Class Action Defense

March 26, 2026March 26, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Illinois Appellate Court Affirms Corporate Officers Who Did Not Knowingly Permit IWPCA Underpayment Violations Are Not Employers

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Gregory Tsonis, and George J. Schaller

Duane Morris Takeaways: On March 17, 2026, in People ex. rel. Ill. DOL v. Quality Therapy & Consultation, Inc., et al., 2026 Ill. App. Unpub. LEXIS 594 (1st Dist. 2026), the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the circuit court’s decision finding corporate officers were not “employers” as defined in section 2 of the Illinois Wage Payment And Collection Act (“IWPCA”), the corporate officers had not knowingly permitted underpayments, and accordingly, the corporate officers were not liable under Section 13 of the IWPCA. Justice Margaret S. McBride authored the opinion on behalf of the Appellate Court.

The decision in Quality Therapy protects corporate decision-makers from personal and strict liability where those decision-makers do not “knowingly permit” a corporation, or such an employer, to violate provisions of the IWPCA.

Case Background

In 1996, Quality Therapy and Consultation, Inc. was founded by Frances M. Parise and John Parise (collectively “the Parises”). Quality Therapy, 2026 Ill. App. Unpub. LEXIS 594,at *2. Quality Therapy provided occupational therapy, speech therapy, and physical therapy services in Illinois to long-term care facilities. Frances Parise acted as Quality Therapy’s president and secretary whereas John Parise was the chief executive officer, and each owned 50% of Quality Therapy and shared authority for business decisions. Id. at *2-3.

After Quality Therapy incurred substantial legal fees from a 2015 federal investigation into its Medicare billing practices and experienced a slow in payments from a primary client, the State of Illinois, Quality Therapy’s profit margins shifted into the negative. Id. at *3-4. In September 2017, Quality Therapy, as a result of the negative margins, could not meet its payroll obligations and issued a WARN Act notice to its employees, “advising that the business would close and all employment would cease in 60 days.” Id. at *4.

Thereafter Quality Therapy informed staff they would not receive their September wages and Quality Therapy was closing on September 30, 2017. Id. Throughout September, the Illinois Department of Labor (the “Department”) received the first of “93 wage applications from [former] employees that would eventually total $550,496, exclusive of statutory penalties.” See id. at *5.

Quality Therapy relied on a bank line of credit to fund payroll on a timely basis, and after the Parises notified the bank that Quality Therapy was closing, the bank immediately called the corporation’s line of credit and froze all funds on hand. Id. Quality Therapy never regained control of its bank account and was unable to access any of its money to pay its employees.

Circuit Court Case Background

In December 2019, the Department filed a three-count complaint, which was later amended in February 2020, and directed individual counts against Quality Therapy, as well as Frances and John Parise, that each knowingly permitted Quality Therapy’s underpayments of unpaid wages and other compensation. The Department maintained all three defendants met the definition of employer under the IWPCA. Id. at *7.

Quality Therapy had been dissolved and was found in default. The Parises moved for summary judgment on the amended complaint and argued that the Illinois’ Supreme Court decision in Andrews v. Kowa Printing Corp., 217 Ill. 2d 101 (2005), “precluded a corporate officer’s individual liability under section 2 of the Wage Act.” Quality Therapy, 2026 Ill. App. Unpub. LEXIS 594, at *7-8. The Department responded that “[the Parises] each acted directly or indirectly in [Quality Therapy’s] interest, which made them ‘employers’ within the meaning of section 2.” Id. at *8

The circuit court denied summary judgment and then presided over a two-day bench trial focusing on Quality Therapy’s ability to pay. Id. The circuit court entered default judgment against Quality Therapy, but, the circuit court rejected “the Department’s argument that the Parises were ‘employers’” as defined in section 2 of the IWPCA, and found that “only [Quality Therapy] was the wage claimants’ employer under section 2.” Id. at *8. The circuit court also denied the claims against the Parises under section 2 and found “[t]he only proper [IWPCA] claim brought under the pleadings against [the Parises] is grounded in” section 13 of the IWPCA. Id. The circuit court reasoned that Frances and John Parise, as corporate officers of Quality Therapy, had not knowingly permitted the underpayments and were not liable under section 13 since Quality Therapy was incapable of meeting its payroll. Id.

The Department appealed on the grounds that “the circuit court erred in finding that the Parises were not employers with Section 2.” The Department acknowledged its argument on appeal ran contrary to the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in Andrews, 217 Ill. 2d 101, but the Department contended that the 2011 amendment to section 13 of the IWPCA “impliedly amended section 2 [of the IWPCA] and superseded Andrews.” Quality Therapy, 2026 Ill. App. Unpub. LEXIS 594, at *9.

The Appellate Court Decision

The Appellate Court affirmed the circuit court’s holding that the Parises were not employers within section 2 of the IWPCA. The Appellate Court, applying the Andrews precedent and interpreting “the statutory language,” concluded “that the amendment to section 13 had no effect whatsoever on section 2” of the IWPCA. Id. at *11.

The Appellate Court rejected the Department’s argument that the 2011 amendment to the IWPCA blended sections 2 and 13 such that it “would render anyone who had a decision making role in payment decisions personally liable for unpaid wages and final compensation.” Id. at *9. The Appellate Court explained the two sections contained distinct definitions, standards, and terms, and presumed that “the legislature did not intend, inconvenient, absurd, or unjust consequences.” Id. at *10.

The Department’s appeal focused on the last clause of section 2 stating that “any person or group of persons acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee” is deemed an “employer” for purposes of the IWPCA. Id. at *11 (quoting 820 ILCS § 115/2). The Department asserted the last clause of section 2 should be read “in conjunction with section 13.”

At issue was the underlined language, added to section 13 in the 2011 amendment:

“In addition to an individual who is deemed to be an employer pursuant to section 2 of this Act, any officers of a corporation or agents of an employer who knowingly permit such employer to violate the provisions of this Act shall be deemed to be the employers of the employees of the corporation.” 820 ILCS § 115/13.

