The Class Action Weekly Wire – Episode 70: Sanctions Issues In Class Actions


Duane Morris Takeaway:
This week’s episode of the Class Action Weekly Wire features Duane Morris partner Jennifer Riley and special counsel Rebecca Bjork with their discussion of key sanctions rulings in the past 12 months of class action litigation.

Check out today’s episode and subscribe to our show from your preferred podcast platform: Spotify, Amazon Music, Apple Podcasts, Samsung Podcasts, Podcast Index, Tune In, Listen Notes, iHeartRadio, Deezer, and YouTube.

Episode Transcript

Jennifer Riley: Thank you for being here again for the next episode of our weekly podcast, the Class Action Weekly Wire. I’m Jennifer Riley, partner at Duane Morris, and joining me today is special counsel Rebecca Bjork. Thank you so much for being on the podcast today, Rebecca.

Rebecca Bjork: Great to be here, Jen. Thank you for having me.

Jennifer: Today we have a little different topic – we are discussing significant decisions granting or denying sanctions in class action cases. Rebecca, what are some of the reasons that a court could grant sanctions in a class action?

Rebecca: Sanctions are usually issued in response to a party violating court procedures, or abusing the judicial process in some way. They are more simply thought of as penalties. In civil cases, sanctions are typically in the form of a monetary fine. But the most extreme sanction imposed in civil cases, including class actions, can be dismissal with prejudice of the filing party’s complaint or dismissal of the answer of the responding party. In either of those cases the sanctioned party would have no further recourse available, and the case would be over with judgment entered against them.

Jennifer: Given the cost of defending a class action, corporate defendants also sometimes move for sanctions if the claims are frivolous. For instance, the Sixth Circuit issued a ruling on sanctions in Garcia, et al. v. Title Check, LLC. In that case, the plaintiff filed a class action against the defendant alleging that its buyers fee violated the Michigan General Property Tax Act. In that one, the district court had dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims, finding that the fee was not prohibited by the statute, and then the defendant moved for sanctions against the plaintiffs’ attorneys on the ground that the case was frivolous and had forced the defendant to incur unnecessary legal fees. There the district court granted the motion for sanctions, and ordered the plaintiffs’ counsel to pay attorneys’ fees and costs north of $73,000. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit then affirmed the district court’s ruling in that when the plaintiffs argued that the district court erred in imposing the sanctions because the legal issues in the case were debatable, and because the district court misunderstood Michigan law.

The Sixth Circuit, however, agreed with the district court’s conclusion that the plaintiffs’ counsel had unreasonably pursued a frivolous claim based on an implausible interpretation of the statute. The Sixth Circuit found the plaintiffs should have known that their claims lacked merit. It also rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that sanctions should have been limited to the specific filings relating to the unnecessary claims. Instead, the Sixth Circuit held that the entire action was frivolous and vexatious. For these reasons it affirmed the district court’s ruling, and imposed the sanction on the plaintiffs’ counsel.

Rebecca: A really interesting case involving sanctions. Last year in a class action was AFL-CIO v. LSRI,LLC, where the court entered more serious sanctions. The plaintiffs were two AFL-CIO locals, Local 846 and Local 847, and their employee benefit plans, and the plaintiffs filed a class action alleging that the defendant failed to pay contributions for workers covered under a labor contract for a project involving SpaceX in Cape Canaveral, Florida, in violation of ERISA. Plaintiffs further asserted, and this is important for the sanctions piece of this case, that the actual amounts that plans were owed could not be determined without an audit of the defendant’s records. So the sanctions issue arose in the case after the defendant failed to appear after being served with a complaint, and the court subsequently entered a default order against it. But then the court also ordered the defendant to submit its books, ledgers, payroll records, bank statements, other financial documents reflecting the hours worked by the defendant’s employees. The defendant did not comply with this order, so the plaintiffs moved for an order holding the defendant in contempt of court. After the defendant failed to appear at the hearing on the motion for contempt, the court granted the motion finding the defendant in contempt, and further imposed a compliance fine of $200 per day, and in addition awarded the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees and costs. Subsequently, the plaintiffs had to file another motion – and this is surprising – they sought the arrest of the defendant’s principal as a last resort, to obtain compliance with the court’s orders. The court concluded that the monetary sanctions had not been effective in inducing the defendant to comply, and therefore determined that the arrest of the defendant’s principal was appropriate, and so, for these reasons, the court ordered the arrest of the defendant’s principal for civil contempt.

Jennifer: That’s a great example. Rebecca. Sanctions are also deemed warranted in some cases where a party is not forthright with its discovery responses. A great example of that is in In Re Keurig Green Mountain Single-Serve Coffee Antitrust Litigation, where death knell sanctions were imposed. The plaintiffs filed a class action alleging that the defendants violated antitrust laws by operating a monopoly, by using exclusive dealings and exclusionary product design. The plaintiffs filed a motion for sanctions asserting that the defendant Winn Dixie failed to respond to discovery. The court granted the motion, and ordered Winn Dixie to pay attorneys’ fees and costs. The court found that Winn Dixie repeatedly and consciously failed to comply with three court orders indicating that lesser sanctions would not be effective.

Rebecca: Right. Federal courts have wide discretion in calibrating sanctions orders. In 2023, a ruling in Lopez, et al. v. Fun Eats & Drinks, LLC demonstrated how sanctions can include civil contempt orders. Plaintiffs moved for contempt and an award of attorneys’ fees after the defendants violated multiple court orders. The court granted that motion, and had previously entered a final judgment against the defendants, and awarded the plaintiffs more than $538,000, plus attorneys’ fees. So the plaintiffs moved for additional attorneys’ fees, and the defendants failed to respond to the motion. The plaintiffs thereafter served post judgment discovery on the defendants, and they again failed to respond. Plaintiffs moved to compel discovery, and the defendants counsel responded by moving to withdraw as counsel of record due to the defendant’s failure to communicate with them regarding the post judgment, discovery. The court ended up denying the defendant’s motion, and granted the plaintiff’s motion to compel, and the defendants once again failed to respond, and the plaintiffs then resorted to filing their contempt motion. The court granted the motion, holding the defendants in contempt for the refusal to comply with the court’s orders and respond to the post judgment discovery, and also held the defendant’s attorney in civil contempt for his failure to appear at the show cause, hearing, as ordered by the court. So that in the end the court granted the plaintiff’s motion, and ordered the defendants and defendants counsel to pay for the plaintiff’s additional attorneys, fees in the amount of over $5,000.

Jennifer: Thanks, Rebecca, that is a great example as well. Were there any notable rulings that you can think of where sanctions were denied over the past year?

Rebecca: Well, actually, most times sanctions motions are denied, and that is simply because the moving party has not been able to demonstrate bad faith or willfulness by the other party. One example is Colucci, et al. v. Health First, Inc., where the plaintiffs allege anticompetitive practices in the acute healthcare market against the defendant. The court denied the motion for class certification due to lack of standing to represent the class, and the parties later stipulated to dismiss the case. So after that the defendant sought sanctions under Rule 11, arguing that the plaintiff’s counsel had no factual or legal support for asserting standing in the first place. This court denied the motion for sanctions, stating that the arguments in support of class certification were not lacking in evidentiary or legal support sufficient to justify an order granting sanctions, and the defendant also failed to demonstrate any improper purpose in prosecuting the case by the plaintiff’s attorneys.

Jennifer: Thanks, Rebecca, great insights and analysis. I know that these are only some of the cases that had interesting rulings on motions for sanctions over the past 12 months, and that we are apt to see some notable rulings over the remainder of 2024 as well. Rebecca, thanks for being here and to our audience listeners – thank you so much for tuning in.

Rebecca: Thank you, Jen.

The Class Action Weekly Wire – Episode 69: Litigation Trends & Legislative Reform Under California’s PAGA


Duane Morris Takeaway:
This week’s episode of the Class Action Weekly Wire features Duane Morris partner Jerry Maatman and associate Sarah Gilbert with their discussion of key developments in litigation and legislation related to the California Private Attorneys General Act.

Check out today’s episode and subscribe to our show from your preferred podcast platform: Spotify, Amazon Music, Apple Podcasts, Samsung Podcasts, Podcast Index, Tune In, Listen Notes, iHeartRadio, Deezer, and YouTube.

Episode Transcript

Jerry Maatman: Thanks, loyal blog listeners and readers for joining us on this week’s installment of the Class Action Weekly Wire. I’m Jerry Maatman, a partner at Duane Morris, and I’m joined by my colleague, Sarah Gilbert, of our San Diego office. Welcome, Sarah.

Sarah Gilbert: Great to be here, Jerry. Thank you.

Jerry: Today we wanted to discuss trends and important developments in state court class action, litigation. Since the decision of where to file a class action is always a strategic imperative for the plaintiff’s bar, and then, whether or not to remove it from state court to federal court. For defense counsel, class action litigation is very much like buying real estate – location, location is everything, Sarah, what are some of the considerations that you’re often speaking to your clients about in terms of state court versus federal court class action litigation.

Sarah: So, although almost all state law procedural requirements for class certification mirror Rule 23 of the federal rules. The plaintiffs’ bar often perceives state courts as having more positive predisposition towards their clients’ interests, particularly where putative class members have connections to the state and the events at issue occurred in the state where the action is filed. Beyond forum shopping between state and federal court, the plaintiffs’ bar also seeks out individual states that are believed to be more plaintiff-friendly, such as California, Georgia, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts – among others – and these are actually among the leading states where plaintiffs’ lawyers file a volume of class actions. These courts are thought to have more relaxed procedural rules related to discovery, consolidation, and class certification; a lower bar for evidentiary standards; and higher than average jury awards – among other considerations – all of which incentivize forum shopping related to state class actions.

