seventh Circuit Affirms Dismissal Of “Bare Bones” Lawsuit Brought Under Illinois Genetic Information Privacy Act

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, and Tyler Z. Zmick

Duane Morris Takeaways: On May 1, 2023, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issued one of only a handful of decisions that have been released regarding the Illinois Genetic Information Privacy Act (“GIPA”). In Bridges v. Blackstone, Inc., No. 22-2486, 2023 WL 3165218 (7th Cir. May 1, 2023), the Seventh Circuit affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ GIPA claims based on Plaintiffs’ failure to allege that Defendant “disclosed” or was “compelled to disclose” their statutorily-protected genetic information. Similar to its more well-known counterpart – the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”) – liability under the GIPA could potentially result in “astronomical” damages awards and may represent an increasingly important Illinois law in the privacy space.

GIPA Background

Enacted in 1998, the GIPA was designed to prevent employers and insurers from using genetic testing data as a means to discriminate for employment or insurance underwriting purposes.

To further that goal, the statute places restrictions on the ability to release “genetic testing and information derived from genetic testing.” Specifically, the GIPA provides that “genetic testing and information derived from genetic testing is confidential and privileged and may be released only to the individual tested and to persons specifically authorized, in writing in accordance with Section 30, by that individual.” 410 ILCS 513/15(a). Section 30, in turn, states that subject to certain exceptions, “[n]o person may disclose or be compelled to disclose the identity of any person upon whom a genetic test is performed or the results of a genetic test in a manner that permits identification of the subject of the test, except to . . . the subject of the test.” 410 ILCS 513/30(a).

Like the BIPA, the more widely-known privacy statute, the GIPA allows “[a]ny person aggrieved by a violation” of the statute to collect liquidated damages “for each violation” in the following amounts: (1) for negligent violations, $2,500 or actual damages, whichever is greater; or (2) for intentional or reckless violations, $15,000 or actual damages, whichever is greater. 410 ILCS 513/40. Like the BIPA, prevailing GIPA plaintiffs can also recover reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.

Case Background

In Bridges, the Plaintiffs sent their DNA samples (obtained through at-home test kits) to Ancestry.com, a genealogy company. Years later, Defendant Blackstone, Inc. purchased Ancestry.com for $4.7 billion in an all-stock acquisition. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a putative class action against Blackstone in July 2021, alleging that its acquisition of Ancestry.com resulted in a violation of the GIPA.

After removing the complaint to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, Blackstone moved to dismiss on the basis that Plaintiffs failed to sufficiently allege a claim for relief under the GIPA.

The District Court agreed, holding that Plaintiffs failed to state a GIPA claim because they did not adequately allege that Blackstone “compelled” Ancestry.com to disclose Plaintiffs’ genetic data under Section 30 of the GIPA. The District Court agreed with Blackstone that “compel[ing]” the disclosure of genetic information necessarily requires something more than receipt or obtainment, yet Plaintiffs alleged only that Blackstone “may have been entitled to request or receive information from Ancestry in connection with the[] acquisition.” Bridges v. Blackstone Grp., Inc., No. 21-CV-1091, 2022 WL 2643968, at *4 (S.D. Ill. July 8, 2022).

The Seventh Circuit’s Decision

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ GIPA claim under Rule 12(b)(6).

Regarding the District Court’s reason for granting Blackstone’s motion to dismiss, the Seventh Circuit held that it need not answer the question “over whether GIPA liability can attach to a company like Blackstone that allegedly receives protected information, rather than discloses that information,” because Plaintiffs “have failed to state a claim regardless.” Id. at *2.

The Seventh Circuit agreed with the District Court that it is not plausible to infer that “a run-of-the-mill corporate acquisition, without more alleged about that transaction, results in a compulsory disclosure within the meaning of Section 30.” Bridges v. Blackstone Grp., Inc., No. 22-2486, Order at 4 (7th Cir. May 1, 2023) (“All we can say with certainty about Blackstone’s all-stock acquisition of Ancestry is that a change in ownership occurred – nothing more.”).

Implications for Employers

One of only a few cases to have interpreted the statute, the Bridges decision indicates that a company is not subject to liability under the GIPA based solely on its acquisition of another company that may be in possession of genetic data.

Nonetheless, Bridges serves as a reminder to Illinois employers that collect genetic information, medical histories, and/or conduct “health screenings” as part of their application processes about the importance of complying with the GIPA.

The GIPA’s statutory text mirrors the BIPA’s text in important (and potentially concerning) ways, including that (i) a plaintiff can likely sue under the GIPA regardless of whether an actual injury is alleged; and (ii) following the Illinois Supreme Court’s logic as applied to the BIPA in Cothron v. White Castle, 2023 IL 128004 (Ill. Feb. 17, 2023) (see here), statutory damages may accrue under the GIPA each separate time a company “disclose[s] or [is] compelled to disclose” genetic data protected by the GIPA. Thus, it is possible that plaintiffs will file increased numbers of GIPA class actions in Illinois courts in the coming months and years.

April 29, 2023December 1, 2023 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Fifth Circuit Casts A Doubtful Eye On The U.S. Department of Labor’s Final Tip Credit Rule

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. and Shaina Wolfe

Duane Morris Takeaways: In Restaurant Law Center, et al. v. United States Department of Labor, et al., No. 22-50145 (Apr. 28, 2023), a decision of significant importance to all employers in general and the service and hospitality industry in particular, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed a Texas federal district court’s order denying a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the new tip credit rule of the U.S. Department of Labor (“DOL”) and remanded for further proceedings. In Restaurant Law Center, the plaintiffs seek a nationwide preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement of the DOL Final Rule regarding tip credit and dual jobs (the “Final Rule”). Importantly, the Final Rule reinstated the “80/20 Rule” by providing that employers can utilize the tip credit so long as 80 percent or more of the work is tip-generating, and not more than 20 percent is directly supporting work. However, the Final Rule also provides that employers cannot utilize the tip credit when an employee performs non-tipped work for more than 30 consecutive minutes. Plaintiffs claim that the DOL impermissibly created a new definition of “tipped occupation” that lacks support in the FLSA, and that enforcement of the Final Rule will impose substantial, ongoing costs on businesses. The district court had denied Plaintiff’s preliminary injunction solely because they failed to establish irreparable harm from complying with the Final Rule. The Fifth Circuit found that Plaintiffs submitted sufficient evidence that the Final Rule necessarily imposes a recordkeeping requirement and that employers who want to continue claiming the tip credit will “incur ongoing management costs” to ensure compliance. This decision is of signal importance as the Fifth Circuit’s decision indicates that the Final Rule may be on shaky ground.