The Appellate Court disagreed that the 2011 amendment to section 13 “effectively modified section 2 and dramatically changed a corporate decision maker’s potential liability for wages.” Id. at *11-12. The Appellate Court reasoned that the IWPCA imposes liability on “two separate and distinct definitions of ‘employer’” because “[i]f there was no distinction between the liability of the corporation and the individual officer, then there would be no reason to have two separate definitions of what constitutes an ‘employer.’” Quality Therapy, 2026 Ill. App. Unpub. LEXIS 594at *12-13 (citing Elsener v. Brown, 2013 IL App (2d) 1209209 ¶ 66).

The Appellate Court also rejected the Department’s expansive interpretation of section 2 and section 13 as “unpersuasive.” Id. at *13. Notably, the Appellate Court cited the Illinois Supreme Court’s language in Andrews, which acknowledged “the breadth of the language” in section 2 was “confounding” because when read literally, it would “make an ‘employer’ out of every person who possesses even a modicum of authority over another employee, from the CEO to the head of the maintenance staff, as such persons undeniably act ‘directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.’” Andrews, 217 Ill 2d. at 107. Accordingly, following the Illinois Supreme Court, the Appellate Court opined that “[a] literal reading [of that clause] would result in absurdity or unjustness in part because of an employer’s strict liability for wages.” Quality Therapy, 2026 Ill. App. Unpub. LEXIS 594at *13.

Various other reasons supported the Appellate Court’s decision. Andrews, the Appellate Court noted, has been consistently applied without “any court or litigant suggesting that the analysis was abrogated by the amendment to section 13 that took effect in 2011.” Id. at *16 (collecting cases following Andrews.) Additionally, the Appellate Court noted that the legislature’s drafted language across both relevant sections of the IWPCA were not constructed with “parallel wording” nor a declaration of an intent to change section 2’s meaning for the phrase “any person or group of persons.” Id. at *18. Following the Department’s interpretation of the IWPCA, the Appellate Court reasoned, would upend “well-established principles of corporate law” and “create personal liability for shareholders, officers, managers, and supervisory employees, regardless of the precision with which corporate formalities are observed, and would remove the fundamental protections afforded by long-standing principles of corporate law.” Id. at *21-22.

Consequently, the Appellate Court found “the amendment to section 13 maintains the framework of the [IWPCA] – it did not alter the general definition set out in section 2 nor did it modify liability under section 13.” Id. at *20.

Finally, the Appellate Court also dismissed the Department’s “new argument on appeal” that it could rely on a self-adopted regulation “which blends sections 2 and 13 based on the Department’s reading of the amendment.” Id. at *22. The Appellate Court found the Department’s interpretation was not well founded and the regulation was “also flawed because it is not based on the new, clear prefatory clause in section 13.” Id. at *26-27.

Accordingly, the Appellate Court affirmed the circuit court’s judgment.

Implications For Employers

Quality Therapy draws a line in the sand delineating when a corporate decisionmaker meets the definition of “employer” under section 2 of the IWPCA. The Appellate Court relied on longstanding Illinois Supreme Court precedent to find the 2011 amendment to section 13 of the IWPCA did not alter the scope of section 2 of the IWPCA.

Employer’s facing claims for violations of the IWPCA must ensure they comply with the payment provisions of the IWPCA. However, protections for corporate-decision makers remain intact, and merely being in a decision-making role with respect to payment decisions is insufficient to establish personal liability for unpaid wages and final compensation under the IWPCA.

Instead, Quality Therapy establishes that only those corporate decision makers who “knowingly permit” an employer to violate provisions of the IWPCA shall be also deemed an “employer of the employees of the corporation” pursuant to section 13 of the IWPCA.

March 25, 2026March 25, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Maryland Federal District Court Finds That Oral Consent Is Sufficient To Make Telemarketing Calls Using A Prerecorded Voice

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, Anna Sheridan, and Ryan T. Garippo

Duane Morris Takeaways: On March 20, 2026, in Bradley, et al. v. DentalPlans.com, No. 20-CV-010904, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59569 (D. Md. Mar. 20, 2026), Judge Brandan Hurson of the U.S. District Court for District of Maryland decertified a certified class action and granted summary judgment on a named plaintiff’s Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) claim. The decision is premised on the legal conclusion that the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) lacked the authority to interpret the TCPA’s consent provisions to require prior express written consent for telemarketing calls and continues the trend of courts which are challenging the FCC’s longstanding monopoly to interpret the statute.

Case Background

DentalPlans operates a “direct-to-consumer marketplace” that sells dental savings plans, including plans offered by Cigna. In November 2018, Deborah Bradley called DentalPlans to enroll in a plan and the representative asked her whether the company had her consent to contact her using “automated dialing system or prerecorded message.” Bradley, et al. v. DentalPlans.com, No. 20-CV-01094, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10050, at *3 (D. Md. June 6, 2024). Bradley ultimately provided such consent and signed up for a dental discount plan with Cigna.

In September 2019, however, Bradley spoke to another DentalPlans representative and told that representative that she did not want her dental plan to automatically renew. As a result, DentalPlans started placing prerecorded calls to Bradley which informed her that “her membership was ending soon and that she could renew her plan.” After Bradley’s plan expired, she continued to receive prerecorded calls which “attempted to ‘win back’ [her] business by encouraging her to repurchase her Cigna plan with DentalPlans.” Id. at *5. In total, DentalPlans placed 10 “win back” calls to Bradley prior to the filing of the action.

As a result of these calls, on April 28, 2020, Bradley filed a putative class action lawsuit under the TCPA, alleging that the calls constituted unauthorized telemarketing calls using prerecorded messages. The crux of Bradley’s argument was that because these calls allegedly constituted “telemarketing” the applicable FCC regulations required prior express written consent, and oral consent would not suffice. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(2). The court agreed with Bradley’s interpretation of the regulation, granted class certification, and certified a class comprised in part of “any consumer who signed up by telephone.” Id. at *27. Bradley then sent notice to the class members and the parties continued to litigate the case.