Jerry: I’ve been a lawyer 42 years, and I think at last, count, I’ve been in 48 different states defending class action litigation. And I’d have to say that although state statutory rules and regimes are based loosely on Federal Rule 23, every state approaches class action litigation a little differently, and there are nuances to the law. What do you think is important, for example, for companies operating in California to know about the nuances of California class action litigation?

Sarah: Absolutely. So, it is very important for companies in California to pay attention to California’s controversial Private Attorneys General Act – we call it the PAGA. The PAGA authorizes workers to file lawsuits, to recover civil penalties on behalf of themselves, other employees and the State of California, for state labor code violations. As of now, California is the only state to have enacted this type of law so far. However, several other states are considering their own similar private attorneys general laws, including New York, Washington, Oregon, New Jersey, and Connecticut. So it will be crucial to monitor state legislation on this topic given the impact such laws will have on class litigation strategy moving forward.

Jerry: Well, I know this has been an especially interesting year for PAGA related developments, especially following the reform legislation signed by Governor Newsom in June. And, as I understand it, after June of 2024, there’ll be a new regime in terms of how PAGA damages, PAGA procedures will take place. And although not to be applied retroactively and only into the future, it’s going to be a brand-new playing field in California. I know you’ve been working very hard on strategies for clients to deal with these changes, what would be some of the high-level points or takeaways that you think are important for clients?

Sarah: Sure. So I mean, as is clear and as you referenced, the PAGA reforms and activity are hotly contested, hotly debated in California. California is the epicenter of class actions filed in state court. It has more class action litigation than any other state. While all varieties of class-wide cases are filed in California, a high majority of those are consumer fraud and employment-related. And something I know, with all of our clients in California facing such claims, is that even where an employer’s written formal policies appear facially neutral and compliant – which is very often the case – employees may successfully seek class certification for demonstrating common issues where an employer’s practices and protocols allegedly violate the law, even if those policies, as written, appear to be compliant.

Jerry: Thanks, Sarah. You know, I think it’s very interesting – most companies think that the California Supreme Court exists to find in favor of plaintiffs. Yet in the last month it issued the Lyft decision, which has a direct ‘apples and oranges’ practical effect on PAGA litigation. As I read the opinion, it says, where an employer is facing multiple PAGA actions and settles one of them, the litigants in the other pending PAGA actions cannot parachute in, intervene and challenge the other settlement. So it makes it easier for a company to deal with PAGA litigation and to settle litigation. What are some of your thoughts on the takeaways from the California Supreme Court decision in Lyft?

Sarah: Yeah, absolutely. This was a seminal ruling came out on August 1st of this year. To give some background, in rapid succession between May to July 2018, three plaintiffs, all Lyft drivers, Olson, Seifu, and Turrieta filed separate PAGA actions alleging improper classification as independent contractors. So in 2019, Turrieta reached a $15 million settlement with Lyft, which included a payment of $5 million in attorneys’ fees. As part of the settlement, Turrieta amended her complaint to allege all PAGA claims that could have been brought against Lyft. She then filed a motion for court approval of the settlement consistent with practice. And although the LWDA did not object to the settlement, when Olson and Seifu, the other two plaintiffs, and their counsel, got wind of the settlement, they moved to intervene, and objected. The trial court denied the intervention requests, approved the settlement, and then denied motions by Olson and Seifu to vacate the judgment in the Turrieta PAGA action. The court of appeal affirmed, finding that as nonparties, Olson and Seifu lacked standing to move to vacate the judgment, as only an aggrieved party can appeal from a judgment. On the intervention issue, the Court of appeal explained that the real party interest in a PAGA action is the State of California, and thus neither Olson nor Seifu had a direct interest in the case.

The California Supreme Court then granted review to consider whether a PAGA plaintiff has the right to intervene, object to, or move to vacate a judgment in a related pocket action that purports to settle the PAGA claims that a plaintiff has brought on behalf of the State. The California Supreme Court ended up agreeing with the court of appeal and the trial court, and they made a few notable findings. The California Supreme Court noted there was nothing in the PAGA statute expressly permitting intervention, and that PAGA’s purpose to penalize employers who violate California wage & hour laws and deter such violations was well served by the settling PAGA plaintiff, thus having other PAGA plaintiffs involved in a settled PAGA claim is not necessary to effectuate PAGA’s purpose. Relatedly, the Supreme Court also found significant the fact that the PAGA statute only requires that notice of settlement be sent to the LWDA and approved by the trial court, necessarily implying that other litigants need not be informed of the settlement or otherwise involved.

The Supreme Court also noted that permitting intervention would result in a PAGA claim involving multiple sets of lawyers, all purporting to advocate for the same client, fighting over who could control the litigation and settlement process, and who could recover the attorneys, fees. The Supreme Court highlighted that PAGA plaintiffs nonetheless have a variety of options to pursue other than intervention, such as consolidation or coordination of PAGA cases, to facilitate resolution of the claims in a single proceeding; or PAGA plaintiff can offer arguments and evidence to a trial court related to the PAGA settlement; or raise his or her concerns with the LWDA, so as to spur LWDA action.

Finally, the Supreme Court then held that the same reasoning for its conclusion against a right to intervention also meant that a PAGA plaintiff has no right to move to vacate the judgment obtained by another PAGA plaintiff in a separate PAGA action, or to require that any objections he or she files to another plaintiff settlement be ruled upon.

Jerry: Thanks for that excellent overview, Sarah. I think 2024 and 2025 are going to be bellwether years in California, not only for PAGA related rulings, especially as the reform legislation is implemented, but just class action litigation in general. As our loyal blog readers and listeners know, we do an annual study called the Duane Morris Class Action Review. We download every filing, every ruling in state and federal courts throughout the United States. This morning there were 118 class actions recorded as being filed yesterday, and 40% of them were in the state of California. So California is truly the epicenter of class action litigation. Well, thanks so much for joining us on this weekly episode, Sarah, and thanks so much for your thought leadership in this space.

Sarah: Thank you. Thank you, Jerry.

The Class Action Weekly Wire – Episode 68: Settlement Issues In Class Action Litigation


Duane Morris Takeaway:
This week’s episode of the Class Action Weekly Wire features Duane Morris partner Jennifer Riley and associate Nick Baltaxe with their discussion of the settlement process in class action litigation and common issues that arise for both plaintiffs and defendants while crafting settlement agreements.

Check out today’s episode and subscribe to our show from your preferred podcast platform: Spotify, Amazon Music, Apple Podcasts, Samsung Podcasts, Podcast Index, Tune In, Listen Notes, iHeartRadio, Deezer, and YouTube.

Episode Transcript

Jennifer Riley: Thank you for being here again for our next episode of the weekly podcast the Class Action Weekly Wire. I’m Jennifer Riley, partner at Duane Morris, and joining me today is associate Nick Baltaxe. Thank you for being on the podcast, Nick.

Nick Baltaxe: Always a pleasure, Jen, happy to be here.

Jennifer: Today we’re discussing settlement issues in class action litigation over the past 12 months. Nick, how often are there settlements in class action litigation?

Nick: You know, class actions are typically not tried to verdict. Trials in these situations are rare, because financial exposure in most of these cases can be vast, and the possibility of an adverse verdict is usually an unacceptable risk to the employer. Because of that, most potential class actions are resolved either before or on the heels of a class certification order. Rule 23 not only provides a process for that certification of the class action, but also does provide a procedure for settlement of the class action claims as well. Specifically, Rule 23(e) lays out a three-part settlement approval process. It includes preliminary approval, then notice to the class, and final settlement approval.

Jennifer: And what would you say are some of the benefits of settling these types of cases?

Nick: You know there are benefits to everyone included. Early settlements offer plaintiffs relatively quick payments, and they get to kind of skirt around the longer, drawn out class certification and class litigation process. It’s a benefit to the defendant because it allows the defendants to end cases early, which usually avoids the costs of protracted litigation, and usually what is very expensive discovery. Also, there’s a benefit to the court system as they get to avoid needless litigation that clogs court dockets. Usually, when permitted, parties frequently choose to settle on a confidential basis, which also allows the avoidance of risk of adverse publicity which is a dynamic that can benefit both defendants and plaintiffs.

Jennifer: Are there any obstacles to settling or getting court approval of class wide settlements? Or what would you say some of the biggest obstacles are?

Nick: Yes. So, as we stated, there’s both a preliminary and a final approval process for these class settlements. In order to secure a court’s approval at the preliminary stage, the parties must provide sufficient information to the court to determine whether or not it will likely be able to approve the settlement and certify the classes solely for the purposes of the entry of judgment. Rule 23(e) includes a detailed list of factors for consideration before final approval, as well, including the quality of class representation. Whether the negotiation took place at an arm’s length, the adequacy of class relief, and the equitable treatment of the class members. Class notice at the preliminary approval stage is also governed by this rule and outlines the proper process for providing notice to the class members.

Jennifer: Thanks, Nick. The settlement approval process is far from a rubber-stamping process, at least in many courts. While the legal standards are rule-based, courts tend to apply the standards in less than identical fashion based on the case law of the federal circuit which within which they’re located, as well as based on their own discretion. So what might pass muster in one courtroom may not pass muster in another courtroom. Courts do tend to use a less rigorous standard for certification of a class for settlement purposes, though, as compared to non-settlement purposes. I think this is especially evident with the Rule 23(b)(3) requirement of predominance. What do you think this means for counsel crafting these settlements?

