Illinois Federal Court Dismisses Data Breach Class Action Lawsuit For Lack Of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Christian Palacios, and Brett Bohan

Duane Morris Takeaways: On August 20, 2025, in Phelps v. Ill. Bone & Joint Inst., LLC, No. 24-CV-08555, 2025 WL 2410341 (N.D Ill. Aug. 20, 2025), Judge Martha Pacold of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted Defendant Illinois Bone & Joint Institute, LLC’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court held Plaintiff failed to adequately plead Defendant’s citizenship, given its status as a limited liability company; therefore, the Court could not determine whether complete diversity existed between the parties. This ruling illustrates the differences between the general diversity statute under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), and the more lenient “minimal diversity” requirement under the Class Action Fairness Act, as well as the consequences of failing to sufficiently plead a limited liability company’s citizenship. 

Case Background

On August 30, 2024, Defendant Illinois Bone & Joint Institute, LLC (“Defendant”) sent a data breach notification letter to its patients, including Plaintiff Alexandra Phelps (“Plaintiff”). Id. at *1. Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of a putative class, filed a lawsuit shortly after receiving the letter alleging negligence, negligence per se, breach of implied contract, and violation of the Illinois Personal Information Protection Act. Id.  

Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. In the motion, Defendant raised two arguments, including: (i) that Plaintiff lacked Article III standing, and (ii) that Plaintiff could not establish diversity jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”). Id. Although Plaintiff had invoked jurisdiction under the CAFA in her Complaint, she did not respond to Defendant’s CAFA arguments. Id. at 2. Instead, Plaintiff argued that she could “invoke jurisdiction under the general diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).” Id.

The Court’s Order

The Court determined that the Complaint failed to allege sufficient facts to support diversity jurisdiction.

First, the Court reasoned that Plaintiff’s decision not to respond to Defendant’s CAFA arguments amounted to a concession that Plaintiff could not meet the standards for subject-matter jurisdiction under the statute. Id. However, although Plaintiff had not invoked general diversity jurisdiction in her Complaint, the Court permitted her to raise these arguments because “a complaint’s imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting jurisdiction does not itself defeat jurisdiction.” Id.

Second, the Court observed that, to satisfy general diversity jurisdiction, Plaintiff must be able to show that Plaintiff is a citizen of a different state than Defendant and “the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs.” Id. Under the CAFA, an LLC, like Defendant, is “a citizen of the State where it has its principal place of business and the State under whose laws it is organized.” Id. Under the general diversity statute, on the other hand, an LLC is a citizen “of every state of which any member is a citizen.” Id. The Court concluded that the Complaint did not include any allegations of Defendant’s “member’s identity or citizenship.” Id. As such, the Court could not determine whether “any member is a citizen of the same state as Phelps.” Id. Because the Complaint did not allege facts sufficient for the Court to conclude that “complete diversity between the parties” existed, the Court dismissed the case without prejudice. Id.

In sum, the Court concluded that, to establish diversity jurisdiction, a Complaint must adequately allege the citizenship of all parties. Id.  Plaintiff’s failure to plead the citizenship of all Defendant’s members was, therefore, fatal to her claims. Id. at 3

Implications For Employers

The Court’s ruling in Phelps serves as a reminder of the distinctions between the the CAFA’s minimal diversity jurisdiction requirement and general diversity jurisdiction. While Plaintiff’s Complaint may have included sufficient facts to establish Defendant’s citizenship under the CAFA, the Complaint could not support the more demanding “complete” diversity jurisdiction requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). 

This case highlights an important procedural defense available to employers, particularly if the named corporate entity in the litigation is a limited liability company (rather than a traditional corporation, who’s citizenship is tied to its state of incorporation and principal place of business). Employers should take note of a plaintiff’s burden to sufficiently establish federal subject matter jurisdiction at the outset of the litigation, and the accompanying procedural defenses they might avail themselves of when a plaintiff fails to sufficiently plead the jurisdictional prerequisite.