DentalPlans ultimately filed a motion for reconsideration of the court’s order granting class certification. In that motion, Dental Plans argued, inter alia, that the court’s reliance on 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(2) was misplaced following the U.S. Supreme Court’s mandate that district courts are “not bound by the FCC’s interpretation of the TCPA.” McLaughlin Chiropractic Assocs., Inc. v. McKesson Corp., 606 U.S. 146, 168 (2025). The parties then briefed that issue.

The Court’s Decision

In a thorough 24-page opinion, Judge Hurson walked through the proper interpretation of the phrase “prior express consent” as used in the TCPA and the scope of Congress’s delegation to the FCC.

In so doing, Judge Hurson turned to the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Insurance Marketing Coalition Ltd. v. FCC, 127 F.4th 303, 312 (11th Cir. 2025), which explained that the “TCPA gives the FCC only the authority to ‘reasonably define’ the TCPA’s consent-provisions” and not create a non-statutory consent regime. Judge Hurson, therefore, reasoned that because the phrase “prior express written consent” was not contained in the statute, the proper interpretation of the statute’s actual language hinged on the authority that Congress delegated to the FCC.

Similarly, Judge Hurson looked to the Fifth Circuit’s very recent decision in Bradford v. Sovereign Pest Control of Texas, Inc., 167 F.4th 809, 812 (5th Cir. 2026), which held the TCPA provides “no basis for concluding that telemarketing calls require prior express written consentbut not oral consent.” (emphasis in original).

Based on these opinions, because the “written consent” language does not appear in the statute, Judge Hurson concluded that Congress needed to delegate the interpretation of the TCPA to the FCC for its current interpretation to stand. But no such delegation is contained in the TCPA. As a result, the “best interpretation” of the statute was that “express consent” is the only requirement imposed by the TCPA, even if the consent is obtained orally.

Therefore, because Bradley provided oral consent to DentalPlans receive such to prerecorded messages when she signed up for her dental plan, she (and, the class) had no viable claims. The court, accordingly, granted summary judgment on Bradley’s individual claim and decertified the previously certified class action.

Implications For Companies

The Bradley decision continues an important trend for companies making telemarketing calls to consumers.

As we explained here, when the Fifth Circuit decided Bradford, the written consent requirement has long been thought of as one of the hallmarks of the FCC’s regulatory regime and is often used by the plaintiff’s bar to assert technical violations of the TCPA even where it is clear that a customer approved of such calls. But the current trend shows that the underlying regulatory scheme is quickly eroding with each decision that passes.

Nevertheless, the decisions in Bradford and Bradley represent only the middle ground on these issues. Other courts would go further and hold that Congress’s entire delegation of any of its authority “run[s] afoul of the nondelegation doctrine, since there are no delimitations on the discretion it grants the” FCC. McGonigle v. Pure Green Franchise Corp., No. 25-CV-61164, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8059, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 15, 2026). Thus, the landscape of positions on such issues is wide ranging and changing by the day.

As a result of this shifting landscape, corporate counsel, and companies engaged in telemarketing, should continue to monitor this blog to stay apprised of any updates as new decisions continue to modify the FCC’s longstanding interpretation of the TCPA.

March 24, 2026March 24, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Announcing The Duane Morris ERISA Class Action Review – 2026!

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. and Jennifer A. Riley

Duane Morris Takeaway: The surge of class action litigation filed under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq., over the last several years persisted in 2025, with class action litigators in the plaintiffs’ bar continuing to focus on challenges ERISA fiduciaries’ management of 401(k) and other retirement plans. Plaintiffs continue to assert that ERISA fiduciaries breached their fiduciary duties of prudence and loyalty by, among other things, offering expensive or underperforming investment options and charging participants excessive recordkeeping and administrative fees. Hundreds of fee and expense class actions have been filed since 2020, driven by a number of familiar plaintiffs’ class action law firms alongside some new entrants into the space.

To that end, the class action team at Duane Morris is pleased to present the 2026 edition of the ERISA Class Action Review. We hope it will demystify some of the complexities of ERISA class action litigation and keep corporate counsel updated on the ever-evolving nuances of these issues. We hope this book – manifesting the collective experience and expertise of our class action defense group – will assist our clients by identifying developing trends in the case law and offering practical approaches in dealing with consumer fraud class action litigation.

Click here to bookmark or download a copy of the ERISA Class Action Review – 2026 e-book.

Check back to listen to the Class Action Weekly Wire podcast episode on ERISA class action trends coming soon!

March 24, 2026March 24, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Nevada Federal Court Certifies A $3 Million Dollar TCPA Class Action Against Individual Nevada Realtor

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, and Ryan T. Garippo

Duane Morris Takeaways: On March 13, 2026, in Garvey, et al. v. Gaitan, No. 23-CV-00920, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53447 (D. Nev. Mar. 13, 2026), Judge Andrew Gordon of the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada certified a Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) class action against an individual realtor for violation of the statute’s prohibition against consentless prerecorded voice messages. The decision serves as a cautionary tale for companies and their individual agents, particularly those entities engaged in direct-to-consumer marketing, to consult experienced TCPA counsel in connection with their marketing campaigns to limit their potential exposure.

Case Background

In 2023, Britney Gaitan, a realtor based in Las Vegas, used an online third-party service to accumulate the homeowner contact information for home sellers whose online real estate listings were either withdrawn or expired. Gaitan then uploaded that list into a software that allowed her to send a prerecorded ringless voicemail message to the list of the home sellers she created. As a result, on March 3, 2023, and March 16, 2023, Gaitan sent these prerecorded voice messages to everyone on her list, including Wayne Garvey, one of the homeowners. Gaitan had no documentation that she received prior consent before placing these ringless voicemail messages.

Garvey ultimately filed suit against Gaitan alleging that she violated the TCPA’s prohibition on consentless prerecorded voice messages codified at 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). Garvey also sought to maintain the case as a class action and represent the owners of the 983 unique cell phone numbers that were called 1,983 times over the course of the two days. Put differently, Garvey ultimately asked the court to certify a class worth up to $2,974,500 or $1,500 per call.

The Court’s Ruling

On March 13, 2026, Chief Judge Andrew Gordon granted Plaintiff’s motion and certified a class against Gaitan. Although Gaitan raised arguments in response to many of the necessary elements for a plaintiff to certify a class action, the dispute largely hinged on Rule 23’s predominance requirement — i.e., whether a common questions of law or fact predominate over issues affecting only certain individual class members. To that end, Gaitan argued that four individualized issues would predominate.