Nick: Yes, settlement on a class wide basis consistently poses strategic dilemmas both for plaintiffs and defendants alike. There are multiple issues that need to be considered recrafting the settlement. For example, how much can a defendant concede without compromising its ability to defend the case to the extent the settlement ends up falling through or is not approved; can we settle something on a class wide basis that may be too cheap, and therefore deemed to be inadequate or unfair when being reviewed by the courts; and finally, how extensive and broad can the release language be to cover the settlement parties without risking of that not being approved by the court.

Jennifer: And the courts can answer those questions on a very wide spectrum. So, now that we’ve laid out the settlement process, do you have any notable rulings that you wanted to discuss from the past 12 months?

Nick: So classified settlements require that plaintiffs show all the applicable requirements of Rule 23, and courts have, and will, deny approval to a proposed class-wide settlement if those requirements are not established. A good example is a case called Mercado, et al. v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority. In that case, the plaintiffs, who are a group of employees of the MTA, filed a collective action alleging that the defendant failed to pay overtime compensation in violation of the FLSA.

The parties ultimately settled the claims, and the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary settlement approval. However, the court denied the motion. While the parties had asserted that the litigation would have been protracted, expensive, and risky – and that the settlement provided close to maximum recovery for plaintiffs – the court found that the parties failed to provide any documentation to support their assertions concerning the ranges of possible recovery and the reasonableness of the settlement. The court also noted that the settlement agreement’s release was overly broad because it extended liability releases to various entities beyond the defendant as well as to individuals who are not part of the lawsuit. The court also examined attorneys’ fees and costs. In the case, the plaintiffs’ counsel sought a fee of one-third of the settlement proceeds and reimbursement of all costs. The court opined that the requested rates were reasonable, but the plaintiffs’ counsel failed to provide any evidence whatsoever to determine whether the costs were also reasonable. The court finally concluded the plaintiffs failed to address whether the conditional certification status of the collective action affected the settlement; whether they were requested service rewards for the named plaintiffs; and that the fees and the cost of the administration of the settlement fund were reasonable. Accordingly, the court denied the motion for preliminary settlement approval.

Jennifer: Nick, how often would you say that there are objections to class action settlements?

Nick: So there is also a process for class members to object to the settlement, and there are objections all the time in these situations to these settlements. Sometimes these objectors are even successful in overturning the settlement or getting it vacated on appeal. An interesting example from the past 12 months is a case called In Re Wawa, Inc. Data Security Litigation. In that case, the plaintiffs allege that their personal information was compromised following a data breach in which hackers gained unauthorized access to Wawa’s payment systems, therefore, compromising the credit and bank card data of around 22 million customers.

The case was ultimately settled for $9 million in gift cards and other compensation to customers, including $3.2 million for attorneys’ fees and costs. One of the class members, named Theodore H. Frank, objected to the settlement, arguing that the fee calculation was unreasonable, and arguing that the settlement was based on a constructive common fund that combined attorney and class recovery, therefore, making the fee award disproportionate to the amount that was being provided to the class members. The objector also raised concerns about side arguments between class counsel and Wawa.

The district court, however, approved the settlement and dismissed the objections. However, Frank appealed, and the Third Circuit vacated the district court’s ruling. The Third Circuit in doing so highlighted two key considerations in evaluating fee rewards: first, the relationship between the fee award and the benefit received by the class members; and second, any side agreements between class counsel and the defendant. The Third Circuit ruled that the district court on remand had to review the fee award with “fresh guidance” from the appellate level, particularly regarding arrangements between the parties prior to any settlement approval being granted. The Third Circuit also noted the parties’ “clear sailing” arrangement, under which Wawa agreed not to contest any fee petitions filed by class counsel for the consumers, and the fee reversion provision that any reductions in class counsel fees would be returned to Wawa rather than distributed to the class members. The Third Circuit made sure that both of those were being reviewed to determine whether or not they were fair and reasonable. The Third Circuit further opined the district court should consider whether the funds made available to the class members, rather than the amount claimed during the claims process, was the best measure of reasonableness, and whether the fee reward was reasonable in light of any other side agreements between class counsel and Wawa. With all those considerations in mind, the Third Circuit accepted the objection and vacated and remanded it to the district court.

Jennifer: Thanks, Nick. Very, very interesting, and a great example of an appellate court articulating the fairness considerations that should be applied by district courts in considering approval of class action settlements.

Well, I think we are about out of time here for today. So thanks so much for joining me, Nick, and thanks to our listeners for being here. We will be sure to give more updates on settlement issues in class action litigation on our blog, the Duane Morris Class Action Defense Blog, so stay tuned.

Nick: Thanks, all.

 

The Class Action Weekly Wire – Episode 67: Key Developments In Securities Fraud Class Action Litigation


Duane Morris Takeaway:
This week’s episode of the Class Action Weekly Wire features Duane Morris partner Jerry Maatman and associate Nelson Stewart with their discussion of significant developments in the securities fraud class action space, including analysis of two key rulings, class certification rates, and major settlements.

Check out today’s episode and subscribe to our show from your preferred podcast platform: Spotify, Amazon Music, Apple Podcasts, Samsung Podcasts, Podcast Index, Tune In, Listen Notes, iHeartRadio, Deezer, and YouTube.

Episode Transcript

Jerry Maatman: Thank you loyal blog readers for joining us for the next episode of our podcast series, the Class Action Weekly Wire. I’m Jerry Maatman, a partner in Duane Morris’ Chicago and New York offices, and joining me today is my colleague from our New York office, Nelson Stewart. Welcome.

Nelson Stewart: Thank you. Great to be here, Jerry.

Jerry: Today we wanted to discuss trends, issues, and important developments in the area of securities fraud class action litigation. Nelson, this is a big space, but could you give us, from your thought leadership perspective, some kind of summary of what you think are kind of key developments in this area?

Nelson: Sure, Jerry. Class action securities fraud claims typically involve an alleged public misrepresentation or omission made by the issuer of a security, a subsequent disclosure that reveals the statement or omission to be false, and a decrease in the value of the security resulting from the disclosure. Securities fraud claims readily lend themselves to class-wide treatment because the number of investors who may claim losses resulting from a misrepresentation is often considerable.

The principal federal statutes for securities fraud claims are the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Both statutes were enacted for the purpose of regulating securities markets and providing increased disclosure and transparency for investors in the wake of the stock market crash in 1929.

The 1933 Act generally applies to misrepresentation made in connection with an initial offering of securities. The 1934 Act imposes liability for misrepresentations related to the purchase or sale of existing securities.

Jerry: Thanks, Nelson, for that framework. By my way of thinking, the absolute Holy Grail in class action litigation for the plaintiffs’ bar is class certification. They file the case, they certify it, and then they monetize it. How did plaintiffs fare over the last year in terms of certifying securities fraud class actions?

Nelson: In 2023, plaintiffs were incredibly successful in gaining class certification. The plaintiffs’ bar secured class certification at a rate of 97% – or put another way, 35 of 36 motions. Companies secured denials in 3% of the rulings, or just in one case.

Jerry: While we do a comparative study of securities fraud with respect to other areas of law, at least in 2023 securities fraud class certification rates were the highest. We recently did a mid-year report in 2024, and still very high, but down to about 67% – 10 out of 15 cases certified in the securities fraud area. In terms of the key guide posts on the playing field when it comes to securities fraud class action litigation, what are some of the key developments that corporate counsel should be aware of?

Nelson: One of the most notable decisions in 2023 was the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Slack Technologies v. Pirani, et al. The Supreme Court addressed a split among the federal circuits created by the Ninth Circuit’s departure from a well-established interpretation of Section 11(a) of the 1933 Act. A plaintiff bringing a fraud claim under the 1933 Act must show that the purchase of shares at issue can be traced back to the false or misleading registration statement. The statute imposes strict liability and a lower standard of proof for a narrower class of securities than the 1934 Act, which applies to misrepresentations or omissions for any security, but carries a higher standard of that requires plaintiffs to show a scienter, reliance, and loss causation.

In Slack, plaintiffs had purchased shares through a direct listing that offered both registered and unregistered stock shares. The inability to trace unregistered shares to a registration statement would be fatal to plaintiffs’ claims under the 1933 Act. In denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the class action, the district court attempted to accommodate the traceability challenges of a direct listing through a broad reading of the “such security” phrase of Section 11(a). The district court held that the unregistered shares were “of the same nature” as shares subject to the registration statement and plaintiffs therefore had standing under Section 11(a) to bring the suit.

 

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit noted that the application of Section 11(a) to the direct listing was one of first impression and it affirmed the district court’s decision while rejecting its broader reading of Section 11(a). The Ninth Circuit expressed concern that the more restrictive reading of the statute advocated by Slack, and applied by other circuits, would limit an issuer’s liability for false or misleading statements through the use of a direct listing and thereby disincentivize the 1933 Act’s goal of transparency.

On further appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s decision and held that the language of the 1933 Act was intended to narrow its focus. Citing Sections 5, 6 and 11(e) as support for the conclusion that the term “such security” refers back to shares that are subject to the registration.

Slack confirms that the novelty of a specific type of offering, such as a direct listing, cannot excuse the well-settled requirements for claims brought under Section 11 of the 1933 Act. Unregistered shares from a direct listing or certain post-IPO offerings are subject to dismissal at the pleading stage for lack of standing under Section 11 if those shares cannot be traced back to the initial registration. Whether an issuer is required to register all shares for sale in a direct listing was not addressed in Slack because this question had not been raised in the prior proceedings.