Case Background

In late 2021, the DOL revived and revised the 80/20 Rule by providing that employers can utilize the tip credit only so long as 80 percent or more of the work is tip-producing, and not more than 20 percent is “directly supporting work.” See 29 C.F.R. § 531.56. Under the Final Rule, no tip credit can be taken for any non-tipped work. “Tip-producing work” is defined as work the employee performs directly providing services to customers for which the employee receives tips (i.e. taking orders and serving food). “Directly supporting work” is defined as work that is performed by a tipped employee in preparation of or to otherwise assist tip-producing customer service work (i.e., rolling silverware and setting tables). Non-tipped work includes preparing food or cleaning the kitchen, dining room, or bathrooms.

The Final Rule also includes a new requirement that an employer cannot utilize the tip credit when an employee performs more than 30 consecutive minutes performing “directly supporting work.” Directly supporting work done in intervals of less than 30 minutes scattered throughout the workday would not invalidate the tip credit, subject to the 80/20 Rule. However, employers must pay minimum wages for “directly supporting work” performed after the lapse of the first 30 continuous minutes.

In December 2021, Plaintiffs challenged the Final Rule in federal district court in Texas on the grounds, among other things, that it violated the Fair Labor Standards Act. Restaurant Law Center, No. 22-50145 at 3. Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction and after holding an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the preliminary injunction. Id. The district court did not reach the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims. Id. Rather, the district court assumed Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits, but concluded they had failed to show they were irreparably harmed by the costs of complying with the new rule. Id. at 3-4. The district court noted that the compliance costs had already been incurred since the Final Rule was in place for more than one month, and any other costs were speculative at best. Id. at 4. Further, the district court found that the new Final Rule, which is similar to the 80/20 rule, does not require employers to monitor their employees’ time. Id.

The Fifth Circuit’s Ruling Reversing The Denial Of The Preliminary Injunction

The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of the preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings with the expectation that the district court “will proceed expeditiously” to reconsider the preliminary injunction motion with the benefit of the Fifth Circuit’s ruling. Id. at 11.

In reversing the district court, the Fifth Circuit found that employers who want to continue claiming the tip credit will “incur ongoing management costs” to ensure employees do not spend more than 30 minutes continuously performing directly supporting work. Id. at 9. Significantly, the Fifth Circuit commented that compliance with the Final Rule requires employers to record their employees’ time. The Fifth Circuit explained that it “cannot fathom how an employer could honor these specific constraints without recording employee time. What if an employer is investigated by the Department or sued by an employee for wrongly claiming the tip credit? Without time records, how could an employer defend itself?” Id. at 7.

The Fifth Circuit also disagreed with the DOL’s assertion that “employers need not engage in ‘minute to minute’ tracking of an employee’s time in order to ensure that they qualify for the tip credit.” Id. The Fifth Circuit opined that “[n]o explanation is given (nor can we imagine one) why an employer would not have to track employee minutes to comply with a rule premised on the exact number of consecutive minutes an employee works” and that an employer will need to account for blocks of employee time, “especially if an employer is accused of violating the rule.” Id. (emphasis in original).

Circuit Judge Higginbotham dissented from the majority opinion. He explained that “the majority yields to the temptation to insert its own logic to fill the void,” insinuating that the majority substituted its own reasoning (and potentially desire for a particular outcome) for Plaintiffs’ lack of a “clear showing they were harmed.” Id. at 17.

The Texas district court now has two important rulings to make. First, according to the Fifth Circuit, it will need to analyze the other preliminary injunction factors and issue another ruling on the motion for preliminary injunction. Second, the district court will need to analyze and issue its opinion on the parties’ fully-briefed motion for summary judgment. It is likely that the district court will issue one ruling tackling both motions. Regardless of the outcome, this case will likely be heavily litigated in the Fifth Circuit.

Implications For The Service & Hospitality Industry

The Fifth Circuit’s decision indicates that a nationwide preliminary injunction preventing enforcement of the Final Rule may be on the horizon. The Fifth Circuit’s decision showcases the unreasonable and costly task of complying with the Final Rule. The service and hospitality industry should stay tuned for the Texas federal district court’s imminent rulings on Restaurant Law Center’s motion for preliminary injunction and motion for summary judgment.

April 26, 2023July 5, 2023 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Federal Court In New Hampshire Grants Conditional Certification In Wage & Hour Litigation After Deciding The First-Stage Standard Applies

By Michael DeMarino and Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Duane Morris Takeaways – In McCarthy v. Medicus Healthcare Sols., LLC, No. 1:21-CV-668, 2023 WL 2989051, at *1 (D.N.H. Apr. 18, 2023), the U.S. District Court for the District Court of New Hampshire granted conditional certification of a collective action consisting of physician recruiters who alleged that they did not receive overtime wages for all earned overtime hours in violation of the FLSA. Although the plaintiff’s motion for conditional certification came late in the procedural posture of the case, the Court nonetheless applied the more lenient first-stage conditional certification standard often relied upon in FLSA collective actions. The decision in McCarthy is an important one as it highlights the ongoing battle between litigants over the standard for conditional certification of a FLSA collective action when the parties have engaged in significant discovery.

Background Of The Case

Plaintiff, a recruiter, worked for Medicus, a nationwide physician recruitment and medical staffing company. Plaintiff alleged that Medicus misclassified him and other alleged similarly-situated employees as a “non-exempt” employee under the FLSA, and failed to pay him overtime compensation for working over 40 hours in a workweek in violation of the FLSA.

Prior to answering the complaint, Medicus twice moved to dismiss the original complaint on statute of limitations grounds. The Court denied those motions, Medicus answered the complaint, and the parties proceeded to discovery. During discovery, the parties unsuccessfully attempted to resolve the dispute at mediation. Afterwards, Plaintiff filed his motion for conditional certification of a collective action.

The Court’s Ruling

In opposing Plaintiff’s motion for conditional certification, Medicus argued that because Plaintiff filed the motion “near the end of the case” and the parties had engaged in “extensive discovery,” the Court should apply the heightened standard applicable to the later, decertification stage. Under that standard, which typically occurs after the defendant moves to decertify the collective action, the Court makes “a factual determination as to whether there are similarly-situated employees who have opted in.” Id. at *2.

In response, Plaintiff argued that he should “not be prejudiced for pausing the litigation (and delaying the filing of this motion) to attempt to resolve the case at a pre-certification mediation, and the more lenient first-stage standard should apply.” Id. Under this standard, “Plaintiffs bear the light burden of demonstrating that there is a reasonable basis for their claim that there are other similarly-situated employees.” Id. at *1.