First, Gaitan asserted that individualized inquiries were required to determine whether any class member actually listened to the voicemail. The problem, however, is that “Gaitan cite[d] no law that states a recipient must listen to the voicemail to suffer an injury under the TCPA.” Garvey, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53447, at *12. To the contrary, the Federal Communications Commission (the “FCC”) only requires that a prerecorded voicemail must be “completed” to implicate the statute, and Garvey submitted such common proof via expert testimony. In short, the court concluded that these completed calls are “a central, common question of the class’s TCPA claims that predominates over any individualized issues.” Id. at *15.

Second, Gaitan asserted the same argument (i.e., an individualized issue as to whether any class member listened to the call) but repurposed it under the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III of the U.S. Constitution. For the same reason, the court concluded that because Gaitan could not cite “any law that the putative class members need to listen to the prerecorded message to be injured under the TCPA . . . they have Article III standing if Gaitan used a prerecorded voice in her ringless voicemail drops when calling their cell phones, and they need not prove any other harm.” Id. at *18. This argument was overruled.

Third, Gaitan asserted that there was individualized inquires as to whether any given class member consented to receive prerecorded voice messages. As the court aptly observed, Gaitan “indicated that she has no documentation showing that she obtained consent from any putative class members.” Id. at *19. Gaitan tried to point to the terms of the multiple listing service (“MLS”), which supposedly require a homeowner to provide his or her phone number to create a listing, and argued this action constitutes consent to receive such calls. Although the court was unconvinced, it correctly observed that the consent defense would apply to the entire class and thus “Gaitan has not provided evidence that determining whether some MLS users consented to being contacted about their property is an individualized issue.” Id. at *20.

Fourth, Gaitan asserted that individualized inquiries were required to determine whether any individual owner of a telephone number was a “residential telephone line” within the meaning of the TCPA. The primary problem, however, is that residential telephone subscriber status is not an element of a claim under Section 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) unlike other sections of the TCPA. In other words, this argument was wholly inapplicable and “does not defeat class certification.” Id. at *21.

As a result, once the realtor’s most significant objection to class certification was overruled, it was a near forgone conclusion that a class would be certified and thus the court proceeded to grant Garvey’s motion.

Implications For Companies

There are multiple cautionary messages embedded in Gaitan for those engaged in direct-to-consumer marketing. The most salient three takeaways are listed below.

The first (and, most important) lesson of Gaitan is to obtain “express consent” prior to making calls using an artificial or prerecorded voice message. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). It can be difficult to defend a TCPA class action without a consent defense and Gaitan is no different.

The second lesson is that TCPA liability does not only attach to companies but may also be applied “to any person within the United States” who makes such calls. Id. Here, Britney Gaitan is the sole defendant facing TCPA liability and thus Gaitan’s personal assets are likely on the line for any resulting judgment. But that is not the end of the story. Many similar agencies have indemnification agreements with their agents, which require the agency to pay for the liabilities incurred by the agent. To the extent such an agreement exists here, both Gaitan and her agency may have exposure for this TCPA liability.

The third lesson is to ensure that any TCPA defense strategy is prophylactic in nature and crafted in collaboration with defense counsel well versed in this space. In this case, Gaitan raised arguments based on wholly inapplicable portions of the statute or asserted defenses with little chance of success given the facts of the dispute. If Gaitan consulted with experienced defense counsel in advance of the calls, then this situation could have been avoided. But once the calls are made, the best course of action is for a TCPA defendant to contact experienced defense counsel to help navigate any resulting class actions.

March 20, 2026March 20, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Illinois Supreme Court Rules That Employees Must Be Paid For Pre-Shift COVID-19 Screenings Under Illinois Wage Law

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, and Tyler Zmick

Duane Morris Takeaways: In Johnson, et al. v. Amazon.com Services, LLC, 2026 IL 132016 (Mar. 19, 2026), the Illinois Supreme Court held that unlike the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), Illinois’s Minimum Wage Law (“IMWL”) requires employers to compensate hourly employees for time spent completing pre-shift COVID-19 screenings and other “preliminary or postliminary” activities. In doing so, the Illinois Supreme Court embraced an employee-friendly interpretation regarding the scope of compensable time under the IMWL. Johnson is a must-read opinion for companies that impacts all employers with hourly, non-exempt employees working in Illinois.

Background

Plaintiffs were former hourly Amazon employees who worked at the company’s distribution warehouses in Illinois. In March 2020, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Amazon began requiring employees to undergo COVID-19 symptom screenings before they could enter the warehouses and clock in for their shifts. According to Plaintiffs, it “took 10 to 15 minutes on average” to complete the pre-shift screenings. See Johnson, 2026 IL 132016,¶ 4.

Plaintiffs subsequently filed a class action lawsuit alleging that Amazon violated the FLSA and IMWL by not paying them and other warehouse employees for time spent undergoing the mandatory screenings.

Amazon moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Plaintiffs’ claims failed because under the FLSA an hourly employee need not be compensated for time spent on “activities which are preliminary to or postliminary to” the employee’s principal work duties. See 29 U.S.C. § 254 (a)(2). In granting Amazon’s motion and dismissing Plaintiffs’ FLSA and IMWL claims, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois reasoned that “state and federal courts frequently look to case authority interpreting and applying the FLSA for guidance in interpreting the [IMWL].” Johnson, 2026 IL 132016,¶ 7.

Plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Rather than ruling on the substance of the appeal, however, the Seventh Circuit certified the following question to the Illinois Supreme Court: “whether Section 4a of [the IMWL] incorporates the [FLSA’s] exclusion from compensation for ‘employee activities that are preliminary or postliminary to their principal activities.’” Id. ¶ 1.