Another key ruling came out of the Southern District of New York in a case titled Underwood, et al. v. Coinbase Global. There, plaintiffs brought claims under Sections 5 and 12(a) of the 1933 Act and Sections 5 and 29(a) of the 1934 Act. Plaintiffs alleged that Coinbase operated a securities exchange without registering with the SEC. Their amended complaint also alleged that the cryptocurrency tokens sold on the Coinbase platform were securities as defined under both statutes.

However, the issue of whether digital assets must be registered with the SEC was not determined because the court found the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act. Section 5 of the 1933 Act prohibits any person from selling unregistered securities unless the securities are exempt from registration. Section 12(a) creates a private right of action for any buyer against the seller of an unregistered security. To meet the definition of a seller under Section 12(a), a seller must either pass title or other interest directly to the buyer, or the seller must solicit the purchase of a security for its own financial interest. The court granted Coinbase’s motion to dismiss the claims brought under 12(a) because the plaintiffs did not sufficiently plead either requirement.

The initial complaint had stated that there was no privity between a user of the Coinbase platform and Coinbase. The user agreement also expressly stated that Coinbase was simply an agent, and a user who purchased a token from through the online platform was not purchasing digital currency from Coinbase. Though the plaintiffs had attempted to avoid this issue by amending their complaint to state that privity only existed between the user and Coinbase, the court held that it would not allow an amended complaint to supersede the admissions in the plaintiffs’ earlier pleading, or the express language of the user agreement. These facts precluded an action against Coinbase under Section 12(a). The company did not meet the definition of a statutory seller as defined in Section 12(a) because it did not pass title directly to a buyer. The plaintiffs also failed to plead anything more than collateral participation in the purchase of the tokens. The court concluded that absent allegations that the plaintiffs purchased the tokens as a result of active solicitation by Coinbase, Section 12(a) was inapplicable.

The court further held that the plaintiffs’ claims under the 1934 Act also failed for lack of privity. Section 29(a) of the 1934 Act provides that every contract that violates any provision, rule, or regulation is void. The plaintiffs argued that the user agreement and the transactions were void because they involved contracts that were premised on an illegal purchase of an unregistered security on an unregistered exchange, which violated Section 5 of the 1934 Act. The amended complaint sought rescission of the transaction fees and the transactions. To allege a violation of Section 29(b), the plaintiff is required to show that: (i) the contract involved a prohibited transaction; (ii) the plaintiff is in contractual privity with the defendants; and (iii) the plaintiff is in a class that the 1934 Act intended to protect. The court again found that privity was not established under the user agreement. The initial complaint asserted that the plaintiffs contracted with users of the Coinbase platform, not Coinbase. Thus there was no contractual privity with Coinbase. The court also noted that the user agreement was not a contract that required the plaintiffs to do anything illegal. A party to the user agreement was free to use the platform to transact crypto currencies or not transact at all. The court concluded this was insufficient to render the sale of digital assets on the platform a prohibited transaction under Section 5 of the 1934 Act.

Recently, in April of 2024, the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of alleged Securities Act violations, fin ding the district court improperly relied on the plaintiffs’ initial complaint and Coinbase’s user agreement, instead of looking solely to the allegations in the amended complaint. The Second Circuit noted that some versions of the user agreements in place when the transaction at issue occurred had conflicting language that could plausibly support the allegations that defendants had passed title to the plaintiffs under Section 12(a)(1) of the 1933 Act. The court upheld dismissal of certain claims brought under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, finding that the plaintiff’s conclusory out allegations provided insufficient detail to support a claim for rescission.

Jerry: Thanks for that analysis. Evident to see a lot of developments in this space over the past 12 months. In terms of that monetization of securities fraud class actions, how did the plaintiffs’ bar do on the settlement front?

Nelson: There were several settlements of over a billion dollars reached in securities fraud class actions last year, and the top 10 class action settlements in this space add up to $5.4 billion.

In SEC, et al. v. Stanford International Bank, the Court granted approval of a $1.2 billion settlement to resolve investors’ allegations that the banks aided Robert Allen Stanford’s $7 billion Ponzi scheme.

A $1 billion settlement was approved in In Re Dell Technologies Inc. Class V Stockholders Litigation, which was a class action brought by investors alleging Dell, its controlling investors, and its affiliates shortchanged shareholders by billions in a deal that converted Class V stock to common share.

And in In Re Wells Fargo & Co. Securities Litigation, another $1 billion settlement was approved in a class action brought by investors alleging that the company made misleading statements about its compliance with federal consent orders following the 2016 scandal involving the opening of unauthorized customer accounts.

Jerry: It seems like 2024 is equally upbeat for the plaintiffs’ bar. We’ve tracked through the first six months settlements totaling over $2 billion, with three individual  settlements near the half-billion mark: $580 million, $490 million, and $434 million for securities fraud class action settlements, so a very robust area for the plaintiffs’ bar.

Well, thanks so much for your insights, Nelson. Very, very helpful in this space. And thank you to our loyal listeners for tuning in to this episode of the Class Action Weekly Wire.

Nelson: Thanks everyone.

The Class Action Weekly Wire – Episode 66: Colorado Stakes Out Artificial Intelligence Frontier With Comprehensive Algorithmic Anti-Discrimination Law


Duane Morris Takeaway:
This week’s episode of the Class Action Weekly Wire features Duane Morris partner Jerry Maatman and associate Tiffany Alberty with their discussion of a significant development on the forefront of artificial intelligence legislation – a Colorado bill recently signed into law making strides to curb the risk of algorithmic bias across all sectors and uses of AI technology.

Check out today’s episode and subscribe to our show from your preferred podcast platform: Spotify, Amazon Music, Apple Podcasts, Samsung Podcasts, Podcast Index, Tune In, Listen Notes, iHeartRadio, Deezer, and YouTube.

Episode Transcript

Jerry Maatman: Thank you, loyal blog readers. Welcome to our next installment of our weekly podcast series, the Class Action Weekly Wire. I’m Jerry Maatman, a partner at Duane Morris and joining me today is my colleague, Tiffany Alberty. Welcome.

Tiffany Alberty: Thanks, Jerry, excited to be here.

Jerry: Today we wanted to discuss what I believe to be a landmark development coming out of the state of Colorado regarding artificial intelligence legislation, and specifically the new AI bill that was signed into law earlier this year. As a member both of the Illinois and Colorado bars, Tiffany, I know you’ve been advising employers on this –  wondered what your takeaways were at a 100,000 foot level on this new law?

Tiffany: Sure. Thanks, Jerry, I appreciate the opportunity to speak today. So, as many of you know, on May 17th of this year, Colorado Governor Jared Polis signed into law SB-205, also known as the Consumer Protections for Interactions with Artificial Intelligence Systems. It does take effect in February of 2026, and it applies to Colorado residents. This bill was modeled after Connecticut’s ambitious legislation which ended up crumbling the same month due to the Connecticut Governor Ned Lamont’s concerns that it would stifle the innovation of the developing AI industry. So, comparing this legislation to AI laws such as in Florida or Utah. The statute is really the first legislation of its kind in the United States that focuses on what’s called “high-risk artificial intelligence systems”. Notably, it requires that developers and companies that deploy this high-risk AI technology use the standard of reasonable care to prevent algorithmic discrimination.

Jerry: Thanks for that overview, Tiffany, that’s very helpful. In terms of what corporate counsel need to understand about the concept of “high-risk AI systems,” how would you describe that in layman’s terms, and with respect to the range of activities or software covered by the new Colorado law?

Tiffany: Sure. So, the Colorado law defines “high-risk AI systems” as those that make or substantially contribute to making “consequential decisions.” Of course, it’s not clear, but some examples that would be considered as “consequential decisions” under the law include a large range of companies and services, including education enrollment or education opportunities, employment or employment services and opportunities, financing or lending services, essential governmental services, healthcare services, housing, insurance, and then, of course, legal services.

The law does actually carve out specific systems that would not be included in the law – that either (i) perform narrow procedural tasks; or (ii) detect decision making patterns or deviations from prior decision-making patterns, and that aren’t intended to replace or influence the human component of assessment and review. Also excluded from the law is AI-enabled video games, cybersecurity software, anti-malware or anti-virus software, spam or robocalling features and filters – all when they’re not considered a “substantial factor” in making these consequential decisions

Going to what a ”substantial factor” is – it’s defined as a factor that (i) assists in making consequential decisions and (ii) is capable of altering the overall outcome of that said consequential decision, or (iii) is generated by an AI system alone.

Jerry: Well on its face, that sounds quite broad, and I doubt that the exemptions are going to be used to swallow the rule. What do corporate counsel need to know about penalties and potential damages under the statute for violations of it?

Tiffany: Sure, so the penalties are hefty. The law provides the Colorado Attorney General with the exclusive authority to enforce violations and penalties up to $20,000 for each consumer or transaction violation that’s involved. However, the law does not contain a private cause of action. Developers as well as deployers can assert an affirmative defense if they discover and cure the violation, or are in compliance with the latest version of the Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework that’s published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, or otherwise known as NIST, or any other framework that is designated by the Colorado Attorney General that should come out with more specific and narrow confines.

Jerry: The job of a compliance counsel is certainly difficult with the patchwork quilt of privacy laws, but what would your advice be specifically for companies involved in trying to engage in good faith compliance with the Colorado law?