Consent Decree Gets Dumped: Court Refuses To Approve Vague Settlement In EEOC v. Waste Pro

By Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Anna Sheridan, and Brett Bohan

Duane Morris Takeaways: On April 22, 2025, in EEOC v. Waste Pro Fla., Inc., No. 23-CV-1132, (M.D. Fla. Apr. 22, 2025), Judge Wendy Berger of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida denied a joint motion for approval of a consent decree between the EEOC and Waste Pro of Florida, Inc. The Court determined that the parties failed to comply with the Middle District of Florida’s local rules and to provide specificities necessary for approval of the consent decree.  For those who think that EEOC consent decrees simply get rubber-stamped, this order demonstrates that that this is not the case. This ruling illustrates the importance of litigants closely adhering to a courts’ local rules and always providing a legal and factual basis for the court to grant their motions, even when those motions are unopposed.

Case Background

On September 26, 2023, the EEOC, on behalf of charging party Fednol Pierre, filed a lawsuit against his former employer, Waste Pro of Florida, Inc. (“Waste Pro”) regarding allegations systemic racial harassment and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. (ECF 1.) The EEOC alleged that Waste Pro perpetuated a work environment that subjected Mr. Pierre to racial slurs and derogatory racial comments and retaliated against Mr. Pierre when he complained of harassment.  Id. ¶¶ 36, 57.

On October 15, 2024, the parties jointly moved for approval of a consent decree. (ECF 65.) The motion spans two pages and includes details about the procedural background of the case, the claims made in the complaint, the settlement process, the decree’s compliance with the federal rules, and the decree’s public benefit. Id. Among other provisions, the agreement provided for a $1.4 million cash award to Mr. Pierre and other Black and Haitian employees and required Waste Pro to employ an officer to ensure compliance with civil rights laws. (ECF 65-1 ¶¶ 17–44.).

The Court’s Order

The Court denied the parties’ joint motion to approve the consent decree and found the motion failed on two independent grounds, including: (1) the motion did not provide a basis for approval and (2) the motion did not comply with Middle District of Florida Local Rule 3.01(a).  (ECF 70 at 1.)

First, the Court determined that “the filing fails to provide this Court with any legal or factual basis” for granting the motion. Id. Courts do not rubber stamp consent decrees. See In Re Blue Cross Blue Shield Antitrust Litig. MDL 2406, 85 F.4th 1070, 1094 (11th Cir. 2023). Instead, courts must independently determine whether the agreements are “fair, adequate, and reasonable” by considering various factors. Bennett v. Behring Corp., 737 F.3d 982, 987 (11th Cir. 1984). In this case, the Court concluded that the parties had not provided it with sufficient information to undertake this analysis, so the Court could not approve the consent decree. (ECF 70 at 1.) As the parties here learned, courts generally will decline to enforce a consent decree that simply restates existing legal obligations without measurable terms.

Second, the Court held that “the filing fails to comply with Local Rule 3.01(a).” Id. The rule requires joint motions to include the word “unopposed” in the title. L.R. 3.01(a). It also requires a motion to include “a concise statement of the precise relief requested, a statement of the basis for the request, and a legal memorandum supporting the request.” Id. The parties titled the motion “Joint Motion for Approval of Consent Decree” and did not include a supporting legal memorandum; therefore, the Court determined that they failed to adhere to the requirements of the rule.

In sum, the Court concluded that it could not grant the parties’ motion without a firm factual or legal basis and that it would not excuse the parties’ violation of the local rules. (ECF 1 at 1.) Instead, it denied the motion and gave the EEOC one week to show cause why the lawsuit should not be dismissed with prejudice. Id.  

Implications For Employers

The Court’s ruling in Waste Pro should serve as a stark warning to all litigants that they should always review a court’s local rules and be in the habit of giving the court a reason to rule in their favor, even when the relief they seek is unopposed.

This case demonstrates the serious consequences that can result from a lack of attention to detail. Here, the Court rejected the parties’ attempt to circumvent the Court’s independent duty to determine the fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness of the agreement.

When settling with the EEOC or any regulatory body, vague promises to “do better” will not suffice. If employers want their settlements approved, they cannot just recycle boilerplate language.

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The opinions expressed on this blog are those of the author and are not to be construed as legal advice.

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