The Court agreed with Plaintiff. It concluded that Plaintiff provided a “reasonable explanation for the alleged delay in filing.” Id. at *4. The Court also noted that numerous case law authorities had “applied the lenient standard under similar procedural circumstances, including after the parties engaged in substantial discovery.” Id. at *3. The Court opined that because conditional certification is ultimately a “case management tool,” it has broad discretion to manage its cases and apply the lenient first-stage standard. Id. at *4.

Applying the lenient first-stage standard, the Court rejected Medicus’s arguments that inconsistencies in Plaintiff’s evidence precluded conditional certification and that certain facts admitted in Plaintiff’s deposition give rise to individualized defenses. Instead, the Court held that for “purposes of this motion,” it need not “resolve factual disputes, decide substantive issues going to the ultimate merits, or make credibility determinations.’” Id. at *8. Over Medicus’s objection, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for conditional certification.

Implications For Companies Facing FLSA Collective Actions

The ruling in McCarthy underscores how the first-stage and second-stage certification standards in FLSA actions can impact the case and drive the decision whether to send FLSA notice to potential collective action members. Although the defendant was ultimately unsuccessful in getting out from under the lenient first-stage standard, corporate defendants facing FLSA collective actions still should push for the heightened second-stage standard when the parties have engaged in some amount of discovery. Whether a court will apply the first or second-stage standard generally will turn on the amount of discovery conducted and the reason for plaintiff’s delay in moving for conditional certification.

April 19, 2023 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Federal District Court in Virginia Rejects Two-Step “Conditional Certification” FLSA Process

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, and Rebecca S. Bjork

Duane Morris Takeaways: On April 14, 2023, U.S. District Court Judge T. S. Ellis, III joined in the fray over whether the long-used two-step process for issuing notice of a Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) collective action is consistent with the text of the statute. In Mathews v. USA Today Sports Media Group, LLC, et al., No. 1:22-CV-1307 (E.D. Va.), he held that it is not. Judge Ellis ordered the parties to engage in limited discovery to establish a factual record upon which he can decide whether members of the plaintiff’s proposed collective action are, in fact, “similarly situated.” If – and only if – he concludes they are, he would then issue a notice allowing such persons to opt-in to the collective action. This ruling is significant because it follows a similar decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in 2021, and the Sixth Circuit is currently considering an appeal raising the same issue. Thus, momentum may be building for the U.S. Supreme Court to ultimately step in and settle the issue. The one-step or two-step process is far from academic, for it has everything to do with litigation costs and risks, and the leverage flowing from a win or a loss in the certification battle.

Case Background

Plaintiff filed a collective action lawsuit under the FLSA alleging that USA Today Sports Media Group, LLC (“USA Today”) and Gannett Co., Inc. unlawfully classified her and others like her as independent contractors, and thus denied them overtime pay. From January 2017 to August 2021, Plaintiff was the Site Editor for the Seahawks Wire website, USA Today’s website covering the NFL franchise Seattle Seahawks. In her role, Plaintiff alleges that she and other “similarly situated” Site Editors for other teams all signed the same “Editor Agreement” with USA Today, and that they all engaged in similar duties such as “writing, editing and publishing sports news articles regarding their respective teams; managing others; editing other people’s articles; and making social media posts regarding articles they had written.” (Slip Op. at 2.) She submitted three declarations signed by herself and two others working as site editors for other teams, along with a motion for “conditional certification” of her FLSA collective. (Id.)

USA Today responded by submitting declaration evidence to show that Site Editors have freedom to create their content including how long their articles are, the tone they take, how many are posted each day, et cetera. (Id. at 3.) It also noted that it did not provide any office space, tools, feedback, performance evaluations, or supervisors to Site Editors, and also allowed them to write for other websites. (Id.) In other words, USA Today submitted evidence to show that under the applicable test for deciding whether someone is an independent contractor, Site Editors meet that standard, so they are not misclassified.

As is typical, Plaintiff argued that her lawsuit should proceed immediately as a collective action by issuance of an order sending notice to all of the other Site Editors around the nation. She maintained that she had submitted sufficient evidence under a lenient first step standard in a two-step process that they are all “similarly situated.” (Id. at 1, 4.) Under a test established in 1987 by Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 118 F.R.D. 351 (D.N.J. 1987), Plaintiff contended that step one is an “initial ‘notice stage’ determination” that members of the proposed collective action are similar enough to receive a notice of the action and be given the opportunity to opt in. (Id. at 4 (citing Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095 1102 (10th Cir. 2001).) Under this view of the FLSA, a plaintiff need only show “substantial allegations” that they are “victims of a single decision, policy or plan” in order for a notice to be sent – in this case, to all Site Editors nationwide. (Slip Op. at 4.) Plaintiffs then usually receive the right to conduct complete discovery, after which defendants may file a motion to “decertify” the collective action, based on evidence developed during the discovery process.

USA Today responded that the Court should follow the Fifth Circuit’s recent decision in Swales v. KLLM Transp. Servs., LLC, 985 F.4th 430 (5th Cir. 2021), which rejected the longstanding approach developed in Lusardi. (Slip Op. at 4.) It argued that the two-step approach has no basis in the statutory language of the FLSA. Rather, it emphasized that the court must instead make a sound factual determination as to whether proposed opt-in plaintiffs are, in fact, similarly situated and that requires discovery targeted solely to that inquiry. (Id.)

The Court’s Decision

Judge Ellis agreed with USA Today. He ruled that the parties must engage in discovery directed to establishing whether or not Site Editors around the country are similarly situated with regards to their work, the supervision provided (or not) by USA Today, along with the other relevant factors to establish that they were misclassified as independent contractors. He began by noting that the Fourth Circuit had not adopted the Lusardi test, nor had it commented on the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Swales. Rather, the Fourth Circuit has simply stated that district courts have discretion to manage the notice process in FLSA collective actions. (Id. at 5.) Judge Ellis decided that “the correct approach then, as noted by the Fifth Circuit, is the one authorized by FLSA’s text. Courts must determine, at the outset, whether a proposed collective action is ‘similarly situated’ to the named plaintiffs. To make this determination, courts may require limited discovery, targeted only at the factual and legal considerations needed to make the ‘similarly situated’ determination.” (Id. at 6.) He then ordered discovery only of the following – from the plaintiffs the Schedule C or W-2 forms of the named plaintiff and two declarants relating to their work writing sports media blog posts; any employment contracts, offer letters or agreements relating to their work; and one three-hour deposition; and from the defendants the independent contractor agreements; policy documents relating to the independent contractor arrangement; an organizational chart; a three-hour long Rule 30(b)(6) deposition; and a three-hour long deposition of defendants’ declarant filed in opposition to plaintiff’s motion. (Id. at 6-7). The discovery must be completed by May 26, 2023. (Id. at 6.)