Tiffany: Sure, great question. There are key responsibilities at stake for both developers of AI technology and deployers, which are the companies that are utilizing these systems, in terms of protecting consumers and employees from the risks of algorithmic discrimination. For AI developers, there is a duty to avoid algorithmic discrimination, and under the reasonable care standard, it includes several critical steps. So that would be providing deployers with detailed information about the AI systems and the necessary documentation for impact assessments; developers must make a public statement about the types of AI systems that they have developed or substantially modified; and disclose any potential risks of algorithmic discrimination to known deployers and the Colorado Attorney General within 90 days of discovery.

So that’s going to be for the AI developer side. Now, if you go to the other variation which is going to be for deployers of high-risk AI systems, they, too, have a duty under the law to avoid algorithmic discrimination, and they are required to implement comprehensive risk management policies, conduct impact assessments throughout the year, and review their AI systems annually to ensure that there’s no algorithmic discrimination occurring. They also need to inform consumers about the system’s  decision-making processes and offer opportunities for correcting any inaccurate information that’s being collected and allow for appeals against adverse decisions upon human review, if that is feasible. And then the last thing that is similar to the AI developer side – deployers must also disclose any algorithmic discrimination discovered to Colorado’s Attorney General within 90 days of discovery.

So, kind of taking more of a bird’s eye view, the law encompasses AI technology when it’s involved in the consequential decisions, such as in an employment context for hiring and firing. And it adds another layer of intervention to check the AI process, and ensuring that it doesn’t have any type of discriminatory or bias intent. As such, companies have until February 2026 to come into compliance with this new Colorado AI law.

Jerry: Well, thanks, Tiffany. Those are great insights. I think the bottom line is compliance just became a bit tougher in terms of all the things that are out there in that wild west which is the legal frontier of artificial intelligence. If there’s nothing other than what we’ve seen from the plaintiffs’ bar is that they’ve been very innovative and using statutes like this and cobbling together class actions involving employer use of artificial intelligence. Well, thank you loyal blog readers for tuning in to this week’s weekly podcast series – we will see you next week with another topic.

Tiffany: Thanks, everyone.

The Class Action Weekly Wire – Episode 65: Key Developments In RICO Class Action Litigation

Duane Morris Takeaway: This week’s episode of the Class Action Weekly Wire features Duane Morris partner Jennifer Riley and associate Kelly Bonner with their discussion of key rulings, settlements, and trends analyzed in the RICO class action space.

Check out today’s episode and subscribe to our show from your preferred podcast platform: Spotify, Amazon Music, Apple Podcasts, Samsung Podcasts, Podcast Index, Tune In, Listen Notes, iHeartRadio, Deezer, and YouTube.

Episode Transcript

Jennifer Riley: Thank you for being here again for the next episode of our podcast, the Class Action Weekly Wire. I’m Jen Riley, partner at Duane Morris, and joining me today is Kelly Bonner. Thank you for being on the podcast, Kelly.

Kelly Bonner: It’s great to be here, Jen.

Jennifer: Today we wanted to discuss trends and important developments in Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, or RICO, class action litigation. RICO is a federal law that provides for extended criminal penalties and a civil cause of action for acts performed as part of an ongoing criminal enterprise. The Congress enacted the RICO in 1970 in an attempt to combat organized crime in the United States. The law has since been used to prosecute a variety of offenses, including securities fraud, money laundering, and even environmental crimes. Kelly, can you explain the burden on the plaintiff in a RICO action?

Kelly: Sure thing, Jen. RICO allows the government to prosecute individuals associated with criminal activities such as the leaders of crime organizations. Although there are criminal charges, today we’re going to focus on the burden for civil RICO claims. So, plaintiff must prove three elements: criminal activity, so that means the plaintiff must show that the defendant committed a RICO crime; a pattern of criminal activity, which means that the plaintiff must show that the defendant committed a pattern of at least two crimes – patterns can include everything from the same victim to the same methods used to commit the crimes, or that the crimes even happened within the same year; also the statute of limitations – in civil RICO cases, the statute of limitations is four years, and that runs from the time of discovery. Plaintiff must also prove the existence of an enterprise. So, civil RICO class actions are significant pieces of litigation, and due to the potential for exposure to treble damages – or, you know, three times the damages – such class actions can present extraordinary risks.

Jennifer: Thanks, Kelly, very different from the types of claims that we often discuss on the podcast. How often are RICO class actions granted class certification?

Kelly: So in 2023, the plaintiffs’ bar secured class certification at a rate of approximately 70%. Companies secured denials in 30% of the rulings – so plaintiffs were largely successful in certifying the class.

Jennifer: Can you discuss any key rulings from 2023?

Kelly: Sure. So, in several 2023 cases, courts granted class certification under Rule 23(b)(3). So this is where the court concluded that common questions of law, in fact, predominated over individual issues, and that a class method was superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. So, for example, in Turrey, et al. v. Vervent, Inc., the court concluded that common questions were dominated over individualized issues where plaintiffs alleged that defendants violated RICO by offering high cost education programs and a sham private student loan program called the Program for Educational Access and Knowledge, or PEAKS. This program saddled students with significant debt and inferior credentials. Plaintiffs sought class certification on the basis that they identified several common questions that could be resolved on a class-wide basis: 1) whether defendants knew that PEAKS was a fraudulent scheme designed to defraud investors and the U.S. Department of Education; 2) whether loans lacked legally required information; 3) whether PEAKS operated as an association, in fact, enterprise; 4) whether PEAKS as an enterprise made fraudulent representations, and 5) finally, whether the PEAKS enterprise use the mail and interstate wire system for its activities. The court opined that all of the elements of a substantive RICO violation could be determined through evidence common to class members. The court also noted that expert testimony sufficiently established that defendants knowingly participated in fraudulent scheme, and that PEAKS was structured to further defend its fraudulent goals. The court also ruled that questions of causation and injury could be addressed on a class-wide basis, since the plaintiffs allege that defendants conduct was the actual approximate cause of their injuries, and that their harms were foreseeable. So, if the loans had not been made or serviced as they were, the borrowers would not have made the payments. Even though the exact amount of damages differed among individual borrowers, the court concluded that this issue did not preclude class certification.

Jennifer: There’s also an interesting ruling that I wanted to mention, that came out of the Fourth Circuit in a case called Albert, et al. v. Global Tel*Link Corp. In that case, the Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded a ruling by the district court dismissing the plaintiffs’ RICO claims based on a failure to establish proximate causation. The Fourth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries were the direct result of defendants’ scheme, and thus sufficient to allege RICO violations. In that case, the plaintiffs were families of prison inmates. They filed a class action alleging that the defendants, a group of providers of inmate telephone services, violated the RICO by colluding to fix prices for single call offerings, as well as misleading the government about their pricing structures, and ultimately causing consumers to pay inflated prices. The district court had dismissed the plaintiffs’ RICO claims on the basis that the plaintiffs did not adequately allege that the defendants proximately caused their injuries, as their harm was contingent upon harm suffered by the contracting governments. On appeal though, the Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded, the Fourth Circuit concluded that even though the alleged conspiracy occurred before it impacted the plaintiffs, the government was not a more direct victim than the plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs’ injuries were not derivative of those suffered by the governments because they would have been charged inflated prices regardless of whether the governments were injured. The Fourth Circuit clarified that the plaintiffs need only alleged facts plausibly supporting a reasonable inference of causation, and that the plaintiffs’ complaint plausibly supports an inference that the governments would have demanded lower prices for consumers but for defendants’ misrepresentations. Because the Fourth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries were the direct result of defendants’ scheme, and therefore sufficient to allege RICO violations, it vacated the district court’s ruling and remanded for further consideration.

Kelly, how did the plaintiffs do in securing major settlements in the RICO class action space over the past year?

Kelly: So, there were several settlements and judgments that were over a million dollars reached in RICO civil class actions in 2023. So I’m thinking of in Lincoln Adventures LLC, et al. v. Those Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London Members of Syndicates, the court granted final approval of a $7.9 million settlement to resolve claims that Lloyd’s Syndicates violated RICO with an illegal anticompetition agreement. A massive RICO default judgment of over $131 million was entered by the court in Gilead Sciences Inc., et al. v. AJC Medical Group Inc., based on allegations that dozens of companies and individuals were involved in parallel schemes run by two healthcare networks profiting from illegal resale of HIV treatment medications. And then finally, in Zwicky, et al. v. Diamond Resorts, which comes out of Arizona, the court granted file approval to a settlement of $13 million, resolving allegations under RICO that defendants misrepresented the required annual fees for timeshare interest they purchased.

Jennifer: Thanks so much, Kelly. I know that these are only some of the cases that had interesting rulings in 2023 and RICO class actions. 2024 is sure to give us some more insights into the ways that class actions will evolve or continue to evolve in the RICO space. Thanks to all of our listeners for joining us today, appreciate having you here for this episode of the Class Action Weekly Wire.

Kelly: Thanks so much. Bye-bye.

 

The Class Action Weekly Wire – Episode 64: Procedural Issues In Class Action Litigation


Duane Morris Takeaway:
This week’s episode of the Class Action Weekly Wire features Duane Morris partner Jerry Maatman and special counsel Brandon Spurlock with their discussion of key decisions addressing a myriad of procedural issues in class action litigation.

Check out today’s episode and subscribe to our show from your preferred podcast platform: Spotify, Amazon Music, Apple Podcasts, Samsung Podcasts, Podcast Index, Tune In, Listen Notes, iHeartRadio, Deezer, and YouTube.