The Illinois Supreme Court’s Decision

The Illinois Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that the IMWL provides “a right of overtime compensation for Illinois employees” and also sets forth 10 “specific exceptions to the general right to overtime compensation.” Johnson, 2026 IL 132016,¶ 12 (citing 820 ILCS 105/4a(1)-(2)). Importantly, the Court observed that four of Section 4a(2)’s 10 exceptions incorporate certain provisions of the FLSA and/or related federal regulations, yet none of the exceptions reference FLSA regulations regarding the exclusion of “preliminary or postliminary activities” from the definition of compensable time. See id. ¶¶ 14, 16.

The Illinois Supreme Court further noted that the IMWL gives the Illinois Director of the Department of Labor (“IDOL”) authority to define the IMWL’s terms. See 820 ILCS 105/10(a). Pursuant to that authority, IDOL promulgated a regulation defining “hours worked” as “all the time an employee is required to be on duty, or on the employer’s premises, or at other prescribed places of work, and any additional time the employee is required or permitted to work for the employer.” 56 Ill. Adm. Code 210.110. In addition to acknowledging the breadth of this definition, the Illinois Supreme Court emphasized that while IDOL referenced provisions of the FLSA and related federal regulations in certain statutory definitions, IDOL did not reference the FLSA regulations “that establish a preliminary or postliminary activities exclusion from ‘hours worked.’” Johnson, 2026 IL 132016 ¶ 16; see also id. (“To the contrary, IDOL defines ‘hours worked’ to include all time an employee is required to be on the employer’s premises, which contradicts the potential applicability of any such exclusion.”).

Accordingly, the Illinois Supreme Court held that a plain reading of Section 4a and IDOL’s definition of “hours worked” reveals that the Illinois legislature did not incorporate the FLSA’s “preliminary and postliminary activities exclusion” into the IMWL. Rather, the legislature delegated the authority to define “hours worked” to IDOL, who “adopted a definition of ‘hours worked’ that necessarily includes preliminary and postliminary activities, explicitly encompassing all time that an employee is required to be on an employer’s premises.” Id. ¶ 18.

In so holding, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected Amazon’s argument that the FLSA’s “preliminary and postliminary activities exclusion” should apply to the IMWL because the IMWL’s general overtime provision “is patterned after the general overtime provision found in…the FLSA.” Id. ¶ 19. The Court reasoned that “while section 4a of the [IMWL] contains the same general overtime provision of the FLSA, it does not include the preliminary and postliminary activity exclusion that is set forth in the FLSA….[T]o accept Amazon’s invitation would be to read exceptions into the statute that depart from its plain language, in violation of our well-established rules of statutory interpretation.” Id. ¶ 20.

Implications Of The Decision

The Illinois Supreme Court’s opinion in Johnson is required reading for companies with hourly employees working in Illinois. The decision definitively answers the question whether the IMWL incorporates the FLSA’s “preliminary or postliminary activities exclusion” – a question that, until now, has been heavily litigated.

Johnson is also a reminder of the importance of complying with federal and state wage-and-hour statutes, as laws in many jurisdictions (including Illinois) impose additional requirements on employers that are not found in the FLSA. See, e.g., Johnson, 2026 IL 132016, ¶ 20 (noting that the overtime provisions of the IMWL and the FLSA “are not parallel but rather state the same general rule with marked differences in their respective statements of exceptions”). Companies must be vigilant to ensure they comply with wage-and-hour laws in all jurisdictions where they have hourly employees.

March 19, 2026March 19, 2026 by Class Action Defense

The Class Action Weekly Wire – Episode 140: Key Developments In Products Liability & Mass Torts Class Actions

Duane Morris Takeaway: This week’s episode features Duane Morris partner Jerry Maatman and associates Andrew Quay and Elizabeth Underwood with their discussion of the key trends and developments analyzed in the 2026 edition of the Products Liability & Mass Torts Class Action Review.

Check out today’s episode and subscribe to our show from your preferred podcast platform: Spotify, Amazon Music, Apple Podcasts, Podcast Index, Tune In, Listen Notes, iHeartRadio, Deezer, and YouTube.

Episode Transcript

Jerry Maatman: Welcome to our listeners! Thank you for being here for our weekly podcast series entitled The Class Action Weekly Wire. I’m Jerry Maatman, a partner at Duane Morris, and joining me today on our podcast are my colleagues Andrew Quay and Elizabeth Underwood. This episode is number 140 in our series, something we’re very proud of in terms of delivering the Class Action Weekly Wire. To our clients and listeners, we’re excited to keep delivering our content on noteworthy class action developments. So, thanks so much for being here, Andrew and Elizabeth.

Andrew Quay: Thank you, Jerry, happy to be here.

Elizabeth Underwood: Thanks for having me, Jerry.

Jerry: Today on our podcast, we’ll be discussing publication of the third edition of the Duane Morris Products Liability & Mass Torts Class Action Review, which was published this past week and put on the Duane Morris Class Action Defense Blog. Andrew, can you tell our listeners a little bit about this desk reference publication?

Andrew: Absolutely, Jerry. The Duane Morris Products Liability & Mass Torts Class Action Review – 2026 analyzes the key rulings and developments in these areas for 2025, and the significant legal decisions and trends impacting this type of class action litigation for 2026 moving forward. We hope that companies will benefit from this resource and their compliance with these evolving laws and standards.

Jerry: As a general rule, products liability in the class action space involves two types of claims. One, personal injuries caused by the product, or mislabeling of the product in terms of defects in what is being delivered. Some cases are litigated in what are called MDLs, others in the class action space, some are suited to mass torts, some are not. Elizabeth, could you kind of give us an overview in terms of this particular area as it relates to class actions?

Elizabeth: Sure, Jerry. So, both class actions and mass tort cases often brought in what is known as a multi-district litigation, MDL, which are forms of procedural mechanisms used to manage and resolve complex litigation cases involving multiple plaintiffs. While both mechanisms are designed to streamline the legal process, they differ in key aspects. In a class action, a single representative plaintiff, or a few named plaintiffs, sues on behalf of a class of individuals who have similar claims against a defendant. On the other hand, the MDL involves the consolidation of cases with shared factual or legal issues. For MDL proceedings, each individual case maintains its identity, and representative plaintiffs do not litigate on behalf of a single consolidated class.