Implications For Employers

Our annual class action review analyzed FLSA conditional certification rates, and plaintiffs won 82% of first stage conditional certification motions, but only 50% of second stage motions. Our previous post on these statistics is here. Hence, the stakes are quite meaningful in terms of the approach outlined in the Matthews ruling.

As any employer who has been sued by a named plaintiff seeking to represent an FLSA collective action knows, the discovery burden imposed by application of the two-step Lusardi decision is far more onerous than what Judge Ellis established in this case. Full merits discovery lasting more than a year is common, as opposed to a narrowly-targeted investigation of the work performed by the plaintiffs along with facts relating to the relevant independent contractor factors. For that reason alone, employers with operations within the Fourth Circuit will be happy to know they can cite Judge Ellis’ ruling in the future. While no one can predict the future with any degree of certainty, it seems likely that this new legal trend regarding the collective action notice process may eventually need to be resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court.

April 17, 2023December 1, 2023 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Seventh Circuit Teaches Important Lesson On The “Rigorous Analysis” Required for Rule 23 Class Certification

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Shaina Wolfe, and Aaron A. Bauer

Duane Morris Takeaways: In Eddlemon v. Bradley University, No. 20-01264 (7th Cir. Apr. 12, 2023), the U.S. Court of Appeal for the Seventh Circuit vacated an Illinois federal district court’s class certification order because it failed to conduct a “rigorous analysis” of each of the Rule 23 factors – numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. A student alleged, among other things, that during the COVID-19 pandemic, Bradley University breached its implied contract with students by shortening the Spring 2020 semester and continuing to charge students full tuition, and was unjustly enriched by charging students for their unused activity fees. The district court granted class certification to students that paid full tuition and activity fees for the Spring 2020 semester. The Seventh Circuit held that the district court did not thoroughly evaluate the Rule 23 factors because it relied only on the pleadings and failed to ensure that the plaintiff had met each of the required factors. The Seventh Circuit’s decision serves as a reminder that plaintiffs must offer sufficient evidence and show how each of the Rule 23 factors are met, and district courts must rigorously analyze the Rule 23 requirements prior to certifying a class action.

Case Background

With the unexpected onset of COVID-19 during the Spring Semester of 2020, Bradley University, like many other schools, transitioned from in-person to remote learning. To facilitate the transition, the university extended its Spring break, which in-turn, shortened the school’s 15-week spring semester to 14 weeks.

A student sued the university for breach of an implied contract because the university charged students full tuition despite the shortened semester. The student alleged that the university’s class catalog served as a contract that entitled the student to 15 weeks of education. The student also alleged that the university was unjustly enriched by the collected student activity fees because students did not attend any on-campus activities. The student sought class certification on behalf of the 7,759 other students.

The U.S. District Court for the Central District of Illinois granted Rule 23 certification of two classes, including: (1) students whose Spring 2020 semester was shortened, and (2) students who paid the Spring 2020 semester activity fees. The university filed a Rule 23(f) appeal with the Seventh Circuit, challenging the district court’s analysis of the commonality and predominance requirements. The university argued that the district court erred in granting class certification because it relied solely on the student’s pleadings without assessing the record. The university also argued that the district court failed to identify or separately analyze the student’s claims.

The Seventh Circuit’s Ruling Vacating Class Certification

The Seventh Circuit vacated the district court’s class certification order and remanded for further proceedings. The Seventh Circuit agreed with the university’s two main arguments.

First, the Seventh Circuit noted that “[t]he district court’s certification order does not reveal whether the court examined the record,” but that the district court repeatedly referred to the student’s allegations without addressing his purported evidence (e.g., the university’s class catalog) or examining how the student would prove his allegations with common evidence. The Seventh Circuit held that the district court’s certification order, therefore, rested on an error of law and amounted to an abuse of discretion because Rule 23 required it to “go beyond the pleadings.”

Second, the Seventh Circuit explained that the district court’s analysis was incomplete because it did not identify or separately analyze the elements of plaintiff’s claims, which is critical to the predominance analysis. The Seventh Circuit emphasized that the district court failed to note the elements of the student’s claims. Instead, the district court listed only one common question for each class without explaining the question’s “relative importance” to each claim, whether any individual questions existed, or how the common question predominated over individual questions. The Seventh Circuit opined that the district court’s analysis was “fatal,” and reiterated that a “one size (or one claim approach) is at odds with the rigorous analysis required at the class certification stage.”

Finally, the Seventh Circuit took the “opportunity” to clarify that, at the certification stage, the district court may only consider the merits of a claim to the extent it is relevant to determining whether the Rule 23 prerequisites for class certification are satisfied.

Implications for Employers

The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Eddlemon serves as important reminder that plaintiffs must support their motions for class certification with a “preponderance of the evidence” and district courts must conduct a “rigorous analysis” of the evidence in the record. To defeat class certification, defendants should emphasize the importance of each Rule 23 factor and attempt to show why, under a rigorous analysis, the plaintiff’s class claims should not be certified.

April 13, 2023 by Alex W. Karasik

EEOC Mid-Year Lawsuit Filing Update For Fiscal Year 2023

By Alex W. Karasik, Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. and Jennifer A. Riley

Duane Morris Takeaways: The EEOC’s fiscal year 2023 (“FY 2023”) spans from October 1, 2022 to September 30, 2023. Through the midway point of FY 2023, EEOC enforcement litigation filings have been fairly status quo with a total of 29 new lawsuits filed in the first six months. Traditionally, the second half of the EEOC’s FY, and particularly in the final month of September, are when the majority of filings occur. Even so, an analysis of the types of lawsuits filed, and the locations where they are filed, is informative for employers in terms of what to expect during the fiscal year-end lawsuit filing rush in September.

Cases Filed By EEOC District Offices

In addition to tracking the total number of filings, we closely monitor which of the EEOC’s 15 district offices are most active in terms of filing new cases over the course of the FY. Some districts tend to be more aggressive than others, and some focus on different case filing priorities. The following chart shows the number of lawsuit filings by EEOC district office.

The most noticeable trend of the first six months of FY 2023 shows that the Charlotte District Office already filed five lawsuits. The Los Angeles and San Francisco District Offices each filed 13 lawsuits in FY 2022. In the first half of FY 2023, however, there was only one filed in Los Angeles, and three in San Francisco. The Birmingham and Dallas District Offices have yet to file a single lawsuit in FY 2023.