Episode Transcript

Jerry Maatman: Thank you loyal blog readers for joining us on our next episode of our weekly podcast series, the Class Action Weekly Wire, I’m Jerry Maatman, a partner at Duane Morris, and joining me today is Brandon Spurlock. Thanks so much for being here on our podcast.

Brandon Spurlock: Great to be here, Jerry.

Jerry: Today we wanted to discuss trends and important developments with procedural issues in class action litigation. This is somewhat of a catch-all term in the Duane Morris Class Action Review in terms of our analysis of key rulings throughout the year. In 2023, federal and state courts address procedural issues and a wide range of class certification issues. Brandon, to your way of thinking, what are some highlights that corporate counsel should be aware of?

Brandon: Yes, jurisdiction is always an important consideration. Class action litigation jurisdictional defenses are often dispositive when a defendant challenges the ability of plaintiffs to maintain their class action in court. The Tenth Circuit issued a very interesting ruling on jurisdiction in Boulter, et al. v. Noble Energy Inc. There the plaintiffs, a group of oil and gas lessors filed a class action against the defendants for alleged underpaid royalties. The defendants then argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction because the plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies required by Colorado’s Oil and Gas Conservation Act, which grants jurisdiction to the COGCC to determine the amount of proceeds due to a payee. However, the Act excludes resolution of disputes over contract interpretation from the COGCC’s jurisdiction. The district court then agreed with the defendants, and granted their motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs did not appeal this decision, but filed a nearly identical second complaint in Boulter II three months later. While the second complaint was pending, the Colorado Court of Appeals issued a decision regarding the COGCC’s jurisdiction in another action. The district court dismissed Boulter II for the second time, and plaintiffs filed a third complaint, Boulter III in December 2021. The district court again dismissed the action on plaintiffs’ appeal. This Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. The Tenth Circuit considered whether the district court’s decision in Boulter I should preclude the jurisdictional arguments in Boulter II and Boulter III, and whether an exception to issue preclusion, based on an intervening change in the law applied. The Tenth Circuit concluded that the ruling in Boulter I did preclude the jurisdictional arguments, and the subsequent complaints. The Tenth Circuit also determined that the decision from the Colorado Court of Appeals did not change the law or provide a basis for plaintiffs to avoid exhausting their remedies with the COGCC. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.

Jerry: I’ve always found jurisdiction to be a very powerful argument for the defense in a Rule 23 situation. But equally pertinent is the concept of standing, and whether or not a named plaintiff has standing to prosecute a class action. In 2023, however, the plaintiffs’ bar secured a pretty plaintiff-friendly ruling on the issue of standing out of the Ninth Circuit in a case called Vargas, et al. v. Facebook, Inc. The district court had dismissed the named plaintiff’s claim in a class action for lack of standing where the named plaintiff, a New York resident and a Facebook user, claimed that as a member of a protected category group, she was unable to view housing ads that similarly situated White Facebook users were able to access based on the algorithms at issue in the Facebook platform. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the class action and remanded the district court’s ruling. The Ninth circuit held that sufficient allegations were asserted in the complaint with respect to the disparate treatment of the named plaintiff as compared to white users of Facebook, and as a result, there was a viable cause of action and an injury-in-fact sufficient to confer standing. Many legal commentators think that the Vargas decision is kind of on the outer edge of standing principles, but nonetheless shows in a very plaintiff-centric, or plaintiff-friendly way, how standing can exist in a class action complaint sufficient for the class action to go forward.

Brandon, are there other areas that you think are impacted that is favorable either to the defense bar or to the plaintiffs’ bar in the class action space?

Brandon: Yes. Jerry also wanted to address the issue of consolidation in class action litigation, since consolidation issues often surface when defendants are subject to multiple class actions, and whether or not to consolidate multiple cases in one forum is often a strategic imperative. For instance, in the case of In Re Tiktok In-App Browser Consumer Privacy Litigation, the plaintiffs filed multiple class actions alleging that TikTok illegally intercepted users, communications and activities on third-party websites through the web browser within the TikTok app. The plaintiff, and the class action pending in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California moved under 28 U.S.C. § 1407 to centralize three of the actions in the Central District of California. Since filing the motion, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, the JPML, have been notified of 14 potentially related actions pending in three additional districts. All of the plaintiffs supported centralization, but the plaintiffs in five actions supported the movement’s position. So, while the plaintiffs in seven actions requested centralization in the Northern District of Illinois, and the plaintiff in one related action alternatively requested centralization in the District of New Jersey, and also in the Northern District of Georgia, and one plaintiff opposed centralization entirely. Because the in-app browser actions raised questions relating to the interpretation and the scope of settlement and the related MDL, the JPML ruled that those questions would be most appropriately resolved by the transferee court. Therefore, denied the motion to centralize those actions.

Jerry: I’ve always thought consolidation of multiple class actions in one quarter of consolidated class actions is a big money saver for the defense in terms of defending something once rather than multiple times, so that’s a key ruling. What about the area of sanctions in class action litigation – were there any particular rulings of note in 2023?

Brandon: Another good question, Jerry. Given the cost of defending a class action, corporate defendants sometimes move for sanctions if the claims are frivolous. For instance, the Sixth Circuit examine this issue in Garcia, et al. v. Title Check, LLC. There the plaintiff filed a class action against the defendant, alleging that its additional buyer’s fee violated Michigan’s General Property Tax Act. The district court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims, finding that the fee was not prohibited by statute. Subsequently, the defendant moved for sanction against plaintiffs’ attorneys on the grounds that the case was frivolous, and forced the defendant to incur unnecessary legal fees. The district court granted the motion, and ordered plaintiffs’ counsel to pay attorneys’ fees and costs over $73,000. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. Plaintiffs’ counsel argued that the district court erred in opposing sanctions because the legal issues in the case were debatable and because the district court misunderstood Michigan law. The Sixth Circuit agreed with the district court’s conclusion, however, the plaintiffs’ counsel had unreasonably pursued frivolous claims based on an implausible interpretation of statute. The Sixth Circuit also found that the plaintiffs’ counsel should have known their claims lacked merit. The Sixth Circuit further rejected the argument of plaintiffs’ counsel that sanctions should have been limited to the specific filings related to the unnecessarily claims. Instead, it deemed the entire action frivolous and vexatious, and affirmed the district court’s ruling. So, very powerful use of sanctions that support a defendant’s position in that case.

Jerry: Those are great insights and analysis, Brandon. It certainly underscores the notion that non-merits issues in essence procedural issues can be important to the overall outcome of a class action and the method by which a corporation defends itself in class action litigation. Well, loyal blog readers thanks so much for joining us in this installment of the Class Action Weekly Wire. And thank you, Brandon, for providing your thought leadership in this space.

Brandon: Thanks for having me, Jerry

The Class Action Weekly Wire – Episode 63: Key Developments In FCRA Class Action Litigation


Duane Morris Takeaway:
This week’s episode of the Class Action Weekly Wire features Duane Morris partner Jerry Maatman and associates Emilee Crowther and Derek Franklin with their discussion of key rulings and trends in class action litigation under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”).

Check out today’s episode and subscribe to our show from your preferred podcast platform: Spotify, Amazon Music, Apple Podcasts, Google Podcasts, the Samsung Podcasts app, Podcast Index, Tune In, Listen Notes, iHeartRadio, Deezer, YouTube or our RSS feed.

Episode Transcript

Jerry Maatman: Thank you and welcome loyal blog readers and listeners to our next episode of the Weekly podcast series that we call the class Action weekly wire. My name is Jerry Maatman, and I’m a partner at Duane Morris and joining me today are my colleagues, Derek Franklin and Emilee Crowther, and we’re here to talk about Fair Credit Reporting Act class action litigation. Emilee and Derek, can you tell me a little bit about what is going on in this space in terms of the history of the FCRA?

Emilee Crowther: Absolutely, Jerry, and thanks for having me today. The stated purpose of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, or the FCRA, is to ensure that consumer reporting agencies, exercise their important responsibilities with fairness, impartiality, and a respect for the consumer’s right to privacy. It requires consumer reporting agencies and entities, obtaining consumer reports to follow reasonable procedures, to assure maximum possible accuracy of consumer reports. Courts have often noted that FCRA violations lend themselves to resolution through class action, litigation, and FCRA. Class actions have increased partially as a result of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction Act, or the FACTA, amendments which require that a consumer who is afforded less favorable treatment and reliance on her credit report be provided an adverse action notice.

Derek Franklin: And in FCRA cases in 2023, the class action plaintiffs’ bar continued to look for any failure of an employer to provide disclosures or obtain proper authorization from an applicant. Although these authorization and disclosure requirements may appear to be relatively straightforward, case law has created additional requirements that may not be as obvious from a plain reading of the FCRA. While employers must be vigilant in their efforts to avoid running afoul of the FCRA authorization and disclosure requirements, the third-party agencies they obtain consumer reports from must also take active steps to ensure that they provide accurate reports. The plaintiffs’ bar is quick to investigate violations of these provisions and bring Rule 23 class actions against CRAs.

Jerry: I know that compliance with the FCRA is not for the faint of heart, and it’s certainly spiked quite a bit of class action litigation in terms of our annual report. Are there some significant guideposts in the case law in terms of FCRA class actions?

Emilee: So, the United States Supreme Court’s decision in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez substantially limited FCRA class actions by making it clear that only consumers who have “been concretely harmed by a defendant’s statutory violation may sue that private defendant over that [FCRA] violation in federal court.” In TransUnion, the defendant credit reporting agency generated thousands of consumer credit reports which mistakenly match the consumers’ names with the names of people on the list of individuals who threaten America’s national security. However, the Supreme Court only allowed this case to proceed for plaintiffs whose false reports had been provided to third-party creditors. According to the Supreme Court, if the third-party creditors did not receive the potentially defamatory reports, then the individuals did not suffer from a concrete injury under the FCRA.