Jerry: Well, I know MDLs make up half of all federal dockets. Some people call them the perpetual black hole – easy to get sucked into it, very hard to get out of it. As of November of 2025, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation in the federal courts reported that a total of 157 MDLs had been established across the country, but with 23 of those MDLs containing 1,000 or more lawsuits, including class actions. So, against that kind of analytical set of statistics, how did the plaintiffs’ bar do in the past 12 months in terms of certifying class actions in this space?

Andrew: Plaintiffs had less favorable results with respect to class certification of products liability and mass tort actions in 2025 over previous years. The certification rate was 37.5%, with 3 of 8 motions for class certification granted, and 62.5%, or 5 of 8 motions denied. This rate was significantly lower than the 2024 rate, when 50% were granted and the other 50% were denied.

Jerry: That’s a pretty big drop-off, and an indication that the plaintiffs’ bar was doing a good job over the past 12 months. Were there any important rulings that stick out in your mind in terms of class certification decisions in 2025?

Elizabeth: Yes, so one of the cases in obtaining class certification was In Re Takata Airbag Products Liability Litigation, a major class action involving allegedly defective airbags in luxury vehicles. At the center of the dispute are cars manufactured by Mercedes-Benz, which were equipped with airbags made by Takata. These airbags used ammonium nitrate, a chemical that can become unstable in high heat and humidity, and potentially explode with excessive force, which pose serious risks of injury or even death. The plaintiffs were a group of car buyers who claimed that Mercedes-Benz either knew or should have known about this defect but failed to disclose it. Because of that, they argued consumers overpaid for vehicles they believed were safe.

Andrew: Building off that, the court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, holding that all claims revolved around the same core questions of, for example, ‘were the airbags defective, and did Mercedes-Benz conceal that defect?’ The court held that common issues predominated over individual ones, and that a class action was the most efficient way to resolve the dispute. However, there was one important exception, and that was Georgia consumers were excluded from the multi-state class, and that’s because Georgia law has stricter requirements for proving reliance and fraud claims, and the plaintiffs couldn’t show that all Georgia buyers received uniform misrepresentations. For the remaining states, the court acknowledged some differences in fraud and consumer protection laws, but said they were similar enough not to defeat class treatment.

Jerry: That’s a very significant decision because it kind of goes against the tide of other rulings that tend to find individual issues predominating when a case depends on the laws of multiple states, and you have a nationwide class. Shows that courts are willing to certify these multi-state fraud and products liability cases when there’s a strong core at the center of these cases, and the courts are able to efficiently administer such a case in one setting and one lawsuit with one class.

We discussed the numbers for class certification in 2025, but the mantra of the plaintiffs’ bar is to find a client, file the lawsuit, certify it, and then monetize it. How did the plaintiffs’ bar do in converting certified class actions into settled class actions in this space over the past 12 months?

Elizabeth: So, the plaintiffs’ class action bar was enormously successful in obtaining class-wide settlements in this area in 2025. The top 10 products liability and mass tort class-wide settlements totaled $17.9 billion in the past year. However, this total was a decrease from the 2024 total of $23.396 billion.

Jerry: Well, $17.9 billion sure is a lot of coin, and that’s only the top 10 products liability class action settlements, so it’s certainly a significant area of concern and heightened risk for Corporate America.

Well, thank you very much for tracking those settlement numbers and lending your thought leadership in this space. Thank you, Andrew and Elizabeth, for being here, and thank you to our loyal listeners for tuning in.

Andrew: Thanks for having me, Jerry. Thanks to all our listeners.

Elizabeth: Thanks, everyone, it was a pleasure to be here.

March 17, 2026March 17, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Announcing The Third Edition Of The Duane Morris Products Liability & Mass Torts Class Action Review!

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. and Jennifer A. Riley

Duane Morris Takeaways: Clients, ranging from some of the world’s largest manufacturers and insurance companies to startup companies and individual inventors, turn to Duane Morris for counsel and representation in claims involving products liability and toxic torts. For years, Duane Morris has worked with clients to develop cost-containment and strategic litigation plans designed to minimize the risk, business disruption and potentially staggering cost of products liability and toxic tort litigation. Our goal is to provide value by acting as proactive counselors and advisors, rather than simply responding to particular problems in isolation. To that end, the class action team at Duane Morris is pleased to present the Products Liability & Mass Torts Class Action Review – 2026. This publication analyzes the key rulings and developments in 2025 and the significant legal decisions and trends impacting both product liability class action litigation and mass tort litigation for 2026. We hope that companies and employers will benefit from this resource and assist them with their compliance with these evolving laws and standards.

Click here to bookmark or download a copy of the Products Liability & Mass Torts Class Action Review – 2026 e-book.

Stay tuned for more products liability and mass tort class action analysis coming soon on our weekly podcast, the Class Action Weekly Wire.

March 16, 2026March 16, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Third-Party Complaint Dismissed With Prejudice After Alabama Federal Court Finds Parties’ Indemnity Provisions Do Not Apply To Title VII In EEOC Sex Discrimination Lawsuit

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., George J. Schaller, and Andrew P. Quay

Duane Morris Takeaways: On March 9, 2026, in EEOC v. TCI of Alabama, LLC, Case No. 25-CV-89, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47895 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 9, 2026), Judge Corey L. Maze of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama dismissed a third-party complaint seeking to enforce indemnity provisions between Defendant-TCI and third-party staffing firms with the aim of indemnifying TCI from liability under Title VII. The Court held that parties cannot contract away their responsibilities under Title VII in light of its comprehensive remedial scheme.

The Court’s decision illustrates that corporate defendants cannot shift potential Title VII liability through contracted indemnity clauses entered into by staffing firms that refer employees.

Case Background

TCI of Alabama, LLC (“TCI”) disposes and recycles PCB contaminated items at various plants and employs laborers to do so. Id. at *3. To hire laborers, since 2020, TCI has “relied exclusively on third-party temporary staffing agencies” who refer qualified applicants. Id.

The EEOC investigated TCI after the Commission learned that TCI allegedly refused to recruit and hire qualified women for laborer positions. Id. Following its investigation, the EEOC issued TCI a letter of determination, found reasonable cause to believe that TCI violated Title VII, and invited TCI to conciliate. Id. The Parties did not reach a conciliation agreement, and the EEOC filed the instant lawsuit. Id.