Analysis Of The Types Of Lawsuits Filed In First Half Of FY 2023

We also analyzed the types of lawsuits the EEOC filed throughout the first six months, in terms of the statutes and theories of discrimination alleged, in order to determine how the EEOC is shifting its strategic priorities. The chart below shows the EEOC filings by allegation type.

The percentage of each type of filing has remained fairly consistent over the past several years. Title VII cases again made up the majority of cases filed the first half of FY 2023, with 59% of all filings, (lower than the 69% in FY 2022, but similar to the 62% in FY 2021 and 60% in FY 2020). ADA cases also made up a significant percentage of the EEOC’s FY 2023 filings thus far, at 31%, an increase from the 18% in FY 2022, although down from the 36% in FY 2021. There were also four ADEA cases filed in the first half of the FY.

The graph below shows the number of lawsuits filed according to the statute under which they were filed (Title VII, Americans With Disabilities Act, Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Equal Pay Act, and Age Discrimination in Employment Act) and, for Title VII cases, the theory of discrimination alleged.

Notable 2023 Lawsuit Filings

Gender Identity Discrimination

After the 2020 U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020), which held that federal law prohibits employment discrimination against LGBTQ workers on the basis of sexual orientation or transgender status, we expected to see more aggressive EEOC-initiated litigation in this area. Two lawsuits involve claims of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and transgender status. In the first, EEOC v. TC Wheeler, Case No. 23-CV-286 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2023), the EEOC alleged that management and employees harassed a transgender male employee because of his gender identity, including telling the employee that he “wasn’t a real man,” and asking invasive questions about his transition. The EEOC further alleged that other employees also made anti-transgender comments and continually referred to the employee by using female pronouns.

In EEOC v. Sandia Transportation, Case No. 23-CV-274 (D.N.Mex. Mar. 31, 2023), the EEOC alleged that the defendant discriminated against lesbian female employees on the basis of their sexual orientation. The EEOC contended that the owner of the company stated that women did not belong in the workplace, that he “hated dealing with women,” and referred to them in a number of derogatory terms.

Both of these lawsuits suggest that the EEOC will be filing more lawsuits seeking to protect against harassment of employees based on their sexual orientation or because of their gender.

Vaccine-Related Litigation

Given the prevalence of vaccine-related debates that emerged during the COVID-19 pandemic, we anticipated there would be a surge of exemption cases coming through the EEOC’s charge intake system. In EEOC v. Children’s Hospital of Atlanta, Case No. 22-CV-4953 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 15, 2022), the EEOC alleged that the pediatric healthcare system violated federal law when it fired a maintenance assistant for requesting a religious exemption to its influenza vaccination policy. The EEOC contended that the defendant terminated the employee for failing to receive the vaccination, despite his request for a religious exemption to the defendant’s flu vaccination requirements based on sincerely held religious beliefs. The EEOC noted that the defendant previously granted the employee religious exemptions in 2017 and 2018, but denied the request in 2019 and subsequently terminated his employment. We anticipate a significant uptick in vaccine-related litigation as the smoke clears from the global pandemic.

Race Discrimination

Several events involving race discrimination over the last few years have made this issue a continued priority for the EEOC. So far, the Commission filed a few notable lawsuits involving race discrimination. In EEOC v. First Advantage Background Services Corp., Case No. 23-CV-958 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 16, 2023), the defendant allegedly used background check information to make discriminatory hiring decisions on the basis of race. In EEOC v. Bilal & Aaya Subway, Inc., Case No. 23-CV-129 (E.D.N.C. March 16, 2023) the EEOC filed a lawsuit alleging that three Subway franchises subjected employees to racial discrimination when their owner regularly made racist statements about Black people and terminated workers because they were Black. The EEOC asserted that the harassment was severe and pervasive, that the owner criticized traditionally Black hairstyles, and fired an employee with dreadlocks.

These filings indicated that the EEOC will continue to litigation race discrimination claims on a priority basis throughout the remainder of the fiscal year.

March 2023 Release Of Enforcement Statistics

On March 13, 2023, the EEOC published its fiscal year 2022 Annual Performance Report (FY 2022 APR), highlighting the Commission’s recovery of $513.7 million in monetary relief for more than 38,000 victims of employment discrimination, including nearly $40 million as a direct result of litigation resolutions.

This annual publication from the EEOC is noteworthy for employers in terms of recognizing the EEOC’s reach, understanding financial exposure for workplace discrimination claims, and identifying areas where the EEOC may focus its litigation efforts in the coming year.

It is a must read for corporate counsel, HR professional, and business leaders.

Strategic Priorities

Addressing systemic discrimination has long been a top priority for the EEOC. In FY 2022, the EEOC resolved over 300 systemic investigations on the merits, obtaining more than $29.7 million in monetary benefits. The EEOC also resolved 10 systemic lawsuits, obtaining over $28 million in relief for nearly 1,300 individuals and significant equitable relief. To ensure the systemic lawsuit cupboard was not left bare, the EEOC filed 13 new systemic lawsuits.

Advancing racial justice was another strategic priority for the EEOC in FY 2022. The FY 2022 APR notes that the EEOC resolved 18 lawsuits alleging race or national origin discrimination, for approximately $4.6 million in relief benefiting 298 individuals. In addition, nine of the new 13 systemic lawsuits include claims of race or national origin discrimination. The EEOC also conducted 468 race and color outreach events, which reached 52,675 attendees. This includes 143 racial justice events reaching 9,064 attendees.

Finally, in recent years the EEOC has indicated that the use of artificial intelligence (“AI”) and algorithmic fairness in employment decisions is a strategic priority. In addition to providing AI training to systemic enforcement teams in the EEOC’s field offices, the EEOC hosted 24 AI and algorithmic fairness outreach events for 1,192 attendees. The EEOC’s efforts culminated with one lawsuit filing in this area. Of note, the EEOC prepared two ADA-related guidance publications relative to the use of artificial intelligence.

We anticipate that the EEOC will continue to focus on these strategic priorities in the remaining months of FY 2023.

Other Notable Developments

Beyond touting its monetary successes, the FY 2022 APR also highlights the EEOC’s efforts in the community. The EEOC conducted 3,302 outreach and training events, providing more than 225,906 individuals nationwide with information about employment discrimination and their rights and responsibilities in the workplace. Among these outreach programs were 399 events for small businesses, which were attend by approximately 18,878 individuals. Finally, 369 outreach events concerned the intersection of COVID-19 and employment discrimination laws. These COVID-19 programs had 26,041 attendees.