Jerry: Well, the TransUnion case certainly has created quite a tidal wave of defenses and case law that have interpreted just what an “injury-in-fact” may be. How has that resulted in terms of FCRA class certification rulings and motions to dismiss over the past year?

Derek: In 2023, all the three major CRAs in the United States – Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion – had to litigate at least one FCRA class action concerning allegedly inaccurate or incomplete credit reports. In one such case brought against Equifax in the Us. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, the court granted in part a motion to dismiss as to a state law negligence claim and injunctive relief under the FCRA. But the court denied in part the motion to strike the class action allegations allowing the plaintiffs’ claim to proceed. The court noted that the plaintiffs could not identify a statutory or common law duty of care owed to the plaintiffs by Equifax. And as to the FCRA claim, the court stated that the case is cited by Equifax, centered on instances where a correctly reported credit score was misleading, which was distinguishable from its position, that it was not “objectively unreasonable” for the company to interpret federal law as being inapplicable to credit scores. The ruling is a good roadmap for defendants involved in FCRA class action litigation.

Emilee: Another case, titled Nelson, et al. v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., the court examined what documents and information would reasonably be “in a consumer’s file” underneath the FCRA. The plaintiff reviewed her credit report and discovered that it contained inaccurate personal identification information, including two addresses that weren’t hers, her maiden name was misspelled, and the last digit of her social security number was incorrect. She contacted Experian to request the information be changed and Experian updated all but one of the incorrect addresses because it was associated with an open credit account. The plaintiff ended up filing a class action against Experian, alleging that Experian violated the FCRA by providing inaccurate personal identification information on her credit report and failing to correct the inaccurate information. Experian filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that although the FCRA’s disclosure provision requires credit reporting agencies to disclose “all information in a consumer’s file” the word “any” in “any item of information contained in a consumer’s file” is limited to information that might be, or has been, furnished consumer report. Experian contended that since personal identification information, like a consumer’s name, address, and social security number, do not bear on an individual’s credit worthiness, such information did not itself constitute a credit report. The court rejected this argument, and found that the FCRA’s plain language “forbid the use of credit worthiness as a limitation on information contained in both the consumer’s credit report and [in the] consumer’s credit file.” However, the court ended up holding that the existence of a duty to reinvestigate was “not enough to prove a violation of the FCRA” – that the plaintiff also had to establish that Experian, either negligently or willfully, failed to satisfy its duty to reinvestigate by showing that Experian’s interpretation of the FCRA was objectively unreasonable. The court ruled that no jury could find that Experian negligently or willfully violated the FCRA, and that Experian’s interpretation of the FCRA was objectively reasonable. Thus, the court granted Experian’s motion for summary judgment.

Jerry: Those are key cases and a great overview of what corporate counsel are facing here. Certainly the business model of plaintiffs’ counsel is to file the class action, certify the class action, and then monetize it through settlements. How did the plaintiffs’ bar do in terms of monetizing significant FCRA settlements on a class-wide basis over the past year?

Derek: Jerry, in terms of securing high settlements – the plaintiffs’ bar did not do nearly as well in 2023 as in 2022. In 2023, the top 10 FCRA, FDPCA, and FACTA settlements totaled $100.15 million. This was a significant decrease from the prior year, where the top 10 class action settlements totaled $210.11 million.

Jerry: Still a lot of money, and certainly corporate counsel need to be on guard in terms of compliance efforts in this area. What are your thoughts on the takeaways given the case law, given the settlements, in terms of what corporate counsel should have in their toolkit for FCRA compliance?

Emilee: Well, Jerry, it’s very important for consumer reporting agencies to implement policies and procedures that furnish accurate reports. Systemic issues in a reporting system provide the plaintiffs’ class action bar with ample evidence to argue that class certification is justified, regardless of whether there was actual harm to many consumers.

Derek: And to add on to that – good document retention can save the day in FCRA litigation. While various cases involve the generation of consumer reports for tenant applicants, they are just as applicable to consumer reports generated for employee applicants and the plaintiffs’ class action bar will continue to press legal envelope.

Jerry: Well, thank you, Emilee, and thank you, Derek, for your thought leadership in this area. And loyal blog readers and listeners, thank you for joining us for this week’s installment of the Class Action Weekly Wire.

Emilee: Thank you, Jerry, for having us, and thank you loyal listeners.

Derek: Thank you, everyone.

The Class Action Weekly Wire – Episode 62: Class Action Fairness Act Key Rulings


Duane Morris Takeaway:
This week’s episode of the Class Action Weekly Wire features Duane Morris partners Jennifer Riley and Alex Karasik and associate Derek Franklin with their discussion of key rulings involving the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”).

Check out today’s episode and subscribe to our show from your preferred podcast platform: Spotify, Amazon Music, Apple Podcasts, Google Podcasts, the Samsung Podcasts app, Podcast Index, Tune In, Listen Notes, iHeartRadio, Deezer, YouTube or our RSS feed.

Episode Transcript

Jennifer Riley: Thank you for being here again for the next episode of our weekly podcast the Class Action Weekly Wire. I’m Jennifer Riley partner at Duane Morris and joining me today are Alex Karasik and Derek Franklin. Thank you both guys for being on the podcast.

Alex Karasik: Great to be here, Jen. Thank you.

Derek Franklin: Thanks for having me, Jen.

Jennifer: Today we wanted to discuss trends and important developments in the area of the Class Action Fairness Act, or the CAFA. Alex, can you tell our listeners a little bit about the CAFA before we get into the latest developments?

Alex: Absolutely. Jen. The CAFA is a staple of class action litigation. It was signed into law by George W. Bush, on February 18, 2005. The CAFA expands federal subject-matter jurisdiction over significant class action lawsuits and mass actions in the United States. Functionally, the CAFA provides a mechanism for defendants to remove class actions from state courts to federal courts. So, as a result, CAFA impacts form selection strategies in the class action litigation space.

Derek: Also, to add to Alex, the CAFA does more than facilitate the removal of class actions from state court to federal court. It also regulates the selection of class counsel, toughen certain pleading standards, tightens control over the range of attorneys’ fees that may be awarded in class action settlements, it facilitates the appeals of class certification orders, and it regulates the settlement process in class action settlements.

Jennifer: Thanks so much for that background, guys. Derek, can you talk a bit more about the impact of CAFA on class action litigation?

Derek: Yeah, CAFA has played a major role in large bet the company class actions. The plaintiffs’ class action bar has traditionally maintained success in achieving class certification in state courts, particularly those with locally elected judges who may be hostile toward out-of-state defendants. Prior to the implementation of the CAFA, in order for a federal court to have maintained jurisdiction,  there needed to be a monetary threshold of $75,000 met by every plaintiff in the case, and all named plaintiffs in a class action had to be citizens of states differing from those of all defendants. Now under the CAFA, jurisdictional requirements are much less restrictive, and thus more difficult for the plaintiffs’ bar to establish that the action should remain in state court.

Jennifer: Alex, what types of class action litigation, would you say, are most affected by the CAFA?

Alex: Great question, Jen. Class actions filed under federal statute, such as the FLSA, Title VII, or ERISA, are almost exclusively filed in federal court. So, the CAFA has most significantly impacted state law wage and hour claims and related state law type class action claims in employee-friendly states, such as California. The plaintiffs’ class action bar notoriously pursues wage and hour claims in state courts. It tends to be a more favorable forum for plaintiffs in certain areas. The Second Circuit over time became known as the federal circuit where securities law became the most developed. However, the Ninth Circuit became a circuit where more rulings under CAFA were made than any other circuit in the federal system. So, we tend to see various wage and hour and other potential consumer claims filed in state court, and therefore removed under the CAFA.

Jennifer: Were there any key CAFA rulings in 2023?

Alex: It doesn’t happen every year – but in 2023, in fact, courts and all of the federal circuits adjudicated jurisdictional issues based on the CAFA. Beyond the traditional wage and hour context, the CAFA rulings come in a variety of shapes, form, and sizes. Some of those came under the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act, which the three of us know very well, being located here in Chicago, Illinois. Other claims involve breaches of consumer product warranties, for instance, under the Magnum-Moss Warranty Act, so CAFA claims can really impact a wide variety of different types of causes of action.

Derek: In particular, the Third Circuit ruled on a breach of warranty case in Rowland, et al. v. Bissell Homecare, Inc., which involved a consolidated appeal concerning four putative class actions filed in state court, alleging violations of the MMWA. The defendants removed those cases pursuant to the CAFA and the plaintiffs filed motions to remand which the district court granted on appeal. The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s rulings under the MMWA. The amount controversy must be at least $50,000, and, if it’s a class action, it must have at least 100 named plaintiffs. The Third Circuit opined that in imposing additional requirements for federal jurisdiction, that Congress manifested an intent to restrict access to federal court for MMWA claims. The Third Circuit determined that at a minimum, the requirement that a class action name at least 100 plaintiffs for federal jurisdiction under the MMWA was not satisfied because each complaint at issue named only one plaintiff. The Third Circuit also reasoned that the MMWA’s stringent jurisdictional requirements were irreconcilable with the CAFA because they have differing requirements for how many plaintiffs must be named in a class action that can be brought in federal court, i.e., the CAFA requires only one plaintiff, and the MMWA requires at least 100 plaintiffs. The Third Circuit, therefore, concluded that applying the CAFA in this situation would render the MMWA’s named plaintiff requirement meaningless.