The EEOC’s lawsuit brought one claim for sex discrimination under Title VII. Id. at *3-4. According to the EEOC, TCI “intentionally excluded from employment a class of qualified females seeking employment as laborers in favor of hiring equally or less qualified male applicants.” Id. at *4. The EEOC maintained that TCI refused to hire women for numerous reasons including that TCI instructed third party staffing agencies, Orin Staffing, LLC, Personnel Staffing, Inc., and WorkSmart Staffing, Inc. (the “Staffing Firms”) not to refer women for its laborer positions because “among other reasons, women would ‘distract’ male workers and increase the risk of sexual harassment in the workplace.” Id.

TCI answered the complaint and then filed its own third-party complaint for breach of contract against the Staffing Firms. Id. TCI’s third-party complaint alleged the Staffing Firms “agreed via contracts” to lawfully refer qualified laborers to TCI. Id. The contracts also contained indemnification provisions, which required the Staffing Firms, as joint employers of referred employees, to indemnify TCI “for all claims caused by the [Staffing Firms’] breach of contract, including a breach caused by failing to follow the law when referring applicants.” Id. at *4-5.

Accordingly, TCI contended that even if the EEOC’s allegations were true, the Staffing Firms’ compliance with TCI’s alleged unlawful instruction was itself “unlawful and violated Title VII.” Id. at *5. Therefore, the Staffing Firms exposed TCI to legal claims which TCI was indemnified for under their agreed contracts. Id.

The EEOC and the Staffing Firms moved to dismiss TCI’s third-party complaint. Id. Their arguments for dismissal varied. Id. The Court focused on one argument raised by the EEOC, whether Title VII preempts TCI’s breach of contract claim and therefore requires dismissal of TCI’s third-party complaint. Id. at *6-7.

The Court’s Opinion

Judge Maze agreed with the EEOC that Title VII preempts TCI’s breach of contract claim and dismissed the third-party complaint with prejudice, explaining that any amendment would be futile. Id. at *9.

Acknowledging Title VII’s “comprehensive remedial scheme,” the Court adopted the holding in EEOC v. Blockbuster, Case No. 07-CV-2612, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2889 (D. Md. Jan. 14, 2010), which held that parties accused of violating Title VII may not bring claims for indemnification against third parties “to skirt their own liability.” TCI of Alabama, LLC,2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS47895, at *7. In Blockbuster, the EEOC brought a Title VII action against the home video rental chain for failing to prevent and correct known sexual harassment at one of its warehouse facilities. Blockbuster, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2889, at *1. Blockbuster, like TCI here, filed a third-party complaint against a staffing firm that agreed to indemnify Blockbuster against any losses arising from any employment claim brought by its employees. Id. The Court in Blockbuster granted judgment on the pleadings against Blockbuster and held that “[t]he primary goal of Title VII to eradicate discriminatory conduct would be thwarted if Blockbuster were permitted to contract around its obligations and shift its entire responsibility for complying with Title VII” to a third party. Id.

The Court here agreed that the policy rationale in Blockbuster applied in greater force to TCI’s third-party indemnification claims given those claims rested on the EEOC’s allegation that TCI instructed staffing firms not to refer qualified women. TCI of Alabama, LLC,2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS47895, at *8. “Federal public policy would be undermined,” the Court explained, “if TCI had the ability to tell others to help TCI violate federal law and then pay TCI if TCI got caught.” Id. Therefore, a contractual indemnity provision could not shield TCI from liability under Title VII.

Even though the EEOC’s lawsuit continues against TCI, the Staffing Firms involved in hiring are not off the hook. In a footnote, the Opinion clarifies that if the Staffing Firms violated Title VII by complying with TCI’s unlawful request to not refer qualified women for laborer jobs, they too can face liability in another case. Id. at *9, n. 2.

Accordingly, the Court dismissed TCI’s third-party complaint with prejudice.

Implications For Businesses

EEOC v. TCI of Alabama, LLC demonstrates that corporate defendants cannot turn a blind eye to potential Title VII harms and attempt to contract away Title VII liability. While indemnity clauses may appear all-encompassing, courts continue to decline coverage where Title VII violations are alleged.

This Court agreed that public policy concerns control and remain critical in analyzing the scope of an indemnity provision in alleged gender-bias hiring under Title VII. After TCI of Alabama, LLC, Companies contracting with outside staffing firms cannot rely on “shifting the blame” through indemnity provisions in contracts when faced with Title VII claims brought by the EEOC.

March 12, 2026March 12, 2026 by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.

Join Us For A Mid-Year Review of EEOC Litigation and Strategy

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Jennifer A. Riley, and Daniel D. Spencer

Duane Morris Takeaway: Please join us for our webinar, Mid-Year Review of EEOC Litigation and Strategy, which will take place on Tuesday, April 7, 2026 at 11:30 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. Central. Click here to register to attend!

Join Duane Morris partners Jerry Maatman, Jennifer Riley and Daniel Spencer for a live panel discussion analyzing the latest impact of the dramatic changes at the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, including its new strategic priorities and the array of EEOC lawsuits filed in the first six months of fiscal year 2026. Moving through FY 2026 with significant changes implemented by the Trump administration, employers’ compliance with federal workplace laws and agency guidance remains a business imperative. Our virtual program will empower corporate counsel, human resource professionals and business leaders with key insights into the EEOC’s latest enforcement initiatives and provide strategies designed to minimize the risk of drawing the agency’s scrutiny.

March 12, 2026March 12, 2026 by Class Action Defense

The Class Action Weekly Wire – Episode 139: Key Developments In FCRA, FACTA, and FDCPA Class Actions

Duane Morris Takeaway: This week’s episode features Duane Morris partner Jerry Maatman, senior associate Anna Sheridan, and associate Caitlin Capriotti with their discussion of the key trends and developments analyzed in the 2026 edition of the FCRA Class Action Review.