The EEOC also expanded its digital footprint, as the EEOC’s website had 10.8 million users. This marks a 3% increase over fiscal year 2021. There were 16 million user sessions, a 4.4% increase over fiscal year 2021. The EEOC had over 29 million page views, a 4.4% increase over fiscal year 2021, and there was a 3% increase in mobile traffic on the website. This data suggests that potential charging parties and other various constituents are more actively engaging with the Commission through its online platforms.

Takeaways For Employers

The first six months of the EEOC’s FY 2023 started with changes in leadership and a focus on new strategic initiatives. With a vastly increased proposed budget, it is more crucial than ever for employers to take heed in regards to the EEOC’s strategic priorities and enforcement agendas.

Stay tuned to our blog for future updates regarding the EEOC’s litigation activities.

April 6, 2023 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

District Court Declines To Award Additional Attorneys’ Fees In $508 Million Sex Discrimination Class Action Settlement

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. and Rebecca S. Bjork

Duane Morris Takeaway: Even when class actions span decades prior to settling, the case seems unwinnable, the settlement contains a vast record, and the outcome was largely favorable to plaintiffs, courts nonetheless might be reluctant to add a “superior attorney performance” lodestar multiplier for an award of attorneys’ fees when the evidence provided by plaintiffs’ counsel is insufficient to do so. This issue was present in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia’s recent ruling in the extraordinary 45-year long case of Hartman, et al. v. Blinken, Case No. 77-CV-2019 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2023).

The ruling is a must read for any corporate counsel involved in class action litigation.

Case Background

Hartman was originally filed on Nov. 25, 1977 by over 1,000 female plaintiffs alleging that they were discriminated against by the United States Information Agency on the basis of their sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act when they were allegedly passed over for hiring or promotions at the agency. The resulting litigation continued for decades, until the last several years, which involved negotiations between the plaintiffs’ counsel and the United States Department of State, the resulting defendant following the dissolution of the U.S. Information Agency. In 2000, the parties entered into a consent decree that provided for a $508 million settlement fund for the class and for “reasonable attorneys’ fees, expenses, and costs.” Id. at 2. The parties also settled more than 20 interim attorneys’ fee requests. Id.

The class action settlement constitutes the largest employment discrimination class action settlement ever.

In 2018, after all settlement funds were issued, plaintiffs filed a motion for a final determination of attorneys’ fees, seeking an additional award of $34 million as an enhancement to the lodestar amount.

Following an extensive evaluation and analysis of the previously awarded attorneys’ fees, the court denied plaintiffs’ request. It ruled that although the lodestar fee that had been awarded up to that point was “likely not an adequate measure of class counsel’s true market value,” plaintiffs had failed to properly identify information necessary for the court to approve a modification to the award. Id. at 3. Specifically, the court noted that plaintiffs had not submitted information regarding the “Laffey Matrix rates” used to calculate interim fees over the past several years, and failed to provide interest rate differences between the 1-year Treasury bill rate and the prime rate. Id. at 3-4.

The parties thereafter stipulated that defendants: (i) would pay plaintiffs $9,033,600 to resolve any issues concerning the use of the below-market Laffey Matrix rates and the Treasury bill interest rate; (ii) that the value of the base lodestar for the enhancement was $19 million; and (iii) that all other claims based on delay of fees, true market lodestar value, or interest paid on the interim fee awards were fully resolved. Id. at 4. The only remaining issue, identified by the parties as a potential dispute, was the possibility of a lodestar enhancement for “superior attorney performance” or “exceptional results.” Id.

Plaintiffs thereafter filed a motion for a lodestar enhancement based on “superior attorney performance.” The court denied the motion.

The Court’s Ruling

The court reviewed plaintiffs’ request under the D.C. Circuit’s “three-part analysis to assess appropriate fee awards under fee-shifting statutes in cases involving complex federal litigation.” Id. at 5. Under that framework, the third part of the analysis, or whether the use multiplies as warranted, was applicable here. Id.

Plaintiffs asserted that exceptional results and superior lawyering justified enhancement of the lodestar because it did not account for: (i) the results obtained; (ii) “the preclusion of other employment by committing both human and capital resources to the case;” (iii) “the duration of the case;” (4) “the ‘undesirability’ of the case;” and (iv) “awards in similar cases.” Id. at 10.

The court essentially found that none of the factors warranted a lodestar enhancement, as all factors were already accounted for in other areas of the lodestar determination. The court explained that any special results obtained should be already reflected in the reasonableness or the hourly rates. The court also noted that the complexity and voluminous nature of the record materials would be reflected in the overall number of hours billed. The court also stated that plaintiffs failed to show how any special commitment of human or capital resources was not already reflected in the lodestar.

As to plaintiffs’ argument that the case was “undesirable” and thus an enhancement was warranted, the court ruled that plaintiffs failed to identify specific evidence demonstrating that the case was undesirable, which was required under pertinent case law. Further, any societal implications from plaintiffs’ victory could not be measured in an objective way by the court in order to provide a lodestar enhancement.

The court concluded by emphasizing that the decision not to multiply the lodestar should not be taken to diminish the “resounding success plaintiffs’ counsel achieved.” Id. at 13-14. However, the court ruled that this case was not the “rare” or “exceptional” case in which “specific evidence” supports an “objective and reviewable basis” for enhancement of the lodestar. Id. at 14. The court thereby denied plaintiffs’ request for an enhancement of the lodestar amount.

Implications For Employers

Fee awards are discretionary, but the ruling in Hartman demonstrates the high standard of evidence required for an enhancement award. This decision is an excellent reference for defense efforts to fight attorneys’ fees awards in large-scale class actions.

April 3, 2023 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

ESG And The Growing Interplay With Class Action Lawsuits

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. and Brad A. Molotsky

Duane Morris Takeaways: The plaintiffs’ class action bar is exceedingly innovative and in constant pursuit of “the next big then” insofar as potential liability is concerned for acts and omissions of Corporate America. Environmental, Social, and Governance – known as “ESG” – each of the verticals within ESG are surely are topics on the mind of leading plaintiffs’ class action litigators. As ESG-related issues evolve and become increasingly more important to corporate stakeholders, class action litigation against companies is inevitable and has already begun to take shape. This blog post reviews the current landscape of litigation risks, and underscores how good corporate compliance programs and corporate citizenship are prerequisites to minimizing risk.