Jennifer: Alex, with the explosive amount of privacy class action litigation recently, can you tell us a bit more about the BIPA ruling in particular that you mentioned earlier?

Alex: Yeah, Jen, there was a really interesting ruling in the Northern District of Illinois in a case called Halim, et al. v. Charlotte Tilbury Beauty, Inc. There the plaintiff filed a putative class action in Illinois state court against the defendants, a makeup and cosmetic company and its parent corporation, alleging violation of the BIPA. It wasn’t a fingerprint scan BIPA case, but rather, this is one where, the defendants allegedly unlawfully collected facial geometry when the plaintiff used the virtual try-on software to superimpose the defendant’s makeup products on the plaintiff’s face. The defendants removed the case to federal court, and the plaintiffs thereafter sought to remand. The court granted plaintiffs’ motion to remand the action to state court because the defendants did not satisfy the $5 million amount-in-controversy requirement. The defendants had argued in removing the case, that they satisfied the requirement through their calculation of a $12 million dollar amount-in-controversy calculation for the BIPA. They claim there was six violations of the BIPA for each putative class member, times 100 putative class members, times two face scans per class member, times $5,000 per violation – which is the statutory amount for a reckless violation – times two defendants. Yeah, that’s a lot of math. And using all this math, defendant came up with an 8-figure number that they anticipated would be the damages exposure. Court rejected this calculation, saying, it’s too speculative and unreasonable to satisfy the defendant’s burden, and therefore, because of that, the court remanded this case back to Illinois state court.

Jennifer: What should corporate counsel and employers be on the lookout for in 2024?

Alex: We anticipate, there will be continued arguments over removal due to jurisdictional issues. The plaintiffs’ bar is crafty and constantly evolving their strategies for arguing against litigating cases in federal court. Many times state courts are more favorable forum, and I don’t think that trend will change in the coming year. What remains to be seen is how effective these strategies will be, and granting motions through remand especially as many of the major class action statutes, such as the BIPA, might evolve at the legislative level.

Jennifer: Well said. Thank you so much for all of this great analysis. Derek and Alex, thank you for being here with me today, and listeners, thank you so much for tuning in.

Alex: Thanks for having me, Jen, and thank you to all of our listeners. We appreciate you tuning in today as well.

Derek: Thanks, everyone.

The Class Action Weekly Wire – Episode 61: Key Developments In Civil Rights Class Action Litigation


Duane Morris Takeaway:
This week’s episode of the Class Action Weekly Wire features Duane Morris partner Jennifer Riley and associate Nathan Norimoto with their discussion of developments and trends in the area of civil rights class action litigation.

Check out today’s episode and subscribe to our show from your preferred podcast platform: Spotify, Amazon Music, Apple Podcasts, Google Podcasts, the Samsung Podcasts app, Podcast Index, Tune In, Listen Notes, iHeartRadio, Deezer, YouTube or our RSS feed.

Episode Transcript

Jennifer Riley: Hello, everyone, and thank you for being here again for the next episode of our weekly, podcast the Class Action Weekly Wire, I’m, Jennifer, Riley partner and Dwayne Morris and joining me today is Nathan Norimoto. Thank you for being on the podcast Nathan.

Nathan Norimoto: Great to be here, Jen.

Jennifer: Today we wanted to discuss some trends and important developments in the area of civil rights class action litigation. Nathan, do you want to talk a bit about this area of law before we get into a development over the past year?

Nathan: Yes, definitely. For more than 70 years, class actions have been among the most powerful tools to secure civil rights in America. This began with the class action of Brown, et al. v. The Board Of Education, which declared school segregation unlawful and arguably set the stage for the Civil Rights Movement. In 1966, Congress and the judicial rule-making authorities crafted Rule 23 with the express goal of empowering litigants, challenging systemic discrimination, particularly segregation, to force courts to order widespread objective relief that would protect members of the class as a whole. Ever since, this provision remains as salient to the enforcement of federal civil rights statutes and constitutional claims as it was at its inception. So, for a multitude of reasons, class actions are often a tool of first resort by advocacy groups to remedy civil rights violations.

Jennifer: Thank you so much for that overview. What were some of the major developments in 2023 and during the first half of 2024 in the civil rights class action litigation space?

Nathan: Class actions in the civil rights context span numerous issues during that time period. Given this breadth of subject area, there were well over 100 decisions in this space. In these far ranging claims and groups of individuals, one common theme continues to be whether litigants can meet the commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23, under the federal rules of civil procedure, to establish class certification. 2023 saw court rulings where numerous civil rights cases were certified, as well as granted class certification affirmed on appeal.

Jennifer: Are there any key rulings from this past year that listeners need to know about in the civil rights litigation class action area?

Nathan: Definitely. So, among all civil rights cases, the ruling on class certification in Progeny, et al. v. City Of Wichita was likely amongst the most significant. The plaintiffs, a nonprofit organization and several individuals, filed a class action alleging that the defendant, the city of Wichita, kept a “gang list” created and maintained by the Wichita Police Department, or WPD, whom WPD personnel had determined that the definition of a criminal street gang member. The individual plaintiffs alleged that they were wrongfully designated as criminal street gang members and added to the gang list, which adversely affected their lives. The plaintiff filed a motion for class certification pursuant to Rule 23, and the court granted the motion. The plaintiff proposed class consisted of all persons included in the Wichita Police Department’s gang list as an active or inactive gang member or gang associate. The court also determined that several common questions existed to establish commonality, including whether the statute was unconstitutionally vague, whether it failed to provide procedural protections to persons on the gang list, and whether inclusion in the gang list has a chilling effect on the right to freedom of association. The court held that the plaintiffs established that the defendant acted or refused to act by applying the gang list criteria to add persons to the gang list without procedural protections for those persons, which was applicable to the entire class. So the court ruled that the requested injunction seeking to bar the defendant from enforcing the statute was appropriate to the class as a whole, because all class members were on the gang list, and therefore the court granted class certification.

Jennifer: Thank you, Nathan, for that overview. So, turning to some trends and developments – there were over 100 rulings in this area in 2023. How are things progressing thus far in 2024 – have there been any interesting cases where class certification was granted?

Nathan: Certainly. So it seems like courts are continuing to grant class certification rulings in this area so far this year. One example here in California, Berg, et al. v. County Of Los Angeles, the plaintiffs were a group of protesters who filed a class action asserting that the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department, or the LASD, had used excessive force against peaceful protesters and unlawfully detain them in violation of their First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights in connection with the George Floyd protests. The plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification on one injunctive relief class and two damages classes, and that motion was granted by the court. As to the injunctive relief class, the defendants opposed the motion on mootness and standing grounds, and the court found that could not determine that the class would be moot, and that because the plaintiffs had stated they plan to attend future protests, they could plausibly be fearful of future harm. Next, for the first damages class, containing individuals who were arrested at the protests, the court stated that there were several common issues central to the class, including (i) whether the defendants have a custom and practice of using indiscriminate force against the peaceful protesters; (ii) whether there has been a manifest failure by the defendants to train employees on the use of force against the protesters; and (iii) whether the defendants had ratified violations of peaceful protesters’ rights. So finally, on the last and third class, the other damages class which contained individuals who were subject to the use of rubber bullets or tear gas, the court determined that the plaintiffs sufficiently established the common alleged harm of a “chill” to their First Amendment rights to unify the class. The court stated that the class met the predominance requirement under Rule 23 because the plaintiffs alleged class-wide general damages and challenged only a single “custom and practice of abusing indiscriminate force against peaceful protesters.” The court concluded that class action would be superior method of adjudication for the direct force class, or the third class, and granted the motion for class certification in its entirety.

Jennifer: It certainly seems like we will see courts continuing to grapple with motions for class certification in this area in 2024, and the plaintiffs’ bar continuing to aggressively pursue certification on behalf of plaintiffs. We know that successful certification often leads to settlements between the parties, rather than continuing the litigation and ultimately going to trial. How successful were plaintiffs in securing settlement dollars in this space in 2023?

Nathan: Pretty successful. Settlement numbers in civil rights class actions in 2023 were definitely significant. The top 10 settlements total $643.15 million. However, this is significant, but it was a decrease from the prior year when the top 10 civil rights class action settlements topped $1.3 billion.

Jennifer: The top settlement amounts in each area of law have been massive in recent years, and a major trend that we track in the Duane Morris Class Action Review. We will continue to track these numbers in 2024 and keep listeners aware of developments. Is there anything else corporate counsel and employers should be on the lookout for in 2024?

Nathan: So given the volume of litigation in the civil rights area, as well as the frequency which with classes are granted and new burgeoning issues for that can percolate in these cases – for example, claims connection with COVID-19 in connection with the increase homelessness issues that we’re facing in our cities – it’s anticipated that the plaintiffs’ bar will continue to be creative, and definitely inventive in this space, as we progress through 2024.

Jennifer: Well, thanks so much for all of this great analysis, Nathan. Thank you for being here with me today. Listeners, thank you for tuning in. And if you have any questions or comments on today’s podcast please feel free to send us a DM on Twitter @DMClassAction.

Nathan: Thanks for having me, Jen, and thank you listeners for being here today.

Jennifer: Thank you listeners again for joining us today, and please join us next week for the next episode of the Class Action Weekly Wire.

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The opinions expressed on this blog are those of the author and are not to be construed as legal advice.

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