Episode Transcript

Jerry Maatman: Welcome to our listeners. Thank you for being here for our weekly podcast series, the Class Action Weekly Wire. I’m Jerry Maatman, a partner at Duane Morris, and joining me today on the podcast are my colleagues Anna Sheridan and Caitlin Capriotti. Thanks so much for being with us today.

Anna Sheridan: Thank you, Jerry. I’m happy to be a part of the podcast.

Caitlin Capriotti: Yes, thanks so much for having me, Jerry.

Jerry: Today, we’ll be discussing the second edition of the Duane Morris Fair Credit Reporting Act Class Action Review. Listeners can find this e-book publication and desk reference on our blog, the Duane Morris Class Action Defense Blog. Anna, can you tell our listeners a little bit about the desk reference?

Anna: Yeah, absolutely, Jerry. This review dives deep into the world of consumer protection laws, specifically the Fair Credit Reporting Act (the FCRA), the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (the FACTA), and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (the FDCPA). Since these areas have long been a focus of litigation, particularly for class actions, Duane Morris created this review to analyze the key rulings and developments in these areas in 2025, and the significant legal decisions and trends impacting the type of class action litigations for 2026. We hope that companies will benefit from this resource in their compliance with these evolving laws and standards.

Jerry: Great, let’s start with the basics. The FCRA, as enacted by Congress, aims to ensure that consumer reporting agencies and employers act responsibly and fairly in using background checks and credit checks. Caitlin, can you give us a quick overview of the substantive key provisions of the FCRA?

Caitlin: Yes, of course. The FCRA is focused on ensuring that consumer reporting agencies, or CRAs, maintain accuracy, fairness, and respect for consumers’ privacy rights. It mandates that CRAs follow reasonable procedures to ensure that consumer reports are as accurate as possible. The law also requires employers to disclose when they are obtaining a consumer report on an applicant for a job, and to follow specific procedures if they decide to take adverse action based on that report. Well, FCRA violations often do come down to technicalities, things like failure to provide proper disclosures or obtaining consent incorrectly, and the penalties can be significant, ranging from $100 to $1,000 per violation, with punitive damages up to $2,500 if the violation is deemed willful.

Jerry: Well, thanks so much. Anna, what about the FACTA?

Anna: FACTA requires consuming reporting agencies to present information in a clearer, more understandable manner. One of the key parts of the FACTA is the requirement for adverse action doses. If a consumer is denied credit or offered less favorable terms based on their credit report, they must be informed. This gives consumers the opportunity to dispute any inaccuracies. In fact, it also emphasizes the need for better protections against identity. Similar to the FCRA, the plaintiffs’ bar has been aggressive in bringing class action lawsuits under FACTA, particularly when the accuracy of credit reports and whether consumers are properly notified when adverse actions are taken. The penalties for noncompliance with FACTA are very much in line with the FCRA violation – up to $2,500 for willful violence. However, there have been some significant Supreme Court rulings that have limited the scope of these lawsuits, especially when it comes to proving actual harm or injury-in-fact.

Jerry: Thank you. I’ll go over the last one, which is the FDCPA, the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. This statute governs debt collection practices, and while it doesn’t directly address credit reporting, it’s closely related, because many debt collectors rely on credit reports to pursue collection actions. The FDCPA regulates how they can communicate with individuals. The information that must be disclosed and their conduct during the collection process. In essence, it’s a companion law that protects consumers in the broader context of both credit and debt. So, in terms of these three statutes, what were some of the notable trends that we saw in the class action space in 2025?

Anna: One notable thing was that courts granted motions for class certification in these cases at almost the exact same rate in 2025 as they did in 2024. Both were around 38%. These rates were down significantly from the 75% of motions being granted in 2023. This could partly be due to the 2021 TransUnion decision and the increasing complexity of FCRA violations. Employers and consumer reporting agencies are now more careful about complying with technical requirements. And plaintiffs are facing higher hurdles in improving harm.

Caitlin: Another thing we’re seeing is the rise of state-level laws that track the FCRA but impose even stricter standards. States like California, New York, and Texas have their own consumer credit reporting laws, and companies need to stay on top of both federal and state regulations to avoid liability.

Jerry: Well, it seems like this area is very much like the rest of the class action state or space where judicial precedents are constantly evolving, and the obligations and duties of companies are in a state of flux. By your way of thinking, what were some of the key, important rulings in this space in 2025?

Caitlin: Yes, so one of the important rulings was Fausett v. Walgreen Co., where the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that plaintiffs bringing claims under the FCRA, or its amendment FACTA, must show a concrete injury to have standing in Illinois state courts. The court held that because the FCRA does not explicitly identify who may sue, plaintiffs cannot rely on statutory standing based solely on a technical violation. Instead, they must meet common law standing, which requires a distinct and concrete injury. In this case, the plaintiff alleged that Walgreens printed too many digits of her debit card number on a receipt, violating FACTA, but she admitted she suffered no actual harm, such as identity theft or misuse of the receipt. The court found this insufficient and ruled that the plaintiff lacked standing overturning the class certification. The decision blocks no-injury FCRA/FACTA lawsuits in Illinois state courts, aligning them more closely with federal standing rules established in Spokeo v. Robins, and potentially affecting other federal statutes with similar private action provisions.

Jerry: That is a key ruling. Certainly, it underscores the M.O. of the plaintiffs’ bar to find a case, file it, certify it, and then monetize it with a settlement. How did the plaintiffs’ bar do in this space in 2025 in terms of class action settlements?

Anna: In 2025, the top 10 FCRA, FDCPA, and FACTA settlements totaled $74.77 million. This was a significant increase from the prior year, when the top 10 class action settlements totaled $42.43 million. However, it’s lower than 2023, when the top 10 settlements totaled just around $100 million.

Jerry: Well, we continue to track class action settlements in all substantive areas on a 24-7, 365 basis, and so we’ll be analyzing and providing analytics on those numbers throughout the year. Thank you both for being here today, and thank you, our loyal listeners, for tuning in. Please stop by our website and our blog for a free copy of the FCRA Class Action Review e-book.

Caitlin: Thank you so much for the opportunity, Jerry.

Anna: Thanks for having me, Jerry, and thanks to everyone for listening.