The Class Action Context

In 2022, the plaintiffs’ class action bar filed, litigated, and settled class actions at a breathtaking pace. The aggregate totals of the top ten class action settlements – in areas as diverse as mass torts, consumer fraud, antitrust, civil rights, securities fraud, privacy, and employment-related claims – reached the highest historical totals in the history of American jurisprudence. Class actions and government enforcement litigation spiked to over $63 billion in settlement totals. As analyzed in our Duane Morris Class Action Review, the totals included $50.32 billion for products liability and mass tort, $8.5 billion for consumer fraud, $3.7 billion for antitrust, $3.25 billion for securities fraud, and $1.3 billion for civil rights.

As “success begets success’ in this litigation space, the plaintiffs’ bar is loaded for bear in 2023, and focused on areas of opportunity for litigation targets. ESG-related areas are a prime area of risk.

The ESG Context

Corporate ESG programs is in a state of constant evolution. Early iterations were heavily focused on corporate social responsibility (or “CSR”), with companies sponsoring initiatives that were intended to benefit their communities. They entailed things like employee volunteering, youth training, and charitable contributions as well as internal programs like recycling and employee affinity groups. These efforts were not particularly controversial.

In recent years, ESG programs have become more extensive and more deeply integrated with companies’ core business strategies, including strategies for avoiding risks, such as those presented by employment discrimination claims, the impacts of climate change, supply chain accountability, and cybersecurity and privacy. Companies and studies have increasingly framed ESG programs as contributing to shareholder value.

As ESG programs become larger and more integrated into a company’s business, so do the risks of attracting attention from regulators and private litigants.

And The Lawsuits Begin From All Quarters

While class action litigation can emanate from many sources, four areas in particular are of importance in the ESG space.

Shareholders: Lawsuits by shareholders regarding ESG matters are accelerating. Examples include claims that their stock holdings have lost value as a result of false disclosures about issues like sexual harassment allegations involving key executives, cybersecurity incidents, or environmental disasters. Even absent a stock drop, some shareholders have brought successful derivative suits focused on ESG issues. Of recent note, employees of corporations incorporated in Delaware who serve in officer roles may be sued for breach of the duty of oversight in the particular area over which they have responsibility, including oversight over workplace harassment policies. In its ruling in In Re McDonald’s Corp. Stockholder Derivative Litigation, No. 2021-CV-324 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 2023), the Delaware Court of Chancery determined that like directors, officers are subject to oversight claims. The ruling expands the scope of the rule established in the case of In Re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996), which recognized the duty of oversight for directors. The decision will likely result in a flurry of litigation activity by the plaintiffs’ bar, as new cases will be filed alleging that officers in corporations who were responsible for overseeing human resource functions can be held liable for failing to properly oversee investigations of workplace misconduct such as sexual harassment.

Vendors and Business Partners: As companies face increasing demands to address ESG issues in their operations and throughout their supply chains, ESG requirements in commercial contracts are increasing in prevalence. Requirements imposed on vendors, suppliers, and partners – to ensure their operations do not introduce ESG risks (e.g., by using forced or child labor or employing unsustainable environmental practices) are becoming regular staples in a commercial context. In addition, as more companies report greenhouse gas emissions – and may soon be required by the SEC to report on them – they increasingly require companies in their supply chain to provide information about their own emissions. Furthermore, if the SEC’s proposed cybersecurity disclosure rules are enacted, companies also may require increased reporting regarding cybersecurity from vendors and others. These actions – and disclosures – provide fodder for “greenwashing” claims, where consumers claim that company statements about environmental or social aspects of their products are false and misleading. The theories in these class actions are expanding by encompassing allegations involving product statements as well as a company’s general statements about its commitment to sustainability.

State Consumer Protection and Employment Laws: The patchwork quilt of state laws create myriad causes of action for alleged false advertising and other misleading marketing statements. The plaintiffs’ bar also has invoked statutes like the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act to bring claims against companies for alleged failures to stop alleged human rights violations in their supply chains. These claims typically allege that the existence of company policies and programs aimed at helping end human rights violations are themselves a basis for liability. In making human capital management disclosures a part of ESG efforts (including whether to disclose numeric metrics or targets based on race or gender), companies may find themselves in a difficult place with respect to potential liability stemming from stated commitments to diversity and inclusion. On the one hand, companies that fail to achieve numeric targets they articulate (e.g., a certain percent or increase in diversity among management) may subject themselves to claims of having overpromised when discussing their future plans. Conversely, employers that achieve such targets may face “reverse discrimination” claims alleging that they abandoned race-based or gender-neutral employment practices to hit numbers set forth in their public statements.

Government Enforcement Litigation: Federal, state and local government regulators have taken multiple actions against companies based on their alleged contributions to climate change or alleged illegal activities. For instance, in 2019, the U.S. Department of Justice investigated auto companies for possible antitrust violations for agreeing with California to adopt emissions standards more restrictive than those established by federal law. While the investigation did not reveal wrongdoing, it underscores the creativity that proponents and opponents of ESG efforts can employ.

Implications For Corporate America

The creation, content, and implementation of ESG programs carries increasing litigation risks for corporations but it is unlikely that ESG programs will diminish is size or scale in the coming years given increased focus by Fortune 100s and 500s and increased regulation at the federal and state levels.

Sound planning, comprehensive legal compliance, and systematic auditing of ESG programs should be a key focus and process of all entities beginning or continuing their ESG journey. As more and more companies adopt some level of corporative ESG strategy planning, compliance and auditing are some of the key imperatives in this new world of exposure to diminish and limit one’s exposure.

Duane Morris has an active Class Action Team to help organizations respond to the ever increasing need to be proactive to these types of risks. For more information or if you have any questions about this post, please contact Gerald (Jerry) L. Maatman, Jennifer Riley or the attorney in the firm whom you are regularly in contact with. We also have ESG and Sustainability Team to help organizations and individuals plan, respond to, and execute on your Sustainability and ESG planning and initiatives. For more information or if you have any questions about this post, please contact Brad A. Molotsky, David Amerikaner, Sheila Rafferty-Wiggins, Alice Shanahan, Jeff Hamera, Nanette Heide, Joel Ephross, Jolie-Anne Ansley, Robert Montejo, Seth Cooley, or the attorney in the firm with whom you are regularly in contact.

March 30, 2023 by Alex W. Karasik

Illinois Trial Court Grants Class Certification In BIPA Class Action

By Alex W. Karasik, Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. and Jennifer A. Riley

Takeaways: In Palacios v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz, LP, Case No. 18-CH-16030 (Cir. Ct. Cook County, Ill. Mar. 16, 2023), a state trial court in Illinois granted Plaintiff’s motion for class certification in an Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (the “BIPA”) class action. Given the limited jurisprudence in BIPA class action certification rulings, this decision is an important read for corporate counsel, as the ruling likely will be used as a roadmap by the plaintiffs’ bar to support their efforts to certify such classes.

Case Background

Plaintiff alleged that Defendant required him and other employees to scan their fingerprints into a biometric time clock system to record the time they worked, and unlawfully collected, possessed, and transferred their biometric information without consent and without a proper retention and destruction schedule. Plaintiff sought to certify a class of all hourly employees who enrolled in or used Defendant’s timekeeping system while working for Defendant between August 9, 2014, and October 15, 2019.

In terms of the four factors to certify the class – numerosity, adequacy of representation, commonality, and appropriateness – Defendant did not challenge the numerosity factor. However, Defendant challenged the motion for class certification regarding the other three factors.

The Court’s Decision

The Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for class certification. First, the Court held that the named Plaintiff was an adequate class representative. Defendant argued that, based on Plaintiff’s deposition testimony, he was, “uninformed and disinterested in the facts, the litigation, and his role as class representative.” The Court rejected this argument, holding that, “while [Plaintiff] may not understand legal jargon . . . he understands the basic facts . . . understands he is making a legal claim for violation privacy rights on behalf of a class of other employees [and] has been in regular communication with his counsel and participated in discovery.” Accordingly, the Court found that Plaintiff would adequately represent the putative class.

Second, the Court held that the commonality factor was met. Defendant contended that Plaintiff was at odds with the rest of the class since he alleged that he suffered emotional distress damages. The Court rejected this argument, holding that Plaintiff testified that he was harmed through a breach of his biometric information privacy rights and was pursuing the same claims on behalf of class members. Accordingly, the Court held that common questions predominated over questions affecting individual class members.

Finally, the Court explained that, “a class action must be an appropriate method for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.” Id. (citations and quotations omitted). The Court opined that many individuals incurred relatively small liquidated damages and their likely recovery was probably too small to justify a separate action. However, collectively, the Court could adjudicate the putative class’s claims, as it noted, “This is what class actions were designed to achieve.” Id. Accordingly, the Court held that a class action was the appropriate method for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.

Implications For Employers

While employers are likely still recovering from the sting of adverse Illinois Supreme Court BIPA class action rulings from early 2023, this decision marks another victory for the plaintiff’s bar. Defendants in BIPA class actions who are facing motions for class certification would be wise to avoid duplicating the arguments made here. In light of the shrinking number of potential BIPA defenses and skyrocketing damages, employers must begin exploring alternative defense strategies to combat these bet-the-company cases.

March 30, 2023December 1, 2023 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Illinois Court Dismisses BIPA Class Action Brought Against Seller Of Point-Of-Sale Technology For Lack Of Personal Jurisdiction

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Tyler Z. Zmick, and Shaina Wolfe

Duane Morris Takeaways: In White v. HungerRush LLC, No. 22-1206 (C.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2023), the Court dismissed claims for violations of the Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”) brought against a company that sells point-of-sale technology for lack of personal jurisdiction. White serves as a reminder to businesses that personal jurisdiction in Illinois may be lacking where their conduct has only a tenuous connection to Illinois and/or where they do not “collect” or “possess” biometric data. This ruling – which is largely consistent with federal court decisions addressing the issue – is a rare win for companies facing BIPA class actions, and is a required read for companies facing privacy class action litigation.

Case Background

Plaintiff worked at a restaurant in Peoria, Illinois, which used a point-of-sale system sold by Defendant HungerRush LLC, a Texas-based company. While working at the restaurant, Plaintiff enrolled her fingerprint onto the point-of sale system as a means of clocking in and out of work. She later sued the Texas-based Company, claiming that it violated the BIPA in connection with its sale of the point-of sale system by (i) failing to develop a written policy made available to the public establishing a retention policy and guidelines for destroying biometric data, and (ii) collecting her biometric data without providing her with the requisite notice and obtaining her written consent.

In response to the complaint, the Company moved to dismiss on the basis that the Court lacked personal jurisdiction. In support of its jurisdictional argument, the Company submitted an affidavit signed by its Chief Administrative Officer and General Counsel.

The Company’s affidavit explained that: (i) it is a Texas-based company; (ii) it does not manufacture finger-scan devices or software; (iii) Plaintiff’s employer purchased a point-of-sale system from it and separately purchased a finger-scan device from a third-party; (iv) the finger-scan device operates independently from its software; and (v) finger-scan data is not transmitted to its point-of-sale software – instead, the finger-scan device sends only an approval signal to its software.

Based on these facts, Defendant argued that its limited contact with Illinois (i.e., selling a point-of-sale system to Plaintiff’s Illinois-based employer) was insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction.

The District Court’s Decision

The Court granted the Company’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2).

First, the Court noted that “[w]here, as here, the defendant submits ‘evidence opposing the district court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff must similarly submit affirmative evidence supporting the court’s exercise of jurisdiction.’” The Court explained that because Plaintiff failed to submit any evidence refuting the Company’s evidence, i.e. the sworn affidavit, the affidavit was considered “unrebutted.”

Second, the Court found that the Company’s unrebutted evidence demonstrated that it did not have sufficient minimum contacts with Illinois for this case and it was not reasonably foreseeable that Plaintiff’s claims related to the Company’s contacts with Illinois. Significantly, Plaintiff failed to submit any evidence refuting the affidavit’s sworn statements that Plaintiff’s Illinois-based employer initiated the transaction with the Company, that any contracts the Company makes with Illinois restaurants are made in Texas with Illinois restaurants reaching out to the Company, that the Company’s system has no cloud functions, or that the Company does not and has never manufactured a fingerprint scanner.

The Court held that because Plaintiff failed to offer evidence or adequate explanations refuting the Company’s sworn statements, she failed to meet her burden in establishing personal jurisdiction.

Implications For Employers

White serves as a reminder that companies must have sufficient contacts with the state in order for the courts to have personal jurisdiction over them. In other words, companies with only limited contacts with Illinois will not be subject to personal jurisdiction in courts within Illinois.

White also illustrates the importance of submitting extrinsic materials (e.g., sworn affidavits) in support of showing lack of personal jurisdiction. Significantly, once the defendant has submitted affidavits or other extrinsic evidence supporting lack of jurisdiction, the plaintiff must go beyond the pleadings and submit affirmative evidence supporting the exercise of jurisdiction. Moreover, courts can dismiss BIPA class actions for lack of personal jurisdiction based on supporting affidavits – even where the affidavits speak in part to the merits of the case. See Order & Op. at